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This dissertation explains the evolution of the United States Army Command and General 
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas from 1946 to 1986. Examination of change at 
the United States Army’s Command and General Staff College focuses on the curriculum 
as a system—students, instructors, professional knowledge, and lessons—mixing within a 
framework to produce an educational outcome of varying quality. Consideration of non-
resident courses and allied officer attendance marks two unique aspects of this study. The 
curriculum of the Command and General Staff College changed drastically over four 
decades because of the rapid expansion of professional jurisdiction, an inability to define 
the Army’s unique body of professional knowledge, and shifting social and professional 
characteristics of the U.S. Army officer corps, reflected in the faculty and students at the 
College. Combined, these factors diminished the role and significance of the Command 
and General Staff College. 
 
The subjects taught to officers at the resident course shifted perceptibly during this 
period. The officer corps redefined professional expertise, moving away from ―purely 
military‖ considerations towards a body of knowledge that was no longer unique. The 
institution, once the Army’s senior tactical institution, distributed its resources—the most 
critical being time devoted to learning—across a broad front. Political, technological, and 
military turbulence of the early Cold War hampered the Army’s efforts to adopt an 
effective curriculum to address the changed security environment until well past 1960. 
Constant changes in the Regular Course affected the non-resident studies program, which 
was never fully resourced. From 1960 to 1973, the curriculum’s form underwent 
fundamental changes. CGSC’s leaders attempted to balance the competing demands of 
peacetime and wartime subjects in a ten-month course, finding it difficult to 
accommodate the demands of both. The College shifted to a model of concentration and 
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Michael Howard once advised scholars and armed forces‟ professionals to study military 
history in width, depth, and context so that they may fully understand the nature of military 
operations and “improve the officer‟s competence in his profession.”1 Historian William Skelton has 
observed, “an intellectual component is central to a professional orientation: a claim to the exclusive 
control of a body of specialized knowledge essential to the fulfillment of an important social need.”2 
At the intersection of Howard‟s admonition and Skelton‟s observation is the military educational 
institution where officers become students in order to master their profession‟s body of specialized 
knowledge. 
Samuel Huntington‟s 1957 classic, The Soldier and the State, may be said to have begun the 
modern scholarly treatment of Army professionalism and education. Huntington‟s principal concern 
was describing civil-military relations, the set of obligations that derived from the officer‟s principal 
responsibility to the nation.
3
 He outlined the origins of American military professionalism and put 
forth three characteristics that defined the professional: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. 
Of particular interest here is the notion of expertise. Huntington stated that a professional was “an 
expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor. Expertise was 
acquired only by prolonged education and experience.” Delving further, he said, “The direction, 
operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence 
is the peculiar skill of the officer.”4 His work became the defining view of officer professionalism for 
the remainder of the twentieth century. Notably, however, Huntington‟s simple theory belies complex 
relationships between experience, society, and professional knowledge. 
                                                     
1 
Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters 11 (March 1981): 9-14. 
2 
William Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 
1992), 88. 
3
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 14th printing, (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2000), 16. 
4
 Huntington, 8-11. Harry Thie and others, Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1994), 220. Adding to the complexity of defining officership as a profession, officers are sometimes seen as having four distinct roles: 
servants of the society, members of a time-honored profession, leaders of character, and last, but not least, war fighters. 
2 
 
One of the first books to attempt to define military education and the relation to military 
professionalism was published alongside Huntington‟s theoretical study in 1957. John Masland and 
Laurence Radway of Dartmouth College explored the education of officers and how the military 
services prepared senior leaders for their emerging role in formulating national policy. Of interest 
here are the mere seven pages allocated to the Command and General Staff College at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, which was an overview of the current curriculum related to national policy. 
The authors noted that Leavenworth did not devote much time to policy and strategy, although they 
found that recent changes initiated by the Commandant might lead the College in this direction. 
Masland and Radway recognized the changing nature of the military professional‟s duties and the 
broadened scope of military professionalism. Their work anticipated the changes that would come to 
the College in later years.
5
  
Unfortunately, the historiography of professional military education in general leaves a faint 
trail, and few scholarly works trace the College‟s evolution. The touchstone work is Timothy K. 
Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army.
6
 Nenninger investigated CGSC‟s role in 
professionalizing the officer corps from 1881-1918 and argued effectively for a close correlation 
between the education of the American officer corps and the rise in professionalism in the United 
States Army. Nenninger traced the humble beginnings of the course and underscored the role 
Leavenworth graduates played as staff officers throughout the Allied Expeditionary Force. He 
established the corporate nature of “Leavenworth men” relative to other officers. Nenninger found 
that commandants exercised a significant influence on the course content and on the professional 
views of graduates themselves. In his view, the faculty defined the institution during this period. 
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Years passed before scholars examined other aspects of the Leavenworth experience. If, as 
Nenninger contended, the early Leavenworth school can be understood by study of the faculty, the 
focus shifted to the students during the interwar years, according to Peter J. Schifferle, who extended 
the historical perspective starting with Nenninger‟s conclusion. Schifferle‟s dissertation covered the 
interwar period and the Leavenworth courses during the Second World War, and he demonstrated the 
significant influence the interwar Leavenworth schools had on the Army‟s success in World War 
Two. Graduates of the Leavenworth courses filled key command positions throughout the Army, and 
their collective view of ground combat made infantry divisions especially capable organizations. 
However, Schifferle also found that the Leavenworth experience had significant shortcomings. 
Courses excluded parallel developments in mobilization and airpower; deficiencies that led to 
mismanagement and inefficient practices sustaining front-line organizations. “Anticipating 




A major gap in scholarship begins in 1945.
8
 A single published book considers the Command 
and General Staff College after World War Two. The US Army Command and General Staff College: 
A Centennial History by Boyd L. Dastrup served as a ceremonial artifact, marking the 100
th
 
anniversary of the Leavenworth schools.
9
 A Centennial History covered major developments within 
the college during the postwar period, including the effect of numerous officer education studies on 
the college curriculum in the fifties, adjustments made during the Vietnam War, and the effect of 
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AirLand Battle doctrine. On the other hand, Dastrup relied heavily on secondary sources for much of 
the evidence, and some of his positive conclusions, such as those regarding the College‟s curriculum 
revision under Major General Lionel C. McGarr, do not hint at the faculty resistance and turbulence 
underlying reform.  
A more balanced historical view by Robert Doughty outlined the evolution of the postwar 
College. He provided a more balanced treatment of the school than did Dastrup. “The Command and 
General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976” was Doughty‟s special study project conducted at 
the behest of the Commandant, Major General John H. (Jack) Cushman. Doughty outlined the 
evolution of the post-war College and wrote with the backdrop of debate over General William E. 
DePuy‟s FM 100-5. Its principal strength arises from the unique access the author had to the material. 
Doughty‟s work established the role of senior leaders in guiding the postwar college through the 
changes of 1976, and he identified three principal tensions within the College during the period: 
education versus training, emphasis on training generalists or specialists, and the question of scope.
10
 
Of the histories of the postwar CGSC, Doughty best described institutional change. One must 
acknowledge, however, that Doughty produced a contemporary history, having written it concurrent 
with many of the events he described. A slight criticism is that Doughty paid scant attention, as 
happened in the other works, to the myriad of staff officers, faculty, and perhaps most telling, 
students. All studies—Doughty, Dastrup, and the official histories—credit the school‟s senior 
leadership for much of the change that took place within the institution. Further examination of 
archival sources shows that Commandants played a role, but they were not always the central element 
in the story. 
While decision making presumably occurred at the top of the hierarchical organization, lesser 
known officer-instructors, civilians, and the students themselves contributed to the form, substance, 
and purpose of the Command and General Staff College. The experience of students, faculty, and 
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administrators all contributed to the evolution of the College. During the postwar decades, outside 
agencies—both military and increasingly civilian institutions—began to shape the College‟s form and 
the school‟s educational content.11 Accordingly, the research presented here takes an expansive view 
of the College‟s activities, including the non-resident course and allied officers in addition to the 
traditional focus on the Regular Course. Consideration of non-resident courses and allied officer 
attendance marks two unique aspects of this study. It is from this perspective that the history of 
American higher education, military professionalism, and American society must be integrated as part 
of CGSC‟s story. 
This study nests into a larger body of research on military education, military 
professionalism, and civilian higher education. One under-researched area of military education is the 
contrast in form and purposes between civilian higher education in America and that of the military‟s 
system. This research, in part, relates the evolving purpose of the Fort Leavenworth schools to the 
current historical understanding of American higher education. The insight offered by the College‟s 
experience with adapting the courses to the rapid change parallels similar challenges of the modern 
American university.  
The Leavenworth courses taught during the interwar period have been credited in part for 
American success in World War Two.
12
 It is important to understand whether the college continued to 
provide the intellectual stimulus necessary to develop equally capable military officers. At the heart 
of this study is the question of military competence and how to create it.
13
 The study extends the most 
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current research on the Fort Leavenworth schools, which ended with an examination of the interwar 
years and the World War Two experience. The few works that have framed the subsequent period 
have not explained developments in the context of external events. Continuing forward from recent 
scholarship, this study narrows the gap in the historical record between 1946 and the present. The 
post-World War Two period saw a significant expansion of professional responsibilities; 
understanding how the institution adjusted to these changes is important. 
The prominent historian of education, Frederick Rudolph, found that something more than a 
collection of courses formed a curriculum. He said “students, knowledge, teachers, and … courses” 
comprised curriculum. He also recognized that the curriculum‟s structure and substance—its 
qualitative aspects—established the basis for judging outcomes.14 All of these elements manifested 
themselves in the curriculum. External influences forced the school to recognize new challenges, but 
the school‟s response to an ever-broadening scope of officer responsibilities took decades to form. 
The development of new ideas competed with entrenched beliefs in the course. Therefore, this study 
adopts the same broad view of the curriculum as a system—students, instructors, professional 
knowledge, and lessons—mixing within a framework to produce an educational outcome of varying 
quality.  
Since 1881, the Leavenworth schools educated the officer corps in the Army‟s way of war, 
and the institution acquired a reputation, if not a mystique, for producing capable staff officers who 
were in high demand across the Army. At the onset of the Second World War, the school had been in 
existence for over sixty years. Significant breaks occurred during World Wars One and Two. The 
interwar years saw some of the most productive educational outcomes, leaving a legacy of excellence 
borne of demonstrated competence in the conduct of war. However, short courses taught during 
World War Two had neither the rigor nor the breadth of those taught during the interwar period. 
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Wartime emergency shortened the course to a few months with a scope limited to essential staff 
skills. When year-long classes resumed at Leavenworth in the fall of 1946, the professional school 
system that educated the Army‟s World War Two senior leadership no longer existed. 
The evolution of the curriculum and the subjects taught reflected, in part, what the Army 
considered important. How did the United States Army‟s Command and General Staff College 
change from resumption of the regular course after the Second World War to 1986? Specifically, why 
did the Command and General Staff College move from a curriculum that taught division and corps 
operations to white, male, primarily Regular Army officers to a system that resembled the modern 
university? This study presented the hypothesis that the curriculum of the Command and General 
Staff College changed drastically over four decades because of the rapid expansion of professional 
jurisdiction, an inability to define the Army‟s unique body of professional knowledge, and shifting 
social and professional characteristics of the U.S. Army officer corps, reflected in the faculty and 
students at the College. Combined, these factors diminished the role and significance of the 
Command and General Staff College following World War Two. 
After World War Two, change came very slowly to the College‟s curriculum.15 During the 
Cold War, subsequent commandants, faculty, and civilian experts never succeeded in re-establishing 
the rigorous academic environment experienced by interwar students. Conservatism reigned, due in 
part to service unification, changes in national security policy, waning budgets, and an unclear vision 
of the Army‟s operational concept. Taken together, these factors retarded progress. Resumption of the 
Army War College, which began at Fort Leavenworth in 1950, disrupted steps forward. Efforts to 
define the Army‟s role on the atomic battlefield thwarted the few adjustments made during the first 
years of the postwar era. The curriculum remained in stasis for over a decade while officers attempted 
to discern a viable role for land forces on an atomic battlefield. 
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Beginning on January 14, 1959, Bell Hall, a purpose-designed building, served as the home 
of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the resident Command General Staff 
Officer‟s Course (CGSOC), known as the Regular Course. When Bell Hall opened, faculty taught 
officers the art and science of war using a new curriculum developed in 1957. A new building 
brimming with updated, but well-worn, ideas greeted the class of 1960. What should this new school 
teach its students? Students could study the successes of past wars, or they could look ahead to 
conflicts in an imperfectly seen future. The College leadership could choose to emphasize command 
or staff duties. The routine use of tactical nuclear weapons competed with partisan wars for 
curriculum space.  
In 1959, the Army‟s leadership had not achieved consensus about the role and direction of the 
Army, much less what should be taught to students. The Army lacked a working definition of modern 
war. New ideas took hold slowly. Within the College, procedural barriers and manpower shortages 
exacerbated the delayed response to external developments. Most adjustments came as a result of 
outside developments, since structural inertia retarded the adoption of new ideas within the College 
for much of the era after World War Two. Most importantly, a fundamental flaw in course design 
prevented an agile response to rapid technological, organizational, and social changes.  
From 1960 to 1973, the curriculum‟s form underwent fundamental changes. The 
transformation of the course between 1960 and 1973 reveals a belated attempt by the faculty, and the 
Army, to catch up to developments, particularly the spread of communism and a newly emerging 
concept of professionalism.
16
 Expansion of the school, rather than contraction, marked the Vietnam 
era. By the end of the Vietnam War, the College had significantly altered the scope and method of the 
Leavenworth resident course. The promise of Bell Hall‟s gleaming exterior did not materialize. A 
decade or so after occupying the new building, the College would reform the curriculum again, 
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although the American experience in Indochina had little to do with the development. By the mid-
1970s, Army leaders initiated reform and modernization, acknowledging that significant components 
of the Army had decayed. The Army recast military doctrine, overhauled the officer education 
system, and turned its intellectual energy to conventional war in Europe against the Soviets.  
The historian‟s choice of periodization opens the historical study to immediate criticism as 
exceptionalists chip away with examples of events that do not fit neatly within the assigned dates. 
Thus, periodization can serve as an enabler or a hindrance in the historian‟s quest to illuminate the 
past. Lynn Dumenil remarked that “history resists clear-cut periodization,” and she observed that 
much of American twentieth century scholarship attempted to group trends into decade-sized 
chunks—manageable for the historian but a view that favors events over connections.17 Similarly, this 
work reaches beyond decades to understand what changed and why. The beginning date carries 
forward from the latest historical research on the Leavenworth schools. The end date roughly 
coincides with three events that had significance for military education. First, the Goldwater-Nichols 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 forever changed officer education. The law directed the 
implementation of mandatory joint education and training for the officers of all services, and it 
radically changed the nature and focus of military education. Goldwater-Nichols represented an 
external intrusion into an area customarily reserved for practicing professionals, namely the content 
of professional education. 1986 also coincides with the publication of the third version of the Army‟s 
FM 100-5 in less than a decade. This manual formalized AirLand Battle and reflected the culmination 
of the Army‟s intellectual fervor that began with General William DePuy‟s 1976 edition of FM 100-
5. Lastly, 1986 allows the study to offer some perspective on the addition of the second-year course at 
CGSC. Known as the School of Advanced Military Studies, the second-year course offered selected 
officers the opportunity to explore operational art and large unit operations. The decision to resume a 
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second-year course marked an important milestone in the Army education system, bringing back a 
frequent feature of the previous Leavenworth schools. 
The research makes extensive use of primary materials available from the Command and 
General Staff College‟s Combined Arms Research Library and the Combined Arms Center and Fort 
Leavenworth archives. The Programs of Instruction and individual lesson plans form the core of the 
material used to assess what was taught. This source is available through the archives of the college, 
and they exist for each year of the study. The Commandant‟s Report, staff papers, and officer 
education studies done during the period will form the basis for determining why change took place. 
Key to understanding the earlier years of the school are the records of the Army Ground Forces, 
Army Field Forces, and Continental Army Command at the National Archives II in College Park, 
Maryland. Additional material came from the Truman Presidential Library and the U.S. Army 
Military History Institute. 
Background material used to establish context comes from War Department and Continental 
Army Command guidance, officer education studies, graduate and instructor papers and records, and 
education policy documentation. Further sources of primary material include professional journals 
such as Military Review and Parameters. The Leavenworth Times and Kansas City Star contained 
local details as well as post and CGSC news. The post‟s own Fort Leavenworth Lamp highlighted 
areas of concern, personalities, and changes in curriculum, organization, and personnel. The Bell, the 
CGSC equivalent of a grade school yearbook, provided an unexpected source of social and cultural 
commentary from students, as well as significant insights into academic concerns. Oral history 
formed another valuable set of sources. Transcripts exist of interviews with notable individuals such 
as commandants and General William DePuy. The oral history of the college‟s first educational 
adviser, Dr. Ivan Birrer, establishes crucial details regarding decisions not contained in the official 
record. The study made use of interviews with participants in later phases of change such as Brigadier 
General (retired) Huba Wass de Czege to gain insights not available through other source material. 
11 
 
Additional material includes several biographies of graduates or commandants of the college. Student 
research projects highlight some of the less apparent undercurrents in the student body. 
The research is presented in three major sections consisting of six chapters. This introduction 
establishes the scholarly context by surveying historical study of the College, including relevant 
works about military education and military professionalism. CGSC evolved after World War Two in 
three intertwined stages. The first two chapters cover the schools at Fort Leavenworth from 1946 to 
1955. The Regular Course resumed in 1946 during a period of organizational disorder that 
characterized the immediate post-war period. The War Department sought to re-establish a peacetime 
educational program for the officer corps, but questions of scope and internal debates over 
resurrection of the U.S. Army War College delayed a satisfactory solution. Once this series of 
organizational issues was settled in the early 1950s, the College then began to focus on questions of 
mission and curriculum content. The second section discusses this period from 1954 to 1964. World 
War Two influenced the program significantly until 1957, when the College adopted the new course 
based upon the atomic battlefield. Political, technological, and military turbulence of the early Cold 
War hampered the Army‟s efforts to adopt an effective curriculum to address the changed security 
environment until well past 1960. A third section addresses the school during the 1960s to1986, 
exploring the adaptation as a result of the Vietnam experience followed by examination of the 
College‟s post-Vietnam history up to the point of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The 1986 law serves as 
a fitting end point since its requirements had a profound effect on professional military education. 
Lastly, the College faculty and administration began to make substantive changes, many unrelated to 
the ongoing war in Vietnam, which led to a completely new course of study by 1973. This study 
traces and seeks to explain the evolution of the CGSC curriculum and provide a context for analysis 





Organizing Officer Education, 1946-1950 
It is hardly necessary for me to remind you of the importance of a sound school system 
for the post-war army. Not only must this system produce skilled leaders for wars of the 
future, but it must also develop a purely American doctrine that will stand the test of 
modern war. This will have to be done in spite of drastic reductions in funds and 
personnel. 
 
    Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow  
Commandant of the Command and General Staff School 
Opening comments, 1947 Army Ground Force Conference 
  
 
Between 1946 and 1950, two formal boards and several lesser studies sought answers to the 
question of how best to educate U.S. Army mid-career officers for the next decade or more of their 
service. Reaching an acceptable balance of form and content took years, if one can say it occurred at 
all. War Department planning for the postwar system of officer education began during the Second 
World War, and the scheme approved by the Army’s Chief of Staff, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, was 
implemented in 1946. A core feature of the new system was a progressive, integrated arrangement 
that provided periodic training and education appropriate to successive levels of an officer’s career. In 
addition to the traditional branch schools and the Command and General Staff School, the War 
Department’s plan envisioned upper tiers similar to what had existed before the war, but the postwar 
arrangement—an Air University, an Armed Forces Staff College, an Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces, and a National War College— diverged from past educational strategies. Notably absent from 
the arrangement was an Army War College.
1
 As a result, the Command and General Staff School 
(CGSS) faculty taught a patchwork curriculum between 1946 and 1950 while the Army organized its 
officer education system. 
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Within the War Department’s broad concept, CGSS, later re-designated a College, filled a 
vital role of preparing mid-career officers for an increasingly uncertain world. The form, content, and 
instructional methods at the CGSC Regular Course varied significantly over time, but the pattern of 
CGSC organization remained remarkably stable during the first postwar decade. While specifics 
changed, the school had a hierarchical organization with an appointed, transitional commandant; 
administrative support staff; instructional departments; and full-time faculty.
2
 The College offered a 
broad range of courses from the year-long Regular Course to shorter classes tailored to specific 
subjects or groups. During these years, departments were renamed, intermediate layers were added, 
and responsibilities shifted, but the basic structural components of the College remained intact.  
The College did not remain static, however. Significant changes did occur over this period, 
reflecting faculty, changes in composition of the student body, modifications in instructional methods, 
and evolving content of the Regular Course. More importantly, a system for providing education for 
the vast majority of officers who could not attend the ten-month course came into being, as the Army 
struggled with the burden of maintaining a large standing army in peacetime. It is fair to state that, 
along with the Army, the staff college’s prestige and effectiveness declined. Serious problems 
regarding methods, scope, and content challenged the school’s faculty and leaders. 
Transition from War 
The story of the period 1946-1949 begins during and to a degree prior to the Second World 
War. For it is in this period that the wartime performance of graduates cemented the reputation of the 
staff college.
3
 For much of World War Two, Major General Karl Truesdell served as commandant. In 
contrast to the one- or two-year course that had been the hallmark Leavenworth experience, the 
school offered an assortment of courses to meet the exigencies of war. Operating under the authority 
of the War Department G3, the school’s repertoire at war’s end consisted of a short training course 
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for division staff officers, which had undergone several modifications during World War Two, a Pre-
General Staff Course for allied officers, a New Divisions Course for commanders and the staff of 
newly-formed combat divisions, and a Command Course of five months’ duration. In all, the post 
hosted nearly a half dozen courses by the end of the war, of which the Command and General Staff 
School was the most important.
4
 
The ten-week staff course differed significantly from prewar instruction given at 
Leavenworth. Classes were much larger, more limited in scope, and practical to an extreme. A 
newspaper feature observed in 1945: ―Faculty members of the school are sent periodically to various 
war theatres to assimilate the latest staff and tactical doctrines. They send back actual operational and 
other orders that will enable the students at the school to work out in their map problems and in their 
logistical tables some of the actual problems that our commanders at the front have solved.‖ Students 
studied near-term tactical problems like the invasion of Normandy, the Rhine crossing, and urban 
operations in Manila. The 25
th
 class of the General Staff Course had been studying the upcoming 
Battle of Japan when news of Tokyo’s surrender reached Leavenworth. The dawning of the atomic 
age caught the school’s leadership by surprise. With no alternative available, the 1,024 officers 
continued to plan an invasion that would not take place. By war’s end, over 17,000 officers had 
graduated from the abbreviated staff training courses, which had begun in December 1940.
5
 
Wartime necessity dictated a learning environment based on mass production techniques. The 
ability to accommodate a large itinerant population was attributed to the system devised by the 
Executive Officer of the Command and General Staff School, Colonel Dana C. Schmal. A 1946 Fort 
Leavenworth News article praised the efficiency of the wartime course. ―Graduating students leave on 
Saturday, and new students arrive on Sunday. They are quickly housed and are prepared to attend 
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classes by eight o’clock on Monday morning.‖6 Combined classes took place in Gruber Hall, a 
massive facility which required the instructor to use a loudspeaker. Interaction with instructors took 
place at a distance. ―If a student wishes to ask a question, he stands up and a WAC brings a portable 
microphone to him.‖7 The last of these mass production courses—the 27th Command and General 




Prior to his departure, Major General Truesdell had launched a new educational initiative 
during the fall of 1945. He envisioned a follow-on course to the Command and General Staff 
School’s traditional General Staff Course aimed at officers who would be generals in 1955. The first 
Command Course began October 2, 1945 as an experimental effort to train future senior leaders. The 
content of this course resembled that of the former Army War College with theater planning, 
mobilization training, and regional studies the principal learning activities. The course admitted forty-
six students with representation coming from the Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces. Teaching 
methods varied significantly from those used in the staff course with each officer assigned to a 
student committee, or small group. Within this group, the students would collaborate to solve the 
strategic problem assigned to the staff group.
9
 Historian Robert Doughty called this experiment 
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―perhaps the most sophisticated course ever presented at the College.‖10 This short-lived course 
graduated two classes and ceased operations in 1946 with the resumption of the Regular Course 
 A few months after V-J Day, Major General Karl Truesdell, who had shepherded the school 
through the war, relinquished his position as Commandant of the Command and General Staff School 
for a short time to Major General Otto C. Weyland, an Army Air Corps officer, who in turn handed 
over command in November to Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow.
11
 As he prepared to depart, 
Truesdell expressed confidence in the American strategic position. ―In the future only the large 
nations will be able to wage war. Only large nations can mobilize the total resources required. 
Witness the atomic bomb. The resources of more than one country were required to produce it.‖12 
Truesdell’s prescience proved limited, and the weapon upon which his confidence rested would vex 
practitioners of the art and science of land warfare for the next decade. 
As Truesdell left the service, the Army had begun a massive demobilization; yet Gerow 
sensed that the future would not feature that global peace and prosperity which political leaders had 
predicted at war’s end. The need to educate officers for a new phase of modern war was clearly 
understood, even if the scope and content of such an education was not apparent.
13 Gerow’s remarks 
quoted at the chapter’s opening foretold the many challenges that the Army and its school system 
would face in the coming decades. He left unstated his own vision of modern war, but he clearly 
thought the Army’s school system should have a significant role in shaping the concepts the new 
Army would employ. The previous interwar period had seen many advances in the tools and trade of 
war. As Peter J. Schifferle demonstrated in ―Anticipating Armageddon,‖ the interwar officer corps 
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engaged in a lively professional dialogue and educated itself despite sparse resources.
14
 The purpose 
of the staff college in those years was to serve as proxy to a skeleton army, in which divisions did not 
exist in appreciable numbers.
15
 Time spent at Leavenworth and duty as an instructor developed 
general staff skills in an officer corps who could only imagine what a division looked like.
16
 The net 
effect of that interwar period was an increase in professional knowledge and a shared understanding 
of how to fight large units on battlefields characterized by mobility, combined arms, and new 
weapons.  
Officers in the next interwar period—1946 and beyond—faced a different environment. The 
postwar Army declined in fighting capability after World War Two, and it did so very soon after V-J 
Day.
17
 The crescendo of demobilization, occupation, unification, and civilianization took their toll on 
a combat-experienced force, which quickly became an embattled shell of its former self. External 
factors obliterated the Army’s collective sense of place. Formation of the Department of Defense, the 
Korean War, and austerity programs skewed the Army’s self-defined role. Internally, the Army had 
difficulty defining how it would fight on the atomic battlefield, discerning Soviet capabilities, 
adapting to a larger force structure, and integrating new technologies. New career management 
systems and increasing specialization across the officer corps created individual angst by blurring the 
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path to the next rank.
18
 The host of internal and external adjustments dislocated the officer corps and 
left it wondering what sort of professional and political minefields lay ahead. 
Organization and Governance 
A series of boards and studies marked the period from 1945 to 1956 in which Army leaders 
sought to establish the structure and content of the postwar Army school system. Reviews ranged 
from Army-wide examinations directed by either the War Department or the Department of the Army 
to locally-initiated efforts in response to a specific problem of Leavenworth. Generally named for the 
board president, these committees studied a variety of issues ranging from school organization to 
curricular content to instructional methods. As will be established, the second comprehensive survey, 
the Eddy Board of 1949, became the most significant of the several studies done during this time.
19
  
During World War Two, the Army had begun preliminary inquiries into the nature of the 
professional school system it would presumably need at war’s end. Not until after the conclusion of 
the war, however, did the War Department begin to take concrete steps to define a follow-on 
educational system. On November 23, 1945, the Army’s new Chief of Staff, General Dwight 
Eisenhower, issued instructions to Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, the Command and Staff 
School Commandant, to ―prepare a plan for the postwar educational system of the Army.‖20 Gerow, 
along with Major Generals William G. Livesay, Donald Wilson, and Stanley L. Scott, recommended 
a comprehensive plan, including suggestions on reactivating the Army War College. Eisenhower’s 
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instructions included his guidance to consider the potential changes needed if the War Department 
was reorganized according to the Patch-Simpson Board recommendations. At war’s end, the Patch-
Simpson Board had identified ―a simpler and more flexible organization, with clear-cut command 
channels, to satisfy the requirements of economy and efficiency,‖ and their conclusions later led to 
the reorganization of the War Department and the Army.
21
 
Gerow’s views about the school were shaped by his own experience as a student and as an 
assistant chief of staff.
22
 Gerow’s impressive record in World War Two included command of the 
29th Infantry Division in 1942. On July 17, 1943, Gerow became the commanding general of V 
Corps and led the corps during its D-Day landings. As the allied forces advanced across France, 
Gerow advanced in rank and responsibility. He was appointed commander of the Fifteenth Army on 
January 15, 1945 and rose to Lieutenant General on February 6, 1945. He continued as an army 
commander until the end of the European campaign.  
Gerow inherited a far different institution than the one he had attended twenty years earlier. 
Gone were the years of accumulated experience teaching division operations to a select group of 
officers. Missing too was the cohort of long time, qualified faculty members and an extended 
curriculum. The institution which had led Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to say, ―It is no 
exaggeration to say that our victories in World War Two were won at Leavenworth…. Here our great 




The War Department Military Education Board, commonly known as the Gerow Board, met 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas between December 4 and 27, 1945 to consider plans submitted by the 
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three existing Army services: the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and Army Service 
Forces. The time given the generals was extremely limited, for a reply was expected by the January 
1,1946—an impossible deadline.24 Gerow’s Board worked in parallel with the Patch-Simpson Board, 
aligning its recommendations for officer education with that group’s final plan regarding the Army’s 
overall postwar organization.
25
 In early January 1946, the board interviewed over seventy-five 
officers representing the various schools and general staff agencies across the Army in Washington, 
D.C.
26
 By mid-January, the Board had completed this task and returned to Fort Leavenworth to 
compile its findings. 
When it issued its conclusions on February 5, 1946, the Board recommended an overarching 
mission for the Army’s educational system as well as eight objectives. The core of the Gerow Board 
report dealt with organizational issues. Going beyond its charter to study Army requirements, the 
Board recommended establishment of a National Security University to serve the needs of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and an Armed Forces College aimed at War Department requirements.
27
 For the Army 
services, Gerow’s panel recommended a multi-level educational structure for the Army designed to 
complement an officer’s experience gained in command and staff positions. Largely influenced by 
precedent and input from the Army Services, the Gerow Board recommended a parallel series of 
schools, one for each Army Service. Each Service was to have a hierarchical school system with 
basic, advanced, and mid-career schools.
28
 
Directly addressing the future of the Command and Staff College, the Gerow Board 
recommended a new Ground College for the Army Ground Forces. Instead of resuming the staff 
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school classes at Fort Leavenworth, the Board proposed that the new school be located at Fort 
Benning, Georgia.
29
 The proposed Ground College was to focus on division and corps-level 
organizations, command and staff techniques in tactical units, and the integration of air and naval 
capabilities. The objectives of the newly proposed Ground College included an imperative to ―keep 
aware of all developments in the means of warfare, to study their effect upon methods and doctrine of 
the Army Ground Forces, and to recommend changes indicated by these developments.‖30 In doing 
so, Gerow’s panel anticipated the need to conduct research to develop a forward-looking doctrine 
which would serve as the Army’s guidepost for future missions. The Gerow Board’s overall proposal 
for this Ground Force’s school suggested an influence from recent World War Two experience and 
the Army’s current organization into three separate services; but it reflected only a minimal 
anticipation of future requirements such as the major revisions that would be needed after 
implementation of the National Security Act of 1947. 
The War Department declined to implement the Gerow plan as submitted, approving instead 
a more limited scheme for Army schools.
31
 The education system followed a progression tied to rank 
and time in service with a four-month Basic School, covering common topics followed by a five-
month branch technical course. An officer would later attend a ten-month advanced branch course. 
The most significant changes made by the War Department to the original recommendations involved 
retention of the mid-level career course at Fort Leavenworth and a more modest version of the senior 
level institution. Instead of a National Security University, two co-equal schools, a National War 
College and an Industrial College, were to provide education on strategic issues.
32
 The Army 
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recognized the value of a progressive professional education system for officers, but this educational 
scheme did not resurrect the Army War College, and that omission would later directly affect the 
postwar staff school.  
The War Department issued instructions on May 27 to Gerow as Commandant of the 
Command and Staff School directing implementation of a modified version of his own Board’s 
findings. The scheme placed the Leavenworth school not at the top of the officer education hierarchy 
but rather in the middle. New York Times reporter Harold B. Hinton equated Leavenworth with the 
Bachelor’s level of a civilian university, with the Armed Forces Staff College being the Master’s, and 
the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces being the Ph.D. equivalent. 
As expected, the War Department did not re-establish the Army War College, opting for joint 
schools.
33
 To meet mid-career needs, the War Department approved a ten-month Command and Staff 
College course and specified a college organization with four schools—personnel, intelligence, 
combined arms, and logistics.
34
 Brigadier General George L. Eberle, acting Director of the War 
Department’s Organization and Training Division, instructed the College to adopt a common 
curriculum covering division- to army group-level topics with specialized instruction necessary to 
meet the needs of the War Department.
35
 This last feature of the War Department instructions caused 
numerous problems for the College during the next few years. The War Department set the date for 
the first class of about 320 officers to begin in the fall of 1946, giving the faculty but a few months to 
prepare.  
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The War Department’s instructions, Circular 202, specified objectives consistent with the 
Army’s perception of World War Two experience and the uncertainties of the Patch-Simpson report. 
The skills reflected the Army’s joint warfare experience from World War Two and the mobilization 
lessons from the interwar period. Graduates were to be able to support and employ Army forces and 
were to be familiar with air and naval procedures.
36
 The College’s mission was to ―provide instruction 
in the light of war lessons and modern developments‖ and to insure ―that officers were capable of 
four primary skills.‖ Of note was the forward-looking focus embodied by the mission statement, but 
the instructions did not specify what it considered modern. The guidance did restrict the school’s 
freedom to select sources, however. ―The doctrine taught at the college will be as prescribed by the 
War Department.‖37 The course would last for forty-one weeks, with three-fourths of the course 
allocated to common subjects. Officers would then attend ten weeks of specialized training in one of 
the four schools. The focal point of this additional training was War Department functions.
38
 Officers 
were to be trained in one of four specialized fields: personnel, intelligence, tactical, or logistical 
procedures. 
Further clarifying the expectations of the Command and Staff College, the War Department 
established three objectives for the Regular Course: 
(1) To prepare officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at the division and 
higher levels. 
(2) To keep aware of all developments in the means of warfare and personnel research, to 
study their effect upon methods and doctrine of the Army, and to recommend changes 
indicated by these developments. 
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In the coming years, the first objective assigned to the school caused two insurmountable challenges. 
Dividing instruction between command and staff duties left open to interpretation the school’s focus: 
command or staff. Worse, the inclusion of Department of the Army staff duties meant the course 
served two purposes: training staff officers for combined arms staffs plus training general staff 
officers for the War Department and U.S.-based Zone of the Interior headquarters. Leavenworth had 
to broaden its course well beyond its traditional forte. Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times military 
editor, observed after his January 1949 visit that the combination of war college and general staff 
officer lessons ―certainly cluttered the Leavenworth curriculum.‖40 The school now had to present 
instruction sufficient to cover command and staff duties ranging from tactical operations at the 
division up to policy formulation at the War Department, rather than take up again its prewar mission 
of training tactical staff officers.  
The second objective, which implied research and continuous adjustment, proved more 
troublesome to the school’s central mission. The need to remain abreast of emerging developments 
and to adapt the curriculum to the doctrinal, organizational, and technical changes of modern war 
proved problematic to the faculty and ultimately affected the relevance of instruction. Meeting this 
need proved far more challenging than any other issue faced by the College’s faculty and leadership. 
Not only did the War Department specify the structure of the course, but it also dictated the 
school’s internal organization. Organizationally, the College was saddled with a structure that did not 
enable accomplishment of the overarching mission assigned by the War Department. The War 
Department Circular decreed a four-schools-within-a-school arrangement aligned with the principal 
general staff functions, and each of the four had a commandant. Brigadier General Robert N. Young, 
the wartime commander of the 3
rd
 Infantry Division, served as the School of Combined Arms 
commandant.
41
 Colonel Horton V. White, a 1923 West Point graduate, became the School of 
Intelligence commandant. White had a number of general staff assignments as an Assistant Chief of 
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Staff, Intelligence including three years as the Sixth Army G2 in New Guinea. Colonel Daniel H. 
Hundley led the School of Personnel, and Colonel Arthur W. Pence headed the Logistics school.
42
 
Each school had a different objective. The personnel school focused on the ―efficiency of its 
personnel management system.‖ In the intelligence school ―principles of military intelligence as 
applied by commanders and staff officers in all types of military operations‖ became the principal 
concern, while the Combined Arms school emphasized ―instruction in tactics, staff duties related to 
combat operations and the combat characteristics of the various arms and services.‖ Lastly, the 
School of Logistics covered ―supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, services and 
management‖43 The two-fold mission, the practice of tracking students into functional courses, and 
even the practice of calling the heads of each school ―commandant‖ led to confusion. As others would 
observe later, the college’s organization was especially crucial since the internal structure, not the 
educational needs of the students, dictated the future development of the College’s curriculum.  
With the scope and organization already set by the War Department, the task of implementing 
the directive fell to the school’s leadership and faculty. And they faced tremendous challenges. 
Writing and implementing a new curriculum, adjusting to a new internal organization, and sifting 
through volumes of material to prepare new lesson content was a daunting task, but doing all of this 
before the 1946-47 academic year began caused the College to adopt a number of shortcuts to enable 
classes to begin in September 1946.
44
  
With the initial preparations underway and the last days of the wartime short courses 
approaching, questions about the College’s teaching and research approaches came to the forefront, 
with the Commandant taking steps that opened the military profession to the influence of civilian 
                                                     
42
 ―Command and Staff College is Capstone of Army Ground Forces School System,‖ Fort Leavenworth News, April 7, 1947, 3. A draft 
1948 reorganization study cited the confusion caused by having four commandants, who in reality were departmental directors, later led to 
an internal reorganization and renaming of the components as departments. Draft memorandum to The Adjutant General, ―Organizational 
Revision of Command and General Staff College‖ 7 June 1948, Binder 1, Box 1, The Command and General Staff College and Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, RG 337, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, NARA II. 
43
 ―C&GSC Top Army Officer Training School,‖ Fort Leavenworth News, April 7, 1948, 3. 
44
 Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, Report on the Activities (January 1947-August 1948) of the Psycho-educational Adviser to the Commandant, 
Command General Staff College, 16 August 1948, 4. Hereafter referred to as the Orleans Report. Also E.A. Salet, ―Reorganization of the 
Command and General Staff College,‖ Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 (September 1948): 3. 
26 
 
educators. Following a meeting with the Chief of the Personnel Research Section in June 1946, the 
Commandant requested the Adjutant General detail a team from the Personnel Research Section to 
―advise and assist the faculty‖ in two areas: preparation and delivery of instruction and the integration 
of civilian expertise into the College.
45
 Thus, the Henry Commission was formed. 
Led by Dr. Edwin R. Henry of The Ohio State University, the four-man commission 
comprised experts in psychology and education.
46
 The team’s mission encompassed three important 
areas of the College. As consultants, they looked at course content, instructor and student selection, 
instructional methods, and evaluation of learning. The commission met three times between August 
and December 1946. The Henry Commission report, issued in February 1947, was notable. First, it 
recommended the immediate establishment of civilian personnel positions in a number of areas 
related to the college administration and instruction.
47
 More importantly the Commission uncovered a 
major issue: the imperfect solution arrived at by the College to accomplish the massive educational 
task placed on it by the War Department.
48
 The Commission reinterpreted the three objectives 
established by War Department Circular 202 to read: 
1. To prepare officers as commanders of divisions, corps, and army, and at comparable 
levels in the communications zone. 
2. To prepare officers for any general staff assignment at division, corps and army level. 
3. To prepare officers for key general staff assignment in one specialized area (that is in 
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This amplification of the War Department directive formed the basis for the Commission’s analysis 
of what the curriculum was intended to achieve. It believed the focus on the first two objectives, 
while organized to accomplish the third, created a system that allowed departments to isolate their 
lessons from those of the other departments. Even this early in the first postwar Regular Course, the 
Commission recognized the dilemma created by having essentially two curriculums in the ten-month 
course.
50
 As both the Gerow Board and Henry Commission stressed, the Command and Staff College 
and its supporting faculty had too wide a scope of responsibility—a problem that would remain until 
1950. To correct this error, the Commission said that the College should be reorganized into ―two 
distinct institutions‖ with one, a college, to train officers on division through army level tasks and a 
second, a university, to specialize in operations above the army level.  
The Commission’s findings reinforced the original Gerow Board plan for separate schools to 
teach tactical and policy matters to officers. Lieutenant General Gerow had not been a proponent of 
specialized training in the ten-month course and quite often reinforced his views as stated in the 
Gerow Board report.
51
 Gerow would use every opportunity to redesign the course to a curriculum 
appropriate to a staff college oriented on operations. Only six months into the first regular course, the 
College had determined that the scope of instruction desired by the War Department was too great to 
be covered in a single ten-month course.
52
 It had uncovered a structural flaw of immense 
consequence. 
The Henry Commission marked one of the first uses of experienced civilian academic 
expertise to shape the professional education of military officers. This practice would continue and 
would expand to allow the direct participation of civilian instructors in the classroom. One member of 
the commission, Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, gained the attention of Lieutenant General Gerow, who asked 
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Orleans to stay on as his consultant. In keeping with the commission’s recommendation to add 
civilian faculty, Orleans joined the staff as the school’s first Psycho-Educational Adviser.53 The 
Army’s school for warriors was slowly opening its doors to the world outside. 
1946-47 Faculty 
The qualifications, assignment pattern, development, and number of officers who served as 
faculty of CGSC varied widely during this period. The first two years—from 1946 to 1948—the 
Regular Course saw the most experienced military faculty the school would enjoy in this or 
subsequent decades. Instructors of the 1946-47 class included Pacific and European campaign 
veterans, a number of whom had commanded battalions or had served on large unit staffs in combat. 
Colonel Edward Postlewaite had led the amphibious assault to recapture Corregidor. He joined with 
Lieutenant Colonel John J. Tolson, III, who had been deputy commander of the 503
rd
 Parachute 
Infantry Regiment in the Philippines attack, to teach a lesson on airborne operations. Colonel Cyrus 
Dolph commanded the mechanized cavalry unit that crossed the Rhine after capture of the Remagen 
Bridge. Colonel George Martin, Chief of Staff of the 45
th
 Division, and later the 44
th
, was on the 
faculty, too.
54
 Other experienced officers included Lieutenant Colonel Harold C. Brookhart who was 
a turnaround instructor from the 21
st
 General Staff Class from January, 1945. At the onset of World 
War Two, he was an infantry battalion commander, but was transferred to command an engineer boat 
battalion in 1943 and served in the Pacific with Sixth Army on New Guinea.
55
 The Army Air Forces 
were represented by officers such as Lieutenant Colonel Travis Hoover. Hoover piloted the first 
aircraft in the lead flight of B-25s during the Tokyo Raid of 1942. Having survived the crash-landing 
and repatriation from China, Hoover’s wartime experience took him to the European theater, where 
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he participated in the Ploesti raid as deputy commander of the 98
th
 Bomb Group. Hoover came to Fort 
Leavenworth in March 1945 as a member of the 23
rd
 class of the Command and General Staff School. 
After graduation, he became a member of the faculty.
56
 While many instructors carried the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel, their time in service qualified them for permanent rank of first lieutenant or 
captain in the Regular Army.
57
 As can be seen, nearly all of these officers graduated from one of the 
wartime short courses. What mattered most to the students of the late forties was their instructors’ 
professional experience.  
To help translate experience into effective teaching, the college instituted an instructor 
training program in 1946, which at the time was considered a novel development.
58
 Lessons covered 
the principles of educational psychology, student motivation, teaching techniques, public speaking, 
and use of audio-visual aids to enhance learning. A principal objective of this hands-on course was 
the perfection of platform presentation skills, with a significant amount of time devoted to public 
speaking. 
The first postwar class reported for duty on September 4, 1946. Like their faculty, the initial 
cohort of Regular Course students represented an anomaly of the postwar period. The rank and 
combat experience of the students tended to be much higher than that of the interwar period. The 
student body was heavily weighted towards Lieutenant Colonel during the immediate postwar years. 
―The current class [1946-47] here includes men who are older and more war-experienced than 
subsequent ones are likely to be,‖ observed Harold Hinton.59 Representative of these students was 
Lieutenant Colonel Derrell M. Daniel, an officer in the First Class of the Command and General Staff 
College. Daniel had fought as an infantry battalion executive officer and commander in north Africa, 
Italy, France, and Germany, and he had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star 
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with six oak leaf clusters, and the Bronze Star with two oak leaf clusters.
60
 The background of the 
first postwar class influenced the Assistant Commandant, Major General Dean, to say the purpose of 
the college as the ―production of commanders for armies, corps and divisions, rather than staff 
officers.‖61 
What was expected of a Leavenworth student in this early period? The Army’s senior leaders 
valued the education provided by the Leavenworth school, particularly the standardization imparted 
by the curriculum. General Eisenhower noted during a 1946 inspection tour of Fort Leavenworth, 
―any officer could be transferred from one army to another, or from one army group to another, 
without any loss of understanding of procedures and methods.‖62 
From the beginning of the postwar school, an element of elitism made itself evident. Those 
selected to attend the course profited by inclusion. Shortly after the first Regular course began, Harold 
B. Hinton wrote in the New York Times, ―The apter officers, to the extent of 50 per cent of the total‖ 
would attend the course at Leavenworth.
63
 The premise that Leavenworth’s students represented the 
Army’s future senior leadership continued in later years. According to a 1949 New York Times article, 
Leavenworth drew its student body from the upper tier of Army officers. ―[P]upils, the top 50 per cent 
of the graduates of the schools of the individual arms and services, are, theoretically at least, the 
future commanders and staff officers of the United States Army.‖64 The comments reflected the 
perception that selection for Leavenworth marked an officer as above his peers.  
Student-officers assigned to the College in 1946 had to meet six official criteria. Officers 
were to have between seven and fifteen years of service, with 18 months service overseas since 
December 7, 1941. They had to be Regular Army officers, be a maximum age of 40 years, have 
graduated from a regular course at a branch advanced school or equivalent experience, and have an 
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efficiency rating of excellent or better for the period December 7, 1941 to December 31, 1945.
65
 None 
of the formal prerequisites for the course mentioned the top 50 percent as a discriminator; however, 
the Army Ground Forces G-1 did reveal that selecting the upper 50% was problematic, stating ―there 
is no mathematically accurate means of determining that an officer is or is not in the upper 50% or 
any other portion of the scale.‖66  
From the outset, student selection deviated from the published entrance requirements. The 
average age was 36.7 years, which was within the planned range. However, the War Department had 
granted waivers as ―rewards for exceptionally meritorious service‖ for thirty-three officers over age 
40. One was 47. Many of the students had been battalion commanders in World War Two or had 
served in general staff assignments.
67
 The officers’ ranks ranged from Colonel to First Lieutenant; 
seventy percent held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or above (table 1).
68
 Quotas were heavily skewed 
towards the Army Ground Forces with 195 of 300 slots allocated to AGF officers, but 73 officers in 
the class came from technical or specialized branches.
69
 Regular Army officers accounted for 233 
members of the class; Officer Reserve Corps, National Guard, and Army of the United States 
numbers were eleven, five, and four, respectively. Twenty-one percent of the first Regular Course 
came from allied nations, which is remarkable given the backlog of eligible U.S. officers. 
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Table 1. Comparison, Student Officer Ranks, 1946-47 and 1949-50 
Rank 1946-47 1949-50 
Colonel 30  
Lieutenant Colonel 206 268 
Major 21 175 
Captain 2 6 
First Lieutenant 1  
Allied 63 (14 nations) 45 (26 nations) 
Source: Breakdown of the first regular class.70 
 
Professional nepotism also influenced student selection and post-graduation assignments, if 
only indirectly. Field commanders contacted senior leaders to advance their candidates for the 
Regular Course.
71
 Conversely, post commanders submitted post-graduation requests to the Army 
Ground Forces or the Department of the Army for specific officers. In a letter to Major General 
Walter L. Weible, the AGF G-1, Major General Jens A. Doe asked for three lieutenant colonels by 
name from the 1948-49 class as they approached graduation. The value of the Leavenworth 
experience can be seen in the proposed assignments; Doe offered to place Lieutenant Colonel 




As mentioned earlier, the Army faced a significant backlog of eligible officers. The College, 
War Department, and future educational boards would grapple with the accumulated demand for 
professional education. The War Department maintained that ―50% of the Regular Army Officers of 




 years of 
service,‖ but the Regular Course had only 500 slots annually as of 1947. In 1947, the Army Ground 
Forces G-3 forecasted that CGSC could handle 700 officers in the 1947-48 course, increasing by 
another 200 spaces to a total of 900 in the 1948-49 school year. The truth was far less. Only 1,211 
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officers graduated from the Regular Course from 1946 to 1949—a number that included 164 Allied 
officers—reducing the total number of U.S. graduates to 1,047, which was barely above the number 
envisioned for one year.
73
 In an Army Ground Forces’ study conducted in 1948, Lieutenant Colonel 
W.E. Brinker reported that 2,256 Infantry, 223 Coast Artillery Corps, 1,079 Field Artillery Corps, and 
625 Cavalry branch officers would not have credit for the Command and General Staff College by 
July 1948. Over 4,000 officers lacked credit for the course compared with 2,357 of their combat arms 
cohorts who had already attended.
74
 The Army Ground Forces proposed a five-year plan to eliminate 
the surfeit of ―Regular Officers of the Ground Arms‖ by 1953 using a combination of Regular Course 
and Associate Course slots, while limiting attendance by all others, namely officers in the specialized 
branches, other services, and allied nations.
75
 
Throughput hinged on a simple physics problem: a shortage of officer housing. Capacity at 
the course fell short of Army needs with about 400 sets of quarters for married officers available, and 
an additional 240 rooms for bachelors available. The school had to apportion housing between the 
Regular, Associate, and other short-term courses. As a result, in 1947, the War Department limited 
attendance to 500 officers, mainly due to the housing shortage at Fort Leavenworth.
76
  
None of this concerned the present class, as they had been lucky enough to get orders to the 
course. As the students settled in to the academic rhythm, instructors attempted to keep up with the 
daily demand. The course was forty-one weeks in length, with thirty-two weeks of common 
instruction and the remainder being instruction in one of the four tracks. Each day required 
instructional material, which had to be researched, written, reviewed, and printed. The instructors’ 
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professional background and familiarity with the subject matter had an effect on student learning, 
since faculty formed the key interface between the students and the untested courseware. But students 
did not necessarily benefit as a result of the instructors’ credentials. To conserve manpower, one 
instructor taught subjects to the entire class of 300 officers in lecture format, much like the wartime 
classes.
77
 From 1946 until the adoption of smaller groups in 1948, three-fourths of the classes were 
taught by a single lecturer, even if the lesson plan said otherwise.
78
 ―The instructors…are encouraged 
to narrow their specialty with a view to becoming an outstanding expert in it.‖79 Many classes used a 
mass lecture format, which was an expedient measure adopted to allow the quick resumption of the 
course (appendix 1). In this environment, good presentation skills were considered highly important, 
and instructors developed proficiency in their delivery. Presentations became theatrical events, 
leading Ivan Birrer to comment, ―it was a platform performance with kind of a capital P.‖80 The 
approach limited the learning outcome since personal interaction between instructor and student 
proved difficult if not impossible. From the outset, one can see a decline of the applicatory method, a 
hallmark of the Leavenworth experience prior to World War Two.
81
 
Outdated instructional methods were not the only shortfall. New material required research. 
Rather than rely on the individual efforts of the faculty to create new knowledge, the school formed a 
Department of Analysis and Research. Colonel Don Faith was assigned in May 1946 as director.
82
 
The department had interdisciplinary functions ranging from student testing, doctrine reviews, and 
recommending changes to the various schools to teaching responsibilities for orientation subjects and 
―the application of the new weapons, devices and techniques and modern warfare.‖ The department 
performed an important function for the College, commenting on proposals sent to it by AGF 
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headquarters, other Army agencies, and the War Department’s Research, Development, and Testing 
Division. As such, Faith’s department became very influential because it had inter-departmental 




In the early spring of 1947, the Army Ground Forces convened an executive-level conference 
on the AGF school system hosted at Fort Leavenworth. In response to the transfer of Army education 
supervision from the War Department G3 to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, the 
commandants’ conference considered twenty-one proposals made during an earlier meeting held at 
Fort Leavenworth in February 1947.
84
 During the February staff-level meeting, the participants 
identified three lingering questions affecting the Command and Staff College from the Gerow Board: 
organization, preparation of technical and administrative service officers, and ―establishment of the 
College as the Ground University in fact as well as in name.‖85 The proceedings from the three-day 
March 1947 meeting reflected the ongoing concerns of the educational leadership, especially with the 
personnel policies governing assignment of instructors and the problem of student throughput to meet 
the demands of the postwar ―bubble.‖86 The Conference did not solve any problems, but it did 
highlight a number of issues facing the Army-wide educational system. 
After the conference, tensions continued between the War Department and the Army Ground 
Forces over the requirement to present both tactical and administrative courses. Having seen first-
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hand the dysfunctional nature of the dual curriculum, General Gerow wrote the commander of Army 
Ground Forces, General Jacob L. Devers, about the College’s experience with its dual mission. 
Instruction on command and staff functions in a combat zone or communications zone met Army 
Ground Force needs, while the ten-week general staff courses supported War Department general 
staff requirements. Gerow questioned the War Department’s directive to teach the content of two 
courses, observing that ―specialized instruction,‖ meaning the War Department general staff 
functions, ―should be conducted at a level higher than the Command and Staff College.‖ He further 
explained ―The available time is scant for thorough presentation of fields now included within the 
scope of instruction. The entire 41 weeks of student residence is needed for proper presentation of the 
Combat Zone and the Communications Zone.‖87 Devers and his staff supported Gerow’s 
recommendations, and the War Department’s reply from Lieutenant General C.P. Hall acknowledged 
the gap in the Army officer education system. Unfortunately, funds did not exist to remedy the 
situation, ensuring a bifurcated curriculum for the coming year.
88
 
A few months later, the War Department re-designated the school as the Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC). On May 8, the War Department issued instructions that would ―make 
the name more in keeping with the aim of the school.‖89 The name added precision to the College’s 
descriptor, although it did little to solve the principal problem of too much material and a 
dysfunctional internal organization. 
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The first Regular Course graduated on July 3, 1947. Assessment of the first postwar course 
by General Gerow and his staff echoed the findings of the Henry Commission. ―[G]raduates of the 
present Command and General Staff College will be reasonably familiar with the staff and command 
problems at division, corps and army levels, and comparable communications zone levels,‖ while 
being ―technically prepared from an academic viewpoint to operate effectively in general staff 
positions at those levels provided always that they possess the requisite personal traits.‖ Even at this 
early date, few believed that the College provided sufficient education to prepare officers to command 
divisions. However, Gerow demonstrated reluctance to make changes to the school system, despite 




Looking back at the first postwar course, resumption of the ten-month course in 1946 may 
have been premature. Instructors wrote courseware concurrent with the resumption of instruction. 
Later experience would demonstrate that the War Department expectations of the College were far 
beyond the capability of the commandants, faculty, and staff of the College.  
The summer of 1947 saw a rotation of experienced instructors. Colonel William R. Grove, 
Course Director of the Regular Course since February 1947, left for duty with the Army Advisory 
Group, Nanking, China.
91
A small number of the faculty went on to higher level schooling. Two 
officers went to the 1947-48 National War College class, and Colonel James W. Holsinger and 
Lieutenant Colonel William J. Eyerly went to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Three 
instructors departed to attend the Armed Forces Staff College.
92
 Other assignments included duty at 
the War Department or overseas tours. Following the first significant rotation of instructors in 1947, 
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the school’s faculty would decline in number and quality—an impediment which would later 
confound the school’s leaders and frustrate students for decades to come. 
Constant turnover of the faculty assured a shortage of experienced instructors. The Henry 
Commission’s findings of 1947 revealed the extent of the College’s difficulty regarding the pattern of 
instructor assignment and qualification for teaching duties. At a minimum, development of an 
individual from fledgling instructor to lesson author required three years, making the triennial 
turnover particularly troublesome. The Commission perceived that an instructor ―learned the ropes‖ 
during the first two years of his assignment. He then operated at peak efficiency for his last year—if 
he stayed for the full three years. While largely complimentary of instructor performance, the 
Commission asked for a change in assignment policy to extend tours to four years to get the greatest 
utilization out of the instructors’ talents.93 Meanwhile, the War Department and Army Ground Forces 
headquarters negotiated officer assignment policies, including stipulations for instructor duty. War 
Department Memorandum 108, issued on November 27, 1946, allowed instructors at CGSC to stay 
for up to four years, and the guidelines discouraged reassignment during the academic year.
94
 For the 
most part, however, instructors taught three courses at Leavenworth and then departed. In the coming 
years, the frequent rotation policy would have a detrimental effect on the institutional memory of the 
College. As the postwar faculty left and new officers took their place, the outpouring of instructors 
precipitated a crisis each spring, as the uncertainty of replacements clashed with known losses.
95
 
Replacement of one-third of the instructors each year took persistence and creativity. The 
importance of instructor duty was questionable to career progression, but it was desirable duty for the 
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 Early on, the Henry Commission detected an informal system in the method for 
assigning instructors, likening it to a good-old-boy network.
97
 Personal connections often resulted in 
assignment. The preponderance of each cohort of new instructors came from within the class just 
graduated. Each year, the faculty would assess current students for possible follow-on assignment as 
an instructor. Over time, the school developed an assessment process, relying principally upon in-
class observations by instructors and subsequent recommendations for candidates. Little was done to 
formally assess candidates’ leadership and instructional abilities, possibly by having them ―to act as 
group discussion leaders, as chiefs of staff, and as assistant instructors during the middle and latter 
phases of the Regular Course.‖ While some leaders criticized the practice and proportion of 
turnaround instructors, the College benefitted in that the officer had some familiarity with the 
school’s operation, lessening the orientation requirements for newly-assigned teachers.98  
One initiative begun at Orleans’ behest was the Reserve Officers Research Program, which 
brought civilian educators to CGSC for limited periods (three weeks to two months). The program 
began in the summer of 1947 to ―develop new methods and improve existing procedures in the 
College institution, establish a pool of qualified instructors for the C&GSC in case of an emergency, 
improve the Army’s relations with civilian educational institutions and to familiarize Reserve officers 
with military activities similar to their civilian pursuits.‖ Participants worked for the Department of 
Analysis and Research, and the program grew quickly. Forty-seven officers in 1948 represented 
academic institutions ranging from the country’s top tier such as Yale, Harvard, and Stanford to 
smaller schools such as Western State Teacher’s College of Macomb, Illinois. The academics worked 
on twenty-two projects in the areas of personnel management instruction, military psychology, 
remedial reading and arithmetic, study habits, student counseling, and library organization, plus they 
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assisted with instructor training courses.
99
 Regardless, the College did not get the full benefit of their 
experience because the program was limited to the summer months, corresponding to the break in 
instruction at both civilian universities and CGSC. More importantly, the search for experience 
outside the school demonstrated an early attempt to improve educational outcomes, as well as a tacit 
admission that the College did not have the expertise in-house. 
The Instructor Training Courses begun the previous year continued in 1947 and 1948, 
reaching three weeks length and roughly thirty hours per week. Although few lessons at the time used 
discussions, the second instructor training class had introduced the Conference Method, which 
brought the student into the learning process.
100
 Within a few years, even the faculty admitted the 
value of the course. Other institutions, including the Armed Forces Staff College and Texas A&M 
University, recognized the course’s value and sought to learn more about the subjects.101 The summer 
of 1948 saw two instructor training classes taught by the Instructor Training section, and the section 
conducted a third course for the new Special Associate Course instructors in October. Four officers 
from the Reserve Officer Research Program assisted in preparing and teaching the lessons.
102
  
With Gerow still in command, the second Regular Course commenced in September. 
Capacity for the 1947-48 course was set at 500.
103
 As officers in the second Regular Course settled in 
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for their ten-month education, General Jacob L. Devers, the commanding general of Army Ground 
Forces, opened the school year with compliments and a challenge. ―The leadership for all of our other 
schools starts here. You officers have been specially selected to attend this school on your past 
records; you have an obligation to live up to. I’m sure you will.‖104 Expectation of Leavenworth 
students remained high, even as some in attendance demonstrated their inability to successfully 
complete the course. Despite claims that students came from the top 50% of the officer corps, a 
number experienced difficulty completing their studies. Shortly after the Second Regular Course 
began, Lieutenant General Gerow wrote General Devers with his assessment that ―some students lack 
the competence necessary for satisfactory accomplishment of the course.‖105 307 officers graduated 
from the First Class on July 3, 1947. 249 U.S. officers completed the course; 58 were international 
officers. Only one failed to complete the work. Of the two U.S. officers not graduating in 1947, one 
had been killed in a car accident while on Christmas leave. The remainder of the class had gone on to 
field assignments or instructor duties.
106
  
During his opening remarks to the 1947-48 class, General Jacob Devers noted: ―The purpose 
of this school is to get uniformity of techniques, but techniques change. This last war was won 
because of this school—because of the uniformity in techniques taught here.‖107 To accomplish this 
objective, the second Regular Course had six phases. Five were common instruction, and one was the 
specialized track taught by one of the College’s four schools. Phase one was the course overview and 
introduction. As an early description of the second regular course said, ―Phase two deals with the 
Combat Zone, and covers the infantry, airborne and armored divisions in attack and defense and 
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includes airborne and amphibious operations followed by the corps and army in combat.‖ The third 
phase covered the Communications Zone, and the fourth phase looked at the Zone of Interior and the 
War Department. At this point, students split into four groups and attended specialized instruction in 
personnel, intelligence, combined arms, or logistics functions of the War Department. Students then 
attended a final phase on joint operations and future warfare.
108
 This final phase of the Regular 
Course lasted about two weeks, with one week spent on joint operations and a second week allocated 
to future war. Future war did not capture much attention in the course. Students spent three days on a 
defensive problem and two days on an attack scenario. This comprised less than seven percent of the 
common instruction and just five percent of the total course.
109
  
Measuring student performance followed similar patterns of the interwar period, but it did 
have some slight differences. Five elements comprised the evaluation program: an inventory test, the 
ROTC qualifying examination, performance in selected exercises, personality ratings by instructors, 
and examinations after each phase. Despite a Henry Commission recommendation to do so, the 
evaluation plan required no term papers or written staff studies, nor did the program ask the student to 
reflect on his learning through self-evaluation. The faculty assessed student learning subjectively on 
both examinations and map exercises and graded examinations round-robin style. Up to three 
instructors would assign marks to the exam, compensating for individual variations and lack of 
instructional experience. The Henry Commission noted, ―Far too large a part of the time of the 
instructional staff is devoted to the grading of examinations.‖110 The practice of ranking students by a 
composite score derived from their grades and ―personality ratings‖ continued in this early period, 
although it became more difficult with the four-school system to achieve uniformity.
111
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One unique feature of the new curriculum was the practical experience in joint operations 
offered through field trips. Students in the early classes took trips to California, Florida, and Georgia 
to observe amphibious and airborne maneuvers. Students and faculty from the School of Logistics 
visited four sites in the eastern U.S. during the 1946-47 course.
112
 In October 1948, 450 staff, 
instructors, and students traveled by air from the Olathe Naval Air Base to southern California to 
observe an amphibious exercise with a force of 30,000 sailors and marines, 60 ships, and 275 aircraft. 
A few weeks later, the class went to Fort Benning, Georgia and Eglin Field, Florida.
113
 The massive 
logistical effort required to move the entire class, combined with the Korean War, led to a cessation 
of the practice in 1950.
114
 
Schools reached out to industry and academia to augment their substance. Logistics students 
went on trips reflecting a broad range of interests. During May 1948, officers went to the Sears-
Roebuck mail order facility and Quartermaster Depot at Kansas City, Missouri, and they visited the 
Natural Cooler Storage Company at Atchison, Kansas. They toured Tinker Air Force Base and the 
Decatur, Illinois Signal Depot.
115
 In June, the School of Personnel hosted a five-day industrial 
relations conference with representatives from ten companies and the University of Kansas. The 
students met in small groups to ―study the practical application of personnel management methods in 
modern industry.‖116 Learning activities for the week began with ten groups of ten officers visiting 
one of the companies to ―make a complete study of the company’s personnel management program.‖ 
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After two days, the students returned to Leavenworth to prepare their committee reports. A further 
half-day was devoted to seminars taught by University of Kansas School of Business professors. The 
remainder of the week was spent to completing and presenting their findings. Early efforts to import 
knowledge from other professions and fields began with the first courses, and the practice would 
expand in later years. 
In the midst of the second postwar course, Lieutenant General Gerow received word of his 
reassignment to command of the Second Army. At the time of his departure, the Command and Staff 
College had the barest trappings of a modern graduate school with a faculty, students, a curriculum, 
and a professional journal. Gerow had overseen the transformation of the College from a collection of 
unrelated short courses to a functioning long course in just a few months.
117
 His staff and faculty had 
managed to resume both the Regular and Associate courses; the instructor training course showed 
promise; the Department of Analysis and Research had begun to grapple with future concepts; and he 
had made tentative steps towards adding civilian faculty to the staff. Much remained to be done, 
however, to regain the influence and vigor of the interwar school. 
Not only did the Army personnel system affect Gerow but it also touched the students. 
Graduation came early for forty-four students of the second class. As would happen periodically 
throughout the postwar period, external emergencies would intrude on the educational experience. 
The War Department directed the early reporting of the officers ―to cope with the planning for UMT 
[Universal Military Training] and Selective Service.‖ All of these students received full credit for the 
course. Ironically, these officers missed the specialized instruction that was to prepare them for the 
positions they were to assume.
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A Homegrown Leader 
Major General Major General Manton S. Eddy’s arrival in January 1948 signaled a new 
phase in the Army’s attempt to craft a professional military education system for the postwar Army. 
Gerow’s replacement had tours as both student and instructor, returning to Fort Leavenworth some 
ten years after his tour as an instructor. Eddy graduated from the two-year course in the early thirties 
and remained as a tactics instructor from 1934 to 1938. Like Gerow, Eddy had extensive combat 
command experience, having been a division commander and corps commander in Europe, but his 
instructor experience would allow him to shape the curriculum and officer education system to 
correct some of the remaining problems from the War Department’s original scheme.119 
Eddy arrived on a chilly day, greeted at Sherman Army Airfield by Lieutenant General 
Gerow. They spent the next few days conferring about the College’s future and the need for continued 
progress in professional education. General Gerow soon departed, leaving Eddy to assess his new 
command.
120
 Eddy’s prior Leavenworth experience, the advice of professional educators, and the 
experience of the first two postwar classes informed his decisions. His tenure would also be marked 
by the intrusion of contemporary events into the curriculum, as Truman Administration initiatives and 
inter-service rivalry became topics of discussion and distraction among the students and faculty. 
Perhaps most importantly for Leavenworth, the outcome of yet another Army officer education board 
under Eddy’s supervision would bring much needed change to the curriculum. 
Soon after General Eddy’s arrival, a professor of psychology from Fort Hays State College, 
Ivan J. Birrer, reported to Fort Leavenworth to take up a position as a statistical consultant with the 
Department of Analysis and Research. Birrer was a slight man, who had experienced World War Two 
as a captain in the Adjutant General’s Corps. The February 6 announcement of Birrer’s appointment 
named his official duties with the College as consulting, instruction, and research in the application of 
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statistical methods. The professor of psychology would soon become much more than his simple job 
title implied. As happens with many who possess a unique competence, Dr. Birrer would cultivate a 




A few months later, another Leavenworth veteran would return to serve as a senior leader. 
Brigadier General Harlan N. Hartness joined Eddy with the title of Assistant Commandant. Hartness’ 
educational background typified the experience of a successful general officer, with attendance at the 
two-year course and three years as an instructor. He had also attended the German General Staff 
School in 1936-37. Like the Commandant, Hartness had served as a division commander in Europe, 
commanding the 26
th
 Infantry Division from 1943 to 1945. Hartness came to Leavenworth from 




 General Hartness, together with General 
Eddy and Dr. Birrer, would nudge the College towards the future of modern warfare, while adopting a 
structure and instructional methods more conducive to the education of military professionals. None 
of this would occur quickly, nor would progress be without pitfalls or active resistance. 
The College’s first major internal reorganization after postwar resumption of classes occurred 
in 1948. Eddy, now a three-star general, approved the reorganization, which sought to correct some of 
the deficiencies created by the War Department’s original education system plan. Much of the input 
for change came from below as department directors and other faculty sought to fix problems created 
by the four-school arrangement.
123
 The plan for the college structure organized the faculty into 
departments corresponding to the common curriculum rather than the specialized instruction. The 
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By adding a fifth school—the School of the Commander and General Staff—and changing 
the name of the School of Combined Arms to the School of Operations and Training, the leadership 
hoped to make the instruction more effective. This reorganization took effect in July 1948 but left 
intact the bureaucratic tensions that existed among the departments.
125
  
The most significant change was a modification to the instructional methods used for the 
common curriculum, which was an outgrowth of a Department of Analysis and Research 
recommendation.
126
 The class was divided into twelve groups of thirty-five to thirty-eight students to 
receive the common instruction. As will be shown later, this shift, while intended to increase student 
learning and participation, diluted the talent of the instructor pool and led to decreased instructional 
effectiveness.  
Instructional methods affected the required number and qualifications of instructors. In the 
first two Regular Courses, instructors taught a few classes, or only one, during the year. By 1948, 140 
military officers and two civilians comprised the faculty.
127
 With the student body set at 500, this led 
to a very favorable 3.5:1 student to faculty ratio. However, the school’s two civilian staff, Doctors 
Orleans and Birrer, used the occasion of Eddy’s arrival to resurface the Henry Commission proposal 
for a smaller class size, believing that the school could increase instructional effectiveness.
128
 Their 
co-authored paper, presented to Lieutenant General Eddy in early 1948, recommended that ―the class 
be broken down into smaller sections,‖ which led to a meeting between Eddy, the four school 
commandants, and the civilian advisors.
129
 With some hesitancy, the Commandant accepted their 
proposal and directed that the school further study implementing the proposition. Colonel Stuart 
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Wood led the study group, which rendered its report on March 18, 1948. In addition to an internal 
reorganization of the school faculty, the Board affirmed the decision to adopt a forty-man classroom. 
Shortly afterward, Lieutenant General Eddy made his intentions known to General Jacob Devers, 
Commander of Army Field Forces, on April 8, stating ―I am strongly of the opinion that this 
practice—instructing 500 students in one classroom—constitutes an inferior instructional procedure 
which is not conducive to the most effective learning.‖ Army Field Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Major General Charles L. Bolte, responded quickly, granting Eddy the authority to pursue the 
reorganization.  
The Wood Report found that the prevalence of Gruber Hall lectures ―prevents that degree of 
student activity and participation fundamental to satisfactory learning‖ and recognized that the 
method ―creates a strictly impersonal relationship between faculty and students.‖ The solution, 
according to the report, was to divide the students into smaller groups. The intent was to bring to life 
a key feature of the Henry Commission: create ―smaller classes whereby applicatory and 
experimental learning will be encouraged as will reflective thinking; and passive learning by the 
student eliminated.‖130 
Implementing the Wood Board system involved more than mere division of labor. The 
continued mandate to teach a bifurcated curriculum caused the college to consolidate the core lessons 
under a new, fifth school, initially named the School of Common Instruction, which had 
responsibility ―to prepare officers for duty as commanders and general staff officers of divisions, 
corps, armies, and comparable levels in the communications zone.‖ The remaining four schools had a 
more limited scope, primarily teaching the DA-level subjects during the last ten weeks of the 
course.
131
 The decision in May 1948 to go ahead with implementing the plan had an immediate 
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consequence—an exponential increase in the faculty’s workload.132 Unfortunately for students 
preparing for the future, Colonel E.A. Salet informed the Army that ―…the content and character of 
instruction will remain unchanged.‖133 The course exposed students to a variety of subjects, but the 
limited time available for each topic meant that students had few opportunities to develop their 
expertise as staff officers or commanders in division or higher units. The division into five 
departments and the adoption of smaller sections constituted the first major change in the postwar 
CGSC. The shift to smaller classes represented a much-needed overhaul of instructional methods, 
given that nearly three years had passed since the war’s end, yet the college remained mired in the 
mass-production process used during the Second World War. Change, however, did not come easily 
to a faculty accustomed to limited responsibilities. As a result of the reorganization and smaller 
instructional groups, instructors would need broad expertise in a number of lessons. No longer master 
of a single lesson, some instructors found their duties increased twentyfold, teaching roughly once per 
week under the rotational system devised to spread the workload. Inside the School of Commander 
and General Staff, the school created five teaching teams of twelve instructors each—one team for 
each day of the week.
134
 Compounding the problem was the haphazard method used to allocate 
teaching responsibilities across the five instructional groups. Ivan Birrer described the process as one 
in which the new teams: 
put together a set of 3 x 5 cards in which all the subjects were listed, and they actually 
just dealt them out. It was not quite one at a time, because you had to take into account 
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In part, the faculty had to take such shortcuts for they had little time to do otherwise. The 1947-48 
course would not end for another month, and instructors had to be realigned with their new 
departments. The new scheme represented a significant departure from previous practices with the 
potential to affect every aspect of the school, ranging from grading to the conduct of exercises. 
Significantly, instructors had to master the ―conference method,‖ which entailed more interaction 
between the faculty and the students. Further, lesson authors had little opportunity to consider 
integrating new material, as the late decision compressed the time available to prepare for the 
September 1
st
 class start.  
In the midst of reorganization, Dr. Orleans’ wife died unexpectedly. Orleans chose to depart 
soon afterwards.
136
 In his end-of-tour report, Dr. Orleans made important observations regarding the 
internal organization of the College and the methods employed in the 1946-47 and 1947-48 courses. 
He said that the internal structure of the College and its four schools led to the design and content of 
the curriculum and highlighted the unintended effect the original War Department Circular had on the 
College’s educational mission.137 Dr. Orleans strongly criticized the impact the College’s 
organization had on the curriculum of the regular course, noting one of the first instances of a 
recurring issue that would plague the College in later years. Rather than working together to achieve a 
common purpose, departments had quickly become fiefdoms more concerned with their limited 
subject matter rather than producing a general staff officer.
138
 The phenomena noted by Dr. Orleans, a 
feature of the modern American university, would have harmful consequences for later forms of the 
College. 
Orleans greatly influenced the College in its ongoing reorganization and helped define the 
structure of the College. He also demonstrated the efficacy of using civilian expertise in designing the 
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educational experience. Integration of civilian faculty into the College may seem to have been a 
recent development, yet nascent steps towards civilianization of the faculty took place soon after the 
school resumed the Regular Course. As noted earlier, Lieutenant General Gerow reached out to 
civilian experts to study the organization and employment of the faculty. Orleans’ continuation as an 
advisor, followed by Dr. Birrer’s thirty years, established continuity in an expanding search for 
expertise outside the military profession. Outsiders lent their knowledge, especially in educational 
techniques and methods and measurement of student learning. 
In addition to his contributions to the internal college reorganization, Dr. Orleans had studied 
issues with student performance. Unsatisfactory student performance, first noted in the 1946-47 class, 
had increased with the second. Failures of the ―top 50 percent‖ had continued with the second 
resident class— portents of looming problems with the selection process and officer competence.139 
During the second year, fourteen officers—3.5 percent of the class—failed, and this development led 
to joint action between the Commandant and his civilian advisors.
140
 They began explorations about 
establishing entrance requirements for the course, given the wide range of World War Two 
experience and constructive credit for officer education. Using expertise from the psycho-educational 
advisor, Dr. Orleans, Eddy recommended a screening exam to reduce the failure rates in August 
1948.
141
 Under a plan put together by Dr. Orleans and Birrer, the College proposed a two-part 
screening exam, consisting of a CGSC Inventory Test and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 
Qualifying Examination to identify officers of low aptitude. The staff proposed testing prospective 
students for the 1949-50 and 1950-51 courses with the intent to turn away potential students with 
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below average scores. Devers accepted this plan in 1948, and the Army G3 recognized the issue with 
basic competencies.
142
 ―Army wide pre-selection testing was discontinued following the testing for 
the 50-51 course.‖ A few non-combat arms branches continued the practice in the next two years, but 
the practice ceased entirely by the mid-fifties.
143
  
Even with this concession, the Commandant looked to other ways to reduce the failure rate, 
especially for the current class, which had 24 officers with substandard test scores. Eddy followed up 
with a request to General Devers to expel students at the Christmas break ―whose work by the end of 
December, 1948, is so unsatisfactory as to make eventual non-graduation almost certain.‖144 Visiting 
academics supported Eddy’s recommendation. ―Even though a careful screening is made of students 
before they come to the CGSC, there are many officers detailed here who probably should not be 
allowed to complete the full course.‖145 Devers agreed with Eddy’s additional suggestion, and he 
directed the staff to coordinate with Department of the Army for final approval. The screening did not 
prevent unqualified officers from attending the third class; however.
146
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How effectively instructors could lead this curriculum hinged on their ability to adapt to the 
new system, and things were not going well. In practice, the course redesign in 1948 did change the 
―content and character of instruction.‖147 Colonel H.F. Harding explained the problem. 
The requirement of having one officer write a unit of instruction and then brief a dozen 
less qualified and less well-informed officers on its complexities presents a number of 
objections. In the first place officers of the technical services are at a disadvantage when 
teaching a combat subject – just as officers of the arms would be if they had to teach a 
specialized and technical subject. Again, the classes lose the value of the wide reading 
and knowledge developed by the original author when a subject is put on only once by a 
dozen different instructors as much experience cannot be gained to improve the teaching 
method, as for example, if the subject were to be taught by a group of three of four 




Predictably, the dilution of expertise resulted in a decrease in effectiveness of instruction.  
The new system led to curious happenings, as the College tried to standardize the educational 
experience across the student body. In one extreme instance, instructors were ordered to issue 
instructions for map problems in all sections simultaneously, because the College did not want to give 
some students a slight advantage that might affect class standings. In some cases, instructor’s lack of 
familiarity with the material led to detestable practices, such as ―the tendency‖ on the part of some 
less-qualified faculty ―to read word for word from the Lesson Plan.‖149 
External concerns continued to impinge on staff officer education. Unification and service 
cooperation came to the forefront during General Eddy’s tenure. The bitter infighting occurring in 
Washington and across the services resounded through Gruber Hall. In spite of the expanded national 
responsibilities and increased size of standing forces, the Army faced questions of relevance in the 
dawning atomic age. Russell Weigley noted, ―For most Americans, including most of the 
government, the Army in the late 1940’s seemed almost irrelevant to the Communist challenge.‖150 In 
his pre-Christmas lecture, Eddy’s address to the faculty, staff, and students captured the Army’s 
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disagreement with the emerging concept of modern war. Eddy declared, ―the most advanced prophets 
of Buck Rogers have, so far, shown nothing to vitiate this concept for the future.‖ Eddy went on to 
say that each service—air, naval, and land forces—had a role in national defense and that there 
existed a proper balance between the three. The Commandant further explained that the services 
ought to be ―unified in spirit and in doctrine,‖ rather than adopting a unitary view of their roles. He 
hinted that if the services themselves could not agree, then the civilian authorities would make the 
decision for the services. ―In my mind, the sooner that is done, the better.‖ At their graduation, 
students of the 1948-49 Regular Course would hear more about these concerns. In his graduation 
remarks, General Omar N. Bradley spoke of the need for a more effective joint force, while 
cautioning that ―our greatest danger is that we will be caught up in the fancy of a futurism and 
commit ourselves to unbalanced forces that will not match the forces which might oppose us.‖ Both 
Bradley’s and Eddy’s comments reflected an early appreciation of the deleterious effect of the inter-
service rivalry; neither anticipated the direction later administrations would choose and the 
corresponding effect on the Army. In the coming decades, the Army would expend significant energy 
in debate and disagreement over the decision made for the services.
151
 
General Eddy opened the 1949-50 course in September with the admonition to ―Make the 
most of your time here, because never again will you have ten uninterrupted months, free of all 
administrative and other duties, to devote to the study of your profession.‖152 The school had slightly 
modified the curriculum, but continuation of the split approach can be seen in the hours devoted to 
each major phase. Common instruction in the revised program was extended for an additional four 
weeks, but the course still retained the troublesome specialized subjects. The 1949-50 school year 
featured 1,200 hours of instruction. Students spent slightly over half of the course, 618 hours, in 
lessons related to command and staff duties in the combat zone. Eddy actively participated in 
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classroom activities, leading two of the tactical lessons himself. The communications zone phase 
included 144 hours of class time. Overviews of the Department of the Army and Zone of Interior 
comprised thirty-six hours. Topics more appropriate to the War College-level took up more than one-
fourth of the course. The departments teaching the specialized subjects had 312 hours. The last few 
weeks before graduation included fifty-four hours of joint and future warfare topics. The remaining 
hours were consumed in orientation and instruction in fundamentals. 
Much of Eddy’s effort in the next few months regarding officer education attempted to solve 
the perceived gap in officer education at the highest level. The absence of an Army War College 
disturbed those generals presently responsible for officer education. Studies in 1947, 1948, and 1949 





1949, the Department of the Army appointed another board to consider the 
education of commissioned officers. Lieutenant General Eddy, as the Commandant at CGSC, was 
appointed President. The Eddy Board was to have a much more decisive impact on the Army’s officer 
education system than previous studies. The wide scope of the task given the board resembled that of 
the Gerow Board, but it also had a specific task to determine if the Army War College ―should be 
included in the Army School System.‖154 One might conclude that the answer had already been 
decided upon, given the instructions to ―provide for an Army War College in the revised plan for the 
Army Educational System.‖155  
Comprised of eight officers, the Board met at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and three other posts 
as it examined evidence regarding its business. The scope of the study was not limited simply to the 
War College question. A major function of the board was ―determining the adequacy of the present 
system to meet educational requirements for commissioned officers in the Army, and the 
appropriateness of the scope of curricula at the various educational levels as they are now 
                                                     
153
 Phillips’ biography of Eddy tells of a conversation between Bradley and Eddy in which the Chief of Staff told Eddy the time to look at 
resuming the Army War College had come. Phillips, 196-197. 
154
 Manton S. Eddy and others, ―Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers,‖ 15 June 1949, 19. 
Hereafter referred to as Eddy Board. 
155
 Eddy Board, 11. To be fair, the Army directive qualified the statement with ―If the investigation of the Board indicates the need for an 
Army War College,‖ although the subsequent paragraph detailed the components to be included in the plan. 
56 
 
established.‖156 According to news reports announcing the board, the purpose of the Army school 
system was to ―educate officers in means and methods of future warfare, in responsibilities of an 
Army in a democracy, and in leadership of the citizen-soldier.‖157 The Army’s announcement 
emphasized the joint aspects of the Army officer, hinting at the ongoing debate over unification and 
the role of land power. 
Findings of the Board ranged from minimum civilian education requirements for officers to 
more clearly defined criteria for selection of students. Although the Army Chief of Staff chose not to 
implement all of the Board’s recommendations, the ones that were adopted in whole or in part marked 
a new stage in the development of the Army education system. Significantly, the thirteen 
recommendations of the Eddy Board recognized the fundamental issues already identified with the 
existing Army school structure. What distinguished this study from previous reports was that the 
Army Chief of Staff acted upon most of its recommendations.  
From an organizational standpoint, the Eddy Board’s recommendations were significant. The 
four educational levels proposed by the Eddy Board became the educational scheme for Army 
officers for the next three decades. Officers would progress through an integrated system beginning 
with a basic course for new lieutenants, followed by an advanced course for captains, with 
opportunities for attendance at a staff college and war college in later years. Not until the advent of 
the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3) did the Army significantly alter the educational 
progression scheme for officers. 
The Eddy Board resolved the problem that had plagued the officer education system since the 
end of World War Two. The report proposed an Advanced Course—a revival of the Army War 
College—to follow the regular Command and General Staff Course. The board reiterated the 
fundamental weakness of the War Department arrangement that had forced the College to cover too 
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much material in the ten months allotted for the course.
158
 The final report observed ―it has been 
demonstrated from 3 year’s experience that too much instruction is crowded into the 10-month 
Regular Course.‖ The finding continued: ―As already pointed out, this course covers in 10 months 
what was formerly accomplished before World War Two in 2 years at the Command and General 
Staff School and the Army War College.‖ The reinstatement of the Army War College narrowed the 
scope of the CGSC curriculum. The board’s version of the Command and General Staff Course gave 
the school a more limited mission.
159
 By addressing CGSC’s role scope, the Eddy Board’s findings 
reduced the expectations of the course to something more manageable within the time allotted.
160
 
As happened with the Henry Commission, the Board was very critical of the specialized 
instruction given as part of the existing course.
161
 The elimination of the specialized material related 
to the curriculum of the new Army War College reduced the scope of the new Regular Course. No 
longer split between large unit and higher level concerns, the College’s new charter focused on 
tactical operations in the divisions, corps and armies with familiarization with the functions of 
echelons above army and Department of the Army staff responsibilities a secondary concern. On 
October 26, 1949, the Department of the Army provisionally approved the Eddy Board report 




The recommendations did not fix all the existing issues as the Board left in place the 
requirement for educating officers in both command and staff functions. This objective reflected the 
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belief that officers would eventually form the cadre of mobilized divisions and corps following the 
World War Two model. In recommending new subjects for CGSC, the Eddy Board cited three 
complex issues that the Army needed to study as a result of America’s changed strategic situation. 
The atomic age, forward-deployed forced in strategically important areas, and ―modern and scientific 
business methods of administration‖ needed intellectual attention. The Board had noted that the 
peacetime Army had to face an ―increased number of problems…as a result of new developments in 
warfare….‖ While the report did not specify what it meant by ―new developments,‖ the atomic 
battlefield was only one of them.
163
 Although the College proclaimed that it ―constantly plans ahead, 
taking cognizance of new developments in weapons, atomic warfare, advanced means of 
transportation, administrative and management methods, and all other problems which might 
someday influence the security and peace of our country,‖ the truth was something less.164 The report 
lacked a recommended method for accelerated research into the conceptual underpinnings of future 
warfare. Still, the Army had addressed the structural flaw in its officer education system—the lack of 
an Army War College. The CGSC leadership could now attempt to fix the content of the Regular 
Course. 
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A Course Correction, 1950-1955 
One of the most important characteristics of the successful officer today is his ability to 
improve continuously his techniques and methods, and, at times, almost even his mental 
processes, not only to keep abreast of the constant changes of modern science, but to 
effect a harmonious and effective relationship with elements of the armed services of one 
or many of the allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.  
 
      Lieutenant Colonel Carl N. DeVaney 
      CGSC Instructor, 1953 
 
As the Department of the Army considered approval of the Eddy Board reforms, the College 
faculty studied the subjects that they would teach in the 1950-51 school year. Anticipating approval 
of the Eddy Board report, the Assistant Commandant ordered the Director of the Department of the 
Commander and General Staff to ―prepare plans for the Regular Course, Command and General Staff 
College.‖ Brigadier General Harlan N. Hartness recognized the changes needed as a result of the re-
establishment of the Army War College and those originating from the new strategic situation. The 
new course had four phases designed to achieve the mission ―to prepare officers for duty as 
commanders and general staff officers of divisions, corps, armies and comparable levels in the 
communications zone.‖1 Significantly, the directive eliminated the thirteen-week specialized training 
task levied on the College by the original War Department Circular of 1946.  
The Eddy Board‘s 1949 recommendations reflected some understanding of future trends, the 
joint nature of warfare, the effect of atomic weapons on war, and the integration of business practices 
into military education. While the Army had made efforts to incorporate joint subjects into its CGSC 
curriculum, the latter two were largely absent in 1949. From the outset, generals had demonstrated an 
uncertainty about the future of land combat with atomic weapons. Asked in September 1945 what 
effect the atomic bomb would have on instruction at Leavenworth, Major General Truesdell replied, 
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―We cannot yet clearly see the implications of such a weapon.‖ Truesdell went on to observe, ―It is 
certain, however, that our military methods will have to be overhauled and renovated.‖  
Research and experimentation, a hallmark of the pre-World War Two period, might have 
ameliorated the situation or illuminated potential solutions, but it proved difficult. The creation of 
new knowledge—a pillar of civilian academia—fell further behind external developments in the art of 
war as a result of instructor shortages and overwork. Typically, instructor duties included more than 
classroom delivery and lesson writing. Instructors devoted time to the preparation of course material 
for extension courses, grading of exams, writing articles for professional journals, reviewing Army 
manuals, performing staff assistance visits to USAR schools, and visits to other Army schools.
2
 
Instructors divided their time among other courses, too. The ten-month course was the college‘s 
flagship, but the three-month Associate course; a one-week course for National Guard and Reserve 
division staffs; the short-lived civilian orientation course; instructor training courses; and an eight-
week allied officer preparatory course required faculty as well.
3
 Among the faculty, isolated instances 
of pure academic research akin to the modern American university occurred,
 4
 but the average 
instructor gave little attention to professional research and writing.
5
 True, professional dialogue took 
place in journals, and the College had one of its own—Military Review. Writings in Military Review 
served to inform the officer corps of doctrinal concepts, notions of future warfare, and school 
activities, although debate was minimal given the editorial policy of not accepting letters. College 
instructors made frequent contributions, often under duress. The 1946 ―Information for Instructors‖ 
specified that ―as part of his regular duties, each instructor will contribute to the Military Review.‖ 
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Quite often, the College staff resorted to impressment of departments to fill the journal, issuing 
monthly quotas for articles.
6
  
The scope of the Army‘s dilemma can be seen in Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr.‘s 
1952 comments: 
The Army must prepare itself for possible global war against an enemy who outnumbers 
us on the ground—an enemy capable of marshaling his resources to strike without 
warning at a time and place of his own choosing. If global war does not suit his purpose, 
this enemy can also incite ―local wars‖ anywhere along the global boundary between the 
Free and Communist worlds. The Army can choose neither the time nor the place of war, 




America‘s position as a European and Asian power, a new national defense structure, and an overhaul 
of the officer personnel system led to expanded professional requirements; however, military 
intellect, that of the officer corps in particular, labored to accommodate the exponential growth in 
technology and new trials arising from growing national involvement in world affairs.
8
 Before the 
College could grapple with future war though, it had to settle issues arising from implementation of 
the amended Eddy Board reports. 
A Wartime School 
Shortly after the release of the report, Eddy received a new assignment to lead Seventh Army 
in Europe, repeating a pattern of leaving reform, and consequences of decisions made, to a successor. 
As Eddy prepared to depart, he left behind a nascent Army War College, which existed in name only. 
During the transition, Fort Leavenworth had two commandants—Major General Horace McBride led 
CGSC, and Major General Joe Swing headed the Army War College. Implementation of the Eddy 
Board‘s recommendation would therefore pit McBride, who assumed command on October 6, 1950, 
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 Harry P. Ball‘s Of Responsible Command outlines the positive outcomes of the 
resumption of the Army War College, but 1950 was a turbulent year at Fort Leavenworth.
10
 As the 
senior officer, Swing had overall responsibility for the post, and his position led him to favor the War 
College‘s needs over those of the staff college. This created tension between the institutions, leading 
to claims that Swing took the most talented faculty and left McBride with the remainder. In addition, 
War College faculty enjoyed more prestige, leading to further strains.
11
 CGSC‘s faculty had few 
opportunities to look at future concepts during this time, as they focused attention on divesting their 




The North Korean attack in June 1950 complicated, but did not halt, the task of restructuring. 
The Korean War itself appears to have had little overall influence on the content of the Regular 
Course, other than hastening graduation for the 1950-51 CGSC class, which graduated a month 
earlier than planned.
13
 The Army needed their talent. 
In December, 1950, the Army staff revisited the question of capacity and throughput at 
CGSC. The arbitrary nature of who attended the staff college came to light in the discussions that 
followed; for in this year, the Army admitted it did not know how many staff college graduates it 
needed: 
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Precise requirements for the total yearly requirements for graduates of Command and 
General Staff College have never been determined. Estimates indicate that in the 
Department of the Army Administrative Area alone, the yearly increment of graduates 
will meet only about one-third (1/3) of the number of requests. Since the yearly 
requirements for the Command and General Staff College graduates have not been 
specifically determined, the Department of the Army believes that a minimum of fifty per 





Still, the Army remained attached to the random figure, asking for ―Any other recommendations to 
reduce the backlog and achieve the current objective of graduating a minimum of fifty per cent (50%) 
of the officers of the Regular Army from the Command and General Staff College?‖ In his response, 
AFF‘s Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Francis H. Oxx said that 4,603 officers of all 
branches were eligible but would not attend the 1950-51 course. While about the same number as the 
1947 study, the figures were grossly inflated by the inclusion of 2,398 technical and specialized 
branch officers, leading AFF to question the basis for figuring the school‘s required capacity.15 Army 
Field Forces recommended that the Regular Course capacity be set at ―600 U.S. Army officers plus 
Air Force, Navy, inactive Civilian components and Foreign officers as required, with the total 
capacity of class not to exceed 700.‖16 
Reducing the still troublesome postwar bulge of officers hinged on solving practical 
problems. Foremost among these were physical classroom space and student housing. Because 
Leavenworth hosted other courses, the staff had to set aside some classroom space for these events. 
Scheduling these courses a year in advance allowed the staff to sequence them so that available 
facilities could handle the need. Housing a large itinerant population posed a greater concern. 
Attempts to increase the output of the course could not overcome the housing shortage. As pressure 
mounted to increase the course capacity, CGSC informed AFF that ―Ft Leavenworth can provide 
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adequate housing and classroom facilities for 600,‖ while retaining 200 sets of bachelor quarters for 
the Associate Course and other classes.
17
 
The quality of students who did attend continued to vary widely. Professional reputations 
could be made, and ruined, at Leavenworth. One instance of the latter occurred over the Thanksgiving 
holiday in 1953. Due to contractor delays during the summer break, Lieutenant Colonel Milton I. 
Wallace‘s quarters had not been painted. The garrison reluctantly scheduled the paint job the 
Wednesday before the holiday—an arrangement to which Lieutenant Colonel Wallace, an engineer 
officer, objected. According to Lieutenant General Hodes, commandant at the time of the incident, 
Wallace ―made violent and repeated protests to several echelons including me.‖ Wallace‘s lack of 
professional decorum led Hodes to enter on his academic efficiency report ―Officer should have troop 
duty. One incident while a student indicated positively that officer needs further training in customs 
of the service and military discipline.‖ Hodes wrote the Assistant Commandant, William F. Train to 
say ―I don‘t ever want him serving with me in any capacity and regret now that I didn‘t take more 
positive action at the time.‖18 
Overall, the Leavenworth student of the early fifties had less professional experience than did 
his immediate predecessors. The College Secretary, Colonel John F. Franklin, Jr. noted a decline in 
student experience as early as 1954. ―Whereas in the years immediately following World War II the 
students possessed an extremely high experience level, today the student body is made up of officers 
whose experience is much less than that of the immediate post-war classes.‖ The 1954-55 class had 
540 U.S. officers. Forty-six percent were lieutenant colonels, reflecting the continued backlog of 
World War Two officers, but forty-one captains attended—seven percent of the class—indicating the 
gradual drift towards a less-experienced student body that concerned Colonel Franklin.
19
 Given the 
entrance requirement of seven to fifteen years of service, incoming officers would have been junior 
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officers during, or have missed entirely, World War Two. Colonel Franklin stressed to Fifth Army 
that ―it appears that the student experience level will drop even lower before it stabilizes.‖20 Not only 
did the students have less experience, the continued use of turnaround instructors meant that the 
overall experience level of the faculty declined.  
Over the summer of 1951, the Army War College moved to Carlisle Barracks, creating 
physical space in addition to the gulf that had grown between the two institutions during the 
preceding year. Soon thereafter, new questions arose concerning the mission of CGSC relative to the 
War College. McBride‘s letter to Ned Almond, who had assumed leadership of the War College, 
summed up the perceived educational gap between the two. ―I feel our school system gives 
reasonably good coverage of tactical and strategical [sic] instruction but I see a definite gap in the 
logistical field, particularly the Communications Zone. Communications Zone instruction appears to 
fall within the scope of booth the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. 
We cannot materially increase our instruction in that field without sacrificing our tactical instruction. 
I understand you feel the same regarding Army War College instruction.‖21 
During the three years of the Korean War, few changes were made to the curriculum, except 
those necessary in response to the Eddy Board and restart of the Army War College. What is notable 
is that Leavenworth did not close the Regular Course during the war as had happened in both the First 
and Second World Wars.
22
 Instead, class sizes increased by approximately 200 U.S. officers in 1951-
52 and 1952-53.
23
 The indirect influence of the Korean War can be seen in the hesitation to make 
major modifications to the course, although the war itself had little direct consequence on the 
subjects. However, the college had adequate links to theater to understand the situation. Monthly 
reports about combat actions in Korea funneled lessons learned to the faculty. One early observation 
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about North Korean practices indicated the need for a modified view of modern war, although little 
suggests that the College acted upon this insight.
24
 Later, the 1954-55 school year had two lectures 
based on experiences in the Korean War, rooted in early tactical lessons about defensive operations. 




The wartime school of the early fifties had two general problems. First was a worsening of 
the faculty situation, already bad because of the shift to smaller class sections and exacerbated by the 
war. Second was a growing deficiency in the state of professional knowledge. History lessons about 
World War Two combat actions proved compelling, but technological developments and a wider 
array of international commitments added new questions to what officers needed to know for future 
duties. The curriculum could no longer rest on its laurels and produce ―officers for duty as 
commanders and general staff officers at division, corps, and army levels, and at comparable levels in 
the communications zone.‖26 Attending to the growing deficit of professional knowledge pivoted on 
having sufficient faculty, for the two were intertwined. 
What constituted a qualified instructor? In 1947, the College had no formal statement of 
credentials, other than a loose description of desirable attributes.
27
 One seemingly obvious 
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requirement, added by 1952, was that the officer had graduated from the Regular Course.
28
 A visiting 
faculty member suggested in 1953 that a ―Description of Desirable Qualifications for CGSC Duty‖ be 
developed.
29
 By 1954, the Commandant articulated five standards: command and/or staff experience 
in combat; a graduate of the Regular Course, recommended as a potential instructor; suitable rank and 
branch according to the school‘s established manpower authorizations; an experienced instructor 
(desired): and a college graduate.
30
 In 1955, the Secretary clarified CGSC‘s expectations to Fifth 
Army‘s G1, stating that the College used two criteria: recommendation by one or more instructional 
departments and professional background, which included much of the criteria outlined in 1954.
31
 
Thus, the College established a threshold for faculty members that emphasized a professional and 
educational background necessary to teach combined arms operations to field grade officers. 
Excellence in teaching did merit comment. ―An important factor in the learning process‖ the 
Eddy Report noted, ―is the development of an atmosphere for creative study and the ability of the 
instructors to inspire thinking on the part of the student.‖32 Colonel H.F. Harding‘s reflections on 
years of study at the early postwar CGSC confirmed this point. Having watched four cycles of the 
Regular Course as a part-time advisor, Harding wrote: ―In spite of the care exercised in the past it is 
my observation over a period of four years that a number of officers, perhaps as high as 20-25%, are 
not suited by personality, temperament, or military background to become excellent CGSC 
instructors. It is true that they are assigned to the Instructor Training Course and they often do a 
passable job in the classroom, But passable is by no means good enough.‖33 Presumably, an ability to 
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create this favorable classroom environment stood as another attribute. Still, despite having a widely-
recognized instructor training program, one senior faculty member admitted, ―If we are successful 
and if the average instructor is successful in the classroom we are not especially sure why or by what 
means!‖34  
On paper, the College had sufficient personnel to accomplish their mission. Despite having 
the full complement of instructors, faculty workload increased, often to excess. The 1952 Office of 
Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) inspection team noted, ―the average workload of the faculty of 
the Command and General Staff College is 54 hours per week. Under peak conditions, certain 
individuals of the teaching staff are required to work as many as 70 hours in some weeks.‖ As noted 
earlier, an instructor‘s first year was essentially an apprenticeship. A shortage of officers fully versed 
in the college‘s courses and methods shifted the burden of revising and creating lessons onto the 
remaining faculty. Increased hours were expected under wartime conditions, but research into new 
developments, particularly atomic warfare, suffered. A subsequent 1953 staff visit by OCAFF noted, 
―Research appears to be lagging due to the personnel situation and the extremely heavy load of 
rewriting training literature‖ The report expressed particular concern that the section created 
specifically for the purpose of research had ―not yet produced any original thinking because of the 
heavy load imposed by projects assigned by outside agencies.‖ Post‘s report acknowledged the 
general confusion about the nascent Cold War and U.S. defense planning, placing some of the blame 
on lack of direction regarding ―national objectives, national capabilities, and world-wide strategy for 
any future war....‖35 The school requested an increase in instructor spaces to allow ―research on a 
number of projects involving the curriculum.‖36 After initial approval, the augmentation got rejected 
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as part of an overall DA reduction in manpower associated with the new defense budget. In 1954, the 
school reported a shortage of eleven officers, yet the seven instructional departments had nearly 100% 
of their authorizations filled.
37
 A Fifth Army directive in October 1954 to replace military with 
civilians met with astonishment. A draft reclama by CGSC stated the obvious: ―it is most essential 
that the officers not only be of the combat arms but that they also have broad experience, training, and 
background, to include a maximum degree of combat. In none of these positions is it considered 
feasible to substitute a civilian.‖38 
Frequent comments about instructor workload warrant a look into the effort required to 
prepare a lesson under the 1940s system. Upon approval of the Program of Instruction by Army Field 
Forces, the College staff allocated lessons among the five departments, who further distributed lesson 
responsibility to a lesson author. Lesson authorship combined research, writing, marketing, and 
editorial responsibilities. If the subject was new to the coming year‘s curriculum, the author 
researched and wrote the problem from scratch. If he were fortunate, an existing lesson required only 
minor revision and updates. Once a he had drafted the lesson, the author submitted it to the College 
for formal review. Submission involved much more than circulation of a written product for 
comments. Lesson review boards met to see the material as it would be presented in class. Grading 
the presentation would be the Director of the Academic Staff, the department head, a representative 
from the problem‘s functional area (operations, logistics), and possibly a representative from another 
service or a technical branch. College guidance left little room for competing viewpoints. At a July 
1953 staff and faculty meeting, the Commandant reinforced the uniformity required within the school. 
―Two or more departments covering the same particular item must be sure they are presenting the 
same information to the students.‖39 Again, the school‘s desire for uniformity trumped inquiry and 
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debate as a mode of learning. Once the lesson author had satisfied any of the panel‘s concerns, he 
submitted it to the staff for editing and printing.  
As time to present the lesson approached, the author next briefed the instructors responsible 
for the delivery of the lesson. This session would take place not long before the class itself. The 
presentation could be exhaustive, with a review of the intent, visual aids, maps, and, in the case of a 
map exercise, the preferred solution. Depending on the instructors‘ level of familiarity with the 
subject, and their agreement—or lack thereof—with the proposed solution, these sessions could get 
quite emotional. More often though, the review process had smoothed out any points of disagreement 
and the instructors accepted the material. They then begin their own personal preparation to deliver 
the lesson to students.  
At last, the day came to deliver the lesson to students. Instructors busied themselves with last-
minute review of the material, final preparation of their notes, and confirmation that the classroom 
was ready for the students. In what seems to be a standard in military schools, the class lasted for fifty 
minutes. The instructor came in, told a joke (perhaps ―off-color‖), presented around five points, and 
the class took a break. Students absorbed what they could, for they had few opportunities to interact 
with the teacher. Attempting to square what the lecturer said with past professional experience created 
conflict. Officers attempting to reconcile ―a conflict between the fundamentals and doctrine taught at 
the school and the student‘s own experience in combat‖ had little chance of carrying the argument. A 
student‘s personal combat experience counted for little in the classroom.40 Officer-students who 
recognized what the school taught bore no resemblance to the situation in Korea found themselves in 
a difficult situation. If they applied their experiential knowledge to a map exercise, they risked the 
derision of the instructor. In his 1953 Military Review article acquainting students with school 
methods, Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry Joseph O. Gerot admonished the officer selected for Army 
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schools to ―adapt himself quickly to his new surroundings and develop an appreciation of why he is 
being schooled.‖41 Gerot, a CGSC instructor and Korean War veteran himself, reflected intellectual 
intransigence, claiming ―the fundamentals and doctrine taught are sound.‖42 This attitude existed 
among instructors, and it closed off the possibility that the doctrine might be wrong or inappropriate 
to the situation. Gerot concluded, ―Students have been fighting the problem for years—the Army 
schools will continue to teach fundamentals and doctrine.‖ As happened in the classroom, the 
instructor got the last word. The school solution invariably trumped years of combat experience and, 
perhaps, hard-won common sense.
43
 
What did students think of the Leavenworth system? Their perceptions of the curriculum can 
be seen in remarks made at year‘s end. As for depth of instruction, portions of it resembled the 
recitation model in the early American classical curriculum.
44
 ―63 students (12.6%) recommended 
that the extent of memorization now required in order to pass this course be dramatically reduced.‖ 
―Instructors should avoid giving ‗hints‘ as to what is on exams,‖ said one group of respondents, while 
others believed ―that the College [should] tell the student that he will be required to memorize in the 
Regular Course and then guide the student as to what should be memorized.‖ Interestingly, the Henry 
Commission had made a similar observation years earlier: 
But it is difficult to justify such an expenditure when the result is learning certain forms, 
the numbers and names of the paragraphs of an estimate, the characteristics of a 
condition, or the like…. The nature of the curriculum would appear to give such items 
undue significance. More important than learning such details, which the students should 
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be able to learn on their own, is learning when such items are needed, where to locate 




Measuring student achievement proved problematic, as illustrated by the attention directed at the 
topic by all of the formal boards.
46
 The faculty employed curious practices, which approached 
intellectual hazing. ―In previous years the title and scope of examinations has not been announced; 
during the war, not even the time was published.‖ For the Class of 1953, the school made a 
concession, announcing that ―during this school year the College announced the general title and 
scope of examinations in the weekly schedule.‖47  
The exams themselves often confused the students as to what was being tested. Students 
asked for ―Clear specific questions on exams and requirements that do not permit 
misinterpretation.‖48 The Commandant acknowledged that his faculty had a problem in a conference 
with an AFF inspection team. ―The problem of proper evaluation of students was discussed at length 
by General Hodge and General Hodes. The college has new methods of evaluation under study in an 
attempt to insure that only fully qualified graduates are certified as qualified general staff officers. 
Neither General Hodge nor General Hodes consider an academic standing basis alone as sound.‖49 




One finds little improvement in instruction compared to the first Regular Course. During 
lesson delivery, originality, spontaneity, and individualism played little role. Students asked the 
leadership ―prohibit reading from the platform and put more emphasis on the discussion technique.‖ 
The press to cram all of the material in to each 50-minute block meant that ―student discussion [was] 
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stifled by [a] desire not to take from [the] instructor‘s time.‖ If they asked for clarification, students 
feared they may miss exam questions. Students took note of the standardization demanded by the 
departments, saying that ―too many instructors were ‗tied‘ to the lesson plan,‖ offering instead ―that 
the College should require the instructor to thoroughly research his problem then release him from 
following the lesson plan, except as the broadest type of guide.‖ Likewise, the practice of judging 
student work against the school solution led to calls for ―more units whose solution will require more 
imagination by the students.‖ Nearly ten percent of the survey group recommended that ―seminar type 
instruction be adopted.‖51 
After presentation, the final step in the life of a lesson began with the post-instructional 
observations by the instructors about the lessons strengths and weaknesses. The lesson author 
compiled and submitted these to the academic staff for consideration as they prepared the subsequent 
year‘s program of instruction—a process that began in the fall with the start of each new class.52 
Given the limited experience of some faculty and the fact that authors prepared material for 
others to deliver, the labyrinth of checks and balances had some advantages. The structure forced 
lesson authors to put some effort into preparing a polished product, but one with a limited shelf life. 
Some problems with this elaborate system become apparent upon close inspection. After delivery, 
faculty attention turned to the next day‘s material. The delay between the conduct of the lesson in one 
year and the revision in a subsequent year dulled memories. Turnover amongst lesson authors was 
high, breaking the continuity and intellectual underpinnings of a problem, and the requirement for a 
new review each year introduced yet another variable as personal and professional differences from 
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one panel to the next could lead to a shift in emphasis. Further, the ballet of approval, preparation, 
review, was an exercise in just-in-time courseware, as the typing pool could not possibly prepare all 
products in advance of the course. The system had little flexibility to incorporate new material in 
response to recent developments. Internal College personnel moves and the departure of experienced 
instructors each year almost guaranteed that any experience with the subject gained by the present 
year‘s instructors would be diluted as new faces joined the faculty. Lastly, the great effort put into 
revising each lesson on an annual basis took time. Lots of time. Independent research suffered, if it 
occurred at all. Rather than accept this year‘s ―good enough‖ lesson, departments required each 
problem to undergo the cycle again. As a result, the faculty had little time to think about the future. In 
particular, the alterations caused by doctrinal shifts were singled out as an irritant to departments. 
Colonel S.W. Foote claimed that new doctrine caused confusion to students, instructors, and lesson 
authors, declaring ―Changes in doctrine or techniques should be held to the absolute minimum during 
any one academic year.‖53  
As has been mentioned, both the leadership and the school knew that their profession needed 
to adapt. Outside the gates of Fort Leavenworth, America and the world around it had changed.
54
 The 
problem was articulating what to do. Looking inside the school, a 1951 study by the College‘s 
Department of Analysis and Research, led by Colonel Albert S. Britt, examined several problems that 
had arisen after implementation of the Eddy Board reforms. In its conclusion, the study called for 
increased instruction on staff duties at all levels of command. His view represented a distinct shift in 
that CGSC had since World War Two claimed to prepare graduates for command positions. The 
Army continued to assume that graduates, much like had occurred in the Second World War, would 
command divisions and higher units upon mobilization. Britt‘s recommendation was a subtle shift 
concerning the emphasis of the school. To support his position, the study analyzed the Army 
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requirements for graduates. It summarized a new belief that ―the concept that the College ‗prepares 
officers for duty as commanders of division, corps, and army, etc.‘ has contributed to the 
misunderstanding of the true requirements for educating officers at the C&GSC.‖ The study correctly 
observed that the likelihood of a graduate of the course reaching division or corps command was 
small. At the same time, graduates were expected to serve in any number of staff assignments, to 
include Department of the Army staff, immediately upon graduation, but the curriculum‘s wide scope 
prevented coverage of the broad range of staff functions.
55
 More tellingly, Britt recognized that the 
American Army‘s strategic position had changed. The officer corps had a larger reservoir of 
professional experience, and students who might become corps and division commanders in the 
future would serve in a number of developmental positions before assuming command of a large 
tactical unit. Later, in 1953, the Assistant Commandant, Brigadier General Max S. Johnson, would 
make a similar observation for more practical demographic and contingent reasons. ―But as the 
experience level of our students drops, and the complexity of military operations increases, and for 
the short-term future [meaning the Korean War], I believe the major emphasis of our instruction 
should be on the development of capable staff officers.‖56 For the next few years, the pendulum 
would vacillate between one emphasis (staff officer) and the other (large unit command) as Robert 
Doughty noted in his study of the College. 
A second study in the fall of 1951 attempted to help the faculty come to grips with unfamiliar 
aspects of the world situation. Like Lisle A. Rose‘s observation regarding the American public, 
professional officers had sensed a need for change in intellectual direction.
57
 The College staff 
reviewed the Regular Course curriculum at the direction of the College‘s new Assistant Commandant, 
Brigadier General Max S. Johnson. Johnson recognized that future warfare included the potential for 
tactical use of atomic weapons. But this was not his only concern. He wanted study of the Aggressor 
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tactical methods, leadership, and terrain-specific combat to be incorporated into the revised course.
58
 
Led by Colonel R. H. Moore of the G4 staff, a team of officers sought to articulate a suitable 




The Moore study‘s results suggested an attitudinal shift towards a more practical orientation 
for the curriculum. With solidification of the U.S. – Soviet axis, the group proposed updates to the 
curriculum largely derived from a desire to study future situations that might exist. Their 
recommendations anticipated likely shortfalls in U.S. capabilities, and they recommended new 
approaches. Moore thought map exercises against Aggressor forces, set in areas where confrontation 
with the Soviets was deemed likely, would be beneficial to students. In a departure from the World 
War Two experience, he further recommended some situations depict ground operations in the 
absence of air superiority and an orientation towards destroying enemy forces vice capturing terrain.
60
  
The study also uncovered a subtle shift in military mindset. For much of World War Two, the 
U.S. Army had engaged in offensive operations. But Colonel S.W. Foote pointed out the necessity of 
studying defensive operations in more detail. Believing both the Korean War and potential combat 
against the Soviets argued for more extensive study of defensive doctrine, he encouraged the 
committee to retain lessons on defensive operations.
61
 
Despite the changes proposed in the Moore Report, a conservative trait was evident. Moore 
observed that it was too soon to undertake a major reconfiguration of the curriculum with regards to 
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tactical atomic weapons. He pointed out that the subject had not existed a few years prior and that 
study and field experimentation would be necessary before instruction could be developed. He 
observed, ―[I]f all the implications of this [tactical atomic] weapon were definitely known at this time, 
including the required changes in organization, etc…,‖ changes to the curriculum could be made.62 In 
this one instant, it is apparent that the College was not leading the intellectual growth of the Army nor 
was it seeking to participate in shaping the Army‘s future. Yet Moore‘s report had also called for a 
plan to stimulate the intellectual development of officers.
63
 The contradiction inherent in the report 
between institutional caution and a desire for increasing the mental faculties of the student officers is 
difficult to reconcile. Instead of serving as a catalyst to Army thought, the College awaited a more 
concrete definition of its role in the post-World War Two battlefield. As a result, the College accepted 
a lesser role as purveyor of current doctrine with slight attention to the future. 
Adjustments to instructional methods marked one of the few real reforms made during the 
initial postwar period, but a far greater need was a comprehensive curriculum that reflected the 
emerging requirements of the professional officer. Despite the admonitions of the Eddy Board, 
Leavenworth was not forcefully leading change nor, it appears, keeping up with it either. Back in 
1950, Eddy himself had captured half of the issue. General Eddy‘s talk to the Associate Course 
showed how reliant on doctrine his instructors were: 
What of the subject matter? The doctrine we teach is approved Department of the Army 
policy. We are neither Monday morning quarterbacks nor Sunday supplement strategists. 
We would be violating our mission if we taught or propounded unsubstantiated principles 
and methods of war. Yet the significant aspect of our teachings is forward thinking. We 
use World War II only as a line of departure. Throughout all the instruction you receive, 
you will recognize the implication of future warfare—of latest organization, weapons, 
and tactics. At the end of your course you will be called upon to project your thinking far 
into the future. When you are, approach it with confidence founded on your 
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The dilemma of content weighed heavily on the faculty and staff of CGSC. How far could one go 
with projecting the future? By the end of 1950, senior Army leaders, such as Major General James A. 
Gavin, would claim ―the A-bomb is an excellent tactical weapon.‖65 Defining the "body of 
specialized knowledge" unique to the profession in the 1950s became a barrier, for without 
doctrine—the Army education system‘s equivalent of new knowledge—the school could not 
accommodate the future. Boyd Dastrup excused the inaction of the College leadership during the 
Korean War with respect to new fields of study, particularly operations on the atomic battlefield. In 
his view, the Army ―did not have any solid reason to revise the college‘s curriculum and accentuate 
nuclear warfare any more than they were doing.‖66 Dastrup‘s examination, however, neglects the 
evidence supplied by the 1951 internal survey of Regular Course design which demonstrated that the 
officer corps had already concluded that the future no longer resembled the past—or the present.67 
Before renovation could happen, much work had to be done. A growing inability to define the 
nature of modern war had a pronounced effect on the school because of the linkage between doctrine 
and lessons. Slow progress on curricular reform caused a growing education gap between the 
professional needs of officers and the Army‘s situation outside the gates of Fort Leavenworth. In fact, 
ten years would pass between the conclusion of World War Two and first full-blown attempt at 
modernization of the lessons. 
Initial efforts to orient students to current developments came in the form of guest speakers.
68
 
Brigadier General William A. Borden, Director of the War Department‘s New Developments 
Division, addressed the class in January 1946 on the topic of ―Current Developments in Warfare.‖ 
Borden‘s lecture established a pattern which would continue for decades. In order to accommodate 
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new topics or emerging developments, the school would invite a guest speaker to update the students. 
In time, the curriculum might be modified to include a lesson on the subject, if it proved of enduring 
interest and could be squeezed into the curriculum.  
Within the rigid curricular model, the guest speaker program represented one area which had 
flexibility. The guest speaker program served as a conduit from senior government and military 
leaders directly to the students. The extent of the program can be found in a sample of the 1952-53 
series. The staff invited speakers, ranging from university professors to the Army‘s legislative liaison. 
Topics varied widely, but indicate a breadth of professional interest. ―Communism in the United 
States,‖ ―Labor-Management Relations,‖ and ―The Army Information Program‖ contrasted with 
technological updates from the Navy, Air Force, and Army Field Forces. Notably, few lecturers 
discussed war fighting, but those talks that did came from unique perspectives. Retired Lieutenant 
General Raymond McLain gave the students a first-hand view of corps operations, Major General 
(retired) E.H. Harmon lectured on ―Imponderables of the Battlefield,‖ and Brigadier General S.L.A. 
Marshall discussed his view on ―The Human Equation in Combat.‖69 The next year, Congressman 
Dewey Short, Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, spoke to the class on ―Congressional 
Relations.‖ The parade of dignitaries simultaneously enlightened and dulled students.70 ―Col 
Underwoods [sic] ―Land Mine Warfare‖ was not good,‖ wrote one student.‘71 Not all students got the 
benefit of these updates, though, as many of the technology and current event topics were classified.
72
  
In the case of future warfare, the curriculum gradually added a series of lessons to cover new 
material. A few years earlier, the College‘s Assistant Commandant had referred to instruction 
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regarding future warfare as the ―‘Buck Rogers‘ phase.‖73 Reflective both of his times and of a general 
satisfaction about the Army‘s recent experience, Major General Dean‘s quip embodied skepticism of 
the future and a satisfaction with the results of World War Two, which may have been detrimental to 
the needs of professional officers of the fifties. Anticipating changes after the Soviet‘s detonation of 
an atomic weapon, Brigadier General Hartness charged the faculty with a new task. ―The preparation 
of all old and new instructional material will recognize the fact that the United States no longer 
possesses a monopoly on atomic weapons.‖74 Additions to the course indicated the growing belief 
that fighting the Soviet Union on an atomic battlefield was the principal threat. The Foreign Armies 
series included briefings on the military capability of the Soviet Union. Employment of atomic 
weapons had been introduced, and by 1951 the topic had risen to seventy-one hours of class time. The 
school added hours in 1952-53, increasing the total hours of instruction in atomics to 210.
75
 Army 
Field Forces left their 1953 inspection tour impressed with the latest efforts, saying ―Tactical 
employment of special weapons is now thoroughly integrated into the Regular Course.‖76 Students, 
on the other hand, believed atomic weapons needed more emphasis.
77
 For the most part, atomic 
weapon instruction took place in the Special Weapons Course—a specialized program begun in Fiscal 
Year 54 to teach staff officers how to plan the use of atomic weapons in support of ground units.
78
 As 
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union rose in later years, the proportion of lessons 
devoted to, or substantially incorporating, atomic conditions grew at an exponential rate. 
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The Problem of Allies 
Combined warfare was a central feature of the American experience in the Second World 
War. From the resumption of classes after World War Two to the present, one outstanding feature of 
the Regular Course has been the diversity of international representation among the student body. As 
mentioned earlier, the 1946 class had sixty-three foreign officers, representing twenty-one percent of 
the class. This figure is especially significant when measured against the number of U.S. officers of 
the combat arms, for example, who comprised sixty-five percent of the first class. Between 1946 and 
1956, hundreds of international officers graduated from CGSC. Surprisingly, historians have paid 
scant attention to the participation of international students and even less to the unique problems their 
attendance presented to the faculty and leadership. 
In his 1953 letter to the staff and faculty, Major General Hodes explained the importance of 
international representation at CGSC. ―The presence of these Allied officers and their families affords 
us a unique opportunity to further the effective military training of our potential allies; to cultivate 
mutual understanding, respect, and friendships; to contribute to the prestige and admiration of the 
United States Armed Forces, the American people and nation as a whole.‖79 Thus, international 
officer participation at CGSC served U.S. national interests, acting as an extension of diplomatic ties 
between the U.S. and other nations. The school also served symbolic purposes as an icon of national 
prestige. International delegations frequently visited the College. For example, eight officers from 
Central America visited C&GS the week of October 1, 1945.
80
 The role of CGSC as an instrument of 
national diplomacy led Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times, to declare after a 
1949 visit to the College that CGSC had supplanted the German Kriegsakademie and France‘s Ecole 
Superieure de Guerre as ―the international magnets which attracted students from all over the world‖ 
and had become an institution of ―international esteem.‖81 The practice of hosting international 
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dignitaries continued throughout the forties and fifties, but the principal contact between Leavenworth 
and other nations was through the students. 
CGSC drew its authority from a broad range of defense programs tied to U.S. interests.
82
 As 
articulated in a Department of the Army letter, the:  
over-all objectives of the training program for Allied military personnel are to 
supplement and enhance the military training which friendly nations, using their own 
resources and combined training facilities are providing; to undertake selected training 
programs which are in consonance with over-all strategic objectives …; and assist in the 
establishment and standardization of such training and operational procedures as can be 




Foreign attendance at schools served as a barometer of U.S. relations. A disagreement between the 
U.S. and the students‘ home country could affect the student. Partly in response to increased 
diplomatic disagreements over Cold War policies, Chile recalled eleven of the twelve Chilean officers 
attending the First Class of the Regular Course in February 1947.
84
 It would not be the last time 
CGSC played a part in a diplomatic spat between nations. 
International participation was not without its difficulties. Two endemic conditions—
students‘ English language proficiency and classified instruction—concerned the staff and faculty 
from the outset. Other issues, ranging from as student conduct to blatant racism directed at students, 
surfaced periodically, but student English skills and the increasing number of hours devoted to 
sensitive topics weighed on the staff constantly.  
English language skills proved the single largest challenge the school had with international 
officers. The nature of the course, being lecture- and discussion-based, mandated ―not only a 
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minimum ability to read English but in addition some familiarity with spoken English.‖ The writer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Walter R. Bruyere III, went on to say, ―Indeed, this familiarity with spoken 
English is crucial in that more than half of the classroom instruction time is spent in oral 
discussion.‖85  
To assist in managing the problem, the College instituted a screening test for prospective 
students in the early fifties. Officially, test results were intended to be used in preparing courseware 
for the Allied Officers Preparatory Course. However, the College staff clearly desired that potential 
students with substandard English skills be disqualified from attendance. Commenting on the 
situation in 1952-53, Lieutenant Bruyere said that ―thirteen Allied officers in the current Regular 
Course‖ possessed ―completely inadequate English language backgrounds.‖ Thirteen officers 
represented a significant proportion of the foreign contingent.
86
 Clearly the College attempted to limit 
the number of students who would understand little, if any, of the instruction, primarily because it did 
not possess the resources needed for individual attention. Still, students with ―meager‖ English skills 
continued to show up at Leavenworth. 
To improve proficiency in English, the school attempted a number of schemes. One obvious 
remedy was classes in basic English skills. In 1946, ―Classes for Chinese students in pronunciation 
and enunciation of the English Language began last week at the Army YMCA. The classes were 
started at the instigation of Major Roger D. Wolcott of the Command and Staff College.‖87 Two years 
later, Major Peter A. Helfert, who served as Officer in Charge of English instruction in the 1948 
Allied Officers‘ Preparatory Course, knew of the need to improve language proficiency of students. 
Helfert consulted Dr. George B. Smith, Dean of the School of Education at the University of Kansas 
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for guidance. The university provided direct assistance through Professors Cloy S. Hobson and Henry 
P. Smith of the School of Education and Agnes M. Brady, a professor in the Spanish department. 
Together with the dean and Major Helfert, this team revised the language laboratory materials and 
tests, and the team came up with new instructional methods. Helfert judged the venture a success, 
observing ―the new methods used enabled the Allied officers to build up a more comprehensive 
knowledge of English than was possible using the old methods.‖88 After the Korean War, CGSC 
installed a language laboratory to reduce the burden on instructors while increasing the direct 
participation of the foreign officer in the English course.
89
 
On occasion, the postwar school used translators in the classroom, usually for Special 
Associate Courses conducted for officers of a single nation.
90
 This was not without precedent. As the 
wartime Commandant, Truesdell established the ―Latin American Class‖ during his tour. The course 
used a separate group of Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking instructors to breach the language 
barrier.
91
 For the most part, once an international student arrived and joined his fellow U.S. students 
in the Regular Course, the foreign officer was left to his own to cope with the language barrier. 
Leavenworth took positive steps to ease the adjustment to both military and civilian society 
and culture, building an extensive support structure. To supervise administration and acculturation, 
CGSC created an Allied Officer‘s section. Incoming international officers attended a two-part Allied 
                                                     
88
 ―Kansas University Educators Help Reorganize Prep Course,‖ Fort Leavenworth News, August 26, 1949, 1, 4. Quote on page 4. As part 
of the cooperative effort, Major Helfert attended courses in the School of Education, which led to him being awarded a Bachelor‘s degree in 
Education in 1949. He was also elected to Phi Delta Kappa. 
89
 Memorandum to The Adjutant General, ―Installation of Audio-Visual Language Laboratory at Command and General Staff College,‖ Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS, 3 December 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II. The College requested $8,500, later increased to $12,000, for the purchase 
and installation. C.C. Eddleman, G3, Department of the Army to Commandant, Command and General Staff College, Wahington [sic] 25, 
D.C., 30 December 1953. Russell G. Misick to Command General, CONARC, memorandum, ―BINAURAL System of Language Training,‖ 
Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 September 1957 assessed the system‘s effectiveness as satisfactory but only as an augmentation to ―live‖ 
instruction. Box 23, Correspondence, 1953-1958, RG 546, Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NARA II. 
90
 General J. Lawton Collins to Chief, Army Field Forces, memorandum, ―Training of Non-English Speaking ROK Officers in Regular 
Course, CGSC,‖ 5 February 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II. In early 1953, General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, inquired as to 
the feasibility of increasing the quota for Republic of Korea officers. CGSC responded with a proposal to create a parallel course for the 
Korean officers, rather than integrate them in the mainstream course. To do so, CGSC requested ten interpreters, ten instructors, and an 
additional $56, 310 to cover printing and supplies unique to this initiative, which never materialized. F.W. Farrell to Chief, Army Field 
Forces, Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, Washington, DC, 13 January 1953, Box 2, RG 
546, NARA II. The Department of the Army preferred integration of the ROK officers into the Regular Course. CGSC‘s previous 
experience with Korean officers led Colonel James M. Lamont, School Secretary, to respond regarding the plan, saying ―Past experience 
has shown that only about one-third of the ROKA officers selected to attend the Regular Course have had, in the opinion of this College, 
sufficient knowledge of the English language to obtain maximum benefit from the course of instruction.‖ James M. Lamont to Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G3, Department of the Army, ―Selection of Republic of Korea Officers to Attend 1954-1955 Regular Course, CGSC,‖ Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS, 9 December 1953, Box 2, RG 546, NARA II. 
 85 
 
Officer Preparatory Course, with non-native English speakers participating in the first part and all 
new allied officers attending the second. During the preparatory course, Fort Riley hosted the 
international officers, exposing them to U.S. soldiers training in the field.
92
 At the beginning of the 
school year, Allied officers attended a reception hosted by the Commandant. One such reception took 
place on September 14, 1947 with fifty allied officers from 22 nations present. This practice became 
part of the rhythm of the new academic year.
93
 Throughout the school year, international officers 
went on cultural trips— Swift and Company, Quaker Oats Factory, and Topeka. The Allied Officer‘s 
Section did the best it could to showcase American military, industrial, and cultural achievements. 
Unsurprisingly, learning and living in a foreign country overwhelmed some students. Some 
problems were of the officers‘ own making. Simple things, like a request for a rug for bachelor‘s 
quarters, might spark general officer involvement. When a Republic of Korea (ROK) major general 
removed a rug from another room, the backlash led to an American general familiar with the situation 
to opine that ―race characteristics‖ and ―differences in opinion‖ may have accounted for the officer‘s 
actions, adding ―it would be well to provide a rug if possible.‖94  
Adjustments to the curriculum to accommodate international officers varied. With the support 
of the Allied Officer‘s section, most foreign students managed to complete the coursework and 
graduate, even ahead of their American peers. At times, the school ignored the issue, adding hours for 
topics that by necessity excluded international officers. Two subjects—intelligence and atomic 
warfare—formed the bulk of classified topics. As early as 1947, Lieutenant General Gerow 
commented, ―The presence of foreign students at the Command and Staff College makes the teaching 
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of Intelligence somewhat restricted even in the common instruction period. This, however, is not a 
serious difficulty and can be satisfactorily handled.‖95  
Unfortunately, the issue would become an obstacle as the Cold War expanded and the Army 
became more involved with the atomic battlefield.
96
 Classified lessons comprised only fraction of the 
early curriculum, but the number of hours slowly increased, reaching several hundred hours in 1951, 
thereby reducing the time international officers spent in the classroom alongside their U.S. 
counterparts. As this practice grew, the school leadership sought to accommodate the significant 
number of international officers by restricting the hours of classified instruction or developing 
alternative activities. By 1951, allies and classified lessons had entered a state of near crisis. The 
1951-52 curriculum covered classified subjects in 230 of its 1278 hours. Not all of the material 
touched on atomic weapons. Hours devoted to confidential or higher instruction included guest 
speakers, USSR, research and development, U.S. naval operations, joint operations, and a briefing 
from the Korea Observer Team. Allied officers attended ―substitute activities‖ during 173 hours, 
leaving a 27 percent gap. On the heels of the Moore Report discussed earlier, the College had 
proposed in October 1951 to nearly triple the number of classified hours to approximately 600 for the 
1952-53 session. To have done so would have halved the course for allied participants. In recognition 
of the looming problem, Colonel Karl Eklund and Lieutenant Colonel W.E. Showalter of the College 
faculty prepared an extensive study ―to recommend measures to reduce the adverse effect on allied 
officer instruction at C&GSC caused by an increasingly classified curriculum.‖ Lowering the October 
estimate, they still found that a fifty percent increase was necessary, amounting to 389 hours, as the 
school implemented recommendations from the Moore Report. The writers noted that classified 
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content meant classified examinations, which would exclude allied officers, and concluded that the 
eventual result of such a program would affect the present system of class rankings.
97
 
The authors showed sensitivity to CGSC‘s role in furthering U.S. defense pacts and treaties. 
Eklund and Showalter also acknowledged the legislative mandates that applied to the situation at 
Leavenworth. The study mentions both NATO and the Rio Pact specifically. Unfortunately, the 
school had a dilemma: should the curriculum meet U.S. officers‘ needs by covering ―new 
developments, and current doctrine and tactics in all fields, with special emphasis on those fields 
undergoing rapid evolutionary development,‖ or should the school ―provide a C&GSC curriculum 
which, insofar as the allied officers are concerned, will help foster the objectives of the program 
under which the allied officers are C&GSC students‖? The two officers concluded that the objectives 
were mutually exclusive and that the decision lay outside CGSC‘s domain.98 
The next spring, an Army Field Forces‘ inspection team noted, ―The inclusion in the 
curriculum of increased amounts of instruction in classified matters presents a major problem 
regarding the training of Allied students.‖99 The rising proportion of classified instruction led the 
Department of the Army to propose that foreign officers only get a certificate of attendance, which 
was later amended to say that foreign students would get the same diploma annotated with ―Allied 
course of instruction.‖ The obvious implication being ―Due to the substantial difference in course 
content, as presented to US and Allied officers, it is apparent that the Allied officers will be 
prohibited from meeting in full the training standards set for US military personnel.‖100 
The Eklund staff study resulted in little accommodation for international officers who 
received a cursory introduction to the effects of atomic weapons in 1953-54, but only after the 
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approval of Army Field Forces.
101
 The central problem of an increasingly classified curriculum 
reflective of developments in modern warfare and a need to remain engaged with allies through 
military education remained unsolved. 
International student participation in classroom activities formed another point of concern. 
Perhaps due to the size of the class or limited English skills, foreign students did not contribute as 
frequently as their U.S. counterparts. College leadership took note of the disparity and called for more 
international officer input during discussions. At the September 26, 1953 staff and faculty briefing, 
Colonel Coutts ―directed that instructors call upon the Allied Officers in their particular classes to 
answer questions and enter into discussion pertinent to the subject material being presented.‖102  
For those students—both U.S. and international—who took the time to bridge the cultural 
gap, the professional relationships established could prove valuable. Allied officer participation in the 
course furthered national purposes, and the Allied officers at the Regular Course benefitted from 
association with a full-time faculty and the best curriculum the Army could provide. 
Second Class Citizens 
That was not the case with regard to another constituency. The opportunity to attend CGSC in 
residence was not universal. By design, only half of the Regular Army officers would get a seat. 
Enrollment of about 250 U.S. Army officers in the first class represented a small portion of the total 
officer strength. Not only did the Army face a surfeit of Regular Army officers without staff college 
credit, civilian component officers of the Organized Reserve, Army of the United States, and National 
Guard theoretically required mid-career professional development. For reserve component officers, 
the chances were miniscule. The composition of the first Regular Course shows that only a fraction of 
U.S. Army officers in the class came from the Organized Reserve (4.3%), the National Guard (1.9%), 
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and the Army of the United States (1.5%).
103
 By the third Regular Course in 1948-49, the proportion 
had fallen to 2.1% allocated to Organized Reserve officers and 1.1% for National Guard, balanced 
slightly by an increase of over 100 spaces in the course. 
The disparity in opportunity came about in part due to the larger problem of providing a mid-
career education to the full-time force. The ten-month course could not satisfy the demand. Various 
schemes to reach part-time officers and the unfortunate lower half of the Regular Army were tried 
over the years, with three principal methods used in the postwar period: an Associate Course, which 
was a condensation of the Regular Course, taught at Leavenworth, lasting four months; a Special 
Associate Course, attended by reserve officers alternating between weekends and two-week summer 
periods and usually taught by part-time faculty at a U.S. Army Reserve school site; and an Extension 
Course, which used the correspondence method. One variation of the Special Associate Course 
alternated extension courses with two-weeks at a USAR school. 
The first Associate Course began January 6, 1947.
104
 Responsibility for the abbreviated 
curriculum, intended for National Guard and Reserve officers and Air Force and Navy officers, fell 
on the existing faculty, as the Associate Course ran concurrently with the latter half of the Regular 
Course. The structure of this new program was similar to the long course, but compressed, with 
proportionally more time spent in the specialized track. Students had one month of common subjects 
with the remainder of the course taught by one of the four schools, and the last week of the course had 
a combined phase.
105
 The expressed intent of the classes was ―to prepare officers for duty as 
commanders and staff officers at division and higher levels and to keep them up to date as to what is 
happening in the Army.‖106 
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The War Department selected student-officers using criteria similar to that of the Regular 
Course: U.S. reserve and national guard officers; no older than 41 years; minimum of seven years 
commissioned service; graduate of a branch advanced course (regular or associate), or equivalent 
wartime experience.
107
 The course had a capacity of 200 officers, but the first session registered only 
155 of which 131 officers actually attended.
108
 Students‘ ranks corresponded to that in the Regular 
Course, but the average time in service, according to Fort Leavenworth News, was five years, nine 
months, well below the seven years set as a prerequisite for selection (table 2). Reflecting the 




Table 2. Student Ranks, Associate Classes, 1946-1950 
 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 
Brigadier General   1  
Colonel 7 24 6 20 
Lieutenant Colonel 59* 72 48 69 
Major 46 46 55 61 
Captain 12 9 18 25 
First Lieutenant 1   2 
Allied 6 (Brazil)  2 (Siam)  
Source: Breakdown of the first associate class,110 Second Associate class,111 Fourth Associate Class.112 
In the succeeding two years, the College presented additional Associate Courses. The second 
began about the time of Gerow‘s departure on January 5, 1948 with 151 students; it ended April 3.113 
In January 1949, the third course started, enrolling 130 students, again from the reserve component 
(table 3). A fourth course began under Eddy‘s tenure in 1950. Eddy used the occasion to express his 
dissatisfaction with the course, writing General Mark W. Clark that ―Not only this year‘s Associate 
Class, but preceding post war Associate Classes fully confirms my belief that the government is not 
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receiving commensurate return from the time, effort and money spent on conducting these classes.‖ 
He continued his criticism saying, ―over half the class ―do[es] not meet the existing eligibility 
requirements.‖ While the Army had taken more care to screen Regular Course officers, the opposite 
occurred with the Associate Course. Eddy went on to complain that field commanders did not 
adequately review the records of potential students, sending over-age officers or those with 
inadequate military education. Eddy did, however, offer a solution in the form of an equivalent course 
to meet the needs of civilian component officers.
114
 
Table 3. Component, Associate Classes, 1946-1949 
Component 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 
Office Reserve Corps 98 115 91 
National Guard 25 34 37 
AUS 1 2  
Other 7  2 
Source: Breakdown of the first associate class;115 116 Second Associate class.117 
Who attended the Associate Course changed dramatically by 1952. In October 1952, Major 
General Hodes asked for approval to combine the short-lived General Staff Officer with the Associate 
Course, citing the significant overlap between the content of the two courses.
118
 In a report prepared 
for Major General Hodes, the college staff found: 
The composition of the resident AC&GSO Classes has changed markedly during the 
post-war period. The first two classes were made up entirely of non-EAD officers. About 
25% of the classes in 1949 and 1950 were EAD officers. In the past two classes, about 




Hodes agreed, and asked AFF for permission to modify the Associate Course. The following spring, 
the Army‘s G3, C.D. Eddleman, concurred. The revised program had twelve weeks of common 
instruction and an additional four weeks of instruction oriented on either the combat division or 
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logistical commands. In the new Associate Course, half of the students would go into each.
120
 The 
resulting two-track approach was reminiscent of the first postwar Regular Courses. It was also an 
intense experience. One assessment concluded: ―Associate course students reported the course 
presented a ‗too much in too little time‘ complex.‖ Responding to their concerns, the College said it 
was ―revising this program and ‗slowing down‘ the course.‖121 
In announcing the change, the Department of the Army reallocated seats between the regular 
and reserve components. At the time, the Army had to devise a suitable means to reduce the number 
of officers who did not have credit for the staff college. One means was to increase the course‘s 
throughput by funneling officers through the Associate Course. From 100 percent representation in 
the first three courses, reserve officers dropped to a fraction of the available spaces when the revised 
course began in August 1953 at Leavenworth. 
 In addition to the Associate Course taught by Leavenworth faculty, a parallel school system 
run by numbered armies attempted to reach the large number of National Guard and Organized 
Reserve officers who did not have the opportunity to attend a longer course. ―In the fall of 1948; this 
Office [OCAFF G3] started a series of Army Area Schools which provide the individual student with 
two weeks instruction each year for a period of three years.‖122 The number of officers enrolling in 
these courses seemed impressive. A 1949 estimate prepared by Army Field Forces Adjutant General 
claimed that 1,754 officers would attend the first phase, while 1,421 would study Phase II lessons. 
Once established, the Army Area schools became Lieutenant General Eddy‘s justification for a 
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request to General Clark to close the Leavenworth Associate Course, believing that the Special 
Associate Course now filled the educational need for civilian component officers.
123
 
CGSC considered these campuses to be satellites, and Leavenworth provided instructional 
material, including the examinations. Instructors at the USAR schools issued examinations prepared 
and graded by full-time faculty, according to a 1949 CGSC letter to Army Field Forces. Two reasons 
underlay this measure. At the time, the school had no idea what would constitute a passing grade, 
since the course had never been taught under these conditions. In order to establish the minimum 
score, the CGSC staff would grade all examinations and establish a cutoff score based upon the 




The College faculty and staff engaged the USAR schools in two ways—inspection trips and 
instructor training. Oversight of numbered army schools demanded significant effort on the part of 
CGSC staff. In addition to their own teaching duties, the College detailed officers to observe 
instruction at the USAR locations. Inspection reports found the schools adhered to the lesson plans 
and instructional methods used at Leavenworth. For example, Lieutenant Colonel O.K. Marshall 
concluded ―The instruction observed was in consonance with the doctrine taught at this College‖ after 
his late January 1950 visit to a Phase I course at the Presidio of San Francisco.
125
 Likewise, 
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Francis reported that ―the classrooms and the instruction observed 
compared favorably with the facilities and instruction at this College.‖126 
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Leavenworth itself engaged in teaching the two-week Phase I and II courses in 1949. This 
was a move, however, not without controversy, as some commanders of the numbered armies 
perceived this as a threat to their own schools. Concern over the initiative led Lieutenant General 
Gerow, who now commanded Second Army, to write General Devers in April 1949. In his letter, 
Gerow objected to the initial reports that ―all resident instruction at the C&GSC level for civilian 
component officers be given at the College at Fort Leavenworth in lieu of conducting the Special 
Course in the Army areas.‖ Gerow maintained that ―This training [Second Army‘s course] has been 
well presented by the short-tour Reserve and National Guard instructors and has been well received 
by the students.‖ Gerow concluded with a handwritten note, telling Devers ―Many student officers 
have told me they can attend and still keep in contact with their businesses by telephone and through 
weekend conferences. This they could not do at Leavenworth.‖ Gerow‘s request and Dever‘s 
subsequent acknowledgement show early hints of a desire for a more flexible system for professional 
development. The challenge of educating a citizen army in modern warfare required methods akin to 
the regimental system that existed in a prior century, albeit larger and more formalized.  
Employing part-time faculty presented unique challenges. Oftentimes, instructors could not 
absent themselves from civilian employment, leaving the school short qualified faculty.
127
 Typical of 
the faculty at USAR Schools was First Army‘s cadre at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The staff of 




Instructor training for reservists took place periodically, often at Fort Leavenworth. These 
courses tended to be subject-oriented, rather than skill improvement courses like the instructor 
training course provided to resident faculty. In July 1949, a letter from Army Field Forces‘ 
headquarters to the numbered armies announced a Phase I Instructor Training Course to be held at 
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The effectiveness of the early USAR schools is difficult to judge. As noted earlier, Gerow 
believed them to be on par with the resident course. Shortfalls in producing the desired outcome 
appeared a few years later, after the enthusiasm for the initial courses subsided. Students who enrolled 
often did not complete the course. One Army commander recommended consolidating the numbered 
army schools in 1953, as the effort did not merit the resources.
130
 Despite CGSC‘s effort to support 
the faculty, special associate courses did not result in a large increase in CGSC graduates among 
reserve component officers. 
The lag in special associate courseware relative to resident course formed a constant concern. 
Leavenworth-based instructors had the advantage in both priority and proximity. Revising the 
Regular Course required one year. New material selected for inclusion in the offsite courses usually 
required modification to meet the circumstances of the USAR schools. Special associate course 
instructors often had to wait an additional year to receive updated material, if they got it at all. Lastly, 
curricular dynamics at Leavenworth would often supersede the previous year‘s modifications, 
rendering ongoing changes to the special associate courses irrelevant. Given that the USAR School 
functioned on a two- or three-year cycle, students and faculty could find themselves several years 
behind their peers at the resident course.
131
 In part, the explanation can be found in the sparse 
resources devoted to the preparation of courseware. 
The last of the three major staff college adjuncts—the extension or non-resident course—
enrolled about from 10,000 to 15,000 officers at one point, which was a disproportionate share of the 
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officer corps. Yet this program had the fewest assets. Much of the work supporting the Special 
Associate Courses came from the extension course section, who served as the coordinator of 
production and the registrar and support for enrollees. As such, the section was chronically 
understaffed. For example, the 1953 department director had nine lesson authors to cover 21 
subcourses, totaling 210 lessons, for the USAR schools and Special Associate Courses, plus extension 
course material.
132
 Officers assigned to the section served principally as authors, since faculty from 




For the student, the course could be intimidating. Periodically, the non-resident section would 
mail the student a box of books, manuals, and oftentimes maps. The officer had few, if any, 
opportunities to interact with fellow students, usually completing the lessons in isolation. Once 
finished, the student mailed the solution to Leavenworth. And he waited. 
By intention, often aggravated by neglect due to lack of resources, the scaled-down versions 
of the Regular Course imparted the basic knowledge needed to function as a staff officer on a general 
staff, barely. As a general feature, the courses did not cover the same scope as the longer resident 
course, usually focusing on a single echelon, usually the division. Educating a citizen-army proved a 
difficult task, as reserve component officers seldom got the same content, quality, and depth of 
instruction afforded the lucky fifty percent of their peers in the Regular Army. The trend towards 
mass professional education paralleled that seen in civilian institutions in the 1960s, similar to the 
explosion in community colleges and the seedier complement, proprietary diploma mills. 
Toward a New Era 
So what had transpired over the course of these turbulent years? In his critique of the 
pernicious effect of bureaucracy on academia, Frederick Rudolph said that one must ―get beyond 
process and consider some of the concrete results.‖ For the early College, the results were decidedly 
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unsatisfactory. The school‘s status had declined to the point that wartime commanders in Korea 
openly questioned whether CGSC was achieving one of its primary goals—―to prepare officers for 
duty on the general staff of division, corps, army, and comparable levels in the communications 
zone.‖134 Major General Williston (Willy) B. Palmer, X Corps commander in Korea, wrote the CGSC 
Commandant in 1951: ―I don‘t know how well you train your students to do my job, all I know is you 
don‘t train them very well to do their job.‖135 Perhaps unfairly, Palmer‘s caustic remark shifted blame 
to Leavenworth, rather than the individual officer who certainly played some role in the incident, but 
a growing number of senior leaders (and graduates) began to view Leavenworth with suspicion. 
While a lonely anecdote, Palmer‘s perception that the school had fallen short reflected a growing 
frustration with the School‘s graduates. 
The role of CGSC's various higher headquarters is largely ignored in institutional histories 
and academic historical studies; yet they form an important link in the school‘s evolution. The 
school‘s relationship to higher authority, and the degree of autonomy, shifted over time with the War 
Department G3, Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces, Fifth Army, and Continental Army 
Command exercising direct supervision of the College during the forties and fifties. Additionally, 
Army personnel managers, civilian agencies, other academic institutions, and civilian experts began 
to exert influence on the school‘s curriculum. While the school‘s bureaucratic traits moderated 
responsiveness to external directives and suggestions, significant changes did occur as a result of 
external findings and decrees. 
Early compromises made in the name of inter-service cooperation saddled the College with 
conflicting roles. Perhaps most significant was the War Department directive to teach the content of 
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two courses, while allocated time was insufficient for even one. The use of specialized courses to 
meet the War Department specifications was roundly criticized later and eventually abandoned. The 
overwhelming task of teaching material applicable to all levels of the Army from the perspective of 
both command and staff positions diverged from the school‘s former role of educating officers for 
division, corps and army staff positions.
136
 Later, the elimination of the specialized track in 
conjunction with the Army War College‘s revival in 1950, while needed, arrested progress at a 
critical juncture. The energy devoted by the Commandant and his staff to solving administrative 
problems had an adverse effect on the quality of the instruction at the College. 
The underlying assumption of the Gerow Board and the War Department presumed a 
continuation of the current War Department structure. The War Department‘s imperfect 
understanding of the radical changes that would occur in defense structure after enactment of the 
National Security Act of 1947 resulted in more delays in implementing a workable scheme. The 
Army itself lacked a clear vision. That any institution would expend the amount of effort the Army 
did between 1946 and 1956 studying officer education underscores the importance it placed upon 
educating the officer corps. Extensive study, however, did not lead to a corresponding increase in 
effectiveness of instruction.  
The school experienced internal trials as it restarted the traditional Regular Course. The 
Commandant, staff, and instructors of the Command and General Staff College dealt with numerous 
organizational issues in the first five years following the end of World War Two. Reflecting the 
immediacy of the task, the 1946 faculty adopted shortcuts in educational methods that allowed the 
development of in-depth instructor expertise at the expense of student learning. Only with outside 
assistance, and the determined effort of a knowledgeable Commandant, did the instructors adopt 
practices slightly more reflective of contemporary educational recommendations. Lieutenant General 
Eddy‘s tenure was significant, not only to the College but also to the overall officer education system. 
Unfortunately, the resumption of the Army War College and Korean War diverted attention from 
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reforming the curriculum, thereby reducing the potential benefits of the Eddy Board‘s 
recommendations to the College.  
Organizational turmoil and uncertainty about the College‘s basic mission inhibited study and 
consideration of the Army‘s real challenges. The College‘s institutional memory was short-lived. 
Army personnel policies assigned faculty to the College for three years. With few, if any, civilian 
faculty, the effect created by this policy appeared to be one of institutional inertia except when a 
Commandant forced change. The institution exhibited a basic bureaucratic trait when faced with 
uncertainty. ―When not sure what to do - reorganize!‖ best describes the reaction to many of its 
challenges. The near-continuous internal reorganization of the College consumed an enormous 
amount of time and resources. 
Like the leadership, the quality of students and faculty varied. Clearly, the officer corps had a 
broad range of intellectual capabilities, reflected in both the achievements and failures of the faculty 
and students. For the most part, faculty members in the immediate postwar period were of high 
quality, reflecting the selection process used by the College. But they were not exceptional as a rule, 
especially after two years of turnover. More tellingly, student officers represented the full span of 
officer talent. Most passed, but some failed. Tentative steps towards screening out the less-talented 
officers met with resistance, as the Career Management Division delegated responsibility to the 
branches. CGSC had little control over admissions, although it made attempts to shape the selection 
process to reduce student failures. Pressure mounted to modify the increasingly anachronistic system 
of student rankings, given the heterogeneous nature of the student body. 
What to teach confounded the leadership more than how to teach. Uncertainty ruled. 
Research and the corresponding growth of professional knowledge seemed unable to keep up with 
developments in military technology. In general, the College faculty exhibited hesitancy to adopt new 
methods or to attempt to predict some part of the future. The jarring effects of the atomic era on the 
officer corps are evident in the College faculty‘s reluctance to develop a curriculum based on their 
perception of the future. Neither the army nor the college faculty could assimilate and act upon 
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external events before a new series of questions reset the standard for professional knowledge. 
Leaders and faculty recognized their requirement was to produce officers capable of fulfilling duties 
ten years in the future, and military professionals judged the content as increasingly irrelevant to the 
future. Not until 1956 would the College take steps towards orienting the curriculum towards the 
future, and even then, it only embraced a fraction of modern war. 
The Command and General Staff College remained rooted in the past, teaching lessons based 
upon World War Two experience. With so much uncertainty, the faculty chose to look to the past 
rather than attempt to predict or incorporate future patterns of warfare. An inherently conservative 
organization faced with tremendous change and uncertainty about the future transposed the problem 
to other military organizations which it perceived as more capable of predicting the future. 
Incremental change, rooted partially in the slow rhythms of educational bureaucracy, became the 
norm for the College. The centralized process used by the College to manage the education of officers 
in the postwar period reflected the most gloomy of Rudolph‘s observations. Impetus for change came 
less from instructor initiative than external studies and forced organizational changes. Internal 
developments and decisions within the college drove little of the adaptation that took place in the 
preceding ten years, but the new strategic situation provided the backdrop and, eventually, the next 





Forward Progress, Slowly, 1954-1963 
The great trouble with starting anything new is to break away from the conservative 
policy of those who have gone before.  
 
Brigadier General William Mitchell 
 
Aboard the USS Blue Ridge on July 1, 1946, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G. 
Russell donned his safety glasses, darkening the morning sun. Moments later, a second, manmade sun 
rose over the horizon. Test Able of OPERATION CROSSROADS had begun. Russell, a CGSC 
logistics instructor, reported to his wife that he was ―surprised at the mildness of the shock and flash‖ 
of the first Bikini Atoll test that summer. Russell spent the next few weeks inspecting the blast-
damaged vessels and cruising the South Pacific before his ship returned to the lagoon for Test Baker. 
He became something of a minor celebrity upon his return to Fort Leavenworth, for he had personally 
witnessed the first peacetime test of America‘s new military weapon.1 Vicariously, CGSC had joined 
the atomic age. A few months later, Major General Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General of the 
Manhattan Project, spoke to the 1946-47 Regular Course students on ―Atomic Operations.‖2 The first-
hand experience of the faculty and visits by guest lecturers proved interesting, but their individual 
experience meant little to a military community whose view of warfare came from other battlefields.  
In these early years, atomic warfare topics appeared as add-ons and did not bring substantial 
change to the underlying philosophy espoused via the curriculum. At the tactical level, the division, 
corps, and field army, and conventional combat, remained the centerpiece of tactical instruction. As 
early as 1949, the Eddy Board, created to study officer education, emphasized the need for more 
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effort in this area. The faculty had good reason for the delay, since doctrinal and policy changes 
obscured the future.  
During 1950-54, the role of land forces in national defense became increasingly ambiguous. 
Historian Russell Weigley, closing his discussion about the Korean War and the Truman 
Administration, wrote that ―the acknowledged first purpose of American military strategy was now 
not to use combats but to deter adversaries from initiating combat.‖3 The change in presidential 
administrations in 1953, largely a result of the Korean War, brought more uncertainty. The 
Eisenhower Administration‘s policy of ―massive retaliation‖ and NSC 162/2, released in October 
1953, emphasized nuclear deterrence and air power. As Andrew Bacevich discussed in The Pentomic 
Era, the ―New Look‖ relegated land forces to the margins.4 By 1954, even students at CGSC had 
begun to ask, ―What is the Army‘s Story?‖5 
Instructors had little factual information upon which to base lessons, causing a gap to open 
between policy, technology, doctrine, and curriculum.
6
 Faculty tried to anticipate technological and 
strategic events in the first five years of the 1950s, but the missing component—knowledge as 
expressed in doctrine—hampered their efforts. The faculty attempted to maintain pace with 
technological developments, importing information and concepts from the Weapons System 
Evaluation Group, for example, but secrecy shrouded ongoing experiments.
7
 Instructors‘ projections 
of how to use atomic weapons relied on conjecture. Two faculty members, Colonel G.C. Reinhardt 
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and Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kintner published a text in 1953, Atomic Weapons in Land 
Combat, which represented their thoughts about land warfare in the atomic age.
8
 Not until 1954 did 
the College faculty, under Major General Garrison Davidson, begin to consider seriously how to 
integrate atomic weapons into lessons. The same year the Army published its concepts in the Field 
Service Regulations.
9
 Now, the College faculty had an official basis upon which to update their 
curriculum. The Army‘s senior leadership, however, wanted more.10 
Major General Lionel C. McGarr arrived at Fort Leavenworth in 1956 with guidance to get 
things moving at what many senior leaders were viewing as a sleepy, hidebound institution. As 
Commandant, McGarr swept aside the previous curriculum, directing a wholesale re-write of the 
course. McGarr‘s actions marked the culmination of the atomic battlefield‘s influence on the 
curriculum. Alongside the steps toward the integration of atomic warfare, the Army‘s Chief of Staff 
unveiled a new concept of limited war, one which would become the Army‘s preferred perspective.11 
McGarr took all of this into account, endorsing a more inclusive, expansive view of war. He directed 
significant changes to instructional methods, the non-resident effort, and he attempted to increase the 
quality of the faculty. 
Both Davidson and McGarr dealt with the accumulated stresses of technological, 
organizational, and conceptual shifts during their tours. When McGarr left for Vietnam in 1960, he 
left behind an institution transformed in many respects. He was one of few officers to place his 
personal imprint upon the College. His successor, Major General Harold K. Johnson, faced a new 
situation. Johnson would have to lead the College staff and faculty through yet another strategic shift 
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and its accompanying doctrinal and organizational changes. At the beginning of this period, nine 
years had passed since World War Two, and little had changed. Over the ensuing nine years, the 
College‘s leadership, prompted or prodded, by outsiders, would establish a new vision for the mid-
career education of professional officers. In retrospect, what occurred was not revolutionary, but it 
was certainly different from the preceding situation. 
Estimate of the Educational Situation 
Garrison H. Davidson‘s arrival at Fort Leavenworth signaled a new era, for ―Gar‖ Davidson 
was not a Leavenworth graduate. Davidson assumed command from acting Commandant Brigadier 
General Charles E. Beauchamp in the summer of 1954, eight years after the Bikini Atoll tests.
12
 As 
happened frequently, the new Commandant inherited a curriculum, and its underlying educational 
philosophy, shaped if not wholly determined by his predecessor. The proposed 1954-55 Regular 
Course consisted of forty-two weeks and 1,688 hours of instruction. Staff functions; division, corps, 
and field army operations; joint operations, along with instruction in other services‘ procedures; and 
logistics in large units filled the academic day. Classified instruction accounted for a reduced 
percentage (about 10%) of the lessons, and study of atomic warfare was given twenty-three hours.
13
 
Regular Course map problems considered a non-atomic situation the norm. General management 
training (amounting to eight hours) had been added at the direction of the Comptroller of the Army.
14
 
Eligibility requirements had not changed much from those established for the 1946-47 class (Regular 
Army or reserve officer on active status, at least eight but no more than fifteen years service, fewer 
than 41 years of age, have completed a branch advanced course, a top secret clearance, and 
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professional potential). U.S. officers competed for one of approximately 525 spaces in each Regular 
Course class. Since the 1954-55 curriculum had been approved by his predecessor and written by the 
course authors, Davidson settled in to observe and learn about the inner workings of the school.  
As he watched, Davidson discerned the faculty‘s reluctance to move ahead, rooted partly in 
uncertainty about the future. Confusion among the faculty was understandable, given the situation 
described in Robert T. Davis‘ The Challenge of Adaptation. The Korean Armistice had recently taken 
effect, the President‘s National Security Council had issued new strategic guidance, the Army‘s 
planned share of future military budgets and manpower had shrunk, early experiments with atomic 
artillery showed potential, and the Army had revised its doctrine.
15
  
The curricular content of the Regular Course had remained static for nearly eight years, and 
along with it, the content of the non-resident courses. The College had no long-range plan. Further, it 
had no vision as to how it might adapt course content to the future as defined by the Army‘s 1954 
Field Service Regulations or the strategic environment outlined in NSC 68.
16
 Curricular planning took 
place on a year-to-year basis, with the sequence beginning in the late summer or early fall. Given 
their three-year production cycle, the non-resident and extension courses were in baleful condition. 
At the prompting of Dr. Birrer, Davidson asked Army Field Forces and the Department of the 
Army for authorization to revisit the College‘s status, using an independent body similar to the Henry 
Commission. Davidson‘s request did not come to fruition for nearly two years.17 In the expectation of 
an outside assessment, Davidson busied the staff and department heads with an internal review, 
creating five ad hoc study groups. Recalling the Eddy Board recommendation to rewrite the CGSC 
curriculum to emphasize atomic warfare, Davidson asked his senior faculty for a broad assessment of 
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the school in September 1954.
18
 Committees considered methods of instruction, questions of 
curricular scope, and a means to increase the school‘s contributions to doctrinal research.19 The 
findings of these ad hoc groups are remarkable, for they uncovered myriad issues within the 
institution.  
Major General Davidson expressed apprehension that the College might be preparing officers 
to fight the last war when the nature of warfare had changed. The Eisenhower administration‘s New 
Look strategy and the new Field Service Regulation added to Davidson‘s concerns.20 To achieve 
some clarity, the Commandant asked infantry Colonel E.F. Easterbrook, head of Department III, for 
an assessment of the ―quality and scope‖ of the College‘s instruction on atomic warfare.21 
Easterbrook‘s study confirmed Davidson‘s suspicions: the College‘s lessons had little material on the 
Soviets and atomic conflict.
22
 
Another committee, led by Colonel J.H. Skinner, looked at instructional methods. Dr. Birrer 
secured an appointment to this panel, and he successfully argued for a three-phase curriculum – a 
crawl-walk-run approach to presenting instruction.
23
 This feature, embedded in the Skinner Report, 
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contained seeds of far-reaching import. Upon this foundation, Birrer and future commandants would 
build a new curricular model along the lines of the concentration-distribution model in use by many 
American universities. The Commandant adopted the proposal in his planning guidance for the 1955-
56 curriculum.
24
 As future practitioners, Davidson wanted the students to gain experience making 
tactical decisions. Affirming the value of the applicatory method, the Commandant stated: ―The 
applicatory exercises are applied to reasonably complicated tactical and logistical problems that 
require the student to solve problems that become progressively more complex and include a problem 
on the development of future organization, tactics and doctrine.‖ He made clear that faculty should 
not teach new material during this final period, ―‖no additional information is given to the student 
during this phase,‖ meaning the student should be developing their professional judgment through 
application—not sitting in a lecture hall taking notes.25 
The committees continued their work through the fall of 1954 and on into 1955. The 
deliberations reflect disagreement across the departments about student evaluation and the optimum 
organization for the school. In January 1955, Major General Davidson gathered his department heads 
and other faculty to debate the role of the College vis-à-vis preparation for command duty or staff 
positions. The problem of providing an education that equipped an officer for future duties had 
plagued the faculty for years because of the requirement to teach published doctrine. Davidson sought 
a way to orient the instruction towards the future. At one point, General Davidson asked: ―If you are 
just teaching a commander or staff officer current duties, techniques, and tactics, are you adequately 
preparing him for future command 10 years from now when he will be faced with new developments 
in tactics, and new technique?‖26 One conference participant, Colonel Gavin, remarked that the 
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Regular Course would use draft doctrine for the 1955-56 class as a means to look ahead rather than 
backwards; it was a small step.
27
  
Not all faculty shared Davidson‘s enthusiasm to anticipate the future. An exchange between 
Colonel J.F. Franklin and Lieutenant Colonel W.R. Desobry at the same seminar underscored the 
faculty‘s unease with use of emerging concepts.  
Colonel Franklin: ―To your knowledge, has a firm concept of operations in support of our 
National War Plans, framed in a period 10 years from now when our students may be 
reaching general officer grade, been injected into our curriculum?‘ 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Desobry: ―No. To the best of our knowledge a firm concept has not 
been developed by an outside agency or by the College. However, it is known that 
outside agencies are conducting such studies geared to the future.‖28  
 
Desobry deflected Colonel Franklin‘s question by drawing attention to ―outside agencies.‖ He 
avoided any inference that it was CGSC‘s responsibility to independently analyze the existing 
situation and prepare an estimate that supported the College mission. Dr. Birrer picked up on the 
opening created by this discussion. He chided the participants for their acceptance of the College 
situation with regards to future war. ―That‘s a very neat position, if we want to be conservative.‖ 
Colonel Seth Weld echoed Dr. Birrer asking, ―what in the world are we doing sitting here passive? 
We may be forced to be passive in this field by pure workload capacity – this I accept. But as a matter 
of choice, this pertains to war; we cannot mentally accept a passive position.‖29 Within the faculty, 
those who would reform the institution so that it prepared the leaders of the future Army lost ground 
to those who awaited definition by an outside agency. Nearly ten years after the end of World War 
Two, CGSC was still seeking a basis for educating officers of the future. 
The mission of CGSC with respect to emphasis of command over staff emphasis was not 
settled at the conference, nor does it appear that it was settled in Davidson‘s mind by February, 1955. 
The school‘s leader faced a dilemma. His organization‘s purpose was the preparation of officers for 
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future duties. The future, as defined by the Army, included ground combat against a similarly 
equipped adversary. Such an opponent may or may not have atomic weapons. ―Today, the Army is 
confronted with the problem of warfare on a battlefield where atomic weapons may be used by both 
sides. Most of us believe that the basic principles of war will remain unchanged; however, everyone 
agrees that the techniques of applying these principles will change,‖ wrote Lieutenant Colonel 
William O. Quirey.
30
 Accepted methods, embodied in doctrine, formed the basis for instruction. 
School faculty and graduates recognized the inadequacy of present doctrine, but their professional 
knowledge had not reached the point at which a substitute could be articulated. The institution most 
responsible for preparing the leaders of that future Army still sought a path in an uncertain direction. 
One final aspect of the ad hoc committees deserves attention and that is their assessment of 
the organization. The Skinner Report recommended further decentralization of responsibilities, 
acknowledging that too many people reported to the Assistant Commandant and that academic 
departments had too many conduits for assignments. Under the Skinner plan, the Director of 
Instruction served as a buffer between the Assistant Commandants and the departments. As such, the 
Director of Instruction functioned like the dean of a school. Department directors would gain more 
autonomy under the Skinner Plan, increasing their authority to determine what their department 
taught.
 31
 Davidson accepted the recommendation. While he retained overall responsibility, the 
Commandant now was separated by two echelons from the faculty. 
While Davidson needed outside support for many of his ideas, he could do something about 
the inattention to doctrine highlighted by the Weld panel. The College‘s role in doctrinal development 
had been limited up to the mid-fifties. While doctrinal development had been a part of the school‘s 
mission for years, this area received minimal resources and attention. Davidson began to emphasize 
the College‘s role in doctrinal development, and he directed that additional manpower be allocated to 
this responsibility. Given the College‘s reliance on published doctrine as the source for instructional 
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material, Davidson believed it important to protect doctrine authors; a fraction of the faculty should 
not be consumed with the machinery of day-to-day preparation and instruction.
32
 A few faculty and 
staff looked to the future, even as the majority looked towards the past. Students, on the other hand, 
were consumed with the present. 
Frustration Friday 
While these deliberations were taking place, the daily and weekly routines of CGSC went on. 
Students took their seats, a small pile of books, manuals, and notes on one corner. The usually stuffy 
room had an extra hint of warmth, for today was no ordinary day. As the clock ticked upward towards 
the appointed hour, a stern-looking lieutenant colonel moved around the room, distributing a small 
packet of maps along with a few sheets of green paper. Today was exam day—the fifteenth in a long 
line of such events. 
To use the vernacular, the exam program of the fifties resembled a game of ―what‘s in my 
pocket?‖ The faculty, supported by the administration, entertained themselves at the students‘ 
expense. ―The complete descriptive title of the Evaluated Exercise will not be given the student prior 
to the administration of the Evaluated Exercise. The weekly schedule will carry only the number of 
the exercise and a general title such as ‗Division Operations.‖33 Students in 1954 came to class not 
knowing whether the exam covered infantry or armored division operations, or logistics, or the setting 
of the problem. 
In the Commandant‘s view, ―the burden of proof of ability to meet the academic standards of 
the college should rest with the student.‖34 The method through which the student demonstrated his 
ability carried the official label of Evaluated Exercises Program. ―The primary purpose of the 
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Evaluated Exercises Program is to measure and appraise student learning which has been gained as a 
result of Command and General Staff College instruction,‖ proclaimed the author of a College staff 
study. The school used examinations to assess the student‘s achievement relative to course standards 
and as a learning opportunity. Students saw exams differently. For a student, exams were serious 
business. To the student, they were a test—the outcome of which would determine their rank relative 
to their peers and, accordingly, their future.
35
 Failure carried a stigma, but the Army imposed upon 
CGSC a requirement to ―certify‖ graduates as general staff officers; thus, the need to do well.36 From 
these multiple views of the examination program sprang a sub-culture that permeated College life.  
Graded exercises had grown significantly over the years. The Regular Course now had 
eighteen graded events, and the faculty set aside fifty-nine hours of class time for them as shown in 
appendix 2, Regular Course, Evaluated Exercises Plan, 1954-55. The Associate Course had nine 
examinations totaling twenty-two hours. The proportion of exams in the Associate Course was 
slightly higher, given its shorter length. The short course‘s focus on the infantry division is also 
apparent in appendix 3, Associate Course, Evaluated Exercises Plan, 1954-55. On average an officer 
would have two tests per month. 
Given their frequency and importance to class standing, it is little wonder that students 
worried over them. ―To determine causes of student ‗examination-consciousness,‖ and to recommend 
procedures to de-emphasize the importance currently attached to the matter of attaining high grades 
on examinations and high class standing,‖ the Commandant commissioned another study and 
designated Colonel U.G. Gibbons to lead the effort.
37
  
Gibbons‘ survey uncovered a number of systemic problems, all of which detracted from the 
stated purposes. Overall, the committee found that three conditions led to the phenomena of ―exam 
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consciousness‖: class standing, regular updates to the ranking, and dissatisfaction with the character 
and content of examinations.
38
 A survey of veteran instructors highlighted the doctrinaire makeup of 
examinations. ―Students should be examined in the realm of problem-solving. Memorization of forms 
and petty techniques should be avoided.‖ The Gibbons‘ committee agreed and recommended 
cessation of ―Examination in minutiae, minor matters of technique, items requiring memorization of 
forms, procedures or data which ordinarily are available at division or higher headquarters.‖39  
Seeking potential remedies, the committee asked faculty how they would modify the 
examination program. Faculty responses indicated significant support for a pass-fail system, rather 
than the current marking scheme (A, B, C, D, D-, and U). Instructors also thought that more feedback, 
in the form of returning marked-up examinations, was preferable to simply reporting the score, or 
withholding information about the grade entirely. The faculty also requested that exams be collected 
after student review, to so ―examinations would not fall into the hands of future students whereby 
some students would see them and others would not.‖40 ―Unequal access to old examinations‖ 
contributed to student anxiety, according to Colonel Gibbons‘ committee. 41 This last point uncovered 
a phenomenon that would shock the Commandant. 
Through the years, an underground developed between present and past students. The 
graduating class handed over a box to friends or acquaintances like tribal lore passing between one 
generation and the next. The faculty had some knowledge of the network, but the College‘s leadership 
had no idea of its magnitude until 1955. A retrospective account noted: ―In the fall of 1955, after a 
detailed study of the College examination system as it operated during the previous school year, the 
Commandant of the College issued a directive requiring students to turn in all examinations in their 
possession which related to the CGSC course. Five tons of examinations were turned in. This amount 
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means an average of some 20 pounds of examinations per student!‖ 42 Not all students had past exam 
copies, leading some officers to openly question the moral and scholastic integrity of their peers.
43
 
But students who worried about the potential adverse effect of Leavenworth‘s ranking system on their 
career had taken advantage of the lax security to their gain. It would not be the last conflict between 
professional ethics and personal practice. 
Over the summer of 1955, Davidson continued to mull over the debate from the January 
conference and the input from his staff. The months of discussion showed the academic bureaucracy 
had not adopted an educational philosophy consistent with contemporary educational practices. 
Without external pressure or firm direction, it was not going to reform itself, either.  
By late summer, Davidson made plain his own views regarding an emphasis on command 
over staff topics. In his remarks to the staff and faculty on August 25, 1955, he said, ―In keeping with 
the overall objective of the Department of the Army, our curriculum here will emphasize command. 
The necessity for that additionally is brought out by the very title of our College, ‗The Command,‘ 
‗The COMMAND and General Staff College.‘‖44 He did not follow up his rhetorical emphasis with 
institutional changes, however. Major General Davidson had several paths in mind for the College, 
which he outlined in a new mission statement. It read: ―To prepare selected officers of all components 
of the Army for duties as: one, commanders of division, corps and Army level; two, commanders at 
comparable levels in the communications zone; three, staff officers at division, corps and Army 
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levels; and four, staff officers at comparable levels in the communications zone.‖45 From an 
institutional standpoint, Davidson‘s mission reflected many of the same unattainable goals from War 
Department Circular 202. In late 1955, the College leadership saw two distinct components of officer 
education. Command required education of officers while staff duties needed training. As the College 
had already learned, to do both within the limited ten-month course was difficult. 
To figure out where to go next, the Commandant again looked to outsiders.
46
 
Surveying Education, Revisited 
When the Educational Survey Commission met in early 1956, the six-man committee carried 
names familiar from the College‘s past: Jacob S. Orleans chaired the forum, with retired generals 
Manton S. Eddy, Troy H. Middleton, and Geoffrey Keyes serving as military representatives. Two 
civilian professors, Harl R. Douglass and H.F. Harding, rounded out the panel.
47
 Three previous 
external studies had called for adaptation; the report of the Educational Survey Commission 
confirmed the slow pace.  
Davidson‘s introductory remarks to the panel outlined the wide gap between the interwar 
Army‘s circumstances and the current situation. ―Prior to World War II the average graduate went 
from here to serve at some small army post. Very few of our graduates ever saw a full division in 
those days,‖ he said. ―Prior to World War II the graduate of this College had a leisurely atmosphere in 
which to develop and was confronted with relatively simple problems whose solutions had far-
reaching effects. The solution of major problems with far-reaching effects was limited to a relatively 
few.‖48 Davidson then contrasted the prewar Army with the Army of the fifties, saying today‘s 
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―atmosphere places a requirement for a more completely developed officer capable of handling 
problems of broader scope and more far-reaching effects than heretofore.‖49 
Via his brief introduction, Major General Davidson summarized the predicament of the 
officer education system. Despite two previous Army-level studies, none had perceived the extent of 
the relationship between the environment, America‘s new strategic position, and the Army‘s 
institutions. By relying on a pre-war structure, the officer education system had thus far proven 
incapable of meeting the demands of the new profession. The Army of the fifties shared a common 
heritage with its predecessor, but the demands and strategic surroundings had shifted, rendering 
questionable the old system. 
Meeting in early 1956 at Davidson‘s request, the Commission observed the widening gap 
between instructional methods and the needs of the students. When the commission released its 
findings in 1956, they began with the usual introductory pleasantries. They found ―superior quality in 
both preparation and performance.‖ The remainder of the report—some thirty-six pages—offered a 
critical appraisal of content, planning, instructional methods, faculty selection, and student evaluation. 
Davidson would later label their effort ―an extremely searching report.‖50 
Curriculum design and planning got mixed marks. On the positive side, the members believed 
that the staff and faculty put a lot of effort into the planning of each year‘s material. On the other 
hand, the commission believed perhaps too much effort went into the process. ―It appears to be a 
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hopeless effort to design the perfect curriculum.‖51 The overly formalized process took too much 
faculty time. 
Hoping to find improvements as a result of the smaller class sections, the team visited a 
number of classes. Unfortunately, they found the instructional methods wanting, although the College 
continued the instructor training program as shown in appendix 4. The nature of the school‘s 
classroom was authoritarian, not collegial. Commission members observed ―a mechanically rigid and 
often excessive adherence to the meticulously prepared and detailed lesson plan. The rigid and 
mechanical adherence was explained as vital because of the influence on the final class standing.‖52 
Commenting further, the team found the environment ―undesirably instructor-subject matter centered, 
unnecessarily alike from day to day, and too rigidly controlled.‖53 They observed little flexibility 
among the instructors, saying ―the use of the ‗school solution,‘ even in the form of ‗this is only a 
solution, but not necessarily the only good one,‘ tends to further limit the teaching activities of the 
instructor, and the learning activities of the students;‖ practices such as these led to ―a lack of 
opportunity for initiative, even in minor aspects of methods.‖54 Interaction between teacher and pupil 
was formal, governed by the transitory nature of the faculty‘s engagement with the student and the 
ever-present competition for class standing.  
As they assessed educational outcomes, they ―looked for extensive evidence of learning 
method that would encourage independence, initiative, resourcefulness, originality, creativeness, 
reasoning, judgment, and the like. The degree of uniformity of classroom activity which has been so 
carefully and effectively planned and prepared for has the obverse effect. Comparatively little time is 
given to committee work, staff conferences, critique activities, and research.‖55 They recommended 
more flexibility. ―It is far better to improve students‘ ability to solve problems of the future than to 
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master details that will be outmoded this year or next.‖56 When this did not occur, educational 
outcomes suffered. 
Comments from the field reflected and influenced the Commission‘s findings. The Chief of 
the Armor Section of CONARC told General (ret.) Keyes: 
There is one possible area of improvement in the teaching at Leavenworth. There 
is a tendency towards inflexibility in some C&GSC graduates. In other words they are 
inclined to perform staff work in accordance with a set pattern which was learned at 
school instead of applying principles to the problem of the moment and adjusting 





Third Army‘s commanding general, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Hickey, judged that ―the 
General Staff officer of the past five years‖ did not have the same professional abilities as did prewar 
graduates, partly because he perceived that the school emphasized staff functions at the expense of 
teaching ―how the commander approaches a problem and arrives at a solution.‖58 He went on to say, 
―the effect at Division, Corps and Army level is that a youngster coming from Leavenworth doesn‘t 
know how to evaluate the problems confronting him.‖59 
The development of intellectual potential and professional judgment—the positive qualities 
outlined in their hypothesis—clashed with what they heard from the field. As Major General Palmer 
had observed during the Korean War, at least some Leavenworth graduates did not meet their 
superior‘s expectations. It is possible that embedded within the ten-month course‘s curriculum was a 
hidden curriculum—one which stressed the search for a right answer and inflexibility in method. It 
might be safe at this point to attribute at least some of the officer‘s post-graduation behavior on the 
educational experience. The commission certainly saw a connection. 
Echoing the Gibbons‘ report, Dr. Orleans and his panel excoriated the evaluation program, 
saying the assessment of learning had little to do with the learning process. ―Examinations at CGSC,‖ 
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the commission reported, ―are almost exclusively used to serve the administrative needs incident to 
determination of class rank and graduation-nongraduation.‖60 They singled out Leavenworth‘s 
practice of ranking students as a disruptive force. ―[A]ll students at the College have been selected on 
the basis of their demonstrated competence and should therefore successfully complete the course. 
There should be no academic failures. In the event that the College believes some achievement 
measure is necessary to identify non-graduates, the present formal examination-class standing 
program is not the best answer.‖61 The members unequivocally denounced the practice. ―The 
Commission is convinced that the determination and reporting of final class standing, and the use of 
examinations for this purpose, has a seriously detrimental effect on the educational program of the 
College. It interferes seriously with the accomplishment of the mission of the College.‖62 Not 
surprisingly, one of the panel‘s recommendations was to end the practice of ranking students.63 
The results disturbed Davidson. He knew that the Regular Course consisted of a crowded 
curriculum and too little time. Only last year, the ―Commanding General, Continental Army 
Command, has recommended to Department of the Army the adoption of a plan for a 2-year course at 
CGSC, in which one-half of the Army students would be ‗selected out‘ at the end of the first year.‖64 
Two years of experience had given him an appreciation of the institution‘s needs and potential 
solutions. He knew from personal observation and now had an independent study confirming that the 
Army asked too much of a single educational experience. Davidson had no time to act.  
Shortly before the Commission delivered its results, the students of 1955-56 left Fort 
Leavenworth for hundreds of posts, camps, and stations worldwide. Dozens went to Military 
Advisory Assistance Groups, including those in Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Curiously, given the 
school‘s stated mission, only fifty-three officers went to divisions, and one joined a corps 
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headquarters. In comparison, twenty-one remained at CGSC as instructors or staff. Of the over 500 
graduates, 248 were majors, and 107 were captains. Brigadier General Train‘s remarks to the class 
highlighted their special place among the officer corps. The title of ―Leavenworth graduate‖ 
represented ―a privilege because you will be given assignments not readily available to nongraduates, 
and a responsibility because you must live up to the promise which your diploma carries with it.‖65 




On graduation day, Gar Davidson received his diploma, too. In summarizing his tour as 
Commandant, Davidson said: 
The College, at the present time, is attempting to accomplish an estimated four 
times as much as was accomplished here prior to World War II in a course that even then 
was hardly leisurely. When compared to the pre-World War II program, the changes are 
striking…. Most important of all is the requirement to prepare students for both atomic 
and nonatomic warfare – a requirement I have emphasized in the College during the past 
two years. But in spite of these much greater requirements now than in 1939, we have a 
one year course and very large classes, whereas until shortly before World War II a two 





Davidson reflected that ―the problem of too much course content is continuously aggravated 
by imposition of new requirements by higher headquarters and changing times. I consider the 
problem probably the most important one that confronts the College.‖68 Aggravating the problem of 
curricular scope was the tension between command and staff duties. Davidson came to support a 
second year of tactical instruction, presented to colonels in generals about ten years after their staff 
college experience. Given his insights, Davidson might have been able to direct the school towards 
accommodation between the old and the new. Unfortunately, he departed at a critical juncture.
69
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would not be present to implement change. Ironically, that too was an observation of the Educational 
Survey Commission. 
Breaking with the Past 
In mid-1956, the College curriculum shed the influence of World War Two. Lieutenant 
General James M. Gavin signaled the upcoming shift to the Class of 1956 at their graduation. Gavin 
intoned, ―Now you are the young, coming generation, and I must impress upon you the fact that 
atomic weapons are here to stay. They will be refined in size and delivery systems until they will 
serve in every echelon of the military establishment.‖70 Yet the graduates had seen little of this future 
in their studies. Similarly, the Class of 1957 would not study the topic very extensively. Their 
successors, on the other hand, would go through a year immersed in the atomic battlefield. If the 
faculty listened, they might have detected some of what lay ahead. Within a few weeks, Davidson 
departed for West Point, and a new personality in the form of Major General Lionel C. McGarr 
arrived to take his place. 
 McGarr turned the institution upside down, changing content, instructional methods, and 
organization. He did all three simultaneously. And he did it in a year. The shift in philosophy 
appeared to be due to several converging events. In addition to the 1956 Educational Survey 
Commission findings, the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) had recently released a 
policy requiring service schools to ―emphasize atomic instruction from the outset, with nonatomic 
instruction covered as a modification thereto.‖71 Significantly, this directive allowed the school to 
teach ―new concepts and interim doctrine in addition to approved DA doctrine.‖72 Tactical problems 
should consider ground combat in a nuclear environment normal, while operations not involving 
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atomic weaponry received less attention. The Army‘s decision to convert from triangular divisions, 
based on three brigades for each division headquarters, to the Pentomic configuration, with five battle 
groups per division, influenced the curriculum.
73
 New Army field organizations and technical 
capabilities, coupled with a stinging assessment of the College‘s effectiveness, led to the seismic 
shift. 
The fall 1956 Associate Course began as most Leavenworth courses did. Officers assembled 
in the post theater, which served as the school‘s lecture hall, eager to begin their studies but somewhat 
apprehensive, given the school‘s fearsome reputation. As explained by Major General McGarr, the 
students had come to Fort Leavenworth and the shorter version of the Regular Course to qualify them 
―for duty with the General Staff of Combat Divisions and Logistical Commands‖ and to gain 
familiarity with the procedures used at corps, field army, and communications zone headquarters. 
McGarr impressed upon the new students the seriousness of the task ahead. Remember, he told them, 
―What I learn here will someday win a battle and save the lives of soldiers under my command in 
combat.‖ To achieve the title of Leavenworth graduate required earnest work, implored McGarr, for 
Leavenworth had to assign each student ―a final class ranking which is required by the Department of 
the Army as one of the components of your permanent record.‖ To this point, McGarr‘s remarks 
could have come from the script from most any previous commandant‘s talk, but he then described 
the need for mastery of both atomic and non-atomic conditions. While map problems in this course 




From his arrival, Major General McGarr warned that he would not follow established 
patterns. In the opinion of the CONARC commander and the new Commandant, Leavenworth had 
not kept up with the Army. During his introductory remarks to the faculty, the Commandant intimated 
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that instructional methods required some attention and that he expected the faculty to lead by example 
in this area. Likewise, Major General McGarr provided his view of the present state of the Army, and 
the College, with respect to atomic weapons. His vision was that the faculty must actively incorporate 




What followed was a chaotic period which can best be described as curriculum by fiat. At 
McGarr‘s direction, the faculty began to reorganize and rewrite the curriculum in the fall of 1956. A 
flurry of guidance and activity followed. ―The Atomic Era is upon us,‖ declared the Commandant in 
October. ―To accomplish the College mission, we must abandon outmoded concepts and procedures 
and replace them with fresh and forward-thinking approaches that recognize the realities of the 
present – and the future.‖76 McGarr declared that every lesson, map problem, and supporting texts 
would be rewritten. With implementation planned for the 1957-58 class, his proposal evoked that of 
the 1946 CGSS or the 1950 War College faculties who had to accomplish tasks on a similar scale.
77
 
The Army‘s senior tactical school had at long last recognized a need to integrate atomic weapons into 
the lessons of the Regular Course. 
The task for leading the revision fell upon Colonel Ward S. Ryan. Ryan had been at CGSC 
for several years, serving as the director of Department V under Davidson.
78
 With implementation 
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planned for the 1957-58 class, McGarr wanted to reorient the institution from the past towards the 
future—one that potentially involved nuclear war against a similarly equipped nation. The Assistant 
Commandant, William F. Train made plain the urgency and magnitude of the task. ―It is apparent that 
the new curriculum must provide for major modification of previous material and substantial original 
work.‖79 To hasten production, McGarr delegated approval authority for courseware to department 
directors, which broke sharply with the past process of review and approval by the College staff. 
Outdated content was only one of McGarr‘s concerns expressed in his October 1956 
guidance. He began to reorient instructional methods, incorporating many of the suggestions from the 
Educational Survey Commission. Stressing flexibility of mind, McGarr told the Assistant 
Commandant that the new curriculum ―must prepare him [the student] to deal with essentials by 
developing his command judgment in a decision-making capacity.‖ The Commandant made clear that 
classroom work should ―stimulate original thinking and initiative‖ and should move away from 
presenting a single solution to tactical problems. McGarr also directed that advocates of existing 




The new guidance did not mean that the College had abandoned lesser forms of war. Major 
General McGarr acknowledged that the faculty must account for Army Chief of Staff‘s policy 
statements on the ―Role of the Army‖ and ―Forms of War,‖ which had articulated a new Army 
mission emphasizing limited wars. According to these statements, the departments must incorporate 
several scales of warfare. 
McGarr directed the overhaul of the course content and departmental organization, but the 
faculty had little respect for his style of administration. Neither the faculty nor their wives appreciated 
McGarr‘s initiative. Long hours followed. Weekends and holidays became extensions of the regular 
workweek. Social lives were disrupted. The faculty considered McGarr a wicked force, and 
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regardless of their internal disputes, they uniformly disliked their new Commandant. He disrupted 
their routine. They derisively referred to the decorated combat veteran as ―Split Head Magoo,‖ 
capturing McGarr‘s name, haircut, and the faculty‘s perception of his character. John Singlaub, an 
instructor in the late 1950s, criticized McGarr for his approach: ―McGarr displayed malevolent (even 
paranoid) cunning, not unlike the fictional Captain Queeg of The Caine Mutiny.‖81 McGarr knew of 
the grumblings, even admitting that he had heard several of them himself.
82
 
Few officers fully supported him, but the Commandant was aided in his task by Majors 
Richard (Dick) R. Hallock and John F. (Jack) Cushman, who were staff officers in the College. In his 
self-published memoir, Jack Cushman revealed that both he and Hallock assisted the Commandant in 
preparing concepts for the school‘s new look. On the 30th of September, 1956, Jack Cushman and 
Dick Hallock wrote a letter that was highly critical of the course to the new Commandant. ―CGSC 
instruction is inadequate,‖ wrote the two. ―It is out of date, sterile, stereotyped, inflexible, 
unimaginative, and fails to prepare for conditions as they exist in the field. Its doctrine is essentially 
ETO-World War II and its approach to atomic warfare is to superficially impose atomics on 
conventional doctrine.‖ The writers found the future bleak, even if atomics were not an issue. ―It is 
even questionable how well CGSC prepares the officer for conventional war, should one occur 
today.‖ The two found a sympathetic general, who relied heavily on the two for much of the 
intellectual content behind the overhaul of the curriculum. According to Cushman, the two worked in 
secrecy, oftentimes meeting with McGarr in his quarters after hours.
83
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McGarr‘s directive included both the extension courses and the USAR school system, both of 
which were supported by Department VI. The Commandant no longer accepted the status quo with 
the non-resident course. By now, the Associate Course had grown to sixteen weeks. The composition 
of the Associate Course in 1957 had shifted to a mix of 75% active army, 9% National Guard, 6% 
Army Reserve, and 9% international officers.
84
 The infantry division remained the central focus of the 
course, and students divided into one of two tracks—combat division or logistical command for the 
final part of the course.  
Over the years, mostly due to staffing shortages, the faculty revised the non-resident course 
on a three-year cycle. McGarr believed this to be unacceptable. On October 1, 1956, the Commandant 
directed the chief of non-resident instruction to shift from a three-year revision cycle to an annual 
cycle. So as to not add to the Regular Course faculty‘s burden, he accepted the staff‘s proposal to 
expand the non-resident section. In November 1956, he requested Fifth Army provide twelve officers 
and ten civilians to augment the extension course effort. With this increase, McGarr believed that the 
school could revise the entire extension course, rather than one-third, each year.
85
 McGarr later 
retained twenty-two officers out of the Class of ‘57 to assist in the rewrite.86 The change affected 
3300 students enrolled in extension courses throughout the Army plus the thousands enrolled in 
USAR schools. One key shift affecting the USAR school program was that the Associate Course 




By February 1957, the faculty had delineated the broad outlines of the new Regular Course. 
Discussion during the February 4 meeting of the faculty board gave little doubt that McGarr‘s 
directives had affected the departments, but these discussions also revealed retention of old habits. 
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Failure to follow the Commandant‘s guidance on any point invited rebuke. Colonel L. Wallace, Chief 
of the Infantry Division Department, briefed the Commandant and Assistant Commandant on his plan 
for implementing the December 1956 guidance. Wallace‘s proposal incorporated atomic and non-
atomic conditions; general and local wars, plus situations short of war; and offense, defense, 
retrograde, and special missions. As Wallace discussed his vision of the case method, he planned to 
identify ―one of the solutions as the most acceptable.‖ McGarr countered sharply, emphasizing ―that 
specific effort must be made to insure that the impression is not left with the student that the 
indicated, preferred solution is the only solution.‖ Wallace acknowledged the point, but he expressed 
concern that waffling might lead students to perceive the school was indecisive.
88
  
The new course imported some seventy hours of instruction on atomic weapons effects, 
characteristics, and employment from the Special Weapons Course. Colonel R.D. Wolfe, Executive 
Officer of Department VII, had the lead for developing instruction on basic atomic means. The 
lessons provided basic knowledge about capabilities and the proposed battlefield use of the weapons. 
Nearly all of the instruction carried some classification, restricting allied participation to but twenty 
hours, but the department made allowances by including a two-hour session for U.S. officers that 
pointed out the differences between classified and unclassified data. This allowed international 
officers to participate in map problems, while enabling the U.S. student to understand the potential 
uses and effects of the new weapons.
89
 
Atomic warfare, while the predominant condition, shared some curriculum space with 
unconventional and guerilla war. Under the guidance of Colonel A.L. Mueller, the Airborne 
Operations and Army Aviation Committee sketched out lessons. Lieutenant Colonels R.J. Low, J.K. 
Singlaub, and T.M. Ariail put together much of the concept. Interestingly, all lessons about the two 
subjects were classified, excluding allies who might share their insights. In contrast to Wallace, 
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Mueller went beyond the guidance to de-emphasize the school solution. His concept allowed the 
instructor to present the student a situation requiring decision. The student would then ―retain his 
original decision and … apply it to the next situation.‖ Mueller offered that any flaws in reasoning 




Evidence of changes to structure also can be found in the February meetings. Ivan Birrer 
recommended in the February 4 Faculty Board meeting that the school should standardize the length 
of classes. He suggested three hours. He believed that a common class length would assist in 




As work progressed on the revision, Colonel Ryan‘s team grew. McGarr used the team as the 
nucleus for a new organization designed along functional lines. McGarr hoped to implement the 
suggestions from the Orleans‘ review. The Commandant issued guidance that established parallel 
departments within the College. One group would continue to teach this year‘s course with existing 
lessons; the second group wrote new material and organized themselves for the 1957-58 class. His 
new organization did away with the generic Department I, II, and III labels, assigning instead 
descriptive titles to each of five embryonic committees: the Departments of Armored Division, 
Infantry Division, Airborne and Army Aviation, Larger Units and Administrative Support, and Staff 
and Education. Both the existing and emergent sections had a colonel assigned as director. McGarr 
believed this arrangement necessary to be fully ready to teach the subsequent curriculum, while 
maintaining the quality of ongoing instruction.
92
 Within each department, directors established a 
doctrinal element to create training literature and updated doctrine to support lessons.
93
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To gain a better understanding of the Army‘s needs, the College hosted a week-long 
conference on Army roles and the operational environment in early March 1957.
94
 McGarr was blunt 
in his observations about the Army education system and the extent to which it had fallen behind 
potential enemy capabilities. The Commandant told participants ―I do not believe these changes in the 
Army‘s needs, together with the necessary, accurate ―Battlefield Picture‖, have been reflected in our 
schools to a sufficient degree in the past. We here at the College are certainly not guiltless in this 
respect.‖95 Participants explored the atomic battlefield in depth, but working groups on local wars and 
situations short of war had equal say.  
One outcome of the conference was the realization that atomic weapons instruction could use 
improvement.
 96
 As Colonel John F. Franklin told CONARC headquarters, the ―current experience of 
the US Army Command and General Staff College in teaching this subject has resulted in a searching 
reappraisal of the entire problem in an attempt to assess the difficulties involved….‖ Atomic 
targeting, in particular the effects tables of the atomic weapons manual, which was a math-intensive 
section, required a significant effort to master.
97
 Franklin pointed out the Special Weapons Course 
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Throughout the spring and summer, the faculty labored to create the new course. Outside 
pressure to add lessons on special topics continued. Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Drye responded to a 
Department of the Army inquiry about management instruction, informed Fifth Army‘s training 
section that the school had five hours of instruction on the topic, plus the lessons on Communications 
Zone had these principles embedded. It was not, however, testable material.
99
  
With work proceeding, Major General McGarr introduced the new curriculum to the Army. 
As part of the implementation of the new content, McGarr directed that the faculty publish a series of 
sixteen Military Review articles entitled ―Keeping Pace With the Future.‖ The articles began with his 
essay published in April 1957. In a complete rejection of the status quo argument advanced by some 
participants in Davidson‘s 1955 conference, General McGarr said ―The USA CGSC must, by realistic 
assumption and instruction, insure that our doctrine and training, even without complete field test and 
evaluation, are sufficient and ready for any future war.‖100 As he had done with the faculty, McGarr 
stated the case forcefully: ―Thinking typical of World War II and Korea can negate all progress if 
applied blindly to new concepts, new organizations, and new weapons on the nuclear battlefield, and 
could well be fatal to our way of life.‖101 Content for ten years, the Command and General Staff 
College took steps to get ahead of current developments. 
By summer, work was not yet complete. It was not for lack of hours expended. An average of 
one-third of the faculty lost leave in June 1957. Over 64% of the officers in the Department of 
Airborne Operations and Army Aviation and two-thirds of the College‘s supervisors lost leave.102 
Still, they left the Commandant unsatisfied. In his review of the draft Programs of Instruction for the 
Regular and Associate Courses, General McGarr commented that the documents ―showed 
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miscellaneous areas where departments have not had as complete an understanding of guidance or 
objectives as desirable.‖ He urged the Assistant Commandant to follow up with the department 
directors to modify the lessons as they were prepared, but he accepted that some changes might have 
to wait until the subsequent year‘s revision.103 
The faculty completed the revision in the spring of 1957 just months before the new class 
began. The 1957-58 course centered on tactical operations. The infantry division remained the 
centerpiece of instruction, with other divisional instruction building from the principles presented in 
the infantry division lessons. Lessons used the Army‘s newly adopted organizational design for the 
division. Armored division, airborne division, and army aviation instruction doubled. To emphasize 
the importance of the subjects, the Commandant created two new departments to teach these subjects. 
General education subjects crept into the curriculum, and these too had a functional department 
charged with creating and teaching the lessons. Overlaid on the new content was a fresh emphasis on 
small group discussion. 
To its credit, the new material adopted a forward-looking focus, oriented toward warfare in 
the 1960-1970 period. The question posed at the conference hosted by Davidson years earlier found 
traction. The Army‘s definition of future war, as demonstrated in the new course, centered on military 
operations on an atomic battlefield. In the new curriculum, students experienced instruction with an 
extraordinary emphasis on the atomic battlefield, but limited war, and war without nuclear weapons 
in particular, was represented.
104
 Lessons such as ―Development and Evaluation of Concepts of 
Operations in Future War‖ permeated the revised POI. Students heard from outside experts on future 
combat developments; each of the existing Corps-level branches briefed the class on future combat 
developments.  
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Alongside the revised Regular Course, the faculty unveiled its plan for a revamped five-year 
course for the USAR schools in August 1957. Under the new scheme, reserve officers would devote 
time throughout the year to completing shorter lessons and would spend two weeks each year in an 
intensive session. Subsequent years followed a similar approach. During the first three years, lessons 
covered division operations. Years four and five explored corps and army operations. At the end of 
five years, the officer would complete the equivalent of the resident Associate Course.
105
  
CGSC had made a significant break with past subjects of instruction. Keeping in mind the 
nature of the subject, conjecture permeated much of the curriculum. With barely time to assimilate the 
previous decade‘s technological changes, and even less time to think about the future implications, 
the faculty and staff adopted a version of the future that was more ―Buck Rogers‖ than even Buck 
himself might have dreamt. Atomic weapons permeated the course. The faculty had incorporated the 
technological aspects of modern warfare, but it had little appreciation for the intellectual implications. 
Students found tactical problems ―too often on [the] fringe of future or fantasy.‖106 Such was the state 
of professional knowledge at the time. 
Not everyone inside the College was happy with the situation. Cushman noted that two camps 
had developed. One supported the new direction, and the second opposed change.
107
 Surprisingly, the 
Assistant Commandant led the latter faction. Dr. Birrer found himself a confidant of McGarr, perched 
precariously at the edge of the Commandant‘s inner circle, but members of the opposing view felt 
comfortable approaching Birrer, too.
108
 McGarr noted the backlash among the faculty when he wrote, 
―Although expected resistance to change has been encountered, this sizable task [curriculum rewrite] 
is ahead of schedule due to the dedicated officers of the staff and faculty who have given it their full 
support.‖109 The Military Review articles were also an attempt by the College leadership to reassert 
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the institution‘s leading role in the intellectual development of officers and to convince the Army‘s 
leadership that McGarr had implemented the changes directed in 1956. McGarr‘s comments in 
Military Review, intended as much to convince the rest of the Army that a new direction was needed, 
came just a year-and-a-half after the Davidson conference.  
In part, CGSC‘s situation reflected a larger issue in the Army‘s school system. Continental 
Army Command (CONARC) Commander, General Willard Wyman, addressed the new direction in 
his speech to the Association of the United States Army annual meeting in 1958. ―To keep up with 
the accelerated demand for greater professional competence in our officer corps, sweeping changes 
have been made in the curricula of our combat arms schools and staff colleges. This year, for 
example, the Command and General Staff College is presenting tactical situations to its students in 
which the conditions for atomic battle are to be regarded as ―normal‖ rather than ―exceptional.‖110 As 
a result, ground combat in a nuclear environment became commonplace in the classroom, while 
operations not involving atomic weaponry were to be relegated to a lesser role in the course.  
Outside Fort Leavenworth, the work by the Department of Nonresident Instruction had shown 
quick results. ―It is now interesting to note that non-resident student enrollment has increased 33% 
since this instruction has been brought up to date,‖ Major General reported to the CONARC 
Commander.
111
 CGSC retained supervisory responsibility for USAR schools, and the non-resident 
department continued to grade examinations. Inspection teams visited the Command and General 
Staff department of USAR schools in each of the numbered Army areas. From their reports, one can 
see the vast difference between the Leavenworth experience and other campuses. In the Second Army 
schools conducted at Fort Knox and Fort George G. Meade, the inspection team noted that only 
eighty percent of the enrolled students attended the two-week session, which occurred frequently 
enough to require a policy allowing students to make up the missed classes using extension course 
lessons. At both schools, only half of the assigned instructors had attended the instructor training 
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course. The team also noted that the availability of texts for student use at these outlying sites 
continued to be a problem. On the other hand, the inspectors at both Second and Third Army schools 
reported that ―instruction observed was excellent.‖112 The definition of academic excellence, 
however, could have several meanings. 
Tangible Benefits 
As had been the case from 1946-54, the quality of faculty and students varied. Student ranks 
dropped sharply in 1957, but this can be attributed to a slowdown in promotions (table 4). Regular 
Course Ranks, Army Officers, 1955-58). Age and time in service remained relatively stable. 
Table 4. Regular Course Ranks, Army Officers, 1955-58 
Rank 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 
Colonel 5 3 0 
Lieutenant Colonel 164 133 43 
Major 252 284 289 
Captain 107 107 192 
        Total 528 527 524 




The faculty still maintained its seniority up through the mid-fifties. Of the faculty in the seven 
instructional departments, only nineteen were majors out of 148 officers. Each department (minus the 
Special Weapons Course team) had at least two colonels, if not more. Reflecting the continued belief 
that the school was a place to learn the fundamentals of the combat arms, eighty-two percent of the 
faculty came from infantry, armor, or artillery backgrounds. The next largest group—eight—were 
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While the school looked for instructors from among its graduates, the mid-fifties also allow 
some examination into the non-graduates who served as instructors. From 1951 to 1955, fifty CGSC 
instructors received College diplomas by virtue of their service as faculty.
115
 Seven instructors 
graduated along with their students in the 1956-57 class.
116
 Army policy authorized award of 
diplomas for instructors who had acquired ―equivalent knowledge‖ by virtue of their service. The 
process was not automatic, and it entailed some work on the part of the officer. College criteria, as 
outlined in a letter to the Adjutant General, qualified an officer after two years in an instructional 
department. They also had to attend the Instructor Training Course, serve as a principal instructor, 
and participate in instructor workshops.
117
 Each year, these individuals merited special recognition for 
their accomplishment. Despite individual efforts at self-improvement, the overall quality of the 
faculty remained average compared to the officer corps as a review of the school would soon show. 
Faculty selection from within the student body continued. The Educational Survey 
Commission had recommended increased emphasis on faculty selection to ensure that the best 
qualified officers from within the current class remained as instructors.
118
 An update to the school‘s 
policy outlined the procedures used. Instructors observed and reported their observations of student 
behavior that merited consideration as an instructor. Departments collected these observations and 
forwarded them to the College staff for future consideration by a board of senior officers. As with 
many requirements, the school went overboard, mandating that each instructor ―submit a CGSC Form 
17 on at least three students after completing each unit of instruction of not less than four hours 
duration.‖ Form 17, or the Instructor Report, asked instructors to rate the student on eighteen positive 
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traits or ten negative characteristics.
119
 Fortunately for the faculty, Dr. Birrer weighed in, calling the 
requirement ―impracticable‖ as it only hassled ―the already overburdened instructor.‖ 120  
Foreign representation on the faculty was minimal and episodic. For a number of years, the 
College had allowed a small number of top-performing allies to remain for an additional year as a 
―guest instructor.‖ The Commandant halted the practice after the shift to atomic-based curriculum and 
updated classroom methods in 1958.
121
 
The school‘s strength relative to its officer authorizations remained steady in 1957. Major 
General O.P. Newman‘s inspection team found 243 of 250 officers present for duty across the 
College in 1957. The Continental Army Command inspectors noted ―‖This School has been 
consistently maintained at or near authorized strength.‖ On the other hand, the strain of the massive 
rewrite effort underway showed. In the College‘s pre-inspection report, 30,125 hours of military 
overtime and 4,922 civilian hours—for a single quarter.122 The exertion of the faculty showed in the 
accounting of their efforts. 
In a personal letter, Brigadier General Train outlined the benefits of a faculty assignment. 
Evident in his comments is the elitism noted in the previous chapter with regards to student selection. 
―I would say that basic to all other reasons is one of selectivity….‖ Train continued his observations, 
saying, ―The intangible benefits include association with the best of one‘s contemporaries as well as a 
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sharing in the prestige and tradition of the College….‖ Perhaps most attractive were the advantages to 
the family and social life.
123
  
While potential instructors underwent scrutiny, students still entered based upon past 
performance. For students, the pressure to perform could lead to cheating among ―the very few who 
are inclined to moral weakness.‖ The trend disturbed Brigadier General Train, who distributed an 
ethics article to both the Regular and Associate Class. Still, it did not prevent cheating. Officer 
integrity came to the forefront in an incident in the spring of 1957 involving two Regular Army 
officers. One shared a school solution that had not yet been presented officially to the second officer. 
The Class of ‘57 lost one potential graduate to a court martial conviction and a further four to 
academic failure. Looking at the results of the 1957 Faculty Board, the threshold for failure included 
the students‘ total points, number of exams failed, and low peer ratings. 215 points separated the 
highest-achieving non-graduate from the lowest-achieving officer declared a graduate. The four 
failures represented a fifty percent decrease over the period 1951-56, with the notable exception of 
the previous year‘s class which had no academic failures (table 5).124 








Source: Wm. F. Train to Commandant, Non-graduates Regular Course 1957 FTLV, 14 June 1957. 
 
The Board‘s decision did not sit well with the Class Supervisor, Colonel C.E. Kennedy. He 
reasoned that since no officers in the previous year‘s class had failed, none should fail this year. He 
believed the four were victims of circumstance since ―it seems probable that no officers in the /8 class 
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will be failed….‖ Hoping to change the decision, Kennedy wrote Major General McGarr claiming 
that declaring those officers non-graduates did little—they were, after all, ―selected from the upper 
bracket of all officers.‖ He asked McGarr to ―set aside recommendations of the Faculty Board and 
pass all officers of the /7 [1957] Class.‖ McGarr‘s handwritten notes show he clearly disagreed with 
his subordinate‘s assessment. McGarr wrote ―we are not in business to pass everyone. We teach 
people to think.‖ As to Kennedy‘s claim that failure would be ―detrimental to the officer‘s morale,‖ 
McGarr replied, ―Why? I may jar him into increased endeavor.‖ McGarr supported the Faculty Board, 
rejecting Kennedy‘s request with ―Disapproved.‖125 
The Williams Board 
In December 1957, the Secretary of the Army directed that the Army form a new board to 
review officer education. It was the third Army-wide survey since World War Two. Lieutenant 
General Edward T. Williams, Deputy Commanding General of CONARC, served as board president. 
Major Generals John A. Dabney and Preston Corderman and six colonels formed the membership. As 
had happened in 1946 and 1949, the Board had an expansive assignment.
126
 Unlike the CGSC 
surveys, the Board employed no civilian educators as panel members. 
The board‘s recommendations, issued on July 1, 1958, ranged over the breadth of the officer 
education system. A number dealt directly with CGSC. On the whole, the Board reacted positively to 
the changes in curriculum and instructional methods underway at the College. The panel 
recommended ―that the US Army Command and General Staff College continue to conduct a difficult 
and rigorous course to the extent that it presents a real challenge to the student,‖ but the board took 
exception to the trend away from ranking students.
127
 A draft College position on the subject of 
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ranking agreed, noting, however, that ―substantial modifications have been made in the College 
evaluation program.‖128 
Two recommendations in the report involved controversial topics. One considered a proposal 
that recommended teaching division operations to officers earlier in their career. The board noted, 
―The proposition has been advanced that the bulk of division level instruction should be conducted at 
the branch advanced course.‖ Williams‘ Board members offered both advantages and disadvantages 
to this proposal, saying that shifting division instruction away from CGSC would expose more 
officers to the subject and reduce the scope of the Regular Course. As disadvantages, the Board listed 
several to include CGCS‘s traditional role, overcrowding of branch school curricula, and 
fragmentation of division tactics into branch-specific schools.
129
 The Board remained ambivalent 
about the proposal but affirmed that CGSC‘s key contribution was the ―tactical application of the 
combined arms and services,‖ further commenting that the ―proven reputation of ‗Leavenworth‘ as 
the place where ground commanders learn the art of battlefield command should be perpetuated.‖130 
The Williams Board also proposed a significant change to the way CGSC students were 
selected and proposed a higher attendance goal. The Board suggested sixty-five percent of eligible 
Regular Army officers should attend the Resident Course, an increase above current target of fifty 
percent.
131
 Under the system existing since World War Two, the Department of the Army allocated 
quotas to each arm and service. Branch officer assignment managers, in turn, selected the officers to 
fill the available slots. What the Williams Board proposed was an Army-wide selection board. This 
would have made CGSC selection similar to the process used to slate senior service college students. 
In the end, the Board did not think that a change was necessary and backed away from endorsing 
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 The Williams Board noted service-wide requirements for CGSC graduates 
equaled 10,242. Available strength, however, was only 9,000. Given the upcoming increase in 




The panel had other concerns with the state of the non-resident and extension courses. Army-
level decisions raised the importance of the non-resident courses. The College‘s position paper to the 
Williams Board detailed the limitations of the present system. Objective-type tests and classification 
concerns, coupled with ―no direct contact between the student and a live instructor‖ prevented 
extension courses from attaining the same level of educational outcome as experienced by a resident 
student.
134
 Not far from the minds of the Williams Board was a major change in promotion 
requirements for reserve component officers. Graduation from a CGSC equivalent course became a 
pre-requisite for federal recognition of promotion to combat arms colonel or general officer in 1958. 




Perhaps most importantly for the future of the College, the Board‘s report showed an 
increased interest in using CGSC to teach peacetime duties. The Army Regulation governing the 
officer school system gave responsibility for preparing officers to ―perform efficiently in peace and 
war.‖ One pre-survey question revealed that the Army had in mind a purpose beyond serving as the 
senior tactical institution. ―How much attention should USACGSC give to leadership, personnel 
management, maintenance, financial management, and supply management,‖ asked the Board. The 
College‘s position, as expressed in its response, was that the Regular Course covered all five subjects 
in conjunction with lessons on related material. The author used some creative accounting in that he 
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reported personnel—194 hours, supply—105.2 hours, logistics—386 hours, maintenance—3 hours, 
and general management—90 hours. A careful reader would have noted the duplication among many 
of the areas and might have questioned the grand total of 778.2 hours against a course with little over 
1100 hours of total instructional time.
136
 
Introduction of new topics occurred incrementally as the College noticed the need for broader 
focus in officer education. This trend would continue in succeeding years with the addition of 
regional studies briefings to the curriculum in 1959-60. One of these wide-ranging lectures examined 
Southeast Asian countries from the standpoint of ―economic, geographical, sociological, political and 
military potential.‖137 While the school had integrated new material, it had not completely accepted 
the broader definition of officership implied by the new topics. The task to further update the 
curriculum and to correct structural problems would fall to later Commandants. 
The question of non-tactical topics did not rest with publication of the Williams Board report. 
Colonel Robert F. Seedlock of the Department of Defense staff wrote to the Commandant in 
September 1958 to ask about ―the aspects of military education which broaden officers beyond purely 
military subjects.‖ In his response, the College Secretary told Colonel Seedlock that CGSC had made 
tentative movement to expand beyond the ―purely military‖ by consolidating these type subjects 
under a single department, the Department of Staff and Education, and by paying attention, starting in 
1957, to subject matter of general educational interest.
138
  
Coded within the College‘s educational philosophy provided to Colonel Seedlock were two 
points that meant more than they said. ―There would be an increased emphasis on the educational 
approach in all instruction to the extent appropriate and practicable.‖ ―Educational approach‖ implied 
something different than the phased applicatory method used for tactical and logistical instruction. A 
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second aspect indicated that professional officers did not possess the knowledge needed and that 
expertise from other fields would be needed. ―The hours which in previous courses were categorized 
as general education would be consolidated in one department to ensure a cohesive approach; and 
advice in this area would be sought from universities. The subject matter selected would be 
specifically appropriate to the educational development of the professional officer, and at the same 
time would reinforce other instruction.‖139 The full import of these two statements became clear 
within a few years. In the meantime, the College staff and faculty found themselves consumed with 
daily affairs, and students. 
Blue Goose 
Barely two and one-half weeks after the 1957-58 Regular Course started, the staff began to 
plan next year‘s course.140 Much work remained. Some guidance had not been implemented due to 
time or resistance. The coming year would be a pilot of the new lessons. Updated material from the 
in-house doctrinal elements needed to be integrated into the next course. The faculty would try out the 
new instructional methods in the coming year. New department directors would take control of the 
courseware and their new departments. The institution had to absorb many changes.  
Officer integrity and student evaluations attracted more attention, too. Brigadier General 
Train hoped that a new rating system would reduce the impulse to cheat, so he called upon the Class 
Supervisor, Colonel Kennedy, to look for ways to emphasize ―moral values‖ in the next course.141 
Train implemented a new grading scheme for students for the 1957-58 courses, which he handed off 
to his replacement, Brigadier General Frederick R. Zierath. The first indication of its effectiveness 
came with the graduation of the Associate Course in December 1957. Ivan Birrer ―pointed out that 
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there had been no occasion during the course to send any warning letters of possible failure to 
students, again indicating that they were successfully absorbing instruction.‖ He reported to the 
Faculty Board that the ―last man on the graduation list…had 12 B‘s, 19 C‘s, and only 4 U‘s.‖ The 
bottom four officers were international students.
142
 
The perennial issue of sufficient instructors to teach all of the courses worsened in 1957-58. 
Based upon the Educational Survey Commission‘s findings about instructor workload, CGSC had 
requested that Fifth Army conduct a manpower survey, which took place in April 1957. Fifth Army‘s 
team recommended an additional twenty-two officers, two enlisted men, and twenty-eight civilians. 
Of this number, CGSC received only twelve officer spaces and eight civilian spaces. Exacerbating the 
existing problems with instructor workload was the school‘s increasing share of writing doctrinal and 
training literature. 
143
 Creating new knowledge required effort beyond the teaching faculty‘s 
capabilities. Officers in the mobilization augmentee program, which had begun in 1948, took some of 
these special projects or taught summer courses at the College. The part-time military faculty took on 
a variety of duties, from special studies to instructor training courses, but the College remained 
woefully short of full-time staff and faculty. 
Faculty turnover for 1958 stood at sixty-six. As the Faculty Board considered potential 
replacements from the 1957-58 classes, it looked for evidence of ―initiative‖ and ―originality,‖ which 
were traits added by the Commandant, who valued ―mental inventiveness‖ in prospective faculty. The 
Board recommended sixty-three officers from the Class of ‗58 as turnaround instructors, expecting to 
get fifteen to twenty of them approved by Department of the Army. Of the selected officers, twenty 
did not have four years of college, and three had the required four years but no degree. Three of the 
officers recommended were captains, added with the proviso that none of them would be assigned to 
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the teaching departments until promotion.
144
 The faculty recommended thirty-one officers from the 
Fall 1957 Associate Course as potential instructors. Through this system, instructors selected those 
who most resembled themselves or what they believed to be the ideal instructor.
145
Anticipating an 
increase in Regular Course students from 622 to 750 and from 320 to 400 in the Associate Course for 
1959-60, Colonel Buynoski wrote the personnel chief of CONARC about the situation. The school‘s 
authorization for officers was to increase to 316 as the College expanded, yet CGSC fell below 
overseas assignments and the Air Defense and the Guided Missile Schools for priority. Speaking of 
the current year, Buynoski observed ―Because of delays in assignments by the Department of the 
Army, the College began the current Academic Year with an actual shortage of 19 officers against the 
fully justified and documented requirement for 281….‖ Buynoski warned that the excessive workload 
might lead to a ―lowering of the quality of the Leavenworth product.‖146 
The ongoing issue with sufficient personnel to meet the College‘s needs peaked in 1958. The 
College‘s pending expansion raised the most concern among the leadership. Major General McGarr 
wrote the Chief of the Officer‘s Assignment Division at The Adjutant General‘s office to declare his 
support for an initiative to increase faculty quality. Under consideration was a plan to require four 
years‘ of college as a prerequisite for instructor duty. ―We are convinced that, since this is a college 
level institution, only officers with an educational background of four years of college should be 
assigned to the Staff and Faculty.‖ McGarr reported that of the 252 officers assigned, sixty-five had 
less than four years of civil education, fifty-five had less than three years, and ten had no college 
education whatsoever. Fifty-one percent of the faculty had no degree.
147
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The Commandant and his staff continued to press Fifth Army, CONARC, and the 
Department of the Army for highly qualified officers to fill instructor slots. At the time, one-third of 
each year‘s replacements came by extending tours, one-third from the graduating class, and one-third 
from the Army.
148
 The faculty and leadership controlled the first two-thirds, while they relied upon 
the Army to provide the remainder. The Commandant outlined what he believed to be the current 
needs for officers in a letter to Brigadier General M.M. Magee, Acting Chief of the Officer‘s 
Assignment Division: four years of college credit and combat service. He told Magee that the 
School‘s mission meant that the School needed 100% fill of all open spaces, and those officers 
assigned had to remain until the end of a full tour. Early departures disrupted the classroom routine.
149
  
Quality became an issue between the College and its higher headquarters. In a briefing paper 
prepared for the Commandant‘s meeting with Brigadier General Ben Harrell, head of the Infantry 
Branch, a staff officer told the Commandant 
The principle which D/A [Department of the Army] must recognize is that the quality of 
the Staff and Faculty must improve if the Army is to have an officer corps to meet the 
challenge of the times. The standards of the past are definitely not good enough. This has 
been recognized by the Educational Survey Commission and others. The simple issue is – 




Already short officers to accomplish existing tasks, Major General McGarr, his Chief of 
Staff, and Colonel James F. Frink, discussed calling off the expansion because of projected shortfalls. 
Fifth Army responded to CGSC‘s request for a higher priority saying it had no more personnel to 
allocate. According to the response on September 17, personnel authorizations and other needs within 
Fifth Army precluded the assignment of more officers. Exchanges between Fifth Army, CONARC, 
and the Adjutant General reveal the problem did not lie with Department of the Army and CONARC, 
who recognized and supported CGSC‘s requirement. Instead, Fifth Army had siphoned some of the 
faculty augmentation to other purposes, leaving CGSC potentially short sixty instructors for the 1959-
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60 class. CGSC competed with an Army in need of the best. Apparently, a Leavenworth education 
was not the priority it once had been.
151
 
Within the course, the Commandant looked closely at the work of the faculty. A few points 
left him unsatisfied. He believed that the map problems still emphasized the European theater too 
much. McGarr preferred a broader approach, which he relayed to the departments through his 
Secretary.
152
 McGarr‘s preference for a wider selection of areas reflected a growing appreciation of 
American defense commitments. His guidance to consider more options besides Europe indicates that 
he, at least, understood that conflict could take place around the periphery of the expanding Soviet 
bloc.  
War absent nuclear weapons existed, too.
153
 Davidson had reminded the faculty of this 
second condition—referred to as non-active atomic, or conventional, conditions back in 1955.154 The 
Army Chief of Staff had articulated a new Army mission that emphasized limited wars. In this view, 
the Army had a role in limited wars that atomic weapons could not fulfill. By design, the other aspect 
of the curriculum outlined by the Educational Survey Commission—increased emphasis on local 
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wars and other situations short of general atomic war—received less attention in the first rewrite.155 
On the other hand, these two areas were not ignored. 
By 1958, Birrer had succeeded in making the phased approach part of the course structure. In 
the guidance for planning the 1960 course, Major General McGarr directed that more time (32%) be 
shifted to the third phase, advanced application, and less to the earlier application phase (35%). The 
fundamental phase would remain constant at 15%. McGarr noted that departments had ―to avoid the 
definite annual tendency to increase fundamental instruction at the expense of more advanced 
instruction.‖156 He would battle with these issues until he left. 
As 1958 drew to a close, the Commandant looked ahead to the 1960 curriculum. His outline 
reflects a broad appreciation of the American strategic situation. McGarr assessed the likelihood of 
general war involving widespread use of atomic weapons as decreasing, but he interpreted recent 
events in Lebanon and the Formosa Straits as indicators of limited conflicts requiring equal levels of 
preparedness. As he saw it, the Army must contribute to ―strategic deterrence, tactical deterrence, and 
application of selective, measured force.‖157 To this end, his guidance allocated percentages to each of 
the three forms of war: general war – 35%, limited war – 55%, and Situations Short of War – 10%.158 
While he was satisfied with the progress made for the previous and ongoing courses, he called for 
better efforts in sixty-three areas. Among the ones he wanted to see modified for the 1960 course, 
McGarr directed the departments to ―aggressively further develop the concept of Unconventional 
Warfare doctrine and instruction, as previously directed.‖159 
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Departments had understaffed the doctrine writing effort, dual-tasking some officers with 
doctrinal duties so the department could maintain a larger instructor pool. McGarr made clear this 
was unacceptable, issuing a number of do‘s and don‘ts to curtail the departments‘ attempts to 
circumvent his guidance. He specified that each department maintain an in-house doctrinal capability, 
staffed with a minimum number of officers. He also mandated a level of quality, saying ―Officers 
selected…must be experienced author/instructors who have demonstrated particular capability for 
original, creative doctrinal work.‖160 
He continued to press for better instructional techniques as shown in his educational 
philosophy at appendix 5. The Commandant found deficiencies in small group discussions 
particularly troubling, and McGarr reiterated his position that instructors should never use lesson 
plans as a ―rigid script.‖ He directed that the faculty de-emphasize the school solution and even freed 
instructors to give their own opinion in the classroom.
161
 He instituted two written requirements, 
although he left some freedom for the student to choose the form (thesis, research paper, or article for 
publication). 
One should not believe Major General McGarr was alone in his beliefs. General Bruce C. 
Clark reinforced the expectations of what graduates should be able to do in his opening remarks to the 
class of 1959: 
Despite the sweeping changes in subject matter and techniques that have taken place at 
this College, the fundamental objective of the course remains the same: to produce 
officers with the mental discipline to think straight and the moral courage to make 
resolute decisions. Thinkers and deciders are what the Army has always expected from 




Among the audience were 620 officers, including allies (table 6). The trend towards more captains in 
attendance continued, with a slight decrease this year. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
urgently requires new concepts and doctrine to include basic definitions (including the definition of unconventional warfare itself) and new 
terminology.‖ He added, ―Unconventional warfare doctrine and instruction will be aggressively, imaginatively and soundly developed as a 
matter of urgency in line with my previous guidance.‖ Emphasis in original. 
160
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Table 6. Regular Course Ranks, 1958-59 
Rank U.S. Army Other U.S. Service Allied 
Major General   2 
Brigadier General   3 
Colonel   6 
Lieutenant Colonel* 65 4 35 
Major* 305 16 26 
Captain 150  8 
Source: Adam S. Buynoski, Roster Number 2, 1958-59 Regular Course, CGSC, 28 November 1958. *Or service equivalent.  
 
To achieve the outcome directed by the Commandant, and desired by other Army generals, 
the faculty shifted some of the instructional workload to the students, using them to lead group 
projects. Guidance from Colonel R.A. Broberg formalized two types of group work: the staff exercise 
and the committee. The two forms differed principally in the degree of decision making authority 
vested in the student leader. In staff exercises, the student role played a principal staff officer, and the 
faculty evaluated the student based upon their performance. In the second type of group work, ―the 
leader is not vested with the right of decision.‖ Students in a committee were expected to solve the 
problem using ―democratic group processes.‖163 The methods employed in the classroom tied to the 
desired outcome of a thinking officer. 
To aid student leaders in their tasks, lesson authors provided a ―Student Leader Guide‖ 
covering housekeeping details like the lesson‘s purpose, time, and training aids; preparatory reading 
for the student leader; and the requirement itself—a briefing, usually. A separate set of guidelines on 
how to manage time and guide discussions formed part of the guidance. The faculty expected students 
to prepare introductory remarks, manage time, prepare questions, cover all main points, and control 
group activity. One essential duty of the student leader was the lesson summary. ―[T]he leader must 
leave no doubt in any member‘s mind as to what the specific purpose of the period was and what 
significant points were covered.‖ In essence, the student leader became the assistant instructor, 
responsible for managing the group‘s learning. The school transmitted the requirement and the 
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functions of an instructor—taught in a three week course and refined through preparation—a few 
days before the problem was scheduled. Students came to dread the ―Blue Goose.‖164 
Sons of Important People 
From 1952 to 1958, both the number and proportion of foreign officers in the Regular Course 
rose slightly. International officers increased by nineteen, reaching eighty by the 1957-58 class. This 
represented a 2.7% increase. U.S. officers, on the other hand, remained relatively unchanged at 541 in 
the final year. The Educational Survey Commission of 1956 asked whether it was wise to give so 
many slots to allies, when the backlog of American officers remained so large. ―The presence of 
Allied officers creates a problem relative to classified material. There is also the question as to 
whether Allied officers do not replace some US officers who would otherwise be able to profit from 
the course offered by the College.‖165 The administration believed that the ratio of one allied student 
to seven U.S. students represented a maximum for the Regular Course. Any increase, according to the 
school, risked ―detract[ing] from the ability to conduct profitable classroom discussions.‖ The 1958-
59 Regular Course had 621 officers. One hundred were allies or from other U.S. services. Only seven 
of the U.S. Army officers came from reserve components.
166
 
The Associate Course had fewer individuals and a smaller proportion. Across the five shorter 
courses in 1956-58, foreign students comprised 0.0%, 4.3%, 2.1%, 10.4%, and 9.2% of each class. 
Academic subjects began with general staff functions but centered on the infantry division. Students 
had limited time with armored division, corps, and army operations, and they had twenty-four hours 
of instruction on atomic warfare, as it was understood at the time. CGSC hosted a few sixteen-week 
Foreign National Associate Courses, one of which the school held in 1955-56 for Nationalist Chinese 
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 The principal reason for segregated courses was their inability to understand English. The 
importance of the course to international diplomacy became apparent when President Chiang Kai-
Shek personally appealed to General Taylor for an additional Special Associate Course for Chinese 
officers.
168
 These special courses overcame the language barrier through translators, but the staff 
expressed the view that it was far more preferable for allied officers to attend the Regular Course.
169
 
In contrast to earlier statements, the staff conceded that atomic instruction would increase, but ―it 
does not appear that this increase will be of such a degree that it would nullify the value of the course 
for foreign officers.‖170 
The Allied Officer‘s Section continued to oversee the Allied Officer‘s Preparatory Course, 
somewhat modified from earlier versions. In 1955, the course lasted eight weeks. In the first phase, 
non-native English speakers through 157 hours of English instruction; the second phase of seventy-
seven hours covered basic Army doctrine and organizations.
171
 The intricate connections between the 
various Leavenworth courses can be seen in the actions subsequent to McGarr‘s directive of October 
1956. The move to atomic conditions and the incorporation of the Pentomic division required more 
than a revision of the Regular and Associate courses. In the fall of 1956, James E. Mrazek, the 
colonel in charge of the Allied Student section, advised Brigadier General Train of the need to revise 
fifty-one of the approximately eighty hours of academic subjects. No one had accounted for this in the 
initial estimate, and Mrazek was desperate for assistance. He asked for four more officers out of an 
already stressed faculty to rewrite the twelve subjects in need of revision; for without modification, 
the Allied Preparatory Course would teach old doctrine—something not acceptable to the 
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Commandant. Mrazek‘s situation was such that he was willing to accept students-in-waiting as 
instructors the following summer.
172
 
As had been past practice, the summer 1957 preparatory course had two phases: English 
instruction followed by basic Army subjects.
173
 Upon conclusion of this course, Colonel Mrazek 
again noted the recurring problem of the tactical portions of the Allied Officer Preparatory Course, 
reversing his earlier position. As he saw it now, the course was a standing requirement that needed 
dedicated instructors and curriculum planning. He outlined a haphazard system that used snowbirds (a 
student who had arrived early) to put together a course on a ―crash basis‖ using whatever means could 
be scraped together. The last-minute nature of the project incurred significant overtime charges and in 
his view did not present a professional image to newly arrived international officers. Worse, 
temporary instructors had little familiarity with the material and oftentimes presented inaccurate 
information. Mrazek recommended that ―professionally qualified authors and instructors‖ from the 
resident faculty prepare and present the lessons.
174
 
The Allied Officer‘s section continued to press MAAGs for cooperation in screening 
potential students. ―[O]ne single factor which most influences the degree of academic success of 
foreign students is English proficiency.‖175 Citing poor English skills as an ongoing concern, the 
section shared with the Foreign Military Training Conference the need to select officers who had 
demonstrated proficiency, because CGSC‘s approach ―integrated‖ international officers alongside 
their U.S. counterparts, giving both the same instruction to the degree classification guidance 
allowed.
176
 The focus on meeting the Army‘s demands for future officers submerged considerations 
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about allies‘ participation in the school. That is, until one student drew national attention to the 
College and the resulting commotion embarrassed its most famous graduate. 
Other crises interrupted the daily work of the Allied Officer‘s Section. In July 1956, 
Ecuadoran Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Gonzalez began to complain that his ulcer was acting up. After 
medical examination, the doctor found Gonzalez to be in a ―rather marked anxiety state‖ at the 
prospect of the Regular Course. ―In his own mind he is convinced that he can be relieved of his 
symptoms only by being allowed to withdraw from the impending course.‖177 Shortly thereafter, 
Lieutenant Colonel Gonzalez returned home. Despite an extensive program of social activities and 
local sponsors, occasional homesickness affected an international student. The extreme case of an 
Ethiopian officer in 1956 led the Department of the Army to direct that in the future, no less than two 
Ethiopians would attend CGSC simultaneously.
178
  
For the most part, assisting in the transition to American society and culture fell to the 
military sponsors of each allied student. Each year, the Allied Officer‘s Section canvassed the post for 
sponsors for the new class of allied officers. The section circulated a list of nations for the next year‘s 
class. Ideally, the sponsor would meet the new student at the airport or train station and convey them 
to the post. For some, this was a simple task as they were housed in bachelor officer quarters on post. 
For others, especially those with families, the student had to rent a house in town. Sponsors helped 
arrange housing, transportation, schools for children, banking, and answered any number of questions 
about daily needs. The program merited the attention of the Commandant, for a despondent or 
discontented allied officer could create lots of work.
179
 
Lieutenant General Rafael L. Trujillo, Jr., a general in the Dominican Republic‘s Air Force, 
arrived in the summer of 1958. Trujillo was a problem from early on. To skirt Army regulations that 
precluded allied general officers from attending schools such as CGSC, Trujillo arrived wearing the 
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rank of colonel, a fact well-known to those who arranged his attendance. This never sat well with 
Trujillo, who promptly made a scene when he found other allied generals among his classmates. 
Trujillo pressed his own embassy for instructions that would allow him to wear his general‘s rank—a 
request the embassy was only too happy to oblige, given that dad was the head of state.
 180
 As the 
situation worsened, the College Secretary, Colonel Adam Buynoski, wrote the chief of the Foreign 
Military Training Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations to outline the problems and 
to request clarification of Trujillo‘s status. Was he a lieutenant general, or was he a colonel as his 
orders stated?
181
 Trujillo himself played the part of jet-setter. 
Trujillo never took his studies seriously, attending class at his leisure. His antics became 
legendary among the faculty and staff. Trujillo‘s notoriety soon expanded beyond Kansas. His 
excesses finally drew the attention of Representative Wayne L. Hays, Democrat of Ohio. In closed 
testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Hays reportedly told committee 
members about Trujillo‘s lavish lifestyle. ―Generalissimo Trujillo‘s son occupied a Kansas City hotel 
and used a fleet of automobiles, a weekend ranch house and other luxuries costing an estimated 
million dollars a year.‖182 Hays, and fellow representatives, were infuriated that American foreign aid 
underwrote these extravagances. Thoroughly outraged by this time, House legislators still attempted 
to ―punish the Dominican Republic for the gay life in Hollywood of Rafael Trujillo, Jr.‖ as they 
debated the FY 59 foreign aid program.
183
 Trujillo claimed the money spent came from his own 
pockets. 
Trujillo‘s yacht anchored in southern California, where he spent a lot of time. During the 
year, he dated Zsa Zsa Gabor and Kim Novak, buying both extravagant gifts and foreign sports cars. 
Somewhat surprised by the news of his friendship with Gabor and Novak, Trujillo‘s wife, and the 
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mother of his six children, sought a divorce in Mexico. From this point on, Trujillo became a media 
sensation. Following a medical procedure, he recuperated in Hollywood ―on leave ‗for medical 
reasons‘.‖ As Trujillo recovered from his surgery, his entourage added to the spectacle. Trujillo‘s 
aide, Victor Sued, got convicted of drunken driving in Torrance, California. Three days later, Trujillo 
returned to Leavenworth and the remainder of the course.
184
  
His excessive absences, however, had now drawn the attention of the administration. A 
debate ensued as to how to treat his case. A month later, Trujillo was declared a non-graduate for 
failure to attend sufficient classes. Trujillo quickly dismissed the action, declaring ―the Good 
Neighbor Policy instituted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
was gone without hope of revival.‖ Trujillo lashed out at the school, saying CGSC ―had been 
converted to political purposes. The diploma it confers no longer constitutes an honor.‖185 Having 
declared this, the Dominican Republic recalled all officers attending U.S. military training the next 
day.
186
 A few days later, Trujillo‘s father announced his promotion to full general of the Army and 
Air Force. Trujillo got the news while in Los Angeles.
187
  
The fallout continued throughout the summer, peaking with the Dominican Republic‘s 
deliberate absence during President Eisenhower‘s address to the United Nations on August 13. The 
New York Times reported the insult on page one. The next month the Dominican Foreign Minister 
called for voters to oust three U.S. representatives in the November 1958 elections. Representatives 
Alvin M. Bentley, Republican of Michigan; Charles O. Porter, Democrat of Oregon; and Charles B. 
Brownson, a Republican from Indiana came under attack by Dr. Porfirio Herrera Baez. The Minister 
dispatched letters to governmental, business, and civic groups calling for the defeat in the coming 
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A New Home 
On the west bank of the Missouri River, the colorful banners of many nations swayed gently 
in the frigid breeze. A gray overcast sky contrasted with the bright reds, greens, and yellows of the 
flags, while gleaming windows and new reddish-brown brick formed the backdrop to this symbolic 
gathering. Inside, the bustle and fuss of ceremony accompanied the freezing temperatures. On this 
brisk January day, Kansans gathered together with the governor, George Docking, to dedicate a new 
academic building at Fort Leavenworth. James Franklin Bell Hall, new home to the Army‘s 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC), opened with all the formalities expected in the 
unveiling of a new military building, especially on a historic post. Major General Lionel C. McGarr 
performed the necessary introductions. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker, a serious and 
slightly balding man, delivered the dedication remarks in the building‘s cavernous auditorium. 
Alongside the Secretary sat elected officials, military officers, even the Chancellor of the University 
of Kansas. With the conclusion of the ceremony, the assembled guests spilled out into the corridors to 
consider the new building‘s modern features. Expecting great things, an advertisement in the 
Leavenworth Times proclaimed, ―Son…It‘s More Than Just a Building‖190  
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James Franklin Bell Hall was a project conceived under Major General McBride‘s tenure, 
although construction did not begin until McGarr had taken over.
191
 Throughout the period preceding 
its opening, construction delays, budget cuts, and personnel shortfalls threatened the expansion. 
Weather and labor strikes prevented its scheduled opening in July 1958. This worried the 
administration, because an increase in the class size was tied to the availability of this new facility. 
Army-wide budget cuts deleted the funding for Bell Hall‘s furnishings, leaving the project 
underfunded by $331,350. The same weather problems that had afflicted classroom construction had 
put new student housing behind schedule. An increased class size meant extra instructors, which had 
been provided for by a Fifth Army manpower survey in April 1957. Much work remained to be done 
before the College could move to its new home.
192
 
Soon after the groundbreaking ceremony, CONARC directed the Commandant to consider 
the ―Feasibility of using all or part of the increased College capacity which will become available on 
completion of Franklin Bell Hall in August 1958, to increase capacity of the Associate Course.‖ 
Could the College teach three Associate Courses per year?
193
 Bell Hall had twenty-four classrooms 
designed to accommodate fifty students each. To make effective use of this capacity, the School 
leadership and CONARC had allocated 900 spaces to the Regular Course and 300 to the Associate 
Course. Given that the school presently taught two Associate Courses annually, the College could 
graduate up to 1500 officers from resident courses.
194
 CONARC, hoping to increase the number of 
qualified officers, wanted a third course to assist in reducing the backlog that still existed. 
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The new academic building gave the College a central home. No longer scattered across 
multiple locations, including a former riding hall, a converted stable, and a gymnasium, the School‘s 
faculty and students occupied a common building. It was the last of the major changes made under 
Major General McGarr‘s command. It turned out to be the most enduring. 
McGarr‘s reputation as a tyrant must be reconciled with the progress made during his four 
years as Commandant. Under McGarr‘s watch, CGSC moved to a new building, enlarged the faculty, 
and expanded the student population. Krepinevich‘s assessment, unfairly, looks at his tenure through 
what happened later in Vietnam, rather than what existed as McGarr experienced it. Ample evidence 
from McGarr‘s own writings suggests that he had a broader appreciation of the U.S. strategic 
situation than has been previously acknowledged. McGarr—and Davidson—sought permission to use 
draft doctrine, which was a distinct break with their predecessors. McGarr managed the expansion of 
the Regular and Associate Courses, gathering the needed resources to increase the capacity of both. 
At his direction, faculty overhauled the extension course and USAR schools‘ curriculums, bringing 
them closer to the resident Associate Course. From the perspective of educational effectiveness, his 
continual emphasis on small group methods and development of individual decision making ability 
indicate a willingness to use more modern approaches.  
Dr. Birrer, who had served Commandants since 1948 as the Educational Advisor, reflected 
back on the changes at CGSC that began with McGarr‘s initiatives. In a retrospective look, Dr. Birrer 
characterized McGarr‘s first two years as ―turbulent,‖ but the reforms had taken hold and lasting 
changes were made by the time the Commandant departed.
195
 In part, change was made possible by 
McGarr‘s extended tenureover four yearsas Commandant. Perhaps the unfavorable 
characterization of the Commandant‘s actions by others reflects the outcome of his professional life. 
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Like the Army of which he was a part, McGarr‘s subsequent service in Vietnam played out in the 
form of a Greek tragedy. 
Transition to War 
At the conclusion of the Korean War, CGSC‘s leaders had assessed the institution. Major 
General Davidson had discovered that during years of war the College had done little to 
accommodate external changes. The Army had broadened the view of CGSC‘s mission. From a 
school focused overwhelmingly on staff duties in large tactical level units, the College had expanded, 
albeit slowly, its scope. The College no longer concentrated on teaching staff skills and tactics. Too, 
the broad outlines of a growing uncertainty about the purpose of CGSC, and officer education in 
general, emerged during this period. One internal assessment, two College-specific commissions, and 
an Army-level board came to widely different conclusions. 
Change could be detrimental, however. The radical shift in the 1957-58 curriculum shows an 
organization caught up in the moment without a full understanding of the future. With little time to 
assimilate the technological changes ongoing around it, and even less time to think about the future 
implications of those changes, the faculty and staff had overreached, adopting a version of the future 
that went too far beyond the limits of professional knowledge. Although understandable given the 
innovations of weaponry the late 1950s, the nuclear battlefield was not the only version of the future. 
A strong antithetical argument existed as well. In this view, the Army had a role in limited wars that 
atomic weapons could not fulfill. The routine use of tactical nuclear weapons competed with quasi-
wars for curriculum space. The College accommodated three versions of the future as best it could in 
the ten months available. The range of potential battlefield conditions, the presence or absence of 
atomic weapons, and the unknowns of the new combat organization encompassed too many variables 
to cover each adequately. 
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In 1959, the Army‘s leadership had not achieved consensus on the role and direction of the 
Army, much less what should be taught to students.
196
 When Bell Hall opened, faculty taught officers 
the art and science of war using a new curriculum developed in 1957. A new building brimming with 
updated, but well-worn, ideas greeted the class of 1960. New concepts of war took hold slowly. 
Procedural barriers and manpower shortages exacerbated the delayed response to external 
developments. Most importantly, a fundamental flaw in course planning procedures prevented an 
agile response to rapid technological, organizational, and social changes. On the eve of the Vietnam 
War, the College had significantly altered the content, scope, and method of the Leavenworth resident 
course. Most adjustments came from outside developments, since structural inertia retarded the 
adoption of new ideas within the College for much of the era after World War Two. On the whole, the 
school reacted to external events rather than seeking to shape the future; the focal point for new 
knowledge lay outside CGSC. Meanwhile, the imperceptible shift to a peacetime orientation gained 
momentum. 
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Defining Professional Jurisdiction, 1954-1964 
When we finished World War II, small wars had never occurred. We didn‘t realize that 
international leadership was very likely to bring us into contact with problems we hadn‘t 
faced before. 
Frank Pace, Jr. 
Secretary of the Army, 1950-53 
 
 
The Leavenworth student of the 1950s—expected to be a skilled leader conversant in new 
forms of war—faced numerous challenges. The first was learning about duties on a battlefield yet to 
be defined. For over thirty years following World War Two, the officer corps struggled to adapt 
intellectually to the changed security circumstances of the United States. Sketching a theory of war 
which would accommodate warfare spanning atomic weapons to insurgency was to prove extremely 
difficult, especially given competing viewpoints within the Army itself.
1
 Modern war in the twentieth 
century required an expansive definition, encompassing the atomic battlefield, conventional major 
conflicts, limited war, and guerilla war. Integrating the atomic weapon into existing schema 
confounded doctrine writers as well as generals. A working definition of modern war, in all its forms, 
remained elusive. Neither those responsible for providing doctrine, nor those responsible for teaching 
it, could produce a satisfactory explanation of the collective means necessary to perform effectively in 
this new environment. Army schools lagged even further behind external developments, because 
military professionals remained uncertain of the future. The resulting lack of coherent direction 
stymied the officer education system.  
It is said by some historians that guerilla war, also called partisan warfare, received the least 
attention in the Army‘s schools. Andrew Krepinevich offered this thesis in The Army and Vietnam. 
More recent scholarship, such as the two-part history of Army counterinsurgency doctrine by Andrew 
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Birtle, plainly shows that the Army experimented with counterinsurgency and had recognized the 
unique character of this form of warfare. Likewise, as will be established, the College and its 
instructors did not totally ignore the issue of small wars. Communist insurgency, especially the 
Maoist variation, intrigued American officers, and the subject generated professional discussion 
amongst faculty.
2
 Officers had individually dissected components of the whole. Interestingly, the 
College‘s professional journal, Military Review, showed an early awareness of guerilla warfare, 
partisans, and Southeast Asia, but not always in a form applicable to the eventual situation the United 
States confronted in Indochina. Collectively, the College formally studied the topic and offered some 
tentative conclusions. The efficacy of their communal efforts forms a major focus of this chapter next 
section. 
The Artful Dodge 
In general terms, the United States Army acquitted itself well during World War Two. 
Glaring World War One deficiencies regarding mobilization, large unit logistics, and battle command 
were studied and corrected during the interwar years. Experienced instructors from the American 
Expeditionary Force populated the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) faculty after the First 
World War, and they helped develop and sharpen many of the interwar operational concepts. While 
not having recognized the potential of airpower, among other miscues, officers had made effective 
use of the interwar years, largely through education.
3
 Army schools played a key role in identifying 
and inculcating American land warfare concepts prior to the Second World War. Students from this 
cohort transformed a skeleton army into an effective military force deployed and employed across the 
globe. 
Officers faced a wholly new situation after 1945. In spite of the expanded national 
responsibilities and increased size of standing forces, the Army faced questions of relevance in the 
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dawning atomic age. Russell Weigley noted, ―For most Americans, including most of the 
government, the Army in the late 1940‘s seemed almost irrelevant to the Communist challenge.‖4 
Demobilization proceeded rapidly, as the Truman administration and Congress responded to public 
opinion and citizen-soldier demands. Having completed their task, service members were returned to 
civilian life by the millions.
5
 The Army‘s dilemma can be seen in Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, 
Jr.‘s 1952 comments: 
The Army must prepare itself for possible global war against an enemy who outnumbers 
us on the ground—an enemy capable of marshaling his resources to strike without 
warning at a time and place of his own choosing. If global war does not suit his purpose, 
this enemy can also incite ―local wars‖ anywhere along the global boundary between the 
Free and Communist worlds. The Army can choose neither the time nor the place of war, 




America‘s position as a European and Asian power, a new national defense structure, and an overhaul 
of the officer personnel system led to expanded professional requirements; however, military 
intellect, that of the officer corps in particular, labored to accommodate the exponential growth in 
technology and new trials arising from growing national involvement in world affairs. As Secretary 
Pace observed, the United States inherited the role of global policeman as European colonial regimes 
in Asia and elsewhere collapsed.
7
 
The Cold War-era Army has had numerous critics. Even before the North Korean attack 
exposed the weaknesses of an occupation army, Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times openly 
questioned the combat readiness of tactical forces.
8
 Later, T.R. Fehrenbach and Andrew Bacevich 
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assailed the quality and performance of the 1950s Army.
9
 Likewise, much has been said about 
America waging the wrong kind of war in Vietnam.
10
 Andrew Krepinevich‘s The Army and Vietnam 
criticized the Army for misunderstanding the nature of the conflict and for using the wrong approach 
as a result.
11 
Krepinevich found the school system ignored counterinsurgency in favor of ―The Army 
Concept.‖12 He asked, ―What has the Army done these past fifteen years [prior to 1965] to prepare 
itself for a war quite unlike those ―traditional‖ wars—World Wars I and II and the Korean War—that 
it had become accustomed to waging?‖13 In fact, very little attention was paid to the subject of 
counterinsurgency in the ten years leading up to expanded American involvement in Vietnam. 
Krepinevich was not the only harsh critic. Russell Weigley observed: ―The old Indian-fighting Army 
had habituated itself to fluid tactics with elements of guerilla-style war; the Army of 1950 had long 
forgotten the tactics of Indian wars.‖14 Historian Ronald Spector later wrote: ―The entire question of 
antiguerilla or, as it was coming to be called, counterinsurgency warfare was complicated by the fact 
that the U.S. Army had paid little attention to the need to develop counterinsurgency training and 
doctrine during the 1950s.‖15 Existing methods had worked to defeat guerillas in ―Greece, Korea, the 
Philippines, and Iran.‖ The prevailing attitude was that American techniques would be successful 
against the Viet Cong, too.
16
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This line of inquiry, however, places Vietnam at the forefront of the American Army‘s 
consciousness during the prelude to the Vietnam War, rather than as just another facet of a 
complicated world. As will be shown, the staff and faculty of CGSC in the 1950s lacked the stimulus 
needed to embrace the problem of counterinsurgency. While the U.S. Army had extensive experience 
with combating guerillas and partisans over its history, a combination of persuasive ideology, 
political indoctrination, and military capability inherent in the communist form of insurgency required 
a re-examination, if not wholesale reappraisal, of old methods.
17
 Moreover, digesting the World War 
Two experience, especially in light of the rapid build-up of the Soviet Army and the increasing threat 
of atomic weapons, proved too great an intellectual leap for the professional officer of the 1950s. 
If a recasting of professional form and thought were to have taken place through the officer 
education system, an institution which logically had to have played a key role was CGSC. The extent 
to which the school incorporated events in Indochina into the education provided to officers at the 
Army‘s mid-career course serves as a reference point for assessing later criticism of the Army. 18 Did 
the CGSC modify its curriculum based on early experience in Indochina? If not counterinsurgency, 
what was taught to officers? Tracing the adjustments made by the College after America became 
directly involved in Vietnam illuminates the process of jurisdictional expansion and the creation of 
new knowledge applicable to the profession.
19
 The role of postwar military schools in shaping the 
professional outlook of student-officers also emerges. If CGSC incorporated lessons on limited war, 
counterinsurgency, or Vietnam specifically, in the 1954 to 1964 courses, these developments may 
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help to understand whether officers had the foresight to recognize and adapt to this new form of 
warfare. Contrasting the 1954 to 1964 Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) 
curriculum against the American advisory efforts in Vietnam during the same timeframe reveals a 
profession struggling with its core tenets.  
America Inherits a War: Advisory Efforts 1954 – 1958 
National Security Council (NSC) paper 64, issued in February 1950, proved to be a 
remarkably prescient analysis. The document expressed the belief that Indochina was a key area in 
the containment of communism and defined the U.S. policy towards the region for ensuing ten years. 
It directed ―the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority a program of 
all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in Indochina.‖20 In the 
ensuing years, despite the Korean War and the buildup in Europe, Indochina would slowly become 
more central to American efforts to counter the spread of communism. 
Bernard Fall provided officers the first practical introduction to Indochina in his October 
1953 Military Review article, which described the situation in Indochina since V-E Day. He covered 
Vietminh capabilities, the Vietminh‘s interleaving of political ideology with military force, and an 
unflattering description of French tactical mistakes. Despite continuing French difficulties, Fall 
concluded: ―It cannot be considered a modern war since one of the opponents is entirely devoid of 
armor and air power.‖21 Perhaps readers thought so as well. 
American military involvement in Vietnam began as a series of observation and logistical 
support efforts intended to bolster the French struggle to counter the communists. In 1950, the United 
States began to provide military aid to the French forces. After the French defeat in May 1954, the 
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U.S. assumed an increasingly direct role in Vietnam.
22
 The Collins Mission culminated a series of 
assessment and support missions to the French, and it marked the transition from French to American 
dominance regarding South Vietnamese affairs.  
Over the next five years, the American presence evolved quietly. The U.S. Military 
Assistance Group, Indochina provided the framework upon which the Collins Mission would build. 
Re-designated as MAAG Vietnam on October 28, 1955, Lieutenant General S. T. Williams became 
chief of the American advisory group in November. Troop strength of the MAAG had risen to 342 in 
1955 and still stood at this level in early 1956. Much of 1954 to 1958 saw the MAAG devote its 
energy to designing a workable army for the South Vietnamese, although it was an army patterned 
after American forms. 
Near simultaneous with the evolution of the MAAG, Lieutenant General John W. O‘Daniel 
headed a joint training venture with the French known as the Training Relations and Instruction 
Mission (TRIM). Formed in February 1955, the mission was allocated 217 U.S. trainers of the 342 
authorized Americans in-country, and it had about 200 French advisers, although the French 
withdrew trainers throughout the coming year.
23
 Given the mission to ―train and develop the 




The next increment of U.S. involvement hid behind the premise of logistical thrift. Departing 
French forces left behind a huge surplus of American equipment. On the pretext of recovering 
materiel, the Americans circumvented the Geneva Accords advisor ceiling in a sleight-of-hand.
25
 The 
Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) of 1956 sought to gain control of the mountain of 
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military equipment using 350 U.S. personnel. However, the troops rapidly shifted from equipment 
recovery to logistical training of South Vietnamese forces. Together with the MAAG, this meant 
there were around 740 Americans in Vietnam at the end of 1956.
26
 
At this point, U.S. training and logistical assistance missions to Vietnam provided very little 
to convince the CGSC leadership to substantially alter the curriculum. The missions that did exist 
concerned themselves principally with training or equipping the Vietnamese. American troops had 
limited direct contact with the insurgents, and the overall numbers of soldiers in country during this 
time were relatively small. In a force averaging over one million troops, an advisory force of less than 
800 in a distant Asian land drew little notice.
27
 
Infiltrating the Curriculum, 1954 –1958 
Direct involvement of American forces in Vietnam began after the July 21, 1954 Geneva 
Accords. Was this sufficient to cause the Army to modify its view of warfare, or did the Army‘s 
educational institution hold to previously established patterns? Krepinevich‘s study found little 
evidence of direct applicability to the emerging form of war. On the other hand, Andrew J. Birtle‘s 
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 documented the 
Army‘s extensive post-World War Two experience in smaller conflicts that became increasingly 
common.
28
 Field Manual 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla Forces, published in 1951 and a related 
volume, Field Manual 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare, clearly demonstrate 
that the Army did not ignore irregular forces and counterinsurgency.
29
 On the other hand, neither of 
the manuals nor the topic itself claimed a substantial share of the curriculum. Central to 
understanding why insurgency was never a regular feature of the curriculum is to remember what was 
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being taught. The meandering course the College took to infuse atomic weapons into the Regular 
Course highlights the Army‘s widespread difficulty in defining a hypothetical war. The College 
experienced great difficulty coming to grips with what the Army temporarily came to see as its 
primary role—land combat on an atomic battlefield. The inability to integrate atomic weapons into 
land combat operations meant little attention would be given to ancillary topics. New topics appeared 
as add-ons and not a substantial change to the underlying philosophy. The College did not completely 
disregard the topic of guerilla warfare, although CGSC hardly emphasized the topic to the level called 
for by later experience.
30
  
Army officers showed some interest in learning lessons from its recent experiences other than 
World War Two, and they studied anticipated enemies. Their rationale for interest in the topic can be 
found in professional writings of the early 1950s. Officers thought that the Army might have to 
employ guerillas, and the Second World War had exposed the limited familiarity most officers had 
with the employment of guerilla forces. Writing about an OSS unit‘s harrowing experience leading 
guerillas against the Japanese, Lieutenant Colonel William C. Wilkinson, Jr, said, ―From the 
beginning, this group was beset with problems which would not have occurred if previous experience 
had been available to draw upon.‖31 
Lieutenant Colonel George T. Metcalf‘s ―Offensive Partisan Warfare‖ enunciated the 
principles of offensive partisan operations for friendly purposes in 1952. Metcalf, a CGSC instructor, 
emphasized that ―future warfare undoubtedly will exploit the partisan potential to a vastly greater 
degree than ever before,‖ but he noted ―there is a notable deficiency of training in and understanding 
of the offensive capabilities and limitations of partisan movements.‖ Metcalf outlined potential roles 
for a partisan force, mainly as an adjunct to conventional units. He urged service schools to devote 
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more instruction to the subject, stating that ―professional military personnel must receive thorough 
orientation and training in the offensive, as well as the defensive, aspects partisan warfare.‖32  
American officers wrote about their counter-guerilla experiences in other regions and in more 
recent conflicts. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick H. Loomis, a CGSC instructor, acquainted officers 
with the situation in Greece during 1949. He detailed the organization and operations of the Joint 
United States Military Aid and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), which was part of General Van Fleet‘s 
United States Army Group Greece (USAGG). Loomis‘ emphasis on the advisory role foreshadowed 
similar methods adopted in Vietnam. The example he used of Greek army tactical operations, 




The general theme of friendly partisans as an economy of force carried forward throughout 
the next ten years. On the eve of increasing American involvement in Vietnam, the Army viewed 
guerillas as something to be dealt with using conventional means. An early CGSC lesson built upon 
this appreciation. The 1953-54 lesson on guerilla operations introduced students to the idea that 
conventional forces might have to both employ guerillas for their own purposes as well as defend 
against them in combat operations. Points considered in the lesson included: 
(a) implications of defense on extended frontages for guerilla and infiltration action; (b) 
use of reconnaissance and combat patrols and infantry-armor-air teams in offensive 
action to combat enemy infiltration, (c) defensive plans by small units to insure 
coordinated reaction to local attack, and (d) countermeasures employing friendly 




The curriculum changed little for the next few classes. Officers had a classified lesson on 
guerilla operations, but little other evidence of the issue can be found in the course. The 1956-57 
school year was essentially a repeat of the previous one. From a review of the CGSOC Programs of 
Instruction (POI) in the 1950s, it is apparent that the college paid negligible attention to the type of 
situation that officers faced in Vietnam during the late 1950s and early 1960s. While counter-guerilla 
                                                     
32
 George T. Metcalf, ―Offensive Partisan Warfare,‖ Military Review 32 (April 1952): 53-61. 
33
 Frederick H. Loomis, ―Report From Greece,‖ Military Review 30 (April 1950): 3-9. 
34
 POI, 1953-54, 87-89. 
170 
 
lessons were never an extensive, much less central, feature of the curriculum, their presence in an 
already crowded schedule demonstrates some level of interest within the officer corps. 
Subsequent modifications to lesson plans in the late 1950s reveal several minor additions 
related to ongoing operations in Vietnam. The 1958-59 POI called for a guest speaker on Military 
Assistance Programs, and students heard another lecture on ―Political and Economic Aspects of Local 
War.‖35 In themselves, these three-hour briefings are relatively unremarkable; however, compared to 
the previous curriculum material, nothing similar had been taught since the restart of the course in 
1946. Communism also appeared in the offerings in the form of an FBI briefing on communist 
activities in the United States.
36
 The 1958-59 POI called for a guest speaker on military assistance 
programs, and students heard another lecture on ―Political and Economic Aspects of Local War.‖37 A 
lecture on communism also appeared in the form of an FBI briefing on communist activities in the 
United States.
38
 In themselves, these three-hour lectures were relatively unremarkable; however, 
nothing similar had been taught since the restart of the course in 1946. Current events lessons, along 
with general management classes and similar topics, symbolize an early movement away from the 
school‘s tactical focus towards a curriculum far more expansive than had been the case earlier. The 
introduction of such topics is an indication that the College had noticed the need for broader focus in 
officer education—three years before President Kennedy took office.  
This trend would continue in succeeding years with the addition of regional studies briefings 
to the curriculum in 1959-60. One of these wide-ranging lectures examined Southeast Asian countries 
from the standpoint of ―economic, geographical, sociological, political and military potential.‖39 But 
the school had not completely embraced the changed focus hinted at by the new topics just 
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mentioned. Just how thoroughly the Army had accepted the use of nuclear weapons in limited war 
can be seen in the one tactical problem that mentioned Vietnam in the 1950s. 
Vietnam made a brief appearance in the 1959-60 war fighting lessons. In a six-hour map 
problem entitled ―Fundamentals of Employment of Army Transport Aviation,‖ the author selected 
Vietnam as the setting for the practical exercise. This was a division-level tactical problem that made 
students apply basic airmobile doctrine to a tactical situation.
40 
The situation given to the students had 
the allied forces, operating under SEATO control, in the midst of a general counteroffensive. Students 
were to incorporate helicopters into their plan for an attack across the Song Ca River near Vinh in the 
eastern portion of South Vietnam. The reason for the selection of Vietnam as the setting remains 
obscure, but it is apparent that the author was more concerned with a conventional attack akin to the 
Korean War than combating an insurgency. The problem‘s opening statement anticipated that: 
In November 19__, fearing open revolt and claiming treaty violations, the Aggressor-
controlled military forces of NORTH VIET NAM, including some Aggressor volunteer 
units, attacked south across the 17
th
 parallel. The Aggressor-controlled force, employing 
nuclear weapons in a tactical role, met with initial success and penetrated approximately 
50 miles in a period of 5 days. Here, because of the stiffening defenses of the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of VIET NAM (AFRVN) and overextended Aggressor lines of 




The only mention of guerilla forces was a link-up with friendly guerillas after completion of the river 
crossing by American forces.  
The structure of the problem and the information given to the students diverged widely from 
the existing Vietnam situation in 1959.
42
 The exercise scenario allowed the use of nuclear weapons by 
both sides. Students were allocated six nuclear devices and were required to plan for their 
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employment as part of their analysis of the best solution.
43 
As the problem continued, both sides had 
employed tactical nuclear weapons—the allies in the preparation for their attack, and the Aggressor 
forces in a counterattack.
44 
Overall, the problem differed little from other conventional war scenarios. 
The choice of Vietnam appears not to be an attempt to reflect actual circumstances in the late 1950s. 
The lesson‘s after action report reflected the general lack of awareness at Fort Leavenworth 
(and, indeed, within the body politic) about the growing Vietnam crisis. Major George E. Handley 
stated that this map problem was identical to that of another airmobile lesson set in Eastern Germany. 
He commented, ―This subject, which is the initial and fundamental subject for airmobile operations, is 
better portrayed in general war and under environmental conditions favoring airmobile operations.‖45 
He went on to recommend that the subject be subsumed into the East Germany lesson to make better 
use of class time. The college adopted his recommendation, and Vietnam left the tactical curriculum 
as quickly as it had appeared.
46
 The short-lived lesson reflects both the depth to which atomic 
weapons and Europe had penetrated the thinking of the Army, and how distant Vietnam really was 
from the consciousness of instructors. 
The Advisor Buildup, 1958 – 1964 
Events in the late 1950s convinced officers deployed to Vietnam of one thing—the South 
Vietnamese needed help if they were going to win. American involvement in 1958-59 remained at 
relatively low levels with continuation of training advisory missions. During the last years of the 
Eisenhower Administration, the Army took increasing notice of the activities in Vietnam even as the 
situation continued to worsen in South Vietnam. Clearly, some officers in the 1950s and 1960s 
understood the problem in Vietnam was not solely a military issue.
47
 Staff reports, journal articles, 
and suggestions from the scene confirm this. By all measures, the Viet Cong insurgency had gained 
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strength by 1960. In the past few years, Special Forces troops assumed increasingly direct roles, while 
advisors proliferated and took posts down to the battalion level. By the time that American advisors, 
both political and military, had realized the seriousness of the situation in Vietnam, it was too late for 
the education system to respond. 
Advisors shifted from training and support towards active participation in combat operations 
by the early 1960s. The number of advisors had doubled in 1960 from the previous year and then 
increased over 350% to more than 3,100 in 1961. During this period, American helicopters and crews 
arrived and participated in operations against the Viet Cong. Further augmentation in 1962 brought 
the total American force to 11,326. And by 1964, U.S. troops numbered 23,310.  
American advisory efforts in Vietnam and the Command and General Staff College directly 
intersected when the new MAAG Vietnam Chief arrived.
48
 Lieutenant General McGarr had just 
completed a tour as the college‘s commandant, and he then moved to Vietnam to assume his new post 
on September 1, 1960. As outlined earlier, McGarr had driven the CGSOC curriculum in a new 
direction in 1957 with his concern about anticipating the directions of future warfare. In doing so, he 
had forced change upon an educational system rooted in past success and confused about the future. 
McGarr‘s ability to foster change in Vietnam was less successful by all measures, but assessing the 
influence of his time at CGSC on McGarr‘s performance as the MAAG Chief requires reconciling 
two widely divergent views. 
In Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960, Ronald Spector depicted General 
McGarr‘s efforts in Vietnam in a very positive manner. He asserted that ―General McGarr had 
carefully prepared for his assignment while commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College.‖49 The Army and Vietnam, however, portrayed a totally different image of the general. 
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―McGarr proved to be an eccentric MAAG chief; nevertheless, his erratic views on counterinsurgency 
were quite representative of the Army‘s during the advisory years.‖50 Krepinevich went on to present 
evidence that the MAAG chief was ill-suited to the task of counterinsurgency. Spector credited 
McGarr for viewing ―counterinsurgency as a distinct species of warfare requiring development of 
special doctrine and techniques,‖ while Krepinevich assailed the MAAG Chief as giving ―lip service 
to counterinsurgency doctrine, while operating in accordance with the ―Concept.‖51 Given the 
turbulence and uncertainty of upper-echelon assignments, it is difficult to support Spector‘s claim that 
McGarr could have foreseen that he would be assigned to Vietnam in 1960 and ―prepared‖ himself 
during his tenure as commandant. Even he ceded that the Army‘s late attempt at a counterinsurgency 
plan under McGarr returned to old ways. ―On the whole, the plan represented a culmination of the 
traditional American approach to Vietnamese problems. With the drastic deterioration of the security 
situation, American military leaders fell back on organizational, technical, and bureaucratic measures 
as the most appropriate devices to combat the Viet Cong.‖52 By the time of his departure, the situation 
in South Vietnam had reached a new level of crisis. 
In February 1962, General Paul D. Harkins replaced McGarr as the senior U.S. military 
representative to South Vietnam. Carrying the rank of full general, Harkins symbolically represented 
a major shift in U.S. policy.
53
 Harkins established a new command, Military Assistance Command 
Vietnam (MACV) which would remain in place until America left the field in Indochina. Thereafter, 
American advisors became principal combatants and would continue in this role until the arrival of 
U.S. combat forces in 1965. 
Expanding Professional Jurisdiction – CGSOC, 1960 
Major General Harold K. Johnson succeeded McGarr as Commandant in 1960. Johnson had 
been a student in the first year-long class after the Second World War, and he had remained as an 
                                                     
50
 Krepinevich, 56. 
51
 Spector, 365; Krepinevich, 57. 
52
 Spector, 372. 
53
 The 1960 MAP Staff Study reinforces this point. ―…MAAG-Vietnam [in 1960] in unique in that it is the only US MAAG in the world 





 In the summer of 1960, Major General Johnson faced a situation quite unlike 
his predecessors. The Army‘s consensus on modern war had solidified in the time since his days as a 
student; publication of Maxwell D. Taylor‘s The Uncertain Trumpet capped the Army‘s position in a 
long-simmering feud over national strategy.
55
 The concepts captured in Taylor‘s work heralded yet 
another change in the Army‘s thinking. By the time Taylor‘s book had circulated, the Army had 
already begun to move away from the failed organization of the Pentomic division, and Leavenworth 
followed.
56
 Planners had begun studying an alternative to the Pentomic division design as early as 
1959. Taylor, and other Army officers, did not believe the Air Force—and nuclear weapons—could 
serve as the sole guarantor of national security. The book heralded dominant, yet repressed, trends in 
Army thinking, and Taylor‘s work received significant attention at Leavenworth.57 CGSC‘s leaders 
understood that their profession had made mistakes after World War Two by not outlining a broader 
vision of modern war. Publication of Maxwell Taylor‘s The Uncertain Trumpet prompted Colonel 
H.L. Ash to ask the editor of the Military Review: 
During the crucial 47, 48, 49, 50 years when the mould of future (the present) defense 
force structure was being set, did the Army actually have the necessary forward looking 
visualization, grasp and understanding of the impact of new ideas and concepts being 
forced by technology (of which Hiroshima was but one) to ensure that its own interests 
and those of our country‘s defense were best being served. 58 
 
Colonel Ash‘s inquiry acknowledged the intellectual gap which had existed for the previous fifteen 
years. Missing from Ash‘s query is any mention of what role CGSC should have played in shaping a 
new understanding of the future. CGSC, under Johnson‘s guidance, would take much of Taylor‘s new 
perspective and emerging Army organizations and put them into the classroom. The College that took 
shape in the next decade would bear little resemblance to the one that Johnson inherited in 1960. 
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If the faculty had little use for McGarr, Johnson quickly earned the respect of the faculty, 
staff, and students. One student remarked, "General Johnson should speak more. He has something to 
say and says it well."
59
 A prisoner of war in World War Two, Johnson was himself a postwar student 
and faculty member at the College, having been at Leavenworth from 1946-1949. As an instructor, he 
had experienced the Gerow and Eddy era, and he had participated firsthand in the initial 




The persistent struggle to define the College‘s basic purpose continued into 1960. Under 
Johnson, the institutional vacillation between an emphasis on staff or command shifted in favor of 
command. In one of his first actions as Commandant, Johnson re-named the Department of Staff and 
Education to the Department of Command. He issued further guidance to strengthen the commander‘s 
perspective during instruction.
61
 Gen, Paul A. Adams, a former CGSC instructor, seemed to agree 
with Johnson‘s assessment, but Adams went further in his critique. ―My first, and I believe most 
important observation is that we are becoming an Amy of technicians, as opposed to an Army of 
professional soldiers in the true sense of the word ‗professional.‘‖ Adams continued, writing ―The art 
of staff work seems to have become an objective within itself rather than quick efficient operational 
aids enabling a commander to obtain the information he needs for reaching decisions and getting the 
decisions appropriately disseminated to the command and implemented. It has been very interesting 
indeed to note the inhibiting effects that the long detailed formats now published have on the thought 
of staff officers, as they frequently appear to be concerned more with matters of form than matters of 
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substance.‖62 Despite the modifications of the past six years, more remained to be done to satisfy the 
Army‘s senior leaders. 
Tactical content under Johnson‘s tenure moved away from the nuclear battlefield—a 
departure consistent with Taylor's The Uncertain Trumpet and President John F. Kennedy‘s new 
strategic vision. Under Johnson‘s watch, the College found the doctrine of Flexible Response, a mix 
of nuclear and non-nuclear defense options, inviting. Adjustments based on new doctrine continued. 
Added content balanced tactical problems with and without nuclear weapons, and the new decade‘s 
curriculum reflected a growing awareness of global challenges. By August 1961, the College had 
added emphasis on joint operations and incorporated the redesigned Army division, known as the 
Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD), concept into lessons.
63
 The infantry and armored 
division departments merged soon afterwards, forming the Department of Division Operations and a 
new department formed—the Department of Joint, Combined, and Special Operations.64 In the next 
year, the College incorporated the 1962 Field Service Regulations.  
The years just prior to full-scale commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam provide the most 
direct evidence of a link between ongoing advisory actions in Vietnam and a response by CGSC. 
Counterinsurgency, although imperfectly understood at the time, found its way into the course. 
Students found the lessons fascinating, and some asked for more time for the subject.
65
 Still, the 
inflexible curricular model of the Regular Course inhibited the teaching of new topics and 
approaches. Unconventional warfare lessons rose to a total of seven topics with thirty-eight hours 
allocated; however, the emphasis remained on exploiting the capabilities of partisans for the benefit 
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of American forces in the 1960-61 POI. One three-hour lesson looked at countering guerillas in a 
limited war, but this problem was set in Iran.
66
 
Map problems reflected a wide range of American defense pledges of the early 1960s. A 
growing awareness of worldwide commitments, coupled with professional interest, led to the addition 
of a ―strategic subcourse.‖ Starting in 1961 with approximately twenty-four hours, the faculty added 
political science topics and comparative military systems, which were outgrowths of the military 
history and geography lessons. In support, the faculty developed twenty-five area studies, covering 
thirty-nine countries. While no South American countries formed the basis for any of these analyses, 
the school had area studies for a number of countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
67
 Guest 
lecturers supplemented the classroom instruction.  
As it would do with other new developments, CGSC faculty added topical lessons as 
introductions. Instructors continued to add material related to the situation in Vietnam and the general 
subject of counterinsurgency. A lesson on ―Military Advisory Groups and Military Missions‖ 
corresponded with the rapid growth of the MAAG in Vietnam.
68
 The ―Nature of Communism‖ 
appeared in 1961.
69
 An additional briefing, ―Communism in Practice,‖ was added the next year.70 A 
slightly expanded strategic overview of Southeast Asia introduced students to ―Current developments 
in Southeast Asia with emphasis on actual and potential trouble areas to include forces involved, 
political alignments, internal disorders, potential inter-nation conflicts, and considerations affecting 
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the application of military power by local coalitions, East, West, or United Nations,‖ although this 
synopsis merited but a few hours.
 71
  
The lessons that did appear illustrate the immature understanding of the faculty with respect 
to counterinsurgency. Like the earlier airmobile lesson, some new material suffered from a general 
lack of understanding about the topic. Inattention to outside developments caused some courseware to 
fall short of what other Army officers did know. The 1962-63 course description for ―Introduction to 
Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency Operations Against Irregular Forces‖ betrayed the 
author‘s lack of familiarity with current operations and professional writings. The combination of 
unconventional warfare with counterinsurgency assumed a simple relationship between employing 
forces for one‘s own benefit and the techniques for countering a communist-backed effort. Worse, the 
course taught students that ―continuous aggressive offensive action‖ was a requirement to 
successfully combat insurgencies, ignoring some of the early findings from the MAAG staff study.
72
 
Not until the next year did a similar course include a discussion of the political, economic, and social 
aspects of combating insurgencies, but it still retained the emphasis on offensive action.
73
 The tactical 
class most closely related to the Vietnam situation used a West African scenario to introduce students 
to measures used by the country team and MAAGs to combat insurgents.
74
 
Not all work produced by CGSC faculty and students deviated from actual situations. A 
remarkable document appeared in June 1962. Lieutenant Colonel Sam C. Holliday, U.S. Army, and 
Major Pierre C. Dabezies, French Army, wrote ―Irregular Warfare in a Nutshell,‖ which was their 
observations on ―combat as it is being fought.‖ Their study looked at the characteristics of irregular 
warfare, defined a typology, and summarized instances of irregular warfare in the past fifteen years. 
Mixing philosophical with practical, the authors considered diverse subjects from how Clausewitzian 
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principles might be applied to irregular warfare to the counterinsurgent‘s need for information. The 
chapters on offense and defense condensed the French experience in Indochina to pragmatic concepts. 
In all, Holliday and Dabezies produced a remarkable study that would have been a useful text in any 
class on the subject.
75
  
The 1962-63 course goal remained broad, but it added an explicit behavioral objective similar 
to the principle expressed by Major General McGarr some years earlier: development of ―student 
proficiency in problem solving and decisionmaking….‖76 CGSC‘s faculty hoped that students would 
achieve some competence in critical thinking skills, much like those developed in civilian 
universities. Course designers valued professional competence over the student‘s mastery of specific 
content. New guidance for the 1963 course directed that 75% of the problems be situated in limited or 
general war settings. Far fewer of these problems assumed routine use of nuclear weapons.
77
 In 1962-
63, the administration added to the number of hours devoted to providing officers a strategic 
appreciation, increasing to sixty-six hours.
78
 In this small step, the Army‘s senior tactical institution 
began to drift from its long-time role as the institution where officers learned how to fight and sustain 
divisions, corps, and armies.  
The move came under the guise of preparing officers for peacetime duties. This broadening 
of the school‘s focal point had begun a decade earlier with the Army Comptroller‘s guidance to add 
management training. Major General McGarr later mentioned the need to consider garrison and 
administrative duties in his guidance and end-of-tour report as did the Williams Board.
79
 Movement 
toward a broader curriculum accelerated in the early sixties, resulting in further structural changes 
that would reshape the College so that it bore little resemblance to its lineage.  
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In a related initiative, the College began taking steps toward a civilian graduate school model. 
One measure of this development is the implementation of student research and writing requirements. 
During the first postwar class, the Henry Commission had indicated the merits of such a requirement. 
A few years later, Lieutenant Colonel Harding recommended a term paper requirement similar to a 
civilian master‘s project. Field commanders agreed that officer schools should develop officers who 
could write and speak more effectively. General Paul D. Adams wrote Major General Johnson over 
the summer, saying, ―There has been a long standing resistance to requiring students to conduct 
analytical studies, and write papers, because getting this done well is hard work for instructors and for 
students, and they sometime even become allies in opposition to them.‖80 Under Birrer‘s guidance, 




Major General Johnson made a number of changes in his first year, but he firmly believed 
that a reassessment of the College was needed given the massive reorganization of the field army, 
experience with the new curriculum, and a new strategic backdrop. The Commandant approached 
CONARC with the concept of an educational survey commission similar to the 1956 panel headed by 
Dr. Orleans. CONARC granted him the authority to conduct such a survey in Fiscal Year 1963.
82
 The 
Commission‘s charter was scripted in broad terms, but the Commandant‘s interest clearly lay in the 
breadth of the CGSC educational experience.
83
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The Commission had both civilian and military representation, although the two civilian 
educators were both retired officers. General (ret.) Clyde D. Eddleman served as chairman; 
Lieutenant General (ret.) E.L Cummings and Lieutenant General (ret.) Edward J. O‘Neill accepted the 
invitation. Earl Rudder, President of the A&M College of Texas, also a Major General in the Army 
Reserve, and Dr. George B. Smith, Vice Chancellor of the University of Kansas joined the panel.
84
 
This group of former officers met on September 27, 1962 at Fort Leavenworth. After their 
orientation, they visited the Army War College, the Air University, the Naval War College, and the 
Marine Corps‘ equivalent schools to obtain data for comparison to the Leavenworth program. Once 
back at Fort Leavenworth, the Commission looked at resident and non-resident instruction. 
The Commission completed its work quickly, rendering its findings before Thanksgiving. In 
contrast to previous surveys, the Commission had far fewer criticisms of the College‘s curriculum or 
teaching methods. The positive nature of their conclusions contrasted sharply with earlier reports.
85
 
Many of their significant findings dealt with policies or matters outside the school‘s control: 
student selection, student ranking, housing, and the Army‘s organization for doctrinal writing.86  
Not all internal problems escaped their notice, however. The committee passed judgment on a 
number of proposals under consideration at CGSC. Nascent discussions about adding language 
training and a cooperative civil-military master‘s degree program were met with skepticism, although 
the Commission approved of an initiative for an in-house master‘s program. ―The introduction of a 
nonmilitary graduate course of study for the purpose of permitting students to obtain a master‘s 
degree is considered unwise in view of the demanding requirements presently imposed on the 
students.‖ It is important to note that their finding was based upon workload and not professional 
                                                                                                                                                                    
States Army Command and General Staff College,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1962, Annex A: Terms of Reference, N-13423.303-A, CARL. 
Referred to as Eddleman. 
84
 Dr. Smith was a retired USAR Colonel. 
85
 ―The United States Army Command and General Staff College is satisfying the qualitative requirements of the Army in a commendable 
manner. While it is difficult to express the tremendous value of CGSC to the United States and its Allies, the continuous demand by senior 
commanders for its graduates is considered adequate testimony of the stature enjoyed by the College.‖ Eddleman, 20. 
86
 The Commission was especially critical of the new arrangement that split responsibility for writing combined arms and logistics doctrine 
between two organizations—Combined Arms Group at Leavenworth and Combat Service Support Group at Fort Lee, VA. Eddleman, 7-8, 
14. Hewes‘ From Root to McNamara has extensive coverage of the Army‘s 1962 reorganization which resulted in the new arrangement. 
The Army‘s reorganization stemmed from the Hoelscher Committee‘s Project 80 report. James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara 
Special Studies (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975), Chapters 8-10, 299-365. 
183 
 
need. While they questioned was the ability of students to complete a joint degree, Eddleman and the 
others accepted the plan to award a Master of Military Art and Science degree under the aegis of the 
North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.
87
 
The question of whether to rank students numerically or by thirds surfaced in the report, too. 
CGSC reported an officer‘s class standing by numeric order, as required by the Department of the 
Army. The Commission expressed dismay at the relatively low number of examinations used to 
establish class rank. The 1963 class underwent thirty-four hours of testing. Surprisingly, this figure 
represents a midpoint, as the hours devoted to exams in the postwar period ranged from 23-55 hours. 
The Commission took the low percentage of hours devoted to testing to be a fundamental flaw, so 
they asked the Commandant to appear before them. His explanation did not dissuade the Commission 
from making this an issue, given the significant effect a poor ranking could have on an officer‘s 
career. In their report, the commissioners said, ―the hours devoted to testing provide an inadequate 
basis for reporting a precise class standing.‖ The retired officers questioned why those selected to 
attend should be handicapped in the future, since a poor ranking might result in unfavorable personnel 
actions in the future. Much of their basis for questioning the practice came from the fact that students 
were selected to attend based upon their prior performance relative to their peers. If the Army insisted 
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The Eddleman Commission did question whether the course gave enough attention to the 
―cold war environment,‖ specifically citing a need to assess coverage of MAAGs, military missions, 
international treaty organizations, and cooperation with allies. The Commission hinted that equivalent 
military schools had greater exposure, which was a problem McGarr had attempted to remedy several 
years before. The other scholastic problem brought up by the Commission stemmed from the general 
lack of writing and speaking skills among the officer corps. While acknowledging this was part of a 
larger problem, the Commission members felt that CGSC could do more.
89
 As had been the case 
previously, external reviews finally prompted the College to admit it had a need.  
In the past, atomic weapons had been the shortfall; now the Eddleman Commission called for 
increased counterinsurgency instruction. The College‘s response to the Eddleman Commission of 
1962 prominently featured counterinsurgency in its report: 
As the course begins, we are taking a hard look at our mission and our instruction and are 
being very frank about our evaluations in preparing for next year‘s presentations. For 
example, we believe that the number of hours devoted to counterinsurgency instruction 
can well be increased. Our review of comments from last year‘s class revealed a deep 
interest in these subjects. In addition, many of the officers in present classes will be 
assigned to Southeast Asia, and they are vitally interested in the techniques of 
counterinsurgency and special warfare. This interest, coupled with the emphasis 
throughout the Department of Defense, would indicate that we continue adding hours in 




Like the case of atomic warfare, it took significant external pressure to cause the school to seriously 
consider moving aside other material in favor of counterinsurgency classes.  
Behind its fledgling attempts at tackling the topic, the staff presented outside agencies a 
grossly inflated accounting. In an effort to satisfy external interest, the college used creative means to 
increase hours well beyond the forty-eight hours found in the 1961 POI. Dr. Ivan Birrer, Educational 
Advisor to the Commandant, observed: 
It became expedient for Leavenworth to appear to be immersed with unconventional and 
insurgent warfare. We solved this problem … by careful definition. Into the setting of our 
problems we would include a sentence or two suggesting that there might be the 
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possibility of some irregular forces…. This permitted us to count the entire subject as 
unconventional warfare and it was by such a device that we ran the hours up to 437. But 
the point to be made is that at no time … did unconventional warfare really occupy any 




As mentioned in a previous chapter, this was not the first time the College staff and 
administration attempted to deflect change by a broad interpretation of orders.
92
 The college 
employed the same dishonest accounting techniques used later by combat units in the looming war. 
The College‘s higher headquarters, CONARC, asked the faculty in 1963 to consider 
incorporating the then-new concept of ―coup d‘etat‖ into the course. CONARC had become 
concerned with the violent overthrow of legitimate governments by communist rebels. The College‘s 
response demonstrated a general lack of curiosity: ―It does not appear that there is enough substantive 
matter in the field of investigation of the coup d‘etat as a form of revolutionary warfare to produce 
any meaningful instruction at USACGSC.‖93 Once again, the faculty demonstrated an unwillingness 
to create or integrate new knowledge based upon outside events. 
These instances of duplicitous responses established a pattern the College would use later 
when faced with new developments. Instructors and course developers waited for accepted solutions 
before making significant course changes, rather than engaging actively in the creation of new 
knowledge. When new concerns began to compete with established norms, the College would 
incorporate topical lectures as an introduction to the subject. Slowly, and only if the topic had 
substantial outside interest and a doctrinal basis, did the College add lessons to the curriculum. The 
reasons, however, had as much to do with process and resources as it did intellectual sluggishness. 
As mentioned earlier, CGSC‘s position as the Army‘s senior tactical school had been the one 
constant theme over its history. Perhaps the most far-reaching comment in the Eddleman Commission 
report questioned the College‘s fundamental purpose. Commission members observed that Army 
Regulation 350-5, which governed officer education, said at the time that the purpose of the College 
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was ―to provide progressive military education and appropriate practical training for officer personnel 
of all components at appropriate levels in order to prepare them to perform efficiently in peace and 
war….‖ Eddleman‘s report formally endorsed a broader interpretation of this statement, stating ―The 
precise mission statement of CGSC should be modified to direct preparation of officers for both 
wartime and peacetime duties.‖94 Just seven years prior, the Commandant, Major General Davidson, 
had lamented the brevity of the Regular Course, saying a second year of tactical instruction was 
needed. In the Eddleman Commission, one sees a sharp departure from a purely professional school 
with a limited jurisdiction over wartime subjects. The Commission‘s findings highlighted the building 
pressures on the officer education system. Serious proposals to move division operations instruction 
to branch schools and the inclusion of ―educational‖ subjects represent a turn away from 
Leavenworth‘s traditional role as the Army‘s senior tactical institution. While it would never cast off 
this responsibility, the faculty and future commandants would embrace the wider scope. 
The recommendations came too late for Johnson to implement, however. Soon after the New 
Year, Johnson departed Fort Leavenworth for an assignment in Washington, D.C.  
Too Little, Too Late 
John Paul Vann wrote ―Harnessing the Revolution in South Vietnam‖ in September 1965. 
His proposal expanded upon his disagreement with the policies and tactics being used by American 
forces.
95
 The next year, a 1966 Army education board questioned why the Army had essentially 
ignored the topic of counterinsurgency since ―United States aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 and the 
subsequent expansion of the Truman Doctrine into a broad program of military and economic 
assistance brought the United States into world-wide confrontation with international Communism.‖96 
By the time the question was asked, it was too late. The Army school system had not developed the 
comprehensive view of modern war called for by General Gerow twenty years earlier. 
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Those inside the Army and without who criticized the Army for failing to act in the period 
before U.S. full-scale intervention in Indochina suggest a broad self-awareness, intellectual agility, 
and capacity to act quickly that did not exist, especially inside the officer education system. Even in 
instances in which the College faculty had recognized new developments, technological, 
organizational, doctrinal advances and bureaucratic dynamics slowed the response. The ponderous 
CGSOC curriculum had little flexibility to adapt to rapidly shifting circumstances. The effort required 
by Major General McGarr in 1956-57 to bring the college up-to-date with the latest technological and 
organizational developments aptly illustrates this point. CGSOC‘s focus on tactical operations of 
divisions, corps, and armies, coupled with a rigid curriculum design process, slowed the institution‘s 
adaptation to the American officer‘s broad new jurisdiction. Instead of ―Keeping Pace With the 
Future,‖ CGSOC found itself struggling to assimilate not only the actions of potential enemies but 
also those of the Army itself. 
The College‘s slow incorporation of counterinsurgency suggests a threshold of professional 
awareness and corresponding action akin to Thomas Kuhn‘s theory of scientific revolutions. ―Failure 
of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones.‖97 Since the methods used against guerillas 
had worked, but the ability to fight a hypothetical war with the Soviets was highly suspect, the latter 
merited proportionally more intellectual effort. It is somewhat understandable given the strategic 
situation and existing defense policies, particularly in the late 1950s, that the Army chose to 
concentrate on atomic warfare. The world from an American perspective was a very complicated 
place with communism pressing outward on several fronts and nuclear weapons seemingly 
everywhere. The Army had not developed concepts it thought appropriate to the atomic battlefield. 
Unfortunately, the Army‘s limited view of modern war caused the officer corps to neglect the 
subjects of limited war and guerilla war at precisely the wrong moment. 
In contrast to its previous role as the Army‘s seminal educational institution, CGSC 
participated tangentially in the definition of professional boundaries. Leaders accepted the status quo 
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as the safe alternative to a new definition of modern war. The hybrid military-educational 
bureaucracy, coupled with real uncertainty about modern war, retarded the evolution of the CGSOC 
curriculum. The jarring effects of the atomic era on the officer corps are evident in the faculty‘s 
reluctance to develop lessons based on their perception of the future. Instructors exhibited hesitancy 
to adopt new methods or to predict some part of the future, whether limited war, nuclear battlefield, 
or an insurgency. An inherently conservative organization faced with tremendous change and 
uncertainty about the future transposed the problem of professional judgment to other military 
organizations which it perceived as more capable of predicting the future. With so much uncertainty, 
the faculty chose to remain wedded to the past rather than attempt to predict future patterns of 
warfare.  
In retrospect, the College reacted too late to significantly influence the officer corps that 
would wage the war in Vietnam. The low level of U.S. commitment to Vietnam in the 1954 to 1959 
timeframe drew little notice from the leadership engaged in another, more pressing, transformation. 
Concentrating on the worst case, or even the preferred case, did not prepare professional officers to 
meet all the challenges they later faced. As the faculty coped with implementing the enormous 
revision of 1957-58, events in Vietnam had just reached the college‘s doorstep. While not completely 
disregarding the growing conflict, instructors had neither the doctrinal resources nor the operational 
experience to modify the curriculum. The College did not act upon the parallel trend in warfare until 
1960, and even then it required outside force. The incorporation of strategic situation briefings along 
with college studies and courseware demonstrates that the Army had become aware of situation. With 
the preponderance of the course devoted to general war, the dash of counterinsurgency topics would 
have appeared as momentary diversions to the student immersed in a school for general war.  
The College‘s experience in this period shows the difficulty of anticipating and recognizing 
external events which would require new approaches. The challenge of educating a doctrine-based 
army in a time of change—absent approved, relevant doctrine—could not be overcome. It also 
highlights the very real difficulty in adapting a centrally-managed curriculum to accommodate new 
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material. Military history, and the Army‘s own recent experience, played a miniscule role in shaping 
the approach to modern war. Writers in the journal most closely affiliated with the College had 
limited influence, even though they served as College instructors and staff officers.  
Escalating American involvement in Vietnam had minimal effect on the school‘s curriculum 
between 1954 and 1964. How to apply military power to achieve a solution in a quasi-war lay just 
beyond the boundary of professional knowledge in the fifties. Once the College inserted lessons 
appropriate to the Indochina situation in the 1950s, other events—in the U.S. but especially those in 
North and South Vietnam—made the new material largely irrelevant. After the conflict‘s sad 
denouement, Dr. Ivan J. Birrer, who advised CGSC commandants for thirty years including the entire 
period of American involvement in Vietnam, was asked about the impact of the war on the College. 
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Confronting Modern War, 1963-1973 
At some great military schools the idea of making the theory of the guidance of armies 
the subject of a special course of instruction has already been entirely abandoned, and 
each individual is left to himself to ascertain its principles from a study of military 




Colmar, Baron von der Goltz 
 
Peacetime concerns filtered into the Army‘s senior tactical institution in the midst of the most 
tortuous war of the Army‘s postwar experience. A growing sense within the officer corps that 
professional knowledge encompassed more than the command, control, and to a lesser degree, 
sustainment, of fire and maneuver became apparent in the discussions and actions of the College‘s 
faculty and leadership. For some officers, the new fields were a welcome addition, meeting a 
professional need that had been glimpsed but never quite realized. For others, the shift to a host of 
administrative and managerial topics represented heresy. To the fundamental skills of an army in the 
field—some might argue the core of land warfare‘s profession—the faculty added coverage of 
management, administration, and technology.  
The curriculum began to reflect a view that took for granted professional acumen in large unit 
tactical operations—the mainstay of the Leavenworth curriculum since its inception—and replaced it 
with knowledge gathered from distant fields. New studies on officer education, new Army 
organizations, the Vietnam War, and a changing role in joint operations reshaped the content of the 
College‘s curriculum in the years ahead. Some issues, such as allied student participation and faculty 
shortages, persisted, ebbing and flowing in response to new stimuli. Paradoxically, the Vietnam War 
seems to have had the least effect on the College‘s curriculum.  
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External demands made themselves apparent in changing assignment patterns of students, 
which led to significant adjustments to the content of the Regular Course. Maintaining a large 
standing army in peacetime, and supplying its attendant bureaucracy, required officers conversant 
across a broad range of knowledge. The accumulated inconsistencies between the duties given to 
CGSC graduates and their studies influenced Leavenworth‘s faculty to try new approaches. Very 
quickly, these tentative steps became accepted norms, and these in turn led to new curricular 
structures. Alongside the radical shift in content, the College leadership adopted a new curricular 
form, shifting from a unitary course common to all students to a program favoring student choice. 
Non-resident studies changed dramatically, too. The options for non-resident studies shifted in 
response to changes in the Regular Course but just as quickly fell back to existing schemes. 
By 1973, as we shall see, CGSC no longer was the Army‘s senior tactical school. The 
institution was something much more—broader in scope, more diversified in offerings, and less 
centralized as an organization. Surprisingly, war had little to do with the change. 
The Junior War College 
Colonel L.M. Wilson, Director of the Department of Division Operations, was piqued. The 
Director of Resident Instruction‘s plan for the 1963-64 curriculum reduced once again the hours 
allocated to division operations. Wilson‘s department had to trim lessons to make room for classes on 
political science, among other additions. In Wilson‘s view, this move was ill-advised, guiding the 
College away from its traditional role as the school where officers learned to fight large units. He 
criticized the new guidance, telling the Director of Resident Instruction, ―My views on the 
degradation of the College curriculum from being the senior school of applied tactics in favor of 
becoming more and more a junior war college are well known….‖ Wilson objected not only to the 
proposed modifications to content but also to the general sense within the administration that the 
school needed to broaden its scope. His opinion put him in conflict with the Assistant Commandant, 
Harry Lemley, Jr., a staunch proponent of including strategic subjects to expand the officer‘s 
perspective. Lemley frequently referred to the new series as the ―Junior War College‖ lessons, which 
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disturbed Wilson and others on the faculty who shared his views.
2
 These officers quickly became the 
minority, as the school would follow Lemley‘s vision, guided by Ivan Birrer and the results of a new 
officer education board. Over the next ten years, the College leadership was to alter fundamentally the 
nature of curricular content and the form of the curriculum. 
Resistance to new ideas is not unique to military educational institutions. Clark Kerr in The 
Uses of the University observed that ―change is a traumatic experience for an academic community, 
as for others.‖3 Commandants and faculty commented on the continual tension between integrating 
emerging topics and the displacement of existing courseware repeatedly. Addition of peacetime 
subjects displaced instruction on military subjects, lessening the time students spent covering the 
complexities of tactical warfare. Robert Doughty‘s three tensions should be refined, since the conflict 
that emerged between war and peace originated in the opposition between the duties of an officer in 
peacetime and the demands of modern warfare.
4
 Both required wholly different conceptualizations of 
knowledge. The former relied on academic knowledge from business, political science, and 
management; officers drew the latter from their own unique experience and culture. The trouble, as 
faculty soon learned, was neither fit neatly into a ten-month course. The curriculum became the arena 
for another discussion about the nature of professional education in a large standing army. 
College faculty and leaders had previously struggled with the dichotomy. The two-part course 
of 1946-50—one portion dedicated to war and the other to training bureaucrats—had never 
satisfactorily met either of its contradictory goals. The Eddy Board had ameliorated the conflict by 
recommending resumption of the Army War College. A growing interest in administration, an 
aroused political awareness, and the absence of a mid-career opportunity to prepare officers to run a 
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peacetime army again raised the question of teaching field grade officers management skills at the 
staff college. 
The blurring of distinction between the civilian and military sphere, if there had been such a 
clear demarcation, contributed to the expansion of what Army officers considered relevant 
professional knowledge. The College‘s parent organization, the Continental Army Command 
(CONARC) recognized the increased breadth and new demands of the profession in 1964—nearly 
twenty years after Lieutenant General Gerow, the school‘s first postwar commandant, hinted at the 
challenges of modern war for officer education.
5
 Now, the challenge had shifted, becoming a need to 
compete internally in matters heretofore considered the province of civilians. CONARC‘s guidance 
for officer education stated: 
As the Army career officer progresses to positions of greater responsibility, he needs the 
professional development and increased perspective that comes from formal education. 
The characteristics of modern land warfare require that he be able to consider logically 
many diverse factors and produce swift and valid decisions. He must understand the 
military aspects of national security and the economic, political and psychological factors 




The situation arose, according to information provided by CGSC to the U.S. Department of 
Education, from ―the increasing participation of the military with other agencies in the affairs of 
government and the increasing intercourse with the civilian world….‖ As a result, the report stated 
that ―America‘s hitherto held view that the Army should confine its activities to strictly military 
affairs no longer obtains.‖7 Army officers saw a greater role for themselves in extra-military affairs, 
and they set about reshaping the staff college to meet this new requirement. 
The conflict between a centralized curriculum and the ever-broadening scale of professional 
knowledge reached the point in 1963 where the College‘s leadership believed new direction was 
                                                     
5
 Gerow‘s remarks are contained in Chapter One. The stark difference between the Army of 1964 and that of World War Two can be seen 
in David Bobroff, ―Fort Hood: Sparta Goes Civilian,‖ Harper’s Magazine 228, No. 1364 (January 1964): 46-53. Richard A. Preston, 
―Perspectives in the History of Military Education and Professionalism,‖ The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History (lecture, 
United States Air Force Academy, 1980), 25. Preston mentioned the difficulties in educating future officers for a technologically-advanced 
society and observed that the services employed civilian experts in World War Two. 
6
 Headquarters, US Continental Army Command, ―Annex Q to USACONARC Training Directive Army Service School System Policies 
and Administration,‖ Ft. Monroe, VA, 14 Jan 1964, Q-16, CARL. 
7
 CGSC, ―The United States Army Command and General Staff College: Information for Review Committee, U.S. Department of 
Education,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1967, 6, CARL.  
 194 
 
needed. As Robert Doughty showed in his study of the College, the hours allocated to large unit 
tactics declined appreciably during the 1960s. Leavenworth‘s faculty, prompted by outside experts 
and internal agitation, began to adjust the course to reflect CONARC‘s understanding represented 
above. From this point forward, the proportion of time spent on tactical operations in Army units 
would decline.  
The change did not occur overnight, and the reasons have not been fully explored. Major 
General McGarr had made tentative allowances for peacetime aspects of professional life, creating a 
separate department to ensure that the subjects got the attention he thought they needed. Both the 
Williams Board and the Eddleman Commission had mentioned the advisability of instruction on 
peacetime duties. Under McGarr, the Department of Staff and Educational Subjects managed and 
taught the lessons. Later, Major General Johnson renamed this department, calling it the Department 
of Command, but its role remained similar.
8
 Major General Johnson adopted the Eddleman 
Commission‘s view that peacetime subjects should be included, going so far as to modify the purpose 
of the College. The College purpose as expressed in his 1963 guidance was: 
To provide officers with a working knowledge for wartime and peacetime duty, to 
include the joint aspects thereof, as commanders and general staff officers at division, 
corps, field army and army group (operations only) to include their combat service 
support systems. To provide a basis for satisfactory performance in a wide variety of 
command and staff positions at nontactical headquarters. To provide the basis for future 




The three-part purpose contained familiar elements, notably the concentration on command and staff 
functions of large tactical units. But prior statements had paid little attention to the administrative 
duties of an officer, and none had mentioned ―joint aspects‖ or the developmental role education 
might play in future service. This shift paralleled the rise of so-called educational subjects in the 
course. In addition, Johnson‘s guidance for the 1964 course stated that ―the general instructional 
objective is the development of student proficiency in problem solving and decision making; the 
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ability to communicate decisions to subordinates and to insure compliance therewith, plus the 
development of facility with the procedures, skills, and techniques employed by commanders and 
general staff officers.‖10 As expressed here, the course was to produce officers who could apply their 
knowledge creatively to future situations as well as apply the methods used by staffs in support of 
their commanders. As Johnson departed, his deputy, Harry Lemley succeeded him—a first, for 
Lemley had been part of the very discussions and planning he now implemented as Commandant. 
The newfound concerns of the Army profession coalesced under the heading of strategic 
subjects. Planning for their integration began in 1962 under Johnson‘s tenure. The original plan 
allotted 99 hours, later increased to 100, for coverage of these learning areas, and built upon a loose 
collection of subjects. The College‘s Department of Command proposed six objectives under the 
broad category of strategy: 
1. The basis of national power. 
2. The nature of national objectives. 
3. The process of developing national strategy. 
4. Major factors and influences from which national strategy is derived. 
5. National agencies which support and execute national strategy with emphasis on the 
military services. 
6. Application of strategic factors and considerations through a series of studies.11 
Within the block, suggested lessons resembled an undergraduate survey. One proposed lesson read 
like the syllabus for a course on comparative international politics. The scope covered ―the nature of 
democratic and totalitarian forms of government‖ and ―the dynamics of the world political power 
pattern.‖ A second lesson looked at the principles of economics. Another compared ―democratic and 
totalitarian forms of government.‖ None of these explored the topic in any depth, allocating it from 
three to nine hours in most cases. In practical terms, this meant as little as half a day up to one and 
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one-half class days to absorb entire academic fields. To supplement the in-class work, the department 
recommended that the guest speaker program be reoriented to directly support the lessons, carving 
fifty-four hours from the program and reassigning them to lectures on strategic topics.
12
 
The ―non-tactical‖ duties referenced in the guidance Lemley carried forward marked a clear 
break with the College‘s past purpose. While a seemingly innocuous, and needed, addition, the 
inclusion of such material in an already crowded course would necessarily displace other content. As 
Colonel Wilson had realized, the material considered dispensable was the tactical subjects. The 
tension between war and peace created conflict within the institution. ―Things were a lot simpler at 
Leavenworth,‖ Ivan Birrer said, ―when we were concerned with only firepower and maneuver.‖13 It 
would be more than a decade before the institution reoriented toward its traditional role. 
Part of the justification for shifting the emphasis lay with the distribution of general staff 
positions across the Army. According to Colonel Jasper L. Wilson, Director of Resident Instruction, 
divisions and logistical commands had about six percent of the Army‘s general staff positions. The 
staff also cited the assignment pattern of graduates as a reason to adopt new curriculum. The Long 
Range Plan: Increased Output of Regular Course prepared by Wilson noted that ―at least one-third of 
the recent graduates of the Regular Course has been assigned to joint or combined headquarters, or to 
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Table 7. Post-graduation assignments, 1960-1962 
 1960-61 1961-62 
Assignment Total Sub Total Sub 
Joint and Combined HQs, MAAGs, Missions 85  111  
DA 90  102  
Overseas Theaters 171  127  
     Europe  91  45 
     Pacific  71  70 
     Alaska  9  6 
     Ryukyu Islands  0  3 
     Caribbean  0  3 
CONUS 77  64  
     CONARC  13  16 
     Armies  24  9 
     Air Defense Command  8  11 
     US Corps  0  3 
     XVIII Abn Corps  1  3 
     Divisions  31  22 
Other 230  240  
     Staff & Faculty  63  95 
     Further Schooling  53  48 
     Branch Assignment  74  59 
     Miscellaneous  32  38 
Source: Jasper L. Wilson, staff study, ―Long Range Plan: Increased Output of Regular Course,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1963. 
 
For the two years shown above, officers left CGSC for non-tactical assignments in roughly the same 
proportion as those assigned to divisions, corps, and army-level units—forty-nine percent to Army 
staff and ―other‖ assignments versus fifty-one percent to large unit headquarters.15 Personnel 
assignment patterns exerted an influence on the curriculum. Preparing officers for their next job, 
therefore, became part of the rationale for the College‘s content.  
Deep beneath CONARC‘s explanation and Leavenworth‘s actions lurked another impetus. 
The gradual erosion of the Army‘s claim to unique military knowledge, abetted by the bitter debate 
over Massive Retaliation in the previous decade, coupled to a growing politicization of the officer 
corps, aligns with the expansion of the curriculum. As Andrew Bacevich explained in ―The Paradox 
of Professionalism,‖ Army officers had become more politically conscious as a result of the civil-
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military conflict between Matthew B. Ridgway and Maxwell D. Taylor and the Eisenhower 
administration. In part, the acceptance of strategic subjects as a proper course of study in the staff 
college stemmed from the de-professionalization that Bacevich claimed had occurred during the years 
leading up to the decision to add the lessons to the course.
16
 
By January 1964, the influence of strategic studies made itself apparent in new departmental 
objectives. The Department of Command added the intention ―to provide a general knowledge of 
strategy, strategic planning and the environmental factors which influence the development of 
national strategy.‖17 Reflecting internal debates at Fort Leavenworth, Martin Blumenson wrote in his 
1964 essay, ―Some Thoughts on Professionalism,‖ that ―the world has become so complex and the 
role of the soldier in that world so important and difficult that an officer who expects to make a 
significant contribution in his calling must continue to study throughout his career.‖18 CGSC began to 
reach upwards into content that had once been the domain of the Army War College. The reaction 
was like lifting the lid off a boiling kettle. 
The evolution of the curriculum and the subjects taught reflect, in part, what the Army as an 
institution considered important. ―In a sense, the curriculum had been getting broader in a piecemeal 
fashion since 1948,‖ Ivan Birrer observed.19 External influences brought to notice new challenges. 
Even if the school‘s response to an ever-broadening scope of officer responsibilities had taken 
decades to form, the new ideas competed with long-standing traditions and entrenched beliefs. Once 
begun, the transition to a broader curriculum occurred relatively quickly. Individuals within the 
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faculty had their own ideas about what officers needed to learn, prompting Colonel Francis W. 
O‘Brien, the College‘s Director of Resident Instruction to write: ―This is a continuing problem—what 
to include in the POI; what to leave out. Everyone wants more of their areas of interest.‖20 
Old concerns resurfaced as the College leadership began to reorient the College from its 
traditional role as a combined arms staff college. Limited people, knowledge, and time became 
distracters. The dearth of instructors continued into the 1960s. Lack of manpower to maintain and 
create lessons once again became an issue since faculty served dual roles as course developers and 
instructors. College faculty, already pressed to accomplish their duties, resisted any extra 
assignments. 
The faculty shortage would soon be exacerbated, for the College lost a number of faculty 
spaces as a result of personnel reductions. By August 1963, the College had 200 officers assigned out 
of the 240 authorized by Fifth Army. Earlier personnel studies had set the required number of officers 
to effectively accomplish its mission at 254. Using either figure as a guide left the school short of the 
number needed to staff the departments, prepare lesson materials, conduct research, and write 
doctrine. CGSC faculty, affected by an Army-wide reorganization, struggled to keep up with the 
many demands on their time.
21
 Comments such as ―the projected College personnel situation favors 
minimum, essential changes and rewrite,‖ appeared frequently in annual reviews.22 Instructors had 
limited time to prepare, and they taught more frequently than they would have otherwise with a full 
complement of instructors. Major General Lemley proposed several cutbacks, including the 
combination of the non-resident instruction department with teaching departments, the elimination of 
certain specialty courses, and the transfer of the annual fifth-year phase of the associate course to a 
USAR schools unit.
23
 In October 1963, Colonel James E. Simmons questioned a new task given to his 
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department, saying ―In review of recent personnel cuts, and more cuts which are anticipated, the 
present personnel policy appears to be toward saving instructor manpower. This is borne out by the 
reduction of the Associate Course from eight sections to six and by the increased use of Sister Service 
instructors.‖24 The cuts were implemented and by 1965 the College had only 84% of the faculty 
needed to provide instructors for each classroom.
25
 
The shortage of faculty and the required effort to produce new courseware combined to limit 
significant modifications. Seemingly minor additions demanded extraordinary effort. Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles Ablett captured the problem as he detailed the production of a new lesson on 
electronic warfare. To develop a single one-hour lesson required 508 hours of effort, according to 
Ablett‘s meticulous accounting. Between the author‘s time, typing, production, and printing, over 
twelve man-weeks of work were needed to create this lesson.
26
 The development of this lesson, 
another example of an emerging topic, explains the faculty‘s reluctance to tackle new subject matter. 
In a course containing over 1100 hours of material, it is little wonder that internal change occurred 
slowly, despite rapid modernization outside the College. 
Instructor shortages and frequent turnover affected daily instruction and lesson preparation. 
Army personnel policies continued to dictate assignment of faculty to the College for three years. As 
a result, the College‘s institutional memory was short-lived. With few, if any, civilian faculty, the 
personnel problem contributed to institutional inertia. One constant was the presence of reserve 
component officers on the faculty. Mobilization augmentees continued to contribute to the College on 
an annual basis. Major Francis H. Heller, who had been part of the program since 1949, made the 
annual trek from Lawrence to Fort Leavenworth. Major Heller, known as Professor Heller at the 
University of Kansas, spent his summers working with one of the departments and serving as 
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temporary editor of Military Review.
27
 The rapid turnover of personnel caused each incoming cohort 
of instructors to rely heavily on what previous instructors passed down to them.  
One advantage to the turnover, however, was the arrival of new ideas. Ivan Birrer often 
commented on the insular nature of the College.
28
 But constant rotation of faculty had a positive 
effect, too, as noted by Dr. Birrer. The field experience an incoming officer had acquired brought a 
fresh perspective to the course. Major Joseph T. Palastra, Jr. was one such officer. He attended the 
Regular Course from 1965-66. Palastra came to Leavenworth a few months early, which led to his 
designation as an instructor for the summer‘s Allied Officer Preparatory Course. He found teaching 
the basis of American society and government a meaningful experience, having not really considered 
them from an outsider‘s perspective. He then joined his former pupils as a student in the Regular 
Course. During the year, he attended numerous social functions and came to believe that the extended 
informal association with old and new peers to be a very important part of the course. He did not have 
the same high opinion of the instruction, however. In particular, Palastra did not think much of the 
airborne and special operations lessons, and he wrote as much on his course evaluation sheet.  
The response of the College faculty to his suggestions was to have his orders changed. 
Palastra, who had been en route to an assignment to Germany, now found himself detailed to duty as 
a Leavenworth instructor. Naturally, the College assigned him to the airborne department. Major 
Palastra remained there for two years, teaching the very courses on airborne and special operations 
topics he had criticized earlier.
29
 Unfortunately, the course structure muted the effect professional 
experience had on the overall course, limiting it to a small circle of students with whom the instructor 
had contact.
30
 After a year or so, if the officer became an author, he could inject his experience into 
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the lesson plans. In practical terms, this did not occur until one-two years after his arrival, meaning 
the experience gained would not make its way into the overall course for several years.
31
  
Lack of faculty and limited time impeded change, but bureaucratic restraints blocked the 
curriculum‘s adaptation, too. Unlike the idiosyncratic course planning in an American research 
university, CGSC developed courses using a bureaucratic approach that ensured uniformity of the 
content and method. The college staff used a centralized curriculum planning and development 
process. Orleans‘ committee had remarked back in 1956 that ―too much effort is being expended in 
this area.‖32 For a brief period under Major General McGarr, department directors made decisions 
regarding lesson content. The decentralized approach did not last long, as Major General Johnson 
believed it to be too loose an arrangement. He directed Colonel Jasper Wilson to impose tighter 
controls on the process.
33
 Wilson did so, establishing a formal process similar to the one used back in 
the late forties and throughout the early fifties to manage the preparation of lessons. The centrally-
managed curriculum once again assumed a rigid form once the curriculum was in place. As the course 
began in August, the process for readying the subsequent year‘s course began.  
The annual review process became the focal point of curriculum design. The CGSC 
Commandant‘s report to the Army in 1965 stated that ―the entire procedures, i.e., receipt of comments 
and recommendations and their translation into Commandant‘s guidance, is consolidated once each 
year into Faculty Memorandum No. 1, the guidance for the ensuing course.‖34 Faculty Memorandum 
Number 1, usually published in draft in the fall of each year, was central to the overall effort. While 
the basic memorandum might have few pages, the attachments added dozens of pages and 
instructions. Each school year, starting in July or August, the College staff managed fifty-two 
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separate steps to prepare the next year‘s courseware.35 Departments added milestones of their own to 
revise or create individual lessons, adding to the burden. Barely four months into the current year, 
department directors briefed the Commandant on their plans for the subsequent year. Given the 
annual turnover among faculty, department directors, and administrators, few key participants had 
witnessed an entire year of instruction, yet they made judgments about modifications to lessons they 
had never presented in a classroom. This process allowed central management of common resources 
such as typists and reproduction capabilities across the College, but it slowed the response to outside 
developments. 
The guidance, and its subsequent replies, became the forum for debate as departments sought 
to advance a particular topic or to insert new material. Over time, the system evolved to referee the 
annual squabbles between departments over the allocation of available hours. The allocation of hours 
to topics became one of the overriding concerns of the directors. As an example, in the mid-sixties, 
the course length remained a constant 38 weeks. Of this time, the College planned on 1672 hours of 
duty time with about two-thirds allocated to academic subjects.
36
 From this finite resource pool, five 
departments vied for platform time. Available classroom time had to be divided among the 
departments and subjects. In an annual accounting battle, departments jealously guarded their share of 
hours, and directors and faculty resisted any attempt to shuffle the status quo. In some instances, one 
classroom hour became the subject of debate among departments and the College staff.
37
  
Time with students became a transactional commodity, and departments measured their 
relative merit by their share of hours. This made itself plain during the planning for the 1964 course. 
For the coming year, Department of Command subjects totaled 316 hours, while DJCASO lessons 
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came to 172 hours. As Assistant Commandant, Brigadier Gen Lemley, proposed to shift the strategic 
studies lesson from the Department of Command to the Department of Joint, Combined and Special 
Operations (DJCASO) under Colonel William Blakefield. One reason given was the more equitable 
distribution of hours across the departments. The Department of Command‘s director, Colonel 
Wilson M. Hawkins, strongly dissented to the proposed transfer in a three-page memorandum. The 
director raised objections ranging from suggestions that the topics aligned more naturally with 
command functions to office space considerations. The director even went so far as to suggest how 
Blakefield‘s department might take the writing and speaking programs, which were principal reasons 
the Department of Staff and Educational Subjects—the Department of Command‘s predecessor— 
was created in the first place.
38
 The memorandum obfuscated the real concern. The Department of 
Command had the preponderance of instructional hours and wanted to keep them.
39
 Inter-
departmental relativism became more important than learning outcomes when determining the 
curriculum. 
Still, modifications to content began to alter the way the College managed the internal 
structure of the course. ―As the total scope of the curriculum offerings widened, in recognition of the 
widening vista in which the Army officer functions, it just simply became impossible to maintain 
centralized control,‖ said Ivan Birrer.40 The trend he noted would accelerate in the next few years.  
Old concerns about learning outcomes remained unanswered. Perceptive faculty members 
knew a gap still existed between the desired outcomes and the classroom practices. Despite the 
College leadership‘s stated preference to emphasize reason and logic in student solutions, proximity 
to the school solution remained the standard measure of success in the classroom. This gap continued 
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in spite of reforms implemented in the past five years. Part of the explanation was the overscheduling 
endemic throughout the curriculum. Previous discussions have made clear the full schedule, with six-
hour class days and four hours of homework. Daily lessons had as little flexibility as the overall 
curriculum. Likewise, faculty members recognized that the imposition of a uniform expectation on a 
class of several hundred resulted in a Pavlovian, not reasoned, response. A departing faculty member 
wrote in 1963: 
Although we disclaim that we are ―answer oriented‖ now we are kidding ourselves. A 
great many of our requirements are stated, ―What is your decision and why?‖, but the 
students know that if they choose the College solution their reasons do not make much 
difference. How can it be otherwise if we give the student 15-20 minutes to reach a 




The overgenerous allocation of content to each session created a condition that made it difficult to 
explore the reasons underlying a student‘s response. The faculty member‘s critique of the classroom 
methods, which presents a very different picture from the official view, said: 
We have a very intelligent group of students and there is no reason why we have to be 
content with producing a group of intuitive decision makers. We do a fairly good job of 
forcing students to make decisions. We should insist, also, that students demonstrate the 
logic behind those decisions. And we should critique the logic as much as we do the 
answer. 
 
The Army is going to need tough thinkers for the future and the College can contribute by 




What made this officer‘s utopian vision difficult, if not impossible, to attain was the size of the class, 
(which remained at fifty students during this period); the transient expertise of the instructors; and the 
mechanistic approach which underlay the program. Over the years, teaching practices conformed to 
the necessity to dispense a set amount of material in a finite period of time. Complicating matters, 
faculty members did not prepare their own exams, tailored to the content they taught and the 
individual learners. As a result, they had to deliver the programmed content of each lesson lest their 
students be unable to complete the graded requirements. 
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As a result of such insights, faculty training began to concentrate on developing abilities as a 
discussion leader. Dr. Birrer continued to teach the Instructor Training Course, and he made 
adjustments from polishing an officer‘s public speaking skills in favor of a course that developed 
effective two-way communicators. Birrer realized during the transition to smaller groups under 
McGarr‘s command that most officers arrived with some inherent ability to transmit information in 
one-way settings. What they did not know how to do well was engage in a give-and-take situation 
between an authority figure and a group of students. Birrer attempted to cultivate this skill by 
instituting a substantial amount of practice and critique during instructor preparation, so the newly-
assigned officer would have a better sense of his expected role.
43
 
For several years, the curriculum design had followed the rule that no day should exceed six 
hours in length with four hours of homework. To ease scheduling, classes conformed to a standard of 
three hours each.
44
 As planning continued for the 1964-65 academic year, the rigidity of the standard 
three-hour lesson made itself apparent. The broadening of the course scope created pressure on this 
longstanding system, as no department had all the hours it believed it needed to cover all the material 
it thought important. In 1963-64, the school had to tack extra lessons onto the end of already crowded 
days to meet unforecast additions, and ―in the case of the Regular Course, the use of Saturday 
mornings in a number of instances‖ was the only way to cram everything in to the regimented 
schedule. Planning for the following year recognized this trend, but no department director was 
willing to cede time to other departments. The addition of more subjects like a computer technology 
lesson and the unwillingness to trim hours inside each department meant that the course would have 
to exceed the six-hour rule to accommodate all of the planned lessons. Colonel O‘Brien wrote the 
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Commandant, saying ―I foresee an increased number of eight hour days and the use of Saturday 
mornings for the Regular Course as a normal practice.‖45  
Colonel O‘Brien proposed to get below the planning figure by trimming hours from six 
lessons, including special weapons, division defensive operations, and Aggressor operations and by 
allowing one- and two-hour lessons.
46
 To arrive at the recommended reduction, Colonel Edward R. 
Lewitz, the staff officer charged with planning the curriculum, compared the hours needed to obtain a 
―working knowledge‖ of division operations in the Regular and Associate Courses. Lewitz made 
much of the fact that the desired level of tactical knowledge could be reached in thirty-three hours 
during the Associate Course, but it supposedly took twice as long to attain the same level of 
proficiency in the Regular Course. Lewitz saw a potential saving of twenty hours by reducing both 
offensive and defensive instruction in the Regular Course.
47
 Colonel John W. Callaway, division 
operations director, was incredulous. He fired back at O‘Brien. ―I am concerned over your D/F 
[disposition form] in which you compare the regular and associate courses based on a descriptive 
term known as ‗working knowledge.‘‖ Callaway continued: ―To use it internally to compare our 
courses is in my view very dangerous because it is used as an exact term to describe a very inexact 
level of knowledge. If we accept the exact meaning of this term, I could make a good case for 
reducing the regular course to six months.‖ In a clear rejection of the comparison, Callaway added 
that ―comparing the Associate and Regular Courses, I would say that graduates from the Associate 
Course have a marginal working knowledge of division tactics whereas graduates of the Regular 
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Course have an exceptionally fine working knowledge of division tactics.‖48 Regardless, the 
Commandant disagreed with half of O‘Brien‘s proposal, leaving the schedule intact.49 One staff 
officer summed up the challenge in a memorandum to the Chief of Resident Studies: ―The problem is 
still in total hours—no change since approval of draft FM1 [Faculty Memorandum 1]….‖50 
For the 1965 course, the Department of Command projected two new lessons, the major 
revision of eleven subjects, and the deletion of seven.
51
 Other departments proposed less drastic 
revisions. Joint and combined subjects remained roughly as before, with one lesson reduced by two 
hours.
52
 The Department of Large Unit Operations replaced a theater combat service support lesson 
with two, allowing more detailed coverage of the difference between logistics in a field army and in 
the communications zone. The department significantly revised two lessons, due to organizational 
changes in the European and Pacific theaters.
53
 Division operations included 270 hours of instruction 
and ten hours devoted to examinations. Thirty-seven hours of common instruction preceded lessons 
on armor, infantry, mechanized, and air assault division operations. The department dropped two 
lessons and reduced the hours for two others. Lessons on jungle operations and the infantry division 
in the attack were added.
54
 Overall, the Commandant reduced the division operations lesson by 
eighteen hours and increased joint lessons by fifteen hours and command lessons by ten.
55
 
Once in place, the faculty resisted modification to the guidance, even if directed by the 
Commandant or Assistant Commandant. One such instance came after the Assistant Commandant, 
                                                     
48
 John W. Callaway to Colonel O‘Brien, DF, ―Comparison of Regular and Associate Courses,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14 January 1964, 
Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL. Callaway labeled the memorandum ―Personal For,‖ indicating he meant the message to go to the chief, 
and not a functionary. Note that within a few years, the total of all mandatory Regular Course tactical instruction (179 hours for division to 
army) would fall below the 189 hours on division operations in the 1964 Associate Course. Doughty, 135. 
49
 ―Proposed Changes to Reduce to Normal Curriculum Hours,‖ Tab D to Faculty Memorandum 1, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL. 
50
 E.R. Lewitz to Colonel O‘Brien, 10 January 1964. 
51
 Memorandum by Marvin H. Merchant, ―Description of Course of Study – Regular Course,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 1964, 
Folder College Directives and Description /5, CARL. 
52
 Memorandum by Frank H. Linnell, ―Description of Course of Study – /5 Regular,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, ca. January 1964, Folder 
College Directives and Description /5, CARL. 
53
 Memorandum by James F. Simmons, ―Description of Course of Study – Regular,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 1964, Folder College 
Directives and Description /5, CARL. 
54
 Memorandum by John W. Callaway, ―Description of Course of Study – Regular Course, Corrected Copy‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 
January 1964, Folder College Directives and Description /5, CARL. 
55
 A.J. Weigley to Commanding General, CONARC, memorandum, ―Draft Program of Instruction for the Command and General Staff 
Officer Course (250-A-C2), the Associated Command and General Staff Officer Course (250-A-C3), and the Mobilization Command and 
General Staff Officer Course,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 9 June 1964, 5, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL. 
 209 
 
Brigadier General E.C. Townsend, reviewed preparations for the 1964-65 course. He did not see 
coverage of automatic data processing (ADP)—an emerging topic of interest. Townsend asserted that 
―we have reached a point in time where this matter is of sufficient importance to warrant breaking it 
out in the College curriculum for separate treatment.‖56 He asked the staff to look into adding a lesson 
on the subject. The response from Colonel Francis W. O‘Brien and Colonel Marvin H. Merchant 
came swiftly. The curriculum had no room, a guest speaker might not meet the objective, and it was 
too hard to put together quickly. But, if the general was serious, the staff could add it to the planning 
guidance for the 1965-66 course. The only suitable way to add a lesson, according to the Chief of 
Resident Instruction and the Department of Command director, would be to schedule the lesson on a 
Saturday morning. Colonel O‘Brien thought perhaps one of the guest speaker lectures held in reserve 
might be dedicated to this use, but there was a danger there, he noted, as previous experience 
indicated this time would be consumed by another unscheduled visitor.
57
 Much of what O‘Brien had 
postulated would soon become irrelevant. A new officer education review lay just beyond the 
horizon.  
The Haines Board 
1966 marked a fissure in CGSC‘s development. While not quite revolutionary, events of 1966 
and beyond show a markedly different approach to officer education. Once solidified, the course 
structure of 1972 became the norm for the next three decades. The board that created the environment 
for change began in 1965 but did not publish its findings until the following year. Lieutenant General 
Ralph Haines led a team of nine officers in the most comprehensive survey of Army officer education 
conducted to date. Haines‘ team examined and questioned every aspect and assumption underlying 
the Army school system and measured these considerations against a worldview of large standing 
forces, repetitive stability and limited war operations; the resulting ―urgent, unprogrammed 
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requirements‖ on officer corps; and accelerated doctrinal, materiel, and organizational development. 
The Board anticipated continued consolidation of administrative responsibilities in the Secretary of 
Defense and renewed emphasis on sound management skills.
58
 Training and education of officers 
would be demanding under such conditions. New expertise in automatic data processing (ADP), 
operations research and systems analysis (ORSA), aviation, and electronics would supplement, or 
even supplant, existing skills. Officers would share responsibilities with civilians, as the Army 
expanded its non-military workforce. The needs of field units and administrative headquarters would 
limit the time available in an officer‘s career for training and education.59 
The Haines Board began in the summer of 1965 with the charge to ―determine the adequacy 
and appropriateness of the current Army school system and the education individual school training 
of Army officers in light of responsibilities which will confront the Military Establishment for the 
foreseeable future; and to recommend such changes in the direction, structure, or operations of the 
system or in the academic program during the next decade as will make the greatest contribution to 
the discharge of those responsibilities.‖60 The Board‘s members faced a significant task. The officer 
education system at the time consisted of two colleges, 22 branch schools, a dozen specialty schools, 
and the military academy and academy prep school. Many of these schools and colleges had associate 
or extension courses.  
When the panel arrived to look at CGSC, they found the Regular Course and biannual 
Associate Course, plus refresher and specialty courses. The Board acknowledged the unifying nature 
of CGSC, given that this was the first educational experience that included a heterogeneous student 
body. Prior to CGSC, the officer attended a school whose students came almost solely from a single 
branch. CGSC, as the combined arms school, mixed representatives from all arms and services. The 
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Board commented on the unique character of this developmental experience, saying that ―C&GSC is 
today the hub of the Army school system.‖61 
The ―Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools‖ was 
perhaps the most influential officer education document of the postwar era, because it provided the 
mandate that led to sweeping structural changes in the mid-career course. The Board‘s 
recommendations for CGSC rested on three observations. The Board considered the prior tactical 
experience of students
62
 to be vastly superior to decades past, with approximately sixty percent of the 
class having served in a division or higher tactical unit. For the Board, this statistic represented an 
opportunity, since the familiarity with division operations could offset reductions in tactical 
instruction, which in turn allowed coverage of peacetime subjects. Next, for well over half the class, 
CGSC was their last professional education. Given that the average student attended during their 
eleventh year, they could expect another eight to ten years of service without another school. In 
addition, one-third of the graduates left CGSC directly for non-tactical assignments, and all of the 
graduates could reasonably be expected to serve in one or more such assignments post-graduation. 
The Army‘s officer education system made no allowance for this third point.63 The Haines Board re-
discovered the problem that War Department Circular 202 attempted to solve twenty years earlier. 
The Haines Board substantially altered the Army‘s view that CGSC was exclusively a tactical 
institution. The Board proposed an expanded mission to ―include responsibility for preparing its 
students to serve in the total military environment, although the primary focus of the course should 
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remain clearly on the Army in the field.‖64 As will be shown, the College embraced the former, while 
relegating the qualifying statement to a diminished position. The Board‘s recommendations are 
curious in two respects. American involvement in Vietnam had escalated by this time, placing the 
Army in the field yet again, and, more surprisingly, only ten years previously the Commandant had 
bemoaned the absence of a second year devoted to tactical instruction. 
What distinguishes the Haines Board from many previous boards is that the Army adopted 
most of the recommendations, and the Army did so rather quickly. As opposed to previous officer 
education studies, the Army‘s Adjutant General closely tracked the status of the approved 
recommendations.
65
 A number of significant actions affecting CGSC took effect within a year. 
Two interrelated suggestions of the Haines Board led to an eighty percent increase in the size 
of the Regular Course class. Associate Courses, designed to serve the needs of reserve component 
officers, ended temporarily as a result of a Haines Board finding. ―There is cause to question the 
validity of the current concept of conducting both regular and associate courses at branch school and 
C&GSC levels.‖66 As evidence for their assertion, the Board cited attendance figures for FY 65, 
which showed seventy-six percent of the class came from the active army, eighteen percent from the 
reserve components, and six percent from allies. This distribution subverted the stated intent and 
purpose for the course, allowing the Army to graduate more active service officers from the staff 
course, while doing little to educate reserve component officers. ―The Board sees no professional 
reason for their continuance in their present form,‖ concluded the report. Instead of an eighteen week 
course that reserve component officers did not attend anyway because of constraints due to civilian 
employment, the panel recommended a mobilization course for reserve officers. It said CGSC‘s extra 
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capacity should be given to the Regular Course. The Board believed that the full capacity of Bell 
Hall—1,344 students—should be dedicated to meeting the Army‘s need for staff college graduates.67 
The Haines Board echoed the earlier Williams Board recommendations regarding who should 
attend the staff college. This position was not without controversy, since the DCSLOG had begun to 
question the basis for allocation of spaces back in 1957. The DCSPER had declined to act, given that 
the Williams Board was studying the education system at the time.
68
 Since 1954, student selection 
had followed the scheme set out by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant 
General Walter L. Weible.
69
 Under this allocation, the three combat arms branches—infantry, armor, 
and artillery (including air defense artillery)—received most of the spaces in both the Regular and 
Associate Courses. The proportion of the Regular Course class from these three branches came to 
about 65% in each of the eight years. Officers from the arms amounted to about 60% for the associate 
courses. The remainder was distributed among the Army‘s technical and administrative branches.70 
Notably, no Women‘s Army Corps officers attended the Regular Course during the period 1955-63. 
Rivalry between service branches resurfaced in 1965. As the Haines Board confirmed, 
combat arms officers got 65% of the spaces, yet they comprised only 55% of the qualified pool. 
―After careful and detailed consideration of the many factors involved, the Board reaffirms the 
traditional philosophy employed in allotting quotas to the C&GSC: i.e., that priority for attendance 
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should be given to those for whom the instruction has direct application, rather than to those for 
whom it is largely a valuable orientation on the functions of others.‖71 
The Board recommended that selection of students should remain under the purview of the 
officer‘s career branch, given the system seemed to work. The Haines Board believed that an Army-
wide board would be impracticable due to the number of records that would require review. 
Additionally, the panel said that only majors and lieutenant colonels should attend CGSC, reversing 
the trend towards a more junior class, heavily attended by captains.
72
 The Army later adopted the 
Haines Board recommendations about quotas. 65% of the class came from armor, infantry, and 
artillery branches, while the technical and specialist branches and allied officers got the remaining 
35%.
73
 For the time being, the composition of the class would follow tradition, even as the course 
itself began to reflect the officer corps‘ wider perspective. 
Fresh on the heels of the Haines Board followed a most unique investigation of CGSC. The 
MMAS program had suffered a significant setback in 1966. Delays in obtaining authority from 
Congress led the North Central Association to withdraw its recognition of the College‘s degree 
program. The concept had encountered resistance, especially among the civilian bureaucrats of the 
Department of Defense, and they had attempted to terminate the program. The survey was part of this 
effort. After the Haines Board, Birrer and others renewed the push to gain authority for the MMAS 
degree. A review committee formed by the U.S. Commissioner of Education sought to understand the 
College‘s desire and qualifications to award a master‘s degree. The committee‘s true purpose was to 
quash the MMAS concept.
74
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The report did little to help opponents of the MMAS. Instead, the committee contended that 
―a greater degree of professionalism will be demanded of the commander,‖ and it clearly lay claim to 
a broad swath of professional responsibility outside the traditional military sphere. Officers now 
functioned in ―broader arenas,‖ meaning civilian government and industry. The profession had 
redefined itself in just a few years, and Leavenworth recognized the implications. The Army‘s senior 




The embryonic MMAS program now prompted an adjustment to the faculty in 1968. Even 
though the North Central Association had withdrawn its accreditation in the spring, the College 
administration still sought to meet the guidelines given by the accrediting committee a few years 
earlier. To meet the need for faculty who held doctorates, the Commandant added reserve component 
officers as consulting faculty. The adjunct faculty members formed the core of a graduate faculty; 
implying that CGSC had no such body, it being a professional school but not a graduate school in the 
sense used in American higher education institutions.
 76
 The addition of these reserve officers with 
academic credentials marked yet another point at which the profession reached outside its core 
membership to obtain professional knowledge and acceptance. 
Educating Citizen-Officers 
The Haines Board recognized the contribution of non-resident instruction to the Army‘s 
overall quality. According to the Board‘s report, CGSC extension courses of all types served the 
needs of 11,000 officers across the Army. 65.1% came from the reserve components. Just under 
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thirty-eight percent of the non-resident course students were active army, and a surprising seven 
percent were foreign officers.
77
 
Efforts to provide a CGSC education to a broader cross-section of the officer corps continued 
throughout the sixties, but diametrically opposed forces created serious difficulties for the various 
programs. The Haines Board resolved some of the underlying issues of priorities, but the Board‘s 
recommendations did not anticipate some subsequent developments. To understand the outcome, 
some review of the situation surrounding this responsibility is necessary.  
 Non-resident studies underwent a number of modifications during the period of the Vietnam 
War. These modifications carried forward a trend from the mid-fifties that had increasingly tied 
promotions in the reserves to military education. Starting in 1956, promotion to reserve component 
general officer hinged on completing CGSC. In 1962, graduation from the course became a 
requirement for promotion to colonel in the combat arms, and completion became a requirement for 
technical and specialist branches four years later.  
Back in 1962, Eddleman Commission recommendations had spurred internal CGSC 
assessments using the Commission‘s findings as the justification for change. Like the Haines Board, 
the Eddleman Commission had questioned whether the classrooms and faculty used for the Associate 
Course could not be put to better use. CGSC‘s parallel study concluded that it was indeed possible to 
increase the number of Regular Course spaces by eliminating the Associate Course and developing a 
new short course to replace it. Before he departed, Major General Johnson dispatched a copy of his 
Long Range Plan to CONARC‘s commander, Lieutenant General John K. Waters. Based upon staff 
work done during the Eddleman Commission‘s visit, Johnson proposed four major initiatives: ―An 
increase in the size of the Regular Course, a reduction in the size of the Fall Associate Course, the 
elimination of the Spring Associate Course, and the initiation of a special course tailored specifically 
to the requirements of and aimed at attracting the highest type of ADT officer.
78
 Implementation of 
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any one component hinged on acceptance of the entire plan. Classrooms, faculty, and housing 
constrained the College‘s ambitions as had been the case for years. 
The Department of Nonresident Instruction inactivated in the summer of 1963 because of 
Army-wide manpower reductions stemming from the Army‘s 1963 reorganization. What became 
quickly clear to the departments who assumed their responsibilities was that the College‘s ―poor 
cousins‖ did a lot more than anyone had realized. Exams had to be graded—and written. Translation 
of the Associate Course into the correspondence format took time, too. Before long, the department 
directors complained to the Director of Resident Instruction, Colonel O‘Brien, who in turn forwarded 
their concerns to the Assistant Commandant. ―The impact of the additional non-resident workload is 
greater than forseen, [sic]‖ wrote Colonel O‘Brien in August.79 To compensate, departments dropped 
some subjects or reduced their length, rather than attempt to maintain the previous content.
80
 
CONARC‘s acting Chief of Staff, Major General George T. Duncan, forwarded the ―Long 
Range Plan for Use of the US Army Command and General Staff College‖ to the Department of the 
Army‘s operations staff in July, 1963. Based upon CGSC‘s internal study stemming from the 
Eddleman Commission, CONARC endorsed a five year phase-in of the four major changes proposed 
by Johnson six months earlier: increase of Regular Course slots from 750 to 1008, reduction of the 
fall Associate Course from 448 to 336 officers, elimination of the spring Associate Course, and 
initiation of the new Special Course for reserve components. CONARC‘s letter supported the 
proposal to conduct a course for reserve officers from January to March, consisting of five two-week 




Implementation proved problematic. Coordination across the reserve components and within 
the Department of the Army revealed a host of objections. Major General Ralph E. Haines (in his 
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capacity before the Haines Board) relayed these to CONARC in an October 1963 letter. Haines 
questioned the figures used to establish Army requirements for CGSC graduates, saying ―the number 
of graduates who are requisitioned consistently exceeds the number available for assignment.‖ The 
Army staff rejected the proposal to eliminate the Associate Course, but the letter did endorse the idea 
of the special course. As a result, implementation of the Eddleman Commission‘s most significant 
finding came to a halt. As Major General Lemley pointed out in his December reply to CONARC, the 
Long Range Plan was an integrated solution, requiring adoption of all components to make feasible 
the individual elements.
82
 Notwithstanding this setback, CGSC had introduced the idea of eliminating 
the Associate Course in favor of increasing the size of the Regular Course. It would not be too many 
years before the idea came to fruition. 
As already noted, personnel cutbacks at the College resulted in the elimination of the 
department responsible for writing the courses, although the duties remained. Increasing demand for 
the non-resident courses, caused by changes in promotion policies for reserve officers, placed new 
demands on the system. Lastly, the ongoing modifications to the Regular Course, which formed the 
basis for the Associate Course, USAR school curricula, and extension courses, created a constant 
need for updates to the existing material. The tight links between the various components of the 
system began to weaken. 
The Associate Course‘s purpose, as stated in 1964, was twofold: ―to provide officers with a 
working knowledge for wartime and peacetime duty as commanders and general staff officers of 
divisions and logistical commands and a general knowledge of the duties of commanders and general 
staff officers at corps and field army to include their combat service support systems‖ and ‖to provide 
the basis for future development for progression to higher command and staff responsibilities.‖83 
                                                     
82
 Ralph E. Haines to Commanding General, CONARC, memorandum, ―Long Range Plan for Use of the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College,‖ Washington, DC, 16 October 1963, N-13423.489, CARL. Harry J. Lemley, Jr. to Commanding General, CONARC, 
memorandum, ―Feasibility of the USACGSC Establishing a Special Active Duty for Training Course for Reserve Component Officers, Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS 3 December 1963, N-13423.489, CARL. 
83
 A.J. Weigley to Commanding General, CONARC, ―Draft Program of Instruction for the Command and General Staff Officer Course 
(250-A-C2), the Associated Command and General Staff Officer Course (250-A-C3), and the Mobilization Command and General Staff 
Officer Course,‖ memorandum, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 9 June 1964, 2, Folder /5 Curriculum Plan, CARL. 
 219 
 
Intentionally omitted was any reference to the strategic subject matter. Students outside Leavenworth 
would get the bare minimum training needed to qualify for staff positions, while reaping none of the 
benefits of the new Regular Course emphasis.  
Until 1966, the options for a reserve component officer or an active duty officer not selected 
for the course remained stable: the Associate‘s Course, the USAR school system, the extension 
course, or a combination of the last two. The Associate Course ended in 1967 as a result of the 
allocation of Bell Hall‘s classroom space to the Regular Course according to a Haines Board 
recommendation.
84
 As a replacement, CGSC offered three options. The USAR schools continued as 
in the past with four years of weekend and summer training. Officers could choose to take twenty-
eight subcourses through the correspondence course over four and one-half years. What was 
somewhat different was the allocation of lessons to phases, now numbering ten.
85
 
Lieutenant General W.G. Rich, who served as the Department of the Army‘s senior reserve 
component representative, advised reservists to get started early on the CGSC course. ―I think the day 
a man makes captain is the day he should start thinking about CGSC. He should plan his schooling so 
that he will complete CGSC well in advance of the time when it will be required for his promotion to 
colonel.‖86 
The differentiation between a certificate and a diploma and a third option for completing the 
coursework forced reserve officers to make a choice. Finishing the first nine phases via the 
correspondence course or USAR system led to a certificate. To earn a diploma, officers had to attend 
the tenth phase in residence at Fort Leavenworth. A third scheme—the Mobilization Course—also led 
to a diploma. The first class graduated 289 officers in August 1967.
87
 This track required the non-
resident student to take half the course through the mail and USAR school system and half through a 
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part-time resident course offered over the summer at Fort Leavenworth. In this format, the student 
attended two four-week courses at Leavenworth.
88
  
In all cases, the reserve component officer was forced to choose between family, career, and 
military duties, to include acquiring professional education. Major General Rowland F. Kirks‘ speech 
to the graduating class of the July 1969 graduates of Phase X highlighted the duality of a reserve 
component officer. ―As a civilian he is a civic leader in every facet of our daily life.‖ He later 
observed, ―As Army officers you are the inheritors of the finest military traditions that the mightiest 
nation in the history of man has hammered out on the anvil of more than 150 military campaigns.‖89 
Despite some heroic language, attaining the designation of CGSC graduate took fortitude and 
forbearance, given the nature of the material. Divining the school solution from the mass of material 
in front of the extension course student proved difficult, if not impossible. 
Many officers chose to blend the ―box of books‖ approach with interaction in a classroom 
environment. USAR schools continued as a popular option. A January, 1967 article described the 
extent of the USAR school system. By this point, 106 USAR school units led classes in cities and 
towns across the United States and overseas. About 6,200 Army Reserve and National Guard officers 
attended classes year-round. Students attending the Associate Course, on which the USAR school 
curriculum was based, completed CGSC in eighteen weeks. By comparison, an officer enrolled in the 
USAR school system took four and one-half years to cover the same material. He attended twenty-
four two-hour lessons held at night from September to May, and an additional two weeks each 
summer. Should a student not live near a USAR school, he could complete the twenty-four lessons by 
correspondence. With no breaks, the officer could obtain a certificate, not a diploma. Unfortunately, 
the vast majority of student-officers did not receive any pay for their efforts.
90
 If the system sounded 
complicated, it was.  
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The efficacy of the entire reserve officer education and promotion system came under 
scrutiny soon afterwards. Following the Detroit riots of 1967, Federal authorities were appalled at the 
actions of the National Guardsmen and initiated a sweeping reassessment of their training programs 
and readiness. One of these commissions, the Hollingsworth Board of 1967, revamped the Army‘s 
approach to reserve officer management and promotion.
91
 One key finding of this study affected 
CGSC‘s non-resident course. Reserve component majors now had to complete half of the non-
resident course to be eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Officers had three years to complete 
the rest of CGSC‘s coursework, and graduation was a requirement for promotion to colonel. The new 
rule took effect in July 1972.
92
  
In the end, much of the effort expended to contrive a workable reserve component officer 
education strategy during the late sixties amounted to naught. The demise of the resident short course 
proved temporary. A new eighteen-week resident course started in 1971—nearly the same model 




During the 1960s, international graduates began to receive more attention, particularly if the 
press could make a negative association between CGSC and the actions of graduates. Lieutenant 
General Trujillo was the first of a number of foreign officers who were linked to CGSC, especially if 
their newsworthiness came as the result of a coup. Two instances of such linkages occurred in South 
Vietnam in 1960 and 1963. The paratrooper revolt of 1960 and the November 1963 coup that led to 
President Diem‘s death both involved CGSC-educated officers.94 Two African graduates drew 
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national attention because of their successful coups. President Goafur al-Nimiery, the leader of 
Sudan, made headlines for his overt criticism of U.S. Middle East policy. Colonel Ignatius ―Ike‖ 
Acheampong, a late sixties graduate, rose to power in Ghana during a coup in 1972.
95
 Together, the 
examples might cause one to question what allied students learned, and indeed press reports inferred a 
connection between the officer‘s attendance at CGSC and the coup.  
The Military Assistance Program, which gave the Army the authority to enroll allied officers, 
came under scrutiny as a result of such events. The programs were criticized because of the notable 
outliers, such as coup leaders.
96
 There is little if any evidence, however, that attendance at CGSC 
spurred the individuals to act against their civilian government. One must note the hundreds of 
international graduates who did not rise to power through coup d‘état. What is interesting is that the 
number of officers attending Leavenworth‘s resident course nearly equaled the total at all other 
service colleges. For FY 70, 103 Allied officers attended CGSC, while 126 foreign officers went to 
other military schools.
97
 The large number kept the small section busy. 
Local issues also concerned the department. Not every American the allies encountered 
proved a gracious host. Students periodically encountered problems with local residents. ―The 
principal problem of living in the local community takes the form of limited discrimination in 
housing and related areas which a few inhabitants of Leavenworth practice.‖98 The staff worked with 
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local government in an attempt to curtail such occurrences, but students occasionally found 
themselves turned away from establishments or isolated by their neighbors. 
Readiness to receive instruction resurfaced as a concern of both external and internal reports. 
The Haines Board report indicated that efforts to improve screening of Allied officers had not met 
with much success. The goodwill generated as a result of attendance was tempered by the limited 
comprehension of the material by foreign officers whose English skills did not match the level of 
instruction.
99
 Over the span of the Regular Course, some accommodations could be made. Not so with 
the Associate Course, which also had international students. Allied officers attending the Associate 
Course received an abbreviated orientation, which the College leadership found unsatisfactory. 
Before the Regular Course, students got up to eight weeks of preparatory training, including the 
English language instruction. On the other hand, Associate Course students got a mere twenty-two 
hours of orientation. The Director of Resident Instruction coordinated with CONARC and the 
Department of the Army‘s DCSOPS to have allied officers scheduled to attend both the FY65 
Regular and Associate Courses attend the preparatory course.
100
 
For the Regular Course, the Allied Officer Section managed an extensive program to 
introduce allied officers to American culture. By the early sixties, the trips covered government, 
industry, social, and technological venues. In the Kansas City area, officers visited the Kansas state 
legislature, industry, the Truman Library, Corps of Engineer projects, art museums, and professional 
sports games. Outside trips to Washington, D.C., United Nations‘ headquarters, West Point, and 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania filled other weeks during the course.
101
 This broad-based program 
acquainted international officers with American culture, government, and society. Soon, the College‘s 
leadership would take steps to create an equally diverse academic experience for students, but only 
for those lucky enough to attend the Regular Course. 
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No other structural development affected modern American officer education more than the 
decision to offer electives at CGSC. In the elective program, the faculty found a solution to a problem 
it had experienced for years under the traditional, centrally-managed curriculum—how to account for 
change without rewriting the entire course. Electives allowed the student latitude to shape their 
educational experience. On the other hand, electives displaced material that had long been the 
hallmark of the College experience. Within a few years, the presence of an elective program led to a 
fundamental redesign of the course, further reducing the time available for combined arms 
instruction. Lastly, the elective program opened the Army‘s senior tactical institution to the influence 
of other professions—a move that the officer corps seemed to welcome. 
While the idea of an elective system in American higher education originated in the 1850s, 
CGSC did not consider and implement a similar program until over a century later. In civilian 
universities, a mixture of concentration and distribution marks nearly every undergraduate 
curriculum.
102
 A core of required courses supplemented by Lernfreiheit form the degree requirements. 
The elective curriculum model began at Brown University in 1850. Later, Charles W. Eliot, president 
of Harvard University, implemented the model over several decades, and he is the one widely 
credited for overcoming institutional resistance, gradually shifting the students, faculty, and 
institution in a new direction. Eliot ―recognized the fundamental importance of the individual‖ and 
gradually instigated a broad series of reforms between 1869 and 1897 to achieve his vision.
103
 
The freedom afforded professors and students to design and select courses based upon 
preference did not always have positive outcomes. Rudolph showed two results were possible from an 
electives-based curriculum. The institution would either see increased ―depth of study‖ and ―spirit of 
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scholarship,‖ or the school would find itself adrift with no common purpose to guide the institution.104 
Rudolph conveyed the downside in his observation that ―one of the most creative, and also one of the 
most destructive, educational developments of the post-Civil War years, the elective curriculum, 
played the paradoxical role of both contributing to the motivation problem and keeping it from being 
far worse than it was.‖105 Regardless of the potential faults, few alternative systems allowed civilian 
academia the flexibility necessary to accommodate the growth in academic fields and knowledge. 
The College‘s elective system originated from the opinion of Jack E. Babcock, a promotable 
colonel, who in 1965 argued for the idea‘s inclusion as part of the Haines Board report.106 The 1966 
recommendations claimed that a fixed curriculum ―directed at the lowest common denominator in the 
class‖ failed to account for the individual‘s needs. An elective system, on the other hand, gave the 
student a choice, offering intellectual diversity to accommodate a wide range of professional and 
personal interests. With electives came flexibility and the ability to adjust rapidly to new 
developments by adding a new course, instead of changing an entire year‘s worth of material. From a 
management standpoint, the Board said that an elective system could curtail ―the growth of specialist 
courses by giving different groups of students a specialist‘s knowledge in certain fields without 
requiring that they attend specialist courses.‖107 The report gave electives legitimacy, applying the 
concept to the entire Army school system but restricting implementation to the colleges. The Board 
recommended that the course include ―greater flexibility to keep it fully responsive to the demands of 
a rapidly changing military environment.‖108 This comment became the faculty‘s touchstone as they 
made substantive alterations to the integrated curriculum model that had been in place since the 
College‘s inception. 
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CGSC‘s leaders had specific purposes in mind when they began the elective program. As 
with many of the arguments employed a century earlier by civilian institutions, electives at CGSC 
were meant to spur interest or to offer greater width and depth than did the mandatory courses. The 
college leadership outlined five components of the program in the 1968 POI. Electives were meant to 
―extend the depth of coverage in selected areas of the curriculum; round-out previous schooling or 
experience; assist in development of a specialty; further the student‘s branch qualification; or satisfy 
intellectual curiosity.‖109 The more flexible curricular model would allow future College faculty to 
quickly implement newer material, too. 
The elective system began modestly during the 1967-68 school year (table 8). Each student 
had to take one of seventeen forty-hour courses. The eclectic mix resembled the modern university: 
Spanish, German, French, Speaking, Writing, Statistics, Operations Research, Automated Data 
Processing, and the fledgling Graduate Study Program.
110
 The jumble was shaped by what was 
available, rather than a calculated need based upon analysis. All classes were taught on Thursday 
afternoon, compounding the problem by requiring a full complement of spaces at the same time each 
week. Some of the courses were taught by University of Kansas faculty, a necessary step given the 
peculiar blend. Military electives included logistics, internal defense (a corollary to 
counterinsurgency), and military history. Language classes, something under consideration since the 
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Table 8. Elective Course Growth, 1967-73. 
 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 
Required 
Number 
1 1 1 2 2 6
a
 
Total Hours 40 40 40 90 90 304 
Hours Each 40 40 40 45 45 40-56
b
  
Offerings 17 23 21 24 — 76c 
      Source: Doughty, 40, 47; POIs, 1967-1973. 
aEach officer took 4 professional and 2 associate electives. 
bAssociate electives were 40 hours; professional electives were 56 hours each. 
c23 were professional and 53 were associate.  
 
The following year, the students could choose from twenty-four courses. The next major step took 
place in 1970 when the College required two electives. Offerings included Applied Cultural 
Anthropology, and each course took 45 hours to complete.  
More internal assessments pushed the elective program forward, being easier since the 
necessary consent was in place. CGSC‘s 1969 Long Range Curriculum Study, led by Colonel 
Jennings, projected a course of study in 1975 with two sections. The second half of the year would 
allow a student to take electives instead of a specified track. For the first time since 1946, the College 
looked well beyond the present to anticipate needed adjustments. 
 
Electives began to displace core material when year-round electives became part of the 
curriculum. As Ivan Birrer related, the Thursday afternoon scheme could accommodate the single 
elective requirement within the existing program structure, since the requirement was only forty 
hours. During the 1960s, the officer corps had gradually embraced civilian education as a cornerstone 
of officer development. The Haines Board had noted that seventy-five percent of officers had a 
baccalaureate degree or higher, but fewer than nine percent had a master‘s degree or higher. The 
Board recommended a more thorough study of advanced degree requirements.
112
 Guidance from the 
Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, to ―get as many master‘s degrees as 
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possible,‖ as Birrer put it, resulted in a new program known as the Cooperative Degree Program. 
Officers applied for the program while at CGSC.
113
 During the Regular Course, the officer attended 
CGSOC classes and fulfilled some of their participating graduate school requirements. After 
graduation from CGSC, the officer then went to school full-time to complete the university‘s degree 
requirements. Upon implementation of the program in 1970, the College had to offer electives 
throughout the year to give the student sufficient hours to transfer to the participating university. The 
Commandant, Major General John Hay, saw this new mandate as detrimental, because it reduced the 
hours of instruction devoted to meeting course objectives. Nonetheless, the staff and departments 
trimmed the lessons and made room for a second elective.
114
 
The College overhauled the curricular structure and replaced it with seven core courses plus 
two required electives. The range of elective topics doubled to forty-eight with many courses in 
business and social science topics. This system remained in place for two years as the College 
prepared for its next transition. While CGSC had departed substantially from previous methods, it had 
one final step to take. 
Institutional Heresy 
Inside their Bell Hall offices on September 28, 1971, Colonel Hal Kressin, Colonel E.D.H. 
Berry, and Dr. Ivan Birrer leafed through a freshly-arrived three-page memorandum from the Deputy 
Commandant.
115
 Colonel Kressin had headed the Department of Non-resident Instruction. Close to 
retirement, Kressin read the pages and realized his last few months in uniform would not be 
undisturbed. Colonel Berry, assistant head of the resident instruction department and already 
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swamped with the day-to-day management of the Regular Course, saw it as an extension of previous 
work based upon the move to standardized two-, four-, and six-hour lessons. Birrer read the 
memorandum and saw opportunity, for Gibson‘s directive proposed to change the entire scheme of 
mid-career officer education. Gibson had in mind breaking the rigid curriculum and reshaping it to 
meet the needs of the present. The select group set about their task, assessing the details of Gibson‘s 
plan, for the Deputy Commandant gave explicit guidance for the way ahead. The team was to assess 
the existing lessons and determine ―those subjects which are common in our curriculum and need to 
be taught to all our students,‖ followed by the allocation of remaining material to one of three general 
areas: tactical, logistical, or administrative topics. The last three Gibson labeled ―Professional 
Electives.‖ He proposed that students would take the common subjects then transition to one of the 
Professional Electives. Courses that did not fit into the above categories would be known as Associate 




Ivan Birrer had sat on the sidelines for the previous twenty years. He quietly had advised the 
College‘s senior leaders for nearly two decades. His accumulated experience gave him insights as to 
what could work and what would not. Beginning with Major General Johnson‘s tour, Birrer became a 
central figure in shaping CGSC leadership‘s decisions. During the sixties and early seventies, he was 
a participant in, or the initiator of, each major step that led to a fundamental restructuring of the 
College. Now, he would openly lead the team that reoriented the institution. His office became the 
project‘s headquarters; his chalkboard the palette for idea after idea. Kressin, Berry and Birrer 
identified weaknesses in Gibson‘s original proposal, concluding a common core and one of three 
tracks (tactics, logistics, or administration) would not work for practical reasons. The school simply 
did not have enough officers to write all the courseware needed to support such a large undertaking. 
After some initial discussions among the three, they began to engage with Brigadier General Gibson, 
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testing new schemes to achieve his concept, while changing the fundamental details of his original 
plan. Gibson agreed with the team and told them to continue working the details.
117
 
A few weeks after release of the Gibson directive, the Commandant, Major General 
Hennessy, released his Plan for Institutional Development (CGSC – 1975). Much like his 
predecessors, Hennessy wanted to make specific improvements in curriculum, instructional methods, 
facilities, and faculty qualifications and training. His vision added a unique element, ―Interface with 
Higher Education,‖ which he elaborated as the desire to ―gain acceptance and recognition as a full-
fledged member of the higher education community.‖ The loss of prestige associated with the North 
Central Association‘s withdrawal of accreditation still stung, even though it had happened years 
beforehand. Hennessey intended to pursue a broad series of reforms, which singly and corporately 
would result in recognition of CGSC as a graduate school on par with American higher education 
institutions. The Commandant‘s image of the College‘s future and the Gibson directive had a direct 
relationship. The work of Birrer‘s group was to attain the objective: ―Modify the present curriculum, 
in both content and design, as required for graduate education.‖118  
Once the team began to market the idea to department directors, however, resistance quickly 
formed. Colonel John White, Director of the Department of Division Operations, wholeheartedly 
disagreed with the concept, not unlike his predecessor of a decade earlier. White saw the proposal as 
an unimaginable departure from the staff college‘s role as a tactical institution. He was joined by the 
Class Director, who objected on the grounds that managing the particulars of each student would 
become an unwieldy affair. Birrer noted that two other department heads did not support the idea, but 
they were less vehement in their opposition. Only Colonel Mike Sanger of the Department of Strategy 
supported the plan. Opposition was inconsequential; the Deputy Commandant was not seeking their 
approval. CGSC was heading in a new direction, and he was going to make it happen.
119
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Gibson and Birrer then approached the Commandant, Major General Hennessy. He listened, 
asked a few questions, then gave the two guidance to socialize the concept with a few others groups. 
After consulting with the student curriculum committee, whose members endorsed the idea, Gibson 
and Birrer returned to his office. Hennessy believed the time had come to approach the CONARC 
commander. Just over two months had passed since Gibson‘s memorandum had arrived.120 
A key event in the decade-long progression from a unitary course to a concentration-
distribution model took place on December 5, 1971. The dawn of the modern CGSC transpired during 
a briefing from Ivan Birrer and the College‘s Deputy Commandant, Brigadier General Gibson, to the 
CONARC commander, Lieutenant General Ralph Haines. Birrer pitched the plan in a Friday 
afternoon session. The timing was ideal, for two separate trails met in the early winter of 1971. The 
first was the pending implementation of the Army‘s Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), 
which modified officer career patterns to a dual-track, specialized, system. The second, and more 
relevant to CGSC, was the release of the Norris Report.  
Beginning in November 1970, Major General Frank W. Norris led a review of the officer 
education system. Norris, one of the Williams Board members back in 1958, had recently stepped 
down as Commandant of the AFSC. A significant part of the report dealt with CGSC. Norris 
concluded that ―the proper role for CGSC in the seventies is to act as a professional university for the 
Army. This should not be a one-course, one-curriculum university. Its principal emphasis should be 
on the conduct of high-caliber military education across the spectrum of professional skills required 
by the modern Army.‖121 Norris proposed a split course with a portion devoted to core subjects and 
the remainder of the course devoted to staff specialist lessons.
122
 Lieutenant General Haines did not 
care for the Norris Report—a fortuitous situation when the College‘s briefing team arrived that 
afternoon. Birrer outlined the core and electives program, and he proposed an immediate changeover 
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to the new arrangement—beginning with the 1972-73 Regular Course. Birrer briefed the plan, and 
when Lieutenant General Haines asked when the scheme could be implemented, Birrer replied that 
the College could start in August. Haines accepted the Birrer-Gibson proposition, giving Hennessy 
and Gibson the necessary latitude to reorganize the College‘s curriculum to a four-term program. 
Birrer returned to Leavenworth knowing the import of the decision.
123
 
After the Christmas break, Dr. Birrer sat down to capture the new program in writing. The 
early January ―Report of Ad Hoc Committee for Regular Course Curriculum Review – CGSC 72-73‖ 
outlined the overall program. Sixty percent of the academic year would go to common subjects, while 
the remaining portion would be allocated to electives, individual study, and guest speakers as shown 
in figure 1 below. The program made a distinction between professional and associate electives, and it 
set the graduation requirement at four professional and two associate electives. The plan divided the 
year into two semesters, and each semester was sub-divided into two terms of about nine weeks. 
Using the two-hour standard lesson developed last summer as a building block, the plan divided each 
day into four two-hour sessions. Common subjects and associate electives would be taught year-
round, while the student would two professional electives in each term of the second semester in 
addition to the core lessons.
124
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Figure 1. Allocation of Hours, Ad Hoc Committee Plan. The four-term plan allocated time to core subjects and electives, 




The memorandum listed seven courses in the common core totaling 668 hours. It was this 
feature that earlier had disturbed Colonel White. Division Operations, Course Three, now amounted 
to 143 hours of the entire year, which meant division operations comprised a mere twenty-one percent 
of the common core—and proportionally much less when electives and other academic events were 
factored in to the computation.
126
 
The Haines Board‘s recommendations took full effect in 1972. The school implemented the 
proposal as promised during the December briefing to Lieutenant General Haines. Students in 1971 
had studied strategy and joint operations in roughly equal measure with tactics. In the summer of 
1972, the Regular Course stepped off in a new direction. Officers would, it was postulated, acquire 
the ―hallmark‖ Leavenworth skills—estimates, orders, and problem solving expertise—in what 
amounted to twenty-two weeks.
127
 In addition to a reduced core of classes, students took 224 hours of 
electives. Birrer described the changes as creating ―a professional graduate school affording career 
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education‖ to Army officers in an article written for Military Review.128 What had been a focused, 
professional school run on the classical model now resembled a modern liberal arts university. 
CGSOC‘s structural changes of 1972 coincided with the beginning of the Army‘s critical 
reassessment of itself. In the years ahead, the College would continue to widen the professional 
education opportunities provided to officers by increasing the choices available, while sticking firmly 
to the basic plan developed in 1971. 
Conclusion 
From 1963-1973, the curriculum of the Command and General Staff College underwent some 
of its most enduring and significant structural changes since its inception. The transformation of the 
Regular Course between 1963 and 1973 reveals a belated attempt by the faculty, and the Army‘s 
education system, to catch up to the global developments, particularly a new definition of 
professional jurisdiction and the expanding basis for professional knowledge. Non-resident 
instruction followed haltingly. 
In general, the College faculty continued to exhibit hesitancy to adopt new methods or 
attempt to predict some part of the future after World War Two. In times of prolonged peace, 
intellectual stagnation overcame outside technical, societal, and military advances. Rapid change 
induced paralysis as the professional body struggled to assimilate changes and to create new 
paradigms. The inherently conservative College organization, faced with tremendous uncertainty 
about the future, lagged behind contemporary developments, oftentimes due to structural limitations 
or faculty shortages.  
By the mid-sixties, CGSC‘s offerings had fallen well behind the increasing specialization of 
the officer corps and the proliferation of professional military knowledge. The school‘s faculty simply 
could not keep up with external developments. The process used by the College to revise the courses 
required an intensive amount of labor. Attempts to maintain a relevant, centralized curriculum caused 
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 Ivan J. Birrer, ―The New CGSC Curriculum,‖ Military Review 52, no. 6 (June 1972): 20-26. Quote on 26.  
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it to fall short of the Army‘s needs. Although the faculty had played a minimal role in creating new 
knowledge, they taught new ideas that did emerge to a more professionally diverse officer corps.  
The hybrid military-educational bureaucracy, coupled with institutional inertia rooted in 
faculty turbulence, retarded the evolution of the curriculum. With nearly a year required to shape 
changes to a POI and little developed doctrine on emerging subjects, the faculty had difficulty 
rewriting and implementing new courseware. The pace of technological change in the Cold War 
contributed to the Army‘s confusion and thus to its educational dilemma. 
During the move to the elective system from 1967-1972, the College led change from within, 
and a civilian stood at the forefront of the campaign. Until the elective system was introduced, CGSC 
did not have a mechanism to respond to the Army‘s needs. Electives freed the faculty from the rigid 
classical curriculum, but the program came too late to prevent the College‘s struggle with military 
and social transformation. For several years before the formal adoption of electives, the College‘s 
leadership had moved in the direction of a divided curriculum, although not in the form anticipated by 
Johnson, or even Norris. The general staff tracks used in 1946-1950 recognized the trend towards 
specialization in officer duties. The curricular model developed in 1971 endured for nearly thirty 
years. The system developed by Birrer and others provided professional education to several 
generations of officers. The changes made by 1972 poised the College to play a central role in the 
doctrinal, personnel, and training revolution that began in 1973. 
A few individuals directed the shift from a centrally-managed, classical curriculum to a 
completely new scheme. Major General Johnson‘s decisions in late 1962 and early 1963 allowed his 
successor, Major General Lemley, to move ahead with structural changes. Lemley‘s unique 
circumstances—serving as assistant during the planning phase—allowed him to make informed 
decisions about the direction and content of the curriculum. Similarly, Brigadier General Jim 
Gibson‘s service as a department head immediately before assuming the Deputy Commandant‘s role 
gave him unparalleled knowledge about the personalities and norms of the College. Gibson, along 
with Cols. H.R. Kressin and E.D.H. Berry, and, of course, the long-serving Educational Advisor, Ivan 
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Birrer crafted a new direction. The question then became: how effectively did the new scheme meet 





A Great Awakening, 1973-1986 
The characteristics of the next war are as insoluable as are those of an unborn babe. 
 
George S. Patton 
 
 
The year 1973 marked a significant turning point for the Army. Vietnam faded rapidly from 
institutional and national memory as the last advisers and prisoners of war returned home.
1
 But the 
memories of protestors shouting obscenities at returning soldiers did not. The Army, however, gained 
no respite, transitioning to an all-volunteer force and thus further isolating itself from American 
society.
2
 In the next two years, the defeat of one proxy army followed the pyrrhic victory of another. 
The swiftness and lethality of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War shocked U.S. Army officers. The Yom 
Kippur War allowed the U.S. Army to foresee the form of a potential war against the Soviet Union. 
The profession did not like what it observed. The war, fought by surrogate armies as it were, 
dissipated the veil of future combat, and the perceived lessons shocked American officers. From the 
Israeli experience, senior leaders derived an understanding that future war against the Soviet Union 
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 George C. Herring, America’s Longest War, The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 319-
320. James H. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (Lawrence, KS: The University Press 
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2
 Morris Janowitz, ―The Emergent Military,‖ in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, ed. Charles C. Moskos, Jr. (Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage Publications, 1971), 257. Janowitz postulated the likely future of the military as smaller, reliant upon volunteers, and less ready. 
He questioned officers‘ professional self-definition of ―responsibility for the management of the instruments of violence‖ in light of the 
future. Janowitz, 258. Major General Robert G. Gard, Jr. contended that ―the fundamental task of the military profession has not changed.‖ 
Robert G. Gard, Jr.,‖The Future of the Military Profession,‖ in Force in Modern Societies: The Military Profession, Adelphi Papers 103 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), 3. M.D. Feld, ―Military Professionalism and the Mass Army,‖ Armed Forces 




would be a ―come-as-you-are‖ affair; they became aware of the necessity for immediate preparedness 
and fighting outnumbered. They had little confidence in their Army‘s abilities.3 
The post-Vietnam Army was an institution in deplorable condition. Robert Scales described it 
as undisciplined and incapable: 
Forty percent of the Army in Europe confessed to drug use, mostly hashish; a significant 
minority, 7 percent, was hooked on heroin. Crime and desertion were evident in 
Germany, with at least 12 percent of soldiers charged with serious offenses. In certain 
units, conditions neared mutiny as soldier gangs established a new order in the barracks 
through extortion and brutality…. Soldiers rebelled for many reasons. In part, their ill-
discipline reflected a concomitant decline of order within American society. Whether 
right or not, many in American society took out their collective frustration with Vietnam 
on the most visible American presence there—the Army…. The lower standards for 
induction forced the Army to lower its standards for discipline and training…. A 1973 
Harris Poll revealed that the American public ranked the military only above sanitation 




Given the abysmal state of the service, these poll results should surprise no one, but there remained a 
kernel of professionalism among the U.S. Army‘s leadership. Otherwise, the events that followed 
likely could not have occurred. 
The Army‘s actions to reform itself in the mid-1970s admitted that significant components of 
the Army had decayed. Army leaders recast military doctrine, created new organizations, overhauled 
the officer education system, and turned their intellectual energy to conventional war in Europe 
against the Soviets.
5
 Why so many changes, and why so many a generation or two after military 
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 Patton‘s quote from a speech he gave in the mid-twenties captured in Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers 1885-1940, vol. 2 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972): 792. David Jablonsky, ―US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs,‖ Parameters 
(Autumn 1994): 18-36. 
4
 Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (1993, repr., Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army CGSC, 1994), 6-7. 
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 Donn R. Pepke, General Orders Number 30, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, VA, 23 February 1973, 
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September 1978-October 1979 vol. 1 (Ft. Monroe, VA: Historical Office, TRADOC, 1982). John L. Romjue, A History of Army 86, The 
Development of the Light Division, November 1979-December 1980 vol. 2 (Ft. Monroe, VA: Historical Office, TRADOC, 1982). John L. 
Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army TRADOC Historical Monograph Series (Ft. Monroe, VA: Office of 
the Command Historian, TRADOC, 1997). Romjue attributes the Army‘s renewal to four conditions: prolonged lack of Army 
modernization, significant increase in Soviet forces in Europe, the 1973 War, and sustained efforts by senior Army leaders (Chiefs of Staff 
Wickham and Meyer, plus the first four TRADOC commanders: Generals DePuy, Starry, Otis, and Richardson). Interestingly, he classifies 
239 
 
success in a global war? In the dominant narrative, Fort Leavenworth and a select group of officers 
figured prominently in the renaissance.
6
 This story, as told by early writers and more recently by 
historians, centers on Army officers and their role in creating a capable, fit, trained Army.  
The situation at Fort Leavenworth mirrored that of the parent organization. The people who 
occupied the rabbit warren of offices in Bell Hall were exhausted by war, and all judged the future 
uncertain.
7
 Contextualizing the College‘s evolution over the next period requires consideration of 
major organizational and conceptual shifts and their consequences for the officer corps. External 
events and trends greatly influenced the development of the College after the Vietnam War.
8
 The 
reorganization of the Army and consequent formation of ―TRADOC‖ (Training and Doctrine 
Command) had a significant effect on the College, as CGSC fell under a new headquarters.
9
 The 
acquisition and management of military manpower directly influenced the officer education system. 
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6
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between technology and geography and military doctrine. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
8
 Over half of Robert Doughty‘s ―The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976‖ dealt with the events of 1973-1976. 
In Chapter 3, Doughty established the causes of change at Leavenworth as arising largely from external factors: Operation STEADFAST, 
the Army‘s reorganization of the school system; the adoption of the Officer Personnel System (OPMS); the Echelon Above Division 
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The cessation of the draft, the shift to a volunteer-based system for raising defense manpower, and a 
new Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) affected the College, both directly and 
indirectly. One result of these events was a comprehensive reassessment of the officer education 
system—the Review of Training and Education for Officers (RETO). Soon, a rise in the number and 
effectiveness of civilian critics of the military began to erode the profession‘s claims of exclusive 
jurisdiction over military matters. Alongside these events, the U.S. Army fashioned a new operational 
concept, which took over ten years to develop, refine, and propagate. 
 “Point A” 
In the summer of 1973, the twenty-seventh Regular Course of the post-World War Two era 
graduated. The average age of students remained very close to that of the 1946 class, rising slightly to 
thirty-seven years, two months as depicted in appendix 6, Allied and U.S. Student Profile, 1973-74.
10
 
Attitudes toward professional education had changed, though. Over the past several decades, selection 
to the Regular Course superseded the educational experience itself. An officer lucky enough to be 
selected was deemed to have been successful professionally. Attendance at the Regular Course was 
seen as a reward for professional accomplishment, rather than a formative experience. Graduates were 
directed into assignments that would guarantee further professional opportunity. Field experience, not 
military education, became the standard for promotion.
11
 The Army‘s leadership sought to change 
that attitude. 
In the age of organizational effectiveness, the difficulties of CGSC merit examination.
12
 As 
explained earlier, the scope of the curriculum had broadened over the past decade, and subjects more 
in line with the War College‘s mission crept into the program. The influence of a new headquarters—
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 Understanding TRADOC‘s role in Army reform is necessary for establishing the context of CGSC‘s activities regarding officer education 
in the late seventies and throughout the eighties. The training focus of TRADOC‘s commander had a significant effect. 
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attendance being anticlimactic, the Council opined that such is no longer the case.‖ Donald B. Vought to Assistant Commandant, 
memorandum, ―Minutes of Faculty Council Meeting [20 February 1976],‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 March 1976, 3, Folder Faculty Council 
Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1976, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
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 The CAC Organizational Effectiveness Studies Office conducted an ―Organizational Scan‖ of CGSC in May 1985.  
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its commander a force majeure—significantly, but slowly, reshaped CGSC, even when its faculty and 
leaders would not admit change was occurring, or even needed.  
General William E. DePuy assumed command of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command on July 1, 1973. Not long after, General DePuy contacted the outgoing CGSC 
Commandant, Major General Hennessey, to express his belief that the Leavenworth curriculum 
should center on the division, with the remainder allocated to corps and brigade echelons.
13
 DePuy‘s 
directive generated immediate concern among the College faculty, and the Departments of Command 
and Strategy sparred repeatedly with the Department of Tactics over the wisdom of the guidance.
14
 
The next thirteen years saw a new tension between traditionalists, who believed the mission of the 
College should center on warfighting, and progressives, who valued the freedom and flexibility of the 
core-elective model. As had happened often in its history, the guidance given to or by one 
Commandant would fall upon another to implement. Major General John H. (Jack) Cushman 
followed Hennessey as Commandant; Cushman‘s arrival during a hot Kansas summer placed him in 
the middle of a firestorm.  
A number of historians have examined the critical period from 1973-1976 at Fort 
Leavenworth. The prevailing narrative, briefly summarized, holds that the relationship between 
TRADOC‘s new leadership and Fort Leavenworth was anything but cordial. Fundamental 
disagreements between the TRADOC and CAC commanders and staff over the role of doctrine, the 
inability of Fort Leavenworth‘s doctrine writers to produce draft doctrine acceptable to General 
DePuy, and a difference of opinion as to the balance of education against training, specifically 
CGSC‘s role in preparing officers for the future, led to a strain between the two organizations. To get 
by this obstacle, General DePuy formed a team at TRADOC headquarters to produce the new 
                                                     
13
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doctrine, which became known as the ―active defense.‖ As a result, Fort Leavenworth played a 
tangential role in the development of combined arms doctrine for the next several years until the 1982 
and 1986 versions of FM 100-5, Operations, when a small group of hand-picked officers crafted 
AirLand Battle doctrine. In this story, Fort Leavenworth‘s corporate contribution remains somewhat 
cloudy.  
From the very beginning, Major General Jack Cushman signaled his intent to bring change to 
the institution. The new Commandant opened the Regular Course in August 1973 with a nine-page, 
single-spaced address, which covered his ―blueprint‖ for the next thirty months.15 Major General 
Cushman had an image of what the Leavenworth experience ought to be, and, after a short period 
spent acquainting himself with the personalities of his command, he met with the department 
directors to outline his new vision for the course. He delivered his plan in September 1973. 




Given that the 1973-74 curriculum was already set, the Commandant for a time tinkered on 
the margins, introducing a voluntary ―Commandant‘s Requirement.‖ 17 Students who chose to 
participate read a short essay then responded in writing, sometimes limited to twenty-five words. 
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―The initial planning for AY 74-75 started when the Department of Resident instruction reorganized during the summer of 1972…. 
During June 1972, the Deputy Commandant, BG J.M. Gibson, gave verbal guidance to the Plans Officer, LTC Harlen O. Elliott, to develop 
a curriculum concept for AY 74-75 that would meet the overall aim contained in the plan for institutional development (CGSC 1975) dated 
4 October 1971. General Gibson also envisioned a curriculum that would allow a student to tailor his programs to gain in-depth knowledge 
of one or more of the traditional curriculum areas with all students receiving a working competence with the traditional Leavenworth 
curriculum…The first step taken by the curriculum planners was to answer the question ‗What qualifications did the Army expect the 
officer to acquire in CGSC in the AY 74-75?‘‖ The author continued, writing ―Several joint conferences were held at CGSC….It was 
determined from these conferences that the need would exist in the 1975-77 timeframe of providing individualized instruction for the 
student….This basic change acknowledged that all officers did not and would not have the same job assignments after graduation; therefore, 
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Major General Cushman took great interest in the responses, reading them before bringing together 
the respondents for a discussion. Cushman selected topics intended to make officers think. The 
subject of each requirement proved less important than the debate they generated over professional 
ethics. As Cushman recounted, officers found the questions ―troublesome material,‖ for the students 
had to grapple with issues of integrity—supposedly a hallmark of the profession, but a trait that all 
knew too many of their peers lacked.
18
 By the next year, the Commandant‘s Requirements had 
become a full-fledged course—Profession of Arms. Major General Cushman had been forthright in 
his guidance. Course 9 was one result. 
Developments under Major General Cushman, assisted by Brigadier General Ben Harrison, 
established the foundation for later evolution of the College. Several accomplishments stand out. First 
was the renewed emphasis on tactical instruction (even if it did not meet the standards of General 
DePuy). Second was the broad discussion Cushman encouraged about professional ethics. His direct 
involvement with student evaluation, which had suffered from grade inflation and lax standards for 
some time, established a new standard using subjective grading.
19
 He also introduced the case study 
method and small groups, while emphasizing the development of reason and judgment. Major 
General Cushman brought more civilian instructors into the classroom, including the Morrison 
Professor of Military History.
20
 Lastly, Major General Cushman was one of the last Commandants to 
enjoy a personal association with the students. Even he noted the growing reliance on his principal 
assistant, because of the new responsibilities thrust upon Leavenworth by TRADOC.
21
 Were the story 
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to end here, one would believe that Leavenworth simply transformed itself under the guidance of a 
strong leader. But the truth is far more complex. 
Understanding Major General Jack Cushman‘s time as CGSC‘s Commandant requires 
reconciliation of two widely different viewpoints. One account depicts him as visionary leader, who 
recognized the College‘s unfulfilled potential and sought to establish a new standard that capitalized 
on the institution‘s possibilities. Cushman, having served closely with Major General McGarr during 
a period of great change in the fifties, knew that any substantive alteration of Leavenworth‘s 
curriculum required firm direction from the top. Further, he knew the year-long teaching and 
development cycle governed the Leavenworth curriculum and, therefore, had some sense of the short 
time he would have to initiate sustainable reform. Further, no one could doubt the clarity of DePuy‘s 
guidance given to Hennessey, especially after the October 1973 War.
22
 On the other hand, faculty and 
department directors at CGSC viewed Cushman as autocratic or simply indifferent. What irritated the 
faculty was not necessarily his guidance for the subsequent year‘s course, which they could 
accommodate—and, if necessary, resist—within the existing system. The problem, from their 
perspective, was the constant adjustments, corrections, and interventions that began soon after Major 
General Cushman began to delve into the details of ongoing lessons. The intensity and interest the 
Commandant brought to their domain upset the existing balance of power between faculty and 
Commandant.
23
 No longer obedient to this style of leadership, the faculty resisted. Frustration grew 
between leader and led.
24
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mere observers?‖ D.B. Vought to Assistant Commandant, memorandum, ―Minutes of Faculty Council Meeting [28 January 1976],‖ Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS, 2 February 1976, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1976, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
24
 Doughty‘s portrayal of the College during this period is one of turmoil imposed by an autocratic leader. In the end, Major General 
Cushman‘s efforts paid off for the institution, but at the cost of his subordinates‘ goodwill. Doughty, CGSC, 106.  
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Simultaneously, the relationship between Fort Leavenworth and TRADOC unraveled. In the 
fall of 1973, TRADOC had directed CGSC to produce scenarios for a Middle East and European war. 
Presented at a TRADOC Commander‘s Conference in December 1973, General DePuy and other 
school commandants met the proposals with skepticism. DePuy began to watch Leavenworth more 
closely. In February 1974, he wrote the Commandant a very blunt letter. ―Frankly, Jack, I am 
concerned about the depth and the quality of work being done at Fort Leavenworth.‖ DePuy then 
proceeded to criticize the scenarios under development at Fort Leavenworth, especially the one 
concerned with the Middle East.
 25
 DePuy then indicated his preference for the work being done at 
Fort Knox by Major General Donn. A. Starry and his team. The TRADOC commander then turned 
his attention to the shallowness of the elective program, expressing particular concern:  
I am concerned that the electives which are being offered for the next school year may 
fall below the acceptable quality level. I say this hoping very much that I will be proved 
wrong. However, when I think about the difficulty in the tactical electives alone, it raises 
my level of concern. If they are not excellent they will be counter-productive and they 




DePuy committed to writing what a number of officers throughout the Army already thought. 
Leavenworth had lost its mystique. DePuy‘s concerns reflected a conflict between two intellects, but 
more fundamentally, the letter showed the depth and early origins of a disagreement between senior 
and subordinate. The difference disturbed Cushman, for he had an entirely different perspective of 
what Leavenworth should do for an officer‘s intellect. The ongoing struggle between education and 
training now crystallized into the professional difference of opinion between senior and subordinate. 
Major General Cushman summarized the difference as follows: ―General DePuy was determined to 
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 The scenarios to which DePuy referred were a European-based scenario employing a heavy corps and a Middle East scenario using a 
light corps. Most reproachful was DePuy‘s characterization of the employment of the 101st Airborne Division as ―unimaginative.‖ 
Cushman‘s previous assignment had been as the 101st division commander. William E. DePuy to John H. Cushman, Letter marked ―Eyes 
Only‖, Ft. Monroe, VA, 19 February 1974. Reproduced in Cushman, Annex E, vol. 2. 
26
 William E. DePuy to John H. Cushman, letter marked ―Eyes Only‖, Ft. Monroe, VA, 19 February 1974. Reproduced in Cushman, Annex 
E, vol. 2. The specific issue that DePuy raised dealt with a forty-hour elective on systems acquisition. DePuy did not believe the course 
would do more than skim the knowledge needed to produce a competent practitioner. 
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teach the Army in the field, and Leavenworth students, ‗how to fight.‘ I wanted to teach the students 
‗how to think about how to fight.‘‖27 
Cushman valued the military experience of the students, and he sought to incorporate it into 
the classroom. Students in the last of the wartime classes had accumulated many tours in Vietnam. In 
his second year of command, the class of 980 U.S. officers had 419 students with one tour, 510 had 
two tours, twenty-six had three tours, and three had four deployments to Vietnam.
28
 One way to bring 
out this expertise was to design learning activities that allowed more student participation. Cushman 
favored the case study method, employing smaller groups, and directed that lessons use this 
technique. On the other hand, faculty claimed to be the sole expert in the classroom. The resulting 
move to smaller groups for some classes, initiated in 1974-75, threatened the faculty‘s self-image. 
The result was discord between faculty and the leadership.
29
 
Outside, the quarrel between TRADOC and Leavenworth deepened. DePuy dispatched his 
deputy, Lieutenant General Talbott, and a team of eighteen TRADOC inspectors on a ―special 
mission‖ to survey the elective program in June, 1974.30 In its report, the team expressed concern 
about the structure of the program and freedom granted to students, but Talbott did not recommend 
cancelling any of the planned electives for AY 73-74.
31
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 Cushman acknowledges the fractious relationship between DePuy and himself in his memoir. Herbert, 51-59, recounted the disagreement 
between the ―DePuy school of doctrine‖ and the ―Cushman school.‖ 
28
 ―Army Student Experience, /5 Class,‖ reproduced in Cushman, Annex E, vol. 2. Surprisingly, twenty-two officers in the class had never 
served in Vietnam. 
29
 A draft article by Lieutenant Colonel Moss M. Ikeda described the change as follows: ―The College‘s thrust to have at least fifty per cent 
of instructor student contact time devoted to classroom discussion is a significant move. This change will demand a new breed of instructor. 
The instructor will no longer play the role of dispenser of information and ‗the‘ expert on the subject being taught. The new role of the 
instructor has become that of a director of learning who guides and motivates students in the process of learning.‖ Moss M. Ikeda, draft, 
―The Evolving, Dynamic Process of Education at the United States Army Command and General Staff College,‖, 31 July 1974, 7. 
Attachment to James K. Murphy to Operations Division, LTC Stockett, ―Input to College History, 17 January 1975, 4, Folder Director of 
Resident Instruction Historical Input, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Ivan Birrer noted that Major General Cushman was a 
proponent of the British syndicate system. Doughty, Birrer, 148. Doughty‘s history has a detailed discussion. Doughty, CGSC, 81-83. 
30
 Orwin C. Talbott to John H. Cushman, Fort Monroe, VA, 7 June 1974, Folder Correspondence (CGSC)-MG J.H. Cushman, Drawer 
1974, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA. 
31
 The team included Brigadier General Paul Gorman, the Deputy Chief of Training and Schools for TRADOC. The tension between 
TRADOC and CAC is evident in one College account of the meeting. ―The overall tenor of the visit was set by General Talbott in his 
opening remarks when he indicated the visit was not an inquisition, an AGI [Annual General Inspection] or anything like that.‖ The fact he 
had to make such a statement indicates the level of enmity between headquarters. Attachment to James K. Murphy to Operations Division, 
LTC Stockett, memorandum, ―Input to College History, 17 January 1975, 4, Folder Director of Resident Instruction Historical Input, 
Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. The team‘s official trip report listed fifteen items that required College attention. ―Trip Highlights,‖ 
attached to Orwin C. Talbott to John H. Cushman, Fort Monroe, VA, 7 June 1974, Folder Correspondence (CGSC)-MG J.H. Cushman, 
Drawer 1974, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA. 
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Planning for 1974-75 included a new three-term model. A sixteen-week term took place 
before Christmas, followed by two twelve-week terms.
32
 Elimination of the Associate Course came 
with an agreement to offer reserve component officers seats during the first term of the Regular 
Course. Over eighty reserve officers joined the Regular Course in the fall of 1975 (table 9).
33
  
Table 9. Students by Component, 1975-1978 
 Number of Students  Percentage 
Component 1975 1976 1977 1978  1975 1976 1977 1978 
Regular Army 895 890 767 757  91% 91% 89% 89% 
Extended Active Duty 77 82 83 89  8% 8% 10% 10% 
Active Duty for 
Training (RC) 
8 8 9 4 
 
1% 1% 1% 1% 
Source: William J. Weafer, Memorandum, Student Profile For /5, /6, /7, and /8 Regular Courses, Ft. Leavenworth, 5 August 
1977, Folder CGSC Mission, History, Statistics, Drawer 1979, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
 
Meanwhile, the disagreement over electives continued into the summer of 1974 and winter of 
1975, and it now involved the question of how the elective program would support the Army‘s new 
Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS).
34
 OPMS strengthened the relationship between 
CGSC and civilian higher education institutions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Director 
of Graduate Degree Programs managed not only the MMAS program but also associations with the 
University of Kansas, Kansas State University, University of Missouri-Kansas City, Wichita State 
University, and Florida Institute of Technology. By 1976, Dr. Birrer had taken over this 
responsibility. Some courses were taught as contract courses, but many were under the Cooperative 
Degree Program, which led to a master‘s degree.35 
The school adopted other practices of civilian universities. Seeing that the student needed 
some guidance navigating his way through the college catalog, CGSC added counseling to the 
faculty‘s duties in July 1974. Closely related, the College introduced ―majors,‖ which required that 
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 ―Inclosure 1‖ to Marshall Sanger to Secretary, DF, ―Feeder Input to College History,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 19 September 1974, Folder 
Historical Input 1974, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
33
 ―Commandant‘s Welcoming Remarks, Opening Exercises, Regular Course,‖ 11 August 1975, Folder Letters – HQ – Misc 75-76, CARL. 
The reserve officers stayed with the Regular Course students for all but two weeks of their course. 
34
 The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) was implemented in 1974. Each officer would have two specialties—one 
designated as a basic entry specialty and the second, alternate specialty designated at some point in the future. 
35
 CGSC, ―Student Handbook, 1981-82‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, June 1981, 7-2, CARL. By 1981, the program encompassed twelve 
disciplines ranging from history to logistics management. 
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the student declare a field in the first term, normally one aligned with their specialty or branch.
36
 
Adding more structure to the electives, grouping them into a series of concentrations, much like a 
major field in an undergraduate college, did nothing to parry TRADOC‘s probing criticism. 
TRADOC‘s Deputy Commanding General, Lieutenant General Talbott, wrote: ―The current 
method of packaging the electives into a major program does not appear to be the best solution to 
support OPMS.‖ Talbott then brought up the depth of the curriculum, asking the Commandant to 
reassess the number of map exercises, given that the curriculum only had one for the entire year.
37
 A 
second visit in April 1975 resulted in more direct censure. Lieutenant General Talbott‘s letter to 
Major General Cushman after the 8-10 April visit revealed that the TRADOC‘s view of Leavenworth 
as a problem had solidified. The criticism shifted from individual courses to a broad-based attack on 
the entire curriculum. According to Talbott, the grading program needed ―a major revision.‖ He 
singled out the elective program, never favored by General DePuy, as needing significant reform. In 
Talbott‘s view, the proliferation of electives led to lower quality, stretched the faculty, and expended 
unnecessary funds. He also questioned the use of small groups, saying that these were labor-intensive 
and ―inappropriate.‖ He questioned the strain on the tactics department, too. ―The members of this 
department should not be over-extended…,‖ warned Talbott.38 Lieutenant General Talbott suggested 
reducing electives and the use of small groups, but he left the details to the Commandant. 
The carte blanche granted by Lieutenant General Haines to Major General Hennessey and his 
subordinates resulted in wholesale restructuring of the curriculum. The freedom created by the new 
scheme decentralized planning and delivery of a substantial portion of the course, given that electives 
                                                     
36
 The underlying process was rather intensive, given that students had few ideas about the offerings other than catalog descriptions. In the 
1974-75 class, students met with their branch representatives the first week of school. A follow-up session between the student and the 
departments took place from 28 August to 13 September. Students met with their counselor and drafted an elective plan. This was then fed 
into a computer using punch cards to tally the student choices in October. Director of Resident Instruction, DF, ―Input to College History, 1 
July 1974 – 31 December 1974,‖ n.d., 6, Folder Historical Input 1974, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
37
 Talbott‘s principal objection was to the alignment of the majors along departmental lines, rather than the grouping by OPMS specialties. 
Talbott wrote that the program was too unstructured. Letting students choose six of their twelve electives left too much choice to the 
student. Orwin C. Talbott to John H. Cushman, Ft. Monroe, VA, 22 January 1975, Folder Correspondence (Service College Coordination) 
1974-75, Drawer 1975, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA. Talbott‘s remarks paralleled a trend in undergraduate education towards 
concentration. Rudolph, Curriculum, 248. 
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comprised forty percent of the curriculum.
39
 A positive example of the flexibility the new 
arrangement permitted was the development of an elective covering the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.
40
 
Faculty in some departments, notably the Department of Strategy, began to develop electives as a 
reflection of their personal interests. With new electives appearing almost weekly, the Commandant 
found it difficult to corral the faculty, and, as Frederick Rudolph had observed, electives could 
obfuscate an institution‘s purpose.  
Pressure from outside the College did not relent. In the fall of 1975, a Department of Defense 
Subcommittee on Excellence in Education, known as the Brehm committee, circulated the idea of a 
six-month CGSC. Cushman countered with a multi-page letter to General DePuy outlining the pros 
and cons of such a move, but he ended with an impassioned statement of the need to leave CGSC as a 
ten-month course.
41
 Next, TRADOC imposed the ―TRADOC School Model‖ on CGSC. The 
organizational scheme separated lesson development from instructor duties.
42
 The TRADOC School 
Model, an idea sponsored by Brigadier General Max Thurman, complemented Instructional Systems 
Design (ISD), another TRADOC mandate, which was a systematic, resource-based approach based 
upon job analysis. ISD proponents advocated that TRADOC schools, including CGSC, adopt a 
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 Orwin C. Talbott to John H. Cushman, Ft. Monroe, VA, 22 April 1975, Folder Correspondence (CGSC) - MG J.H. Cushman, Drawer 
1974, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA. Attached to this document is ―Trip Highlights, Command and General Staff College, 8-10 
April 1975.‖ Talbott had some reason to be concerned. 
39
 Electives proliferated in 1973-74. The course summary prepared for General Creighton Abrams‘ May 1974 visit listed sixty-five 
Professional Electives and forty-six Associate Electives. Electives by department: Command—10; Tactics—8, Logistics—4, and 
Strategy—29. Inclosures 7, 8, and 12, John C. Barrett to William J. Livsey, Letter, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d. [ca. April 1974], Folder 
Miscellaneous College History Documents from 1969 to 1974, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
40
 ―Lessons of the 1973 Middle East War‖ was one of four electives Major General Cushman added to the curriculum for the second half of 
the 1973-74 year. Additions included ―Nature and Characteristics of Ground Combat,‖ Code of Conduct,‖ and ―a model of an automated 
tactical operations center.‖ Attachment to Murphy memorandum, 10. Harrison memorandum, 3, contained remarks that indicate these were 
not spur-of-the-moment decisions. In September, Cushman stated, ―As I have noted, we should modify /4 if we can. We should consider the 
use of electives in /4 as a means of developing material that might be suitable for the common curriculum in /5.‖ Two areas he specifically 
mentioned were ―Computers as an Aid to Commanders, Staffs and Managers‖ and the ―Nature and Characteristics of Ground Combat.‖ 
Also DRI, memorandum, ―Development of an Elective on the YOM KIPPUR War,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 January 1974, Folder 
Director of Resident Instruction Historical Input, Drawer, 1974, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
41
 Thomas W. Carr to Commandant, Army Command and General Staff College, ―Memorandum for Record on Visit of Subcommittee on 
Excellence in Education to Fort Leavenworth and the Appointment of Executive Agents,‖ Washington, DC, 15 October 1975. W. Darryl 
Henderson, Memorandum for Record, ―Visit of the DoD Subcommittee on Excellence in Education to the Army Command and General 
Staff College, 29-30 September 1975,‖ 9 October 1975. Both in Folder Philosophy of Curriculum Content, Drawer 1975, Cabinet CGSC, 
CAFLA. The principal task of the subcommittee was how ―to achieve quality education through a reasonable and effective use of 
resources….‖Regarding the elective program, the subcommittee report ―expressed concern that the electives offered in support of OPMS 
seemed to be unusually diverse.‖ Henderson, 4. John H. Cushman to William E. DePuy, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 5 November 1975, Folder 
Correspondence (CGSC)-MG J.H. Cushman, Drawer 1974, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA and Folder Miscellaneous Materials-
1975-1978, Drawer 1978, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA. Doughty, Birrer, 164. 
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utilitarian approach, imparting the knowledge necessary to ―fight and win‖ and not much else. Both 
Major General Cushman and the Assistant Commandant, Ben Harrison, expended much effort to 
deflect and delay this latest directive.
43
 The College leadership found itself caught up in a 
bureaucratic snare. 
At the time, the initiatives were too much, too quickly. Faculty saw the changes as 
revolutionary, rather than an evolutionary improvement upon an already solid foundation. Many years 
later, Major General Cushman would agree that perhaps too much had occurred in too short a time 
span, although he would remain convinced of the appropriateness of the reforms. Tactic instruction 
did need updating; the profession ought to consider its nature; and grading should rest upon subjective 
judgment of a fellow, slightly more experienced, professional.
44
 Upon later reflection, a number of 
officers, and Ivan Birrer, came to respect what Cushman had instigated at Leavenworth, saying, ―On 
my personal scale of Commandants—the scale is in terms of personal effect over the long term—he 
stands with the top three. Perhaps twenty years from now, my successor will put him at the top. I 
wouldn‘t be surprised.‖45 
In the midst of doctrinal and organizational turmoil, students, supposedly the raison d’etre of 
the College, continued to leave Fort Leavenworth for a wide variety of post-graduation assignments. 
A 1976 analysis of five-year trends showed that less than twenty-five percent of the graduates went 
directly to tactical units (battalion through corps) as their first assignment. Fewer than eight percent 
went to a corps or division staff after graduation. First tours at joint and combined headquarters, the 
Department of the Army staff, and major commands, on the other hand, accounted for over forty 
percent of each graduating class. As a percentage of total assignments over a five-year period, 
battalion to corps assignments rose slightly to 27.8 percent. Roughly three-fourths of the composite 
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 Doughty, Birrer, 165. TRADOC Pamphlet 350-30, Interservice Procedures for Instructional Systems Development, all five volumes of 
it, implemented TRADOC‘s vision of training and education. 
43
 Doughty, Birrer, 164-172. 
44
 G.S. Meloy to Chief of Staff, United States Army, memorandum, ―Evaluation of CGSC Curriculum, Ft. Leavenworth, KS,‖ Washington, 
DC, 1 February 1982, 1, CARL. 
45
 Doughty, Birrer, 175. 
251 
 
graduates‘ time was spent in non-tactical assignments in the five years following graduation.46 Like 
their predecessors for the past thirty years, graduates left CGSC for a very large Army. 
The “Leavenworth Problem” 
In the summer of 1976, Major General John R. (Roy) Thurman inherited the dysfunctional 
relationship between CGSC and TRADOC. Senior officers had for some time (even prior to 
Cushman‘s arrival) referred to it as the ―Leavenworth Problem:‖ an ill-defined but quite real malady 
that had befallen the Army‘s senior tactical institution.47 No single document summarizes the myriad 
issues facing the College in the seventies. While Leavenworth‘s leaders and the faculty may have had 
some culpability, the problems at Fort Leavenworth were merely a symptom of an underlying cultural 
bias that had crept into the officer corps. The Army officer education system had a grave weakness, 
and it needed an overhaul. 
The adversarial relationship between the College and TRADOC headquarters accounted for 
part of the perception. There was, however, more substance to the argument than mere 
misunderstandings between divergent viewpoints. The compounding effect of a rigid approach, 
marginal faculty, and personal experience with ―the best year of their lives‖ had tainted several 
generations of officers, who now valued experience over education. Leavenworth did have 
problems—a number of them, and many stemmed from the resources allocated to Leavenworth‘s 
leaders to accomplish a host of tasks. Faculty quality and quantity topped the list of daily concerns for 
the College‘s leadership. No amount of vision and personal inspiration could compensate for a lack of 
competent faculty in sufficient quantity. 
The systematization of officer education continued. In 1977, TRADOC foisted another 
system upon CGSC: Criterion Referenced Instruction (CRI). CGSC had a structured approach to 
developing lessons; indeed, the concept of plan, prepare, execute, and assess had guided instructors‘ 
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 ―Assignment Profile, 1970-75 Grads, as of 1 July 1976,‖ inclosure to William E. Bartholdt to Deputy Commandant, ―Analysis of CGSC 
Graduates‘ Assignments,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 24 September 1976, Folder Miscellaneous Materials-1975-1978, Drawer 1978, Cabinet 
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 James L. Collins, Jr. to John H. Cushman, Washington, DC, 27 March 1974, Folder Correspondence (CGSC)-MG J.H. Cushman, 
Drawer 1974, Cabinet CAC/Ft. Leavenworth, CAFLA. 
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work in the past. CRI, a commercial approach, turned lesson and course development into a starched 
process. The imposition of CRI by TRADOC in 1977 created confusion throughout the faculty. 
Authors had to restructure every lesson to fit into CRI‘s system of terminal and enabling learning 
objectives. Ivan Birrer, who was soon to retire, looked on incredulously as the Training Management 
Institute‘s ―missionaries‖ converted the faculty and staff to the new system.48 Professor Archer Jones, 
the outgoing Morrison Chair, added his criticism to the faculty‘s widespread condemnation of CRI. 
The faculty split into two camps. One abhorred the concept. ―[T]his is a management nightmare….‖ 
The second group, a minority in fact, embraced it.‖ Little suggests that CRI helped instructors and 
course writers create a better learning environment for students. Regardless, the administration 
mandated following TRADOC‘s guidance, so the faculty set about rewriting every piece of lesson 
material to conform to the new structure.
49
 Within a few years, the College had faculty bulletins 
describing how to reconcile graduate education with tasks, conditions, and standards.
50
  
Meanwhile, faculty quality, as measured against professional norms, fell below the Army‘s 
average—and stayed there for a sustained period. This is not to infer that highly competent officers 
did not serve on the faculty, for there is ample evidence to the contrary.
51
 The 1970s faculty had an 
image of the ideal instructor, which rested on two principal features: outstanding military records and 
―a master‘s degree in an area directly related to the Staff College curriculum.‖52 In the classroom, a 
good instructor, entertained, prodded, and imparted. Once identified, the better officers in the College 
tended to be pulled up to staff positions in the College. The Army personnel system, and many of its 
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 Doughty, Birrer, 182-189. Ivan J. Birrer to Deputy Commandant, DF, ―Comments Regarding CRI Symposium,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 
12 July 1977, Folder Faculty Council Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1977, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
49
 Dr. Birrer remarked on the process and the negative outcomes, even going so far as to draft a counter-argument to TRADOC on 
Brigadier General Louisell‘s behalf. Birrer, 185. Minutes of Faculty Council Meeting [July 1977], 25 July 1977, 3, Folder Faculty Council 
Meeting Minutes, Drawer 1977, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. Robert Arter to Commandant, memorandum, ―Instructional Philosophy,‖ Ft. 
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 Gerald J. Carlson, memorandum, ―Learning Objective Standards,‖ n.d. [ca. May 1980] and CGSC, Faculty Bulletin, draft, ―Review and 
Approval of CGSC Evaluation Instruments,‖ n.d., Folder CGSC Miscellaneous: Commander‘s Updates, Drawer 1980, Cabinet CGSC, 
CAFLA. 
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 A number of talented officers, such as Hersch Chapman and Bill Stofft, taught at Fort Leavenworth. Decorated officers—Roger Donlon 
among them—served in the College, too. But officers of this competence and professional esteem were exceptions in a time of scarcity. 
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constituents, had a different view. Instructor promotions—one indicator of the service‘s judgment of 
relative standing—seemed to lag behind Army-wide rates.53 The College administration perceived a 
disparity, and the faculty themselves did, too. 
Recruiting faculty had to overcome years of accumulated disdain. Army officers had a poor 
image of CGSC duty, especially during the 1973-1984 period. One initiative the College attempted to 
solve the shortage was faculty tenure. The Army personnel chief denied the request but did indicate 
that extensions past the three-year mark might get approved. The Chairman of the Faculty Council, 
Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Vought, believed this to be counterproductive, stating ―we have always 
found it easy to retain those whom no one else wanted.‖ Vought continued his dire assessment of the 
College‘s position with regards to a quality faculty: 
A long tour at CGSC has never been career enhancing, now we cannot even legitimize it 
as a recognized activity. In all honesty, the question of ―quality‖ faculty is not only 
multifaceted (knowledge, ability to import [sic] it, etc.) but critical to CGSC‘s 
institutional integrity. We run the risk of degrading the faculty by shifting those people 
identified as ―exceptional‖ from teaching to functioning as staff action officers.54 
 
Word-of-mouth increased the problem of faculty recruitment. After the December 1976 Faculty 
Council meeting, Vought wrote, ―Our currently tumultuous image is having its effects on faculty 
recruitment (i.e., no one wants to join the faculty unless his alternatives are thoroughly 
undesirable).‖55 Faculty and the leadership hoped to improve the image of instructor duty, but they 
believed that ―CAC will achieve solution to the problem of having adequate numbers of quality 
officer personnel only when young officers throughout the Army recognize the opportunities and 
challenges that exist here.‖ Then writer added hopefully ―Quality will breed quality….‖56  
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 DTD to Commandant, Fact Sheet, ―Maximizing Faculty Expertise,‖ 17 November 1976, Folder DOD Committee on Excellence in 
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Outside experts sought to increase the voice of the faculty in governance. The North Central 
Association accrediting team expressed concern about lack of a representative faculty council during 
accreditation visit in 1975. Since World War Two, the College‘s faculty council had been comprised 
of department directors. The NCA recognized that the teaching faculty had no forum for governance, 
and the Association called this matter to the attention of the College‘s leadership.57 Other external 
reviews reinforced the role faculty expertise played in the mix between student, faculty, and 
knowledge A January 1978 comment by the CGSC Advisory Committee highlighted this 
relationship: 
In the judgment of the committee, it appears that the College‘s approach to education 
reflects an almost obsessive concern with system, methodology, and classroom 
geography. It should be remembered that the quality of the faculty remains the most 
crucial variable in any school program. Indeed, it is the faculty quality that is the real 




The committee‘s reasoning formed the argument for later requests to obtain officers approximating 
these standards. 
Recruiting faculty from within the student body, as one means to identify ―good‖ officers, 
continued in the late seventies. The task proved difficult, because the administrative procedures 
imposed by the College staff turned the process into a paper drill. In-class observation was supplanted 
by reviews of student qualification cards, given the administration‘s policy of requiring 
recommendations before the first term had finished. The Faculty Council, deeming the process 
illogical, requested an extension, since the policy resulted in ―the hasty submission of a specific 
minimum number of names to meet an administrative requirement, rather than identification of 
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specific officers whose personality, aptitude and knowledge indicate they would make good 
instructors.‖59 
By the summer of 1978, CGSC‘s leaders had an even stronger justification to request the 
Army send its best officers to teach. While he was TRADOC commander, General DePuy had 
lobbied for an Army-wide survey of the service‘s needs for officer training and education. The 
Army‘s Chief of Staff assented, and established the Officer Training and Education Review Group in 
August 1977, under Brigadier General (promotable) Ben Harrison‘s chairmanship. Harrison, 
Cushman‘s Deputy Commandant, released A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) 
in June of 1978.
60
 Similar in scale to the Haines Report, the comprehensive five-volume RETO study 
discussed every aspect of officer education. Some key findings concerning CGSC will be considered 
later, but the report reinforced the admonition of CGSC‘s Advisory Committee: 
The critical ingredient at USACGSC is the teaching faculty. No educational system, in 
the absence of good teachers, can insure a quality product. No student body can fully 
educate itself. Peer learning can reinforce, no replace, expert teaching. Not even an 
expertly designed course of instruction can overcome the absence of high quality faculty 




Unfortunately, not all of the Army‘s senior leaders were convinced of the need to staff Leavenworth 
with the best. A January 1979 briefing to TRADOC‘s Major General John Seigle highlighted the 
negative perception the Army had of CGSC. Brigadier General Robert Arter, the Deputy 
Commandant, reported to the Commandant that Major General Seigle had opened the session with 
two CGSC staff officers with the quip: ―he was not sure the quality is there [CGSC] and asked the 
rhetorical question of ‗Who‘s gotten promoted there?‘ from the CGSC staff.‖ Majors DeReu and Van 
Steenburg, the two CGSC representatives presenting the briefing, pressed him on this point, 
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highlighting the need for high-quality officers if the school was going to deliver a first-rate education. 
Seigle countered, saying, ―CGSC should do a better job of training officers rather than ‗educating 
them.‘‖62 
In addition to the expertise deficit, Fort Leavenworth‘s leaders had to cope with a severe 
shortage of officers, limiting the school‘s ability to carry out existing tasks, much less introduce new 
ideas or return to proven practices, namely small groups. The RETO report noted that from 1974-
1978 Leavenworth had lost approximately half of its faculty complement.
63
 This reduction led to 
larger classes, including the cessation of work group discussions.
64
 The faculty slipped back into old 
habits, as the ―flashy, instructor-centered lesson‖ once again became the norm. Their technique 
broadcast the learning points to the students, and the student was expected to ―pick up the important 
points.‖65 Workloads rose, and faculty morale fell. In October 1980, the personnel situation worsened. 
TRADOC conducted a manpower survey that recommended the elimination of seventy-seven spaces 
within CAC. The combat development (CACDA) and training development (CATRADA) activities 
gained spaces, but CGSC lost slots.
66
 CAC spread the losses among its headquarters, but the number 
of officers available to teach dipped yet again.  
The summer of 1982, while not too unfavorable from an accounting standpoint, looked very 
bad as a matter of practicality. During the summer rotation in June, CGSC had 179 of 223 authorized 
officers. The Deputy Commandant projected the loss of thirty-two more officers and sixty 
replacements. A new instructor still had to undergo faculty training, learn the material, and then 
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prepare to instruct. The late arrival of most replacements meant that the 1981-82 students would be 
instructed by experienced faculty two-thirds of the time, while one-third of the faculty would be see 
students, the classroom, and the lesson for the first time, simultaneously.
67
 
In 1982, the College‘s leadership began a sustained campaign designed to better the faculty 
situation. The Deputy Commandant, Major General Crosbie Saint, wrote his counterpart at the 
Army‘s personnel center, asking for his assistance in promoting CGSC as a career-enhancing 
assignment. ―It is my belief,‖ Saint observed, ―that we must have the very best officer available to 
perform the vital tasks necessary in developing and teaching the Army‘s future leaders doctrine and 
its application. Marginal or average doctrine/instructional developers do not train or educate superior 
performers for our Army.‖68 The Deputy Commandant personally selected twenty-five officers from 
the 1983 class to stay as instructors, repeating a pattern from decades past.
69
 
An opportunity to improve the personnel situation began when the Commandant, Lieutenant 
General Richardson, moved to the Pentagon to take an assignment as the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans, and, therefore, the Army‘s principal staff officer who oversaw TRADOC‘s 
functions. This placed him in a unique position, having witnessed firsthand the need for higher-
quality officers. He wrote Lieutenant General Maxwell R. Thurman, the Army‘s personnel chief, in 
April 1982 to ask for assistance in staffing the College with faculty of better quality (appendix 8).
70
 
Within the profession, quality had definable characteristics, hinted at by Richardson‘s letter. Four 
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basic criteria defined a top-notch field grade officer: selection for staff and senior service college 
attendance, military and civilian education level, selection and completion of command at the 
battalion and brigade, and selection for promotion the first time eligible. By those measures, 
Leavenworth and Army schools in general lagged behind other assignments. An analysis of lieutenant 
colonel promotion rates from 1981 showed school faculty and staff fell twelve percent behind the 
Army at large, although the two years before had been on par with average rates.
71
  
Meanwhile, Fort Leavenworth‘s leadership labored to accomplish their mission with the 
personnel at hand. Leaders grew frustrated, and their comments showed that they believed CGSC no 
longer was important to the Army. Major General Crosbie Saint, the Deputy Commandant, spoke 
frankly: ―I would say that Leavenworth‘s view of its importance and its true importance to the Army 
has significantly changed. (I‘m talking in terms of the last two years; nothing startling has happened 
within the last year.) Leavenworth‘s true importance and Leavenworth‘s view of its importance…but 
the Army has not seen that…You can tell how a commander feels by where he puts his money—the 
Army doesn‘t do it here. ROTC, recruiting, reserve components, and the initial entry training—that‘s 
TRADOC‘s preoccupation.‖72 Saint said, ―The quality isn‘t here. I have maybe 10 people I can give a 
job to.‖73 Brigadier General Saint would not see the positive effect of his efforts, but his successors 
benefitted from the work he did along with Lieutenant General Richardson. 
Lieutenant General Richardson‘s request seems to have resulted in a turnaround by 1984. The 
promotion board for lieutenant colonels selected twenty-six of thirty-one eligible majors in the 
primary zone of consideration, plus one officer selected from below the zone category. The eighty-
three percent rate topped the Army-wide average by 12.8 points. Still, instructor duty did not rank 
highly among officers, and the individual officer‘s perception of instructor duty at CGSC remained 
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one of the critical obstacles to recruiting a more-capable faculty. An interview with June 1984 
graduates of the Regular Course revealed that they believed there was a ―stigma attached to staying at 
CGSC to teach—students would fight [an] assignment.‖74  
Faculty quality, measured against the personnel system‘s standards, may have improved, but 
the quantity issue lingered. In 1984, personnel cutbacks forced departments to teach with fewer than 
half the number of officers their Table of Distribution and Allowances required. The Department of 
Tactics furnishes one extreme example. Organized into four committees—corps, division, threat, and 
doctrine—the department had 63.5 percent of its required personnel. The division and corps 
committees each had twenty-one of forty-one authorized officers. The department offset this gap with 
professional experience. All but two in the department had been to a staff college, over two-thirds had 
master‘s degrees, and all had staff experience. The chiefs of the division, corps, and doctrine 
committees had commanded battalions and were slated to attend, or had attended, a senior service 
college. Officers in the department worked hard, though, to meet the incessant demands of the 
academic calendar. Instructors were the bare majority in the department of sixty-eight officers. The 
remainder wrote doctrine, worked on special studies (the AirLand Battle Study Group for example), 
or tended to administrative tasks.
75
  
Military faculty now shared the classroom with civilian professors, who had increased 
significantly since 1967. By 1975, Dr. Birrer no longer was the lone civilian professor on the faculty. 
The addition of electives brought more civilian instructors to CGSC classrooms, but these professors 
had not been part of the permanent faculty. Dr. Philip J. Brookes had joined the Department of 
Command faculty on July 1, 1975, although he had enjoyed a close association with the College since 
1967 as part of the University of Kansas‘ support to the elective program. Two other civilians, Drs. 
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L.L. Sims and J.R. Goldman, served in the tactics and strategy departments, respectively. The 
creation of the Combat Studies Institute in 1979, discussed later, added full-time civilian faculty to 
the College. Ten professional historians were part of CSI in 1986. A smaller number of civilians, 
including Dr. Brookes, who had succeeded Dr. Birrer as the graduate program director in 1978, 
staffed other College departments.
76
 The presence of civilians, few of whom had any prior military 
service, denotes a striking departure from past patterns of professional education at CGSC. 
When they were not teaching, instructors wrote lessons using the five-phase Accountable 
Instruction System (AIS) (an outgrowth of Instructional System Design), and they followed a fifteen-
step course development process (appendix 9). Part of the over-engineered approach to instructional 
development imposed by TRADOC in the late seventies, lesson authors followed over 200 pages of 
detailed instructions contained the 1980 Author’s Handbook draft. The details focused on task 
analysis, treating graduate education as no more complicated than teaching someone to repair 
automobile engines. Its guidance included how to dissect complex topics as staff operations for 
tactical missions. The handbook suggested that an appropriate list might include: 
Staff estimates 
Tactical nuclear targeting package 
Mission analysis 
Mission statement 
Course of action can best be supported with personnel, logistics, or command and control 
Rear area protection plan 
Concept of the operation 
Course of action to accomplish the mission 
Required changes to OPORD [operations order] during battle 
Select most expedient mode of transmission 
Tactical plan 
Tactical movement plan 
Warning order 
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Applying Cartesian principles to warfare, the lesson author reduced the complexities of combat to 
mechanical formulae, and they created lessons accordingly.
77
 In such an environment, overworked 
instructors had little patience for new ideas from the top. 
Teaching Tactics 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the core of the Leavenworth curriculum at one time 
was fire and maneuver. In that ―simpler‖ time, a student immersed themselves in the study of 
operations of the Army in the field. The curriculum since the early sixties had most certainly moved 
away from that knowledge as the sole focus of the course. Even the term ―course‖ had become a 
misnomer, for the Regular Course had expanded to a variety of courses, some having little to do with 
an army at war. Major General Cushman had attempted qualitative upgrades to the tactical 
curriculum, but progress was difficult.
78
 Colonel Bill Louisell, director of the tactics department, 




Changes in the tactics department spilled over to the rest of the College. The tension between 
departmental perspectives and what was viewed as retrenchment in the curriculum spilled over into 
the Faculty Council. Faculty members argued that peacetime skills needed as much emphasis as did 
those required for combat. As they became more familiar with the active defense doctrine and the 
new FM 100-5, officers reacted negatively to the 1976 manual and guidance to re-emphasize 
operations. ―The emphasis on combat skills is really a holdover from training a mobilization Army,‖ 
recorded on participant at the February 6, 1977 council meeting. Sometimes comments bordered on 
the illogical. ―We emphasize ‗win the first battle‘ but spend too much time on the combat aspects of 
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battle.‖80 The Army‘s senior leaders had a different view of the matter of tactical proficiency. ―There 
are very few Majors and Lieutenant Colonels running around in the Army today‖ wrote Brigadier 
General Paul F. Gorman in 1978, ―who have much more than a kindergarten idea of how to put 
together all combat power to insure that every dollar invested gets three dollars back.‖81 Gorman was 
not alone in his criticism. 
Sixty-eight percent of the graduates of the 1981 Regular Course responded to a CGSC survey 
about post-graduation assignments. Slightly over thirty percent went to joint, combined, Army, or 
major command staffs. Tactical units gained 29.2 percent of the graduates, and 139 respondents, 
about twenty-eight percent, went to training assignments, such as service school instructor, ROTC, 
Recruiting Command, or further schooling. The wide range of post-College assignments strengthened 
the argument for a broad curriculum, but Army leaders began to question the wisdom of such an 
approach to officer education.
82
 
A genuine concern regarding the Army officer‘s ability to plan and conduct tactical 
operations surfaced in the late seventies and early eighties. From the perspective of a tactical 
commander, ―Leavenworth had become an orientation course for majors, with emphasis on 
humanities, political and social sciences. The major could graduate from Leavenworth without having 
read a single ‗hard‘ book, professional or otherwise.‖83 Christopher Bassford‘s The Spit-Shine 
Syndrome detailed the many failures of the modern military officer in performing his duties.
84
 
Bassford, looking back at the post-war military, claimed that officers lacked the ability to carry out 
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their basic functions, and the military possessed none of the skill of its immediate predecessor.
85
 
―Today‘s army was born in the 1950s, and in the process the older, genuinely military tradition was 
obliterated.‖86 Another wider issue was the preparation of officers to serve as planners in high-level 
staffs. A Strategic Studies Institute report, ―Operation Planning: An Analysis of the Education and 
Development of Effective Army Planners,‖ raised more questions about professional competence and 
whether the Army as a service had the ability to develop officers capable of performing duties in 
operational headquarters.
87
 Notwithstanding the emerging interest in operational art, the Army, and 
other services, had lost the ability to plan contingency operations on a large scale. As more and more 
Army leaders had come to appreciate since Vietnam, the profession had lost more than a war. 
The effects of the 1976 doctrine can be seen in a major change in the College‘s mission, 
which was publicized in revised curriculum guidance for the 1978-79 course. Issued on January 20, 
1978, the new mission statement reflected the belief that CGSC should produce battalion 
commanders. In stark contrast to the post-war mission statement, the College was now expected to 
―prepare graduates to…command battalions, brigades, and equivalent-sized units in peace or war.‖ 
The directive added the educational requirement to prepare officers to ―serve as principal staff 
officers from brigade through division, to include support commands, and as staff officers of higher 
echelons, including major Army, joint, unified or combined headquarters, major Army installations 
and agencies.‖88 For an institution that had previously experienced difficulty teaching division and 
higher operations, the lowering of focus to the brigade and battalion added an extraordinary burden. 
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At CGSC, the lack of stable, understood, and accepted doctrine contributed to an interregnum 
in which the Department of Tactics could do little more than delay. The curriculum development 
cycle hampered the ability to adapt to the new ―how-to-fight‖ doctrine. In October 1980, Colonel 
Clyde J. Tate, director of the tactics department, wrote Lieutenant General Richardson about the 
widespread confusion over Active Defense doctrine. Tate wrote, ―I don‘t believe that the solution is 
to issue fresh circulars, pamphlets, or executive summaries to the field. Such efforts might be viewed 
as edicts from the Ivory Tower which compound confusion rather than dispelling it.‖ Colonel Tate 
believed that the best option was ―to let the process of doctrinal development take its course while 
continuing to train our people according to published doctrine.‖89 This meant waiting until the 1982 
version of FM 100-5 was published before further changes would take place. 
An unexpected consequence of the Instructional Systems Design model contributed to the 
deferral. The separation of doctrine development from the teaching of doctrine—the division of 
research from the teachers—created a situation in which ―the instructors were very shallow,‖ since 
―they did not know the reasons behind the words that were in the doctrine, nor the reasons, the 
theories, the tradeoffs, the arguments, or how certain words were arrived at in doctrine.‖90 
In the course of revising tactical instruction, the College faculty nearly succeeded in 
extirpating low intensity conflict, small wars, internal defense, and counterinsurgency from the 
curriculum by 1980. Low intensity conflict instruction for the 1981-82 course fell to a mere eight 
hours. Security assistance operations lessons in 1980-81 claimed forty-six hours to, including 
scenarios in Thailand, Africa, and Latin America.
91
 The original guidance for the /2 [1981-82] 
Regular Course cut the subsequent year‘s lessons to four one-hour topics (an introduction, 
insurgency, internal defense and development strategy, and security forces) and two two-hour lessons 
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(terrorism and security assistance). Colonel Tate‘s counter-proposal in March 1981 would have added 
hours to the lessons plus hours for an application exercise, which were not part of the plan, and two 
case studies. Department directors refused to give up any of their allocated hours to increase the 
coverage, so it remained at its lowest point since the early sixties.
92
 By the 1983-84 Regular Course, 
LIC instruction increased from sixteen to twenty-three hours (table 10).
93
 
The subject of tactical expertise continued to simmer. Following a division commander‘s 
conference in December 1981, the TRADOC commander, General Glenn K. Otis, sent a message to 
the CAC commander asking for ideas of how to identify and cultivate ―selected tacticians for 
battalion level command.‖94 Lieutenant General Howard F. Stone‘s March 1982 response did little 
more than deflect the idea, saying that the ―Army requires a much broader base of tactically 
competent officer than those few ultimately selected for battalion and higher command.‖ In Stone‘s 
view, selecting tactically competent officers was the function of personnel selection boards.
95
 The 
College did institute a Master Tactician Program ―to identify and recognize tactical excellence 
displayed by students during their academic year….‖96  
The year AirLand Battle doctrine was released, Colonel Tate wrote the Director of Academic 
Operations, Colonel Sidney L. Linver, to express concern over the proposed shift of some tactical 
instruction to programmed texts and self-study. Tate observed, ―The rest of the army is saying we 
need to get back to the fundamentals, ‗stress the basics,‘ and we at CGSC continue to reduce the 
fundamentals. Are we at cross purposes?‖97 Tate thought some of the non-military instruction could 
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be reduced. Linver‘s reply signaled agreement but conceded it would take time before substantive 
change could occur. ―I am in wholehearted agreement with your comment recommending that ‗we 
reduce core hours in the soft subjects that have little relevance to teaching Army officers how we 
fight.‘ It would greatly assist in the planning for /4 if you would be more definitive in your 
recommendation for those hours of soft subjects which should, in your opinion, be eliminated.‖ 
Linver continued, ―Since /4 and /5 will largely center on combat operations in the division, corps and 
echelon above the corps, it is imperative that the College get your best judgment with respect to the 
instruction in this critical area. Clyde, I sorely need your attention to this far ranging policy matter.‖98 
Embedded in Linver‘s reply is the admission that the doctrine of AirLand Battle would not be fully 
implemented in the upcoming course. The work of improving tactical instruction would wait another 
year. 
In January 1984, the Department of Tactics reorganized into a corps and division committee. 
Previously, the department had an offense and a defense committee. Faculty adapted to their new 
configuration as they prepared to teach AirLand Battle.
99
 A message later that year from Robert W. 
Garrott, Jr., CGSC‘s Department of Tactics director, showed what had been accomplished and just 
how much work remained to be done. The origins of his message, entitled ―Tactical Training at 
CGSC,‖ remain obscure, but in quoting a conversation on the topic of tactical instruction, Garrott 
highlighted the slow pace of change: 
I am concerned that tactical teaching and application in TRADOC schools are falling 
short of our goal of developing competent and confident tacticians to become the Army‘s 
future battalion commanders. Tactical mastery requires stimulating instruction and 
rigorous intellectual application, yet my sensing is that tactical teaching is mostly 
pedestrian and students‘ thinking is largely rote. Thus, there is a tactical void that will not 
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be corrected without a powerful effort on the part of CGSC and branch schools alike to 




Garrott‘s message revealed that only in the past year had students engaged in division tactical 
exercises in which they had to make tactical decisions. The 1985 lesson on division operations 
(P316), largely a result of Lieutenant Colonel William D. Meier‘s efforts, had the students both plan 
and execute a division offensive operation. This was a major shift, as previous tactical instruction had 
ended with planning. Meier later said, ―It worked so well in October of ‘85 that after it was repeated 
in December ‘85 its methodology was adopted and transposed to elements of various pre-command 
courses and to the tactical seminar as well as throughout the Department of Tactics.‖101 Officers had 
few, if any, opportunities to test their concepts against a thinking opponent. Garrott also pointed out 
that there was no equivalent applicatory exercise at the corps level.
102
 
One last development merits mention before proceeding to other aspects of the College‘s 
evolution. During this period, a broader view of large unit operations, one more consonant with the 
historical experience of armies, began to take shape. Logistics, long separated from the College‘s 
lessons on tactical operations, began to show up more frequently in the faculty‘s and leader‘s 
discussions. The faculty began to look at the idea that ―logisticians must be tacticians, and vice 
versa,‖ as retired Lieutenant General Galvin wrote in December 1983.103  
The lingering question of purpose and audience led Captain Raymond Drummond of the 
College staff to believe he had found an inconsistency between the Army‘s newfound interest in 
tactical operations and the composition of the class. Drummond calculated that combat arms officers 
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comprised a smaller proportion of the student body. The 1980 class had 178 infantry officers, but had 
declined to 150 by the 1984 class. Artillerymen had dropped, too, from 104 to seventy-five. Much of 
the decrease could be attributed to the smaller class size, but even then, combat arms officers fell 




During 1982-85, the College curriculum used a planning figure of 1,624 hours. As shown in 
table 10, core academic hours ranged from 670 to 796. Added to this load was 240 hours for 
Individual Development Courses, as electives had come to be known, and hours for guest speakers, 
COMPS, counseling, fitness, and physical training. Individual study hours accounted for thirty-four 
percent of the course in 1981-82 but decreased steadily to twenty-seven percent of the course by 
1985. Tactics, it should be noted, shrank to less than 150 hours (table 10).
105
 
Table 10. Distribution of Core Course Hours, AY 82-85 
Course 
Number 
Course Title AY81-82 AY82-83 AY83-84 AY84-85 
1 Staff Operations 117 127 113 76 
2 
Planning, Programming, and 
Integrating the Force 
60 60 55 56 
3 Tactics 170 161 160 149 
4 Logistics 34 67 55 63 
5 
Regional Assessments and 
Planning 
55 59 59 61 
6 Applied Military History 36 40 64 66 
7 
Joint Combined Planning and 
Operations 
71 76 63 69 
8 College Exercises 24 112   
 Low Intensity Conflict 8 16 23 30 
9 Profession of Arms 103 94 62 62 
— College Exercises   92 112 
Total  670 796 746 744 
Source: CGSC, Briefing, Comparison of AY 82-85 Curriculum, 6 January 1984. 
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It is not difficult to see why some might question whether Leavenworth was doing enough to create 
competent tacticians. 
If there remained any doubt as to the direction the former Commandant, now TRADOC 
commander, intended the College to move, General Richardson‘s remarks to the Department of 
Tactics on October 28, 1985 dispelled them. ―Warfighting is the core of our profession, Unless 
Leavenworth builds warfighting competence, we don‘t stand a chance of executing our doctrine and 
winning the next war.‖ Richardson then laid out his expectations: ―All departments at CGSC are 
important, but DTAC sets the tone.‖ This meant that instructors ―can‘t approach responsibilities with 
an attitude of business as usual, can‘t be satisfied staying one jump ahead of the student,‖ and the 
instructor ―can‘t be reduced to acting as a transmitter of canned material.‖106 Knowing the propensity 
to interpret platitudes to mean something else, Richardson did not leave to the instructors‘ 
imagination what he expected. ―This is what I want,‖ the general continued: 
o Instructors who are authorities rather than mechanics—who teach students how 
to think, not what to think and what to do. 
 
o A balance in the instruction that covers the entire spectrum of warfighting but 
emphasizes the principles of AirLand Battle through a focus on the execution of 
division tactical operations. 
 
o An emphasis on the quality of student thinking and a halt on mechanical 
approaches to instruction that reduce learning to techniques and formula. 
 
o Instruction focused at the student who is prepared to profit from attendance. 
 
o In short, I want less form and more content—an emphasis on product rather than 
process. 
 
o DTAC instructors set the tactical standards for the Army. If it is not done here, it 
won‘t be done. 
 
General Richardson closed with one final observation, ―What you are trying to accomplish is 
not measured on exams but is the foundation of warfighting competence for the Army.‖107 Five 
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months later, the revival of tactics in the CGSC curriculum led to the re-designation of the 
Department of Tactics as the Center for Army Tactics.
108
 The new name reflected an increasingly 
positive atmosphere among the faculty and leadership within the College. Tactics was not the only 
subject taught at Fort Leavenworth, however. Military history and the operational level of war had 
flourished. A newfound interest in studying professional knowledge led to the establishment of new 
organizations. Major General Palmer noted this in 1985, as he closed out his tour as Deputy 
Commandant. ―There has been a renaissance in the way we think about our business—warfighting—
and that thinking is centered in and around Bell Hall on the banks of the Missouri.‖109 All that 
remained was to convince the faculty and students this was indeed the case.    
The “Leavenworth „B‟” 
In 1973, student evaluation at Leavenworth bore little relation to student achievement. Grade 
inflation had pushed the preponderance of grades into the upper reaches. In Major General 
Cushman‘s assessment, this was wholly unsatisfactory. For AY 74-75, he imposed a cap of twenty 
percent on ―A‖s.110 Paradoxically, this measure decreased student motivation. Instead of striving for 
excellence, students had little incentive to put effort into their studies, since the chances of failing 
were miniscule. Over time, the term ―Leavenworth B‖ became synonymous with half-hearted effort.  
Major General Cushman‘s edict, while seemingly draconian, simply highlighted that the 
standards in the College had slipped. Evaluation meant little. If all students were doing that well, 
perhaps the wrong measures were being applied, or the tests were too easy. Regardless, the symptoms 
called for an evaluation of the evaluation program. 
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In December 1973, Major General Cushman announced more adjustments. In the time since 
Major General Johnson had done away with exam weeks, the College had resumed dedicating a week 
for examinations. This was going to change. The Commandant directed that common curriculum 
would no longer be evaluated during an examination week, scheduled in January. He introduced 
subjective grading to the College. Instead, ―a method of more continuous and subjective evaluation‖ 
was to be employed, using a variety of techniques: ―formal oral presentations, informal oral 
presentations, classroom contributions, written homework assignments, research products, book 
reports, quizzes and examinations. Course grades could not be derived solely from an end-of-course 
examination.‖111 
Evaluation standards collapsed. Four Regular Course officers failed to graduate in June 1974 
for academic deficiencies. In the next five classes, no Regular Course officers failed.
112
 ―The 
perceived decline was attributed to an increase in subjective evaluation. Some members asserted that 
―we now have problems in this area because we often teach from ephemeral sources reflecting new 
doctrine and, lacking definitive sources, cannot require specific student responses.‖113 Between 1981 
and 1983, five U.S. officers failed to complete the course—three active and two reservists. The 
reasons for failure shifted significantly, however. The scales kept more officers from graduating than 
did any inability to learn. Two were declared non-graduates for academic or ethical reasons, and three 
were dismissed for failing to meet the Army‘s height and weight standards.114 Officers kept Academic 
Boards busy during the 1982-83 course, however. The Board met four times during the year to 
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consider academic deficiencies of twenty-six officers.
115
 Despite the relative ease of the course, 
academic ethics slipped. Cheating among students drew increased notice.
116
 An Academic Board 
dismissed one officer involved in a 1983 cheating incident on a staff communications assignment.
117
 
U.S. students were not the only ones singled out for reproach; the Board placed four Allied officer 
placed on academic probation in the winter and spring of 1983. Overall, the ―Leavenworth B,‖ and its 
close relative, the ―Leavenworth A,‖ supplanted the ―school solution‖ as the standard for 
achievement. 
The College staff proposed an evaluation system of credit or no-credit in March 1979.The 
Faculty Council recorded its concern during its May 3, 1979 meeting. During an extensive discussion, 
the nine members expressed their collective frustration at the evaluation program. ―We appear to be 
moving at a rapid rate away from the stringent evaluation of our officers that has allowed 
identification of officers clearly superior in performance and intellectual capability, an identification 
process that has served the Army well.‖ In the faculty‘s view, Leavenworth‘s grading policy should 
encourage a ―competitive environment‖ creating ―the stimulus for eager and active participation in 
the learning process.‖ They warned that continuing present practices would taint the faculty‘s view of 
their role, leading to further decline as faculty would begin to accept average work as superior. ―[T]he 
Council feels that the issue of the quality and credibility of the CGSC educational experience as 
perceived by other military and civilian agencies must be considered.‖118 The perceived impertinence 
of the faculty infuriated the Director of Education and Curriculum Affairs. In a hotly-worded rebuttal, 
Colonel Warne D. Mead lashed out at the ―mis-information‖ and ―lack of knowledge‖ displayed in 
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the Council‘s minutes saying the members were ―totally unaware‖ of the written guidance ―approved 
by all the Department Directors and the Deputy Commandant.‖ In Mead‘s view, the proposed policy 
had none of the negative qualities mentioned by the Faculty Council, and, in fact, had remedies for 
every single objection raised.
119
 Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Gregor, in turn, fired back: 
As Director, DECA, you are satisfied that such evaluation will have certain required 
characteristics. The ‗policy‘ says so. This is your ‗reality.‘ The instructor, however, has 
another reality….He observes that the evaluation process in credit/no credit courses can 
become nominal at best. The evaluation process is watered-down, reduced, and becomes 
a perfunctory exercise that wastes time and reduces the learning levels originally 
intended….It is the reality the Council feels it must reflect and convey if it is to continue 




The faculty felt that the school‘s senior leadership did not support them, even when the faculty 
attempted to impose uphold academic standards in the classroom. The Deputy Commandant took 
notice. Gregor, chairman of the Faculty Council, wrote the Deputy Commandant after his address to 
the faculty in July 1979. Gregor said, ―the specific issue involved is support of faculty 
recommendations to relieve officers from the Regular Course for academic failure.‖ He continued, 
saying ―The feeling that no officer will fail the College prevails, reinforcing the ‗Leavenworth B‘ 
syndrome on the part of students, encouraging academic lethargy.‖121  
Grades rose perceptibly in the 1980s, in some instances reaching nearly ninety-nine percent 
of the students rated above average and superior. As one example, the grades for P455, a core course 
in the Department of Sustainment and Research Operations, showed only eight officers rated as 
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average, and a single failure (table 11). While civilian graduate schools commonly require 
maintenance of a B average, the proportion of As in the class indicates a return to leniency. 
Table 11. Overall final grades P455 in AY86 
  Student Divisions  Total 
Grade  A B C D  Number Percentage 
A  144 133 181 178  636 85.59 
B  14 28 31 25  98 13.19 
C  3 3 1 1  8 1.01 
U  0 1 0 0  1 0.21 
         Total  161 165 213 204  743 100.00 
Source: P455/AY86 PIC, Folder Post-Instructional Conferences, DSRO-004, CGSC 86, CAFLA. 
 
The College as a whole fared no better. The cumulative grades for all Term 1 courses in the 
subsequent year‘s course showed ninety-six percent of the students granted above average and 
superior marks, although the grades were more evenly distributed between As and Bs.
122
 
Mediocrity, fueled by grade inflation and intellectual torpor, became commonplace. Students 
had little fear of failing the course, and they did not feel challenged by the material, going so far as to 
state that the 1980 ―course is not graduate level‖ in their end-of-course reviews.123 The course simply 
was not challenging them to think, and officers did not need grades to tell them so. 
The level at which instruction should start lingered as a significant question, and one that had 
many answers, depending on whom one asked. From the instructor‘s perspective, the diversity of the 
class mandated that basic material be taught and tested first. From the advanced students‘ perspective, 
instruction on fundamentals was a waste of valuable time, leaving untouched the more complex 
subjects they thought they had come to Leavenworth to learn. In their opinion, they knew the basics 
and were ready for graduate-level courses.
124
 
On the other hand, the results of pre-course testing instituted in 1977 and 1978 told a different 
story (appendix 11). Similar to the inventory tests of the late 1940s, CGSC‘s Deputy Commandant 
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added an Inventory Examination as a prerequisite for Regular Course students.
125
 The exam tested 
comprehension in seven areas, including military subjects like tactics and strategy and subjects like 
history, management, and geography. In the 1977-78 course, the cumulative average across the 
College was 59.8 percent; the next year‘s class scored 0.4 percent better. The results were not 
attributable to the diversity of the class, either. In the 1978 class, combat arms officers averaged 63.0 
percent on the tactics section, while the lawyers, dentists, and doctors in the class achieved 54.1 




The AY 82-83 entrance results did not show much improvement. In fact, they showed a slight 
decline in officer general knowledge. A message sent to TRADOC reported, ―Test results in AY 
82/83 showed that only 123 (19%) of 648 students achieved 50%, 19 (3%) of 648 students achieved 
60%, and not a single student achieved a 70% score on the baseline survey.‖127 It was clear that 
officers, very busy in their pre-enrollment assignments, had little time to keep themselves current on 
preparatory material. 
As one means to impart fundamental knowledge, the College developed the Combat Skills 
Comprehensive Phase (COMPS) consisting of two parts: non-resident and resident. About five 
months before the course started, the school sent extension course materials to officers who could 
voluntarily study the books prior to arrival at CGSC. During COMPS Week (part of the academic 
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year), officers studied self-paced lessons and then took a post-test. Students deemed ―marginal‖ or 
―not competent‖ were offered remedial training, later known as ―Bonehead Tactics.‖128 
Despite the effort invested in creating COMPS, faculty continued to re-teach the material in 
the classroom, rather than using it as a foundation for advanced instruction. ―An abiding problem of 
the CGSC core curriculum has been its remedial character. A great deal of the core curriculum is 
devoted to providing basic factual information required of our students before substantive military 
education can be conducted.‖129 Students, faced with a lecture on material already studied, did a 
―mind dump‖ or became ―frustrated.‖ The Chief of the Division Operations Committee in DTAC 
made no apologies for demanding students learn the basics on their own time. 
In a graduate school classroom, if you displayed ignorance of a fundamental concept, the 
instructor did not stop, take you back to your undergraduate (or some enabling course) 
learning, and reteach that concept. He told you that you needed to spend some extra time 
studying that which you should already have learned and that he would not take valuable 
class time to go over fundamental material. We have to move in that direction….If we 





Faculty contributed to the motivation problem by unprofessional conduct. Surveys of the 
1979 and 1980 classes revealed the nature of CGSC from a students‘ perspective. The College treated 
student-officers as if they had set aside their ―self-discipline, curiosity, intellect, and sense of 
responsibility‖ the day they reported to class.131 Students saw their relationship with instructors as 
adversarial; some faculty ruled by threats or intimidation from the platform, insulting students or 
other departments during presentations. Field grade officers, treated as unruly, petulant children, took 
on the mantle, stacked arms, and waited for graduation. 
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Faculty lowered their own credibility, too. Students quickly sensed whether an instructor was 
prepared for the day‘s class or simply unmotivated to teach. Subjective comments from the Class of 
1980 rated the quality of instructors as ―mediocre‖ or ―poor,‖ questioning whether teachers were 
screened. Instructors who remarked, ―I don‘t like the class either; I just teach it,‖ and ―I‘m sorry this 
will be boring, but I‘m not the author‖ quickly lowered the class‘ expectations. Students learned soon 
after the academic year started that doing homework was fruitless, since the instructor would often 
present the homework during the lesson. In very few instances, students were asked to actively 
participate, and when they did, it was usually upon receipt of a ―Blue Goose.‖ In such cases, the 
officer received a packet of blue papers, a requirement to perform, and not much guidance beyond 
what was printed. Only 4.4 percent of the 1979-80 students rated the quality of instruction as 
excellent. 36.6 percent thought it good, while 44.9 percent believed it ―adequate.‖ On the other hand, 
approximately sixty percent of the class thought the year had prepared them for their next 
assignment.
132
 In total, the Regular Course officer hardly saw this as the ―best year of their lives.‖133 
Sustaining motivation in the classroom drew the Deputy Commandant‘s attention. Shortly 
after the start of classes in August 1980, Brigadier General Robert H. Forman expressed his concern 
about some instructors‘ attitudes in the classroom.134 He wrote all of the department directors, ―I‘m 
already receiving feedback that some of our instructors are introducing their subjects with ‗this isn‘t 
testable‖. The signal there somehow is, it isn‘t important….Let‘s get it stopped.‖135 
The College did attempt to reward the highly-competent student. The Master Tactician 
Program, mentioned earlier, the Marshall Award, the Pershing Award, and the Eisenhower Award 
recognized academic achievement. As a further incentive, the school offered the option to ―test out‖ 
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of fundamentals courses. A student who chose to challenge a subject could take a subject exam; those 
who achieved eighty percent or better got credit for the course. Of the 1982-83 class, forty-seven 
students attempted in one or more Term 1 courses; nineteen passed.
136
 The entry-level of the officers 
was less than they themselves supposed but that factor only partially explains the dynamic of student, 
knowledge, and faculty. The school‘s leadership pondered their options. 
By Extension 
Major General Harrison‘s RETO study addressed a systemic issue that had affected the 
Army‘s officer education system since World War Two. For approximately half of the Army‘s active 
officers, attendance at a branch advanced course was their last formal professional education. Any 
further development took place during subsequent assignments. True, they could enroll in the staff 
officer‘s course through correspondence or the USAR school system, but as will be shown, these two 
paths became increasingly disconnected from the College‘s curriculum, much less the Army‘s new 
environment. 
Non-resident options retained much of the same character that they had acquired in the 
previous decade; however, inside the College system, the non-resident program declined in 
importance.
137
 An organizational change in January 1976 had abolished the Department of Non-
resident Instruction, formerly led by a colonel, and aligned the function under the Department of 
Education and Training. The newly-minted Extension Training Management Division graduated 
2,359 officers in 1975-76.
138
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In years past, the school had struggled to maintain some parity between the Regular Course 
and the extension course. The situation worsened in the mid-seventies. The College staff continued to 
distribute preparation requirements,
139
 but the quality of the work produced by faculty varied 
significantly. As a result of the instability in the basic curriculum, the non-resident program plunged 
into disarray. 1977 saw a renewed interest in non-resident studies from four sources: inside the 
College, Forces Command (FORSCOM), TRADOC, and the Army‘s RETO study group. In a 
summary of the January 1977 Faculty Council meeting, the chairman captured the grim situation 
portrayed by the Deputy Commandant. During his discussion with the council, the Deputy 
Commandant remarked, ―Non-resident Instruction—vast improvement is required. We need answers 
to basic questions such as selection procedures, course content and conduct. Tremendous effort must 
be brought to bear to bring non-resident instruction in line with the resident program.‖140 Soon 
afterwards, the College staff began an in-depth review of the entire non-resident program, leading to a 
rewrite of all non-resident instruction.
141
 After a year and a half, the College leadership could say that 
the non-resident material had some resemblance to the core material in the Regular Course. By 
December 1978, the authors had prepared the additional versions of their lessons, and the leadership 
could claim ―We now export the same product that is taught to the resident class.‖142 
One ―improvement‖ implemented in the summer of 1977 was the termination of the Fort 
Leavenworth Phase, the two-week wrap-up session that permitted non-resident students some contact 
with Bell Hall. The last of the two-week phases graduated 1,469 active and reserve component 
officers on August 5, 1977.
143
 Thereafter, the College reported a sharp decline in enrollments as 
shown in figure 2. Also during the summer, the College Commandant, Major General J.R. (Roy) 
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Thurman, pursued the elimination of the USAR school option, citing considerable per-graduate 
budget savings that would accrue. Underlying Thurman‘s recommendation was a belief that USAR 
school instructors were ―incompetent‖ to teach CGSOC material. The proposal gained little support 
from TRADOC‘s staff.144 Thurman‘s proposal did have support from the RETO study, which 
recommended that the Army ―discontinue the current nonresident program…and substitute a 
‗Corresponding Studies Program,‘ based on the full academic year regular course along the lines of 
the current Army War College model….‖145 
 
 
Figure 2. Enrollment in CGSOC Non-resident Courses, 1978-1986 (annual average). 
Source: CGSC, Briefing, Chart 1, Student Population Growth, n.d. [ca. 1986], Folder General, SOCS-003, CGSC 86, 
CAFLA.  
 
The late 1970s and early 1980s represent the low point in a chronically mediocre effort to 
educate officers unable or not selected for the resident course. The practical problem of three 
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separate, but parallel courses, continued. Authors for a resident course lesson also had to prepare a 
version for presentation at the USAR schools plus a correspondence version. For CGSC‘s leadership, 
the Regular Course was CGSC; the other versions simply served as distracters and drained already 
short instructor resources to low-payoff efforts. In 1979, the Director of Curriculum and Educational 
Affairs confirmed what many already knew—the resident course was the priority.146 
Paradoxically, in some respects, the educational needs of reserve component officers drove 
the form of the Regular Course. The decision in the seventies to eliminate the Mobilization Course 
and to integrate the Reserve Component Course within the first term of the Regular Course meant that 
all graduation requirements for the short course had to be accomplished before the Christmas break. 
The efficiency measure reduced flexibility within the year-long program, since the scheme required 
that the essential material be presented in a condensed period.
147
 
To the officers who needed the CGSC diploma for promotion, the non-resident courses 
provided a great service, if not good training. Non-resident courses—USAR and extension versions—
claimed to have graduated 34,000 officers between 1966 and 1980, averaging about 2,300 per month. 
This total included 7.084 Active Army, 19,545 Army Reserve, and 7,191 Army National Guard 
officers, plus 180 others.
148
 
The extension course, unsurprisingly, was not very difficult. A hundred or more active duty 
officers proved the point each summer, coming to Fort Leavenworth on permissive temporary duty 
for the purposes of completing the course. Some showed up having not done any of the coursework. 
The Regular Course faculty, learning about this in 1979, objected:  
[T]his practice is contrary to the best interests of the Army, CGSC and the officer 
involved; that this practice subverts the intent, goals and fundamental principles of this, 
an accredited graduate level institution; and that this practice makes a mockery of the 
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academic and professional value of not only the correspondence course curriculum, but 
the resident course curriculum as well. 
 
The record for arrival to completion, according to the non-resident department, was two and one-half 
weeks. Many finished the requirements in three weeks. The school was powerless to prevent the 
ritual, since the officers successfully passed all prescribed examinations and writing requirements. 
Having done so, they left in a few weeks after their arrival with diploma in hand.
149
 
The incremental efforts to improve the non-resident courses met with little success. The 
CGSS Planning Guidance for AY 86-87, issued on November 26, 1985, reaffirmed the policy that the 
two non-resident options ―mirror, where possible, the [resident] version‖ of the course. Although the 
guidance stated that all three versions should be prepared simultaneously, the document allowed no 
more than one year‘s difference between the resident and non-resident course materials.150  
In January 1986, the Assistant Deputy Commandant, Colonel John F. Orndorff, presented the 
College‘s options to bring the resident and non-resident tactics courses into consonance with the 
guidance by May 1986. The faculty considered plans that would produce updated resident and non-
resident materials simultaneously, but they could not arrive at a workable scheme. The most 
significant obstacles were the pending transition to small group instruction and the ongoing revision 
of the core tactics lessons. The tactics department could produce a resident and USAR school version, 
but then there would be two dissimilar sets of tactics lessons. One advantage of waiting a year, 
according to Colonel Orndorff, was that the faculty could base the non-resident materials on the new, 
classroom-tested, resident course. Seeing the magnitude of the transition, Brigadier General Franks 
concurred with the delay.
151
 
As shown in the earlier figure 2, enrollments increased in the 1985-86 school year, reaching 
13,960 in March 1986, and 1,026 students had graduated by that month. By April, another 180 
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students completed the course. The non-resident department reported ten officers had failed the 
course that month.
152
 Curiously, the statistics show an unexplained gap—the ratio of graduates to 
enrollees. Since the course was designed for completion within three years, approximately one-third 
(or more) of the officers enrolled in any one year should complete the course. Yet the number fell 
consistently short of the theoretical graduation rate. One probable explanation lies within the behavior 
of captains, since the spike in enrollments included a number of most junior officers. They believed 
that completion of the non-resident course would increase their chances for promotion to major, and 
completion of the non-resident course bettered their chances at one of the few slots to the Air Force, 
Navy, or Marine Corps staff colleges. Once selected for the resident course, however, a number of 
these officers dropped the correspondence course.
153
 There is little other to suggest the reasons why, 
but more telling, few within the College asked why either.  
Brigadier General Franks had reason for concern. The number of active duty officers enrolled 
in non-resident programs nearly equaled the number of Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve 
officer combined (6,013 to 6,568) in January. Franks asked for an update on improving the non-
resident course. The non-resident director, Lieutenant Colonel Thurlow D. Young, had few answers. 
Outranked and unable to claim equal status with the teaching departments, Young struggled to keep 
up with the daily volume of work. Several months of delay followed. Now very concerned about the 
state of the entire program, Franks ordered the Director of Academic Operations, Colonel Michael T. 
Chase, to conduct an in-depth review in May. Chase found in fact that ―very little ‗mirror image‘‖ 
existed between the resident and USAR school versions of the course. Chase found extensive gaps 
among the tactics, logistics, and writing portions of the course. The tactics course, for instance, still 
centered largely on brigade operations—material that had not been in the Regular Course for over two 
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 In some areas that did resemble the resident course, like leadership, the inspection found that 
lessons plans and supporting materials did not exist. Colonel Chase judged only the history, military 
law, and force integration lessons as meeting the standard for currency and completeness. Brigadier 
General Franks, irritated with the chronic procrastination, scribbled on his reply to the DAO: ―Your 
mission: Fix this. Franks.‖155 
More reviews followed along with more bad news. A September review of Phases 2, 3, and 5 
found more deficiencies. Four of ten lessons met the ―mirror image‖ standard; seven of ten were 
judged effective. Three lessons were assessed as marginally or very marginally effective. The Low 
Intensity Conflict lesson had material dating back to 1981. Additionally, the inspectors found that 
most of the examination program was written in such a manner as to test far below desired cognitive 
levels.
156
 Despite some improvements made as a result of Franks‘ interest, a lot of work remained to 
rehabilitate the non-resident studies program. 
A Bigger Bag 
Scholars have asked how the Army managed to revive itself following Vietnam. Several 
assert that one of the central intellectual developments of the 1980s was that of operational art. 
Operational art, discussed heavily by Soviet military theorists in the interwar years, linked the tactical 
and strategic levels of war. Although the U.S. Army did not formally recognize the concept until the 
1980s, it incorporated the theory into its doctrine, making it a centerpiece of post-Vietnam thinking. 
Richard Swain offered a succinct history of the Army‘s adoption of operational art in his essay 
―Filling the Void.‖ He summarized the personalities and conceptual underpinnings of the Army‘s 
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Shimon Naveh attributed the Army‘s intellectual engagement in the 1980s to civilian defense 
reformers.
158
 William Lind, one of the civilian commentators, believed that education played a vital 
role in the abilities of the officer, who ―must be able to put whatever military situation he faces into a 
larger context of military history, theory, and men‘s behavior in combat. The development of an 
ability to think logically, under stress of battle, must always be a fundamental objective of military 
education.‖159 One should not infer, however, that academic attention to education‘s importance 
translated to perfection in practice. 
The Army‘s own view, both official and unofficial, is that the revitalized Army emerged 
phoenix-like from Vietnam, largely from internal efforts, particularly those of General DePuy and the 
1976 version of FM 100-5, later supplemented by General Starry and the AirLand Battle concept.
160
 
Robert M. Citino offered a critical review of the concept‘s origins in Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm. In 
assessing the Army‘s doctrinal renaissance, Citino agreed that Vietnam had pressured the officer 
corps into a reassessment of warfighting. Citino added a coda to his assessment: ―The 1986 FM 100-5 
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[the Army‘s primary operations manual], in fact, would represent for the army a kind of intellectual 
culmination point.‖161 
Within CGSC, the establishment of three new entities: the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), the 
Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the School of Advanced Military Studies served as 
hallmarks of the intellectual enthusiasm. Two new schools—one imposed from above, the other an 
innovation from below—reached well beyond the Regular Course.162 All had a positive influence on 
the Regular Course. 
The first of the three new organizations to appear, the Combat Studies Institute, grew out of 
an existing team of military historians then subordinated to the Department of Unified and Combined 
Operations. An artifact of Major General Cushman‘s tenure, the ―Applied Military History Team‖ of 
four officers and two visiting historians taught core and popular elective classes. In 1978, the 
TRADOC commander, General Starry, asked the Commandant, Lieutenant General Thurman for a 
concept that would use military history research to inform Army concepts.
163
 As told by Roger Spiller 
in ―War History and the History Wars: Establishing the Combat Studies Institute,‖ both Starry‘s staff 
and the College leadership waffled, presenting half of an answer to the direct question General Starry 
had asked, When given the opportunity, Major Charles R. Shrader prepared and won approval of a 
much more extensive concept—a full-fledged military history department for the College.164 Shrader 
proposed an Institute that possessed attributes of an academic department in a civilian university: 
faculty who had earned academic degrees in their discipline, an extensive research and publication 
program, and teaching responsibilities. From the viewpoint of its benefactor, CSI was to serve the 
Army‘s practical needs. The faculty wanted to insure that history remained true to its professional 
ethos. Shrader‘s concept balanced these concerns: professional historians to teach military history to 
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the Regular Course students and a historically-minded research arm that could meet General Starry‘s 
intent.
165
 Lieutenant General Thurman approved the plan on September 14, 1978, and CSI became an 
official College department in June of 1979.
166
 In the future, CSI‘s professors would become the 
nucleus of a growing civilian presence within the professional school.  
The second organization, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, abbreviated CAS3 
and pronounced Cass-Cubed, resulted from the recognition that much of the staff work in the 
American Army was done by field grade officers. The proposal to teach division operations 
fundamentals to captains in the branch advanced course, first raised years earlier, had never 
materialized. To a degree, the Regular Course curriculum adjustments in the 1970s had proceeded as 
if that suggestion had been implemented. More importantly, a gap existed for over half the officers in 
the Army, who had no formal learning opportunities after their branch course—a technical school. 
One of the most significant findings of the RETO report was ―all field grade officers need some staff 
training,‖ but the Army could not afford to send all majors to CGSC. Rather than decimate the 
Regular Course, thereby allowing the other sixty percent to attend, the board recommended a new 
school to ―train all majors (Active and RC) for service as staff officers, with the Army in the field, in 
peace and war.‖ The nine-week course was an entirely new feature of the officer education system; it 
had few parallels in the Army‘s history. Conceived as a staff course for majors (later amended to 
captains), the course featured a mandatory correspondence phase followed by a resident phase taught 
at Fort Leavenworth.
167
 The first course began in April 1981. The difference between it and the 
Regular Course was striking—nearly all of the new school‘s instructors had commanded battalions as 
lieutenant colonels, and all of the instruction took place in small groups. 
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A second school, begun soon afterwards, acknowledged a gap existed inside the Regular 
Course. A second year of professional schooling had been part of the interwar CGSC program. In 
large part, this additional year provided extended coverage of tactical operations in divisions, widely 
recognized at the time as a complex body of knowledge requiring extensive study. It has become 
common to equate the School of Advanced Military Studies, known as SAMS, with the second-year 
course of the interwar period. While both recognized that professionals needed to study in depth, 
SAMS was not started to fulfill the same role as the second year of the interwar school. The school 
began to provide a place to study the lost knowledge of warfare, which proponents claimed formed 
the core of the profession.
168
 It began with one officer‘s idea. 
That one officer, Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, made the case for a second-year 
course, but he relied on significant support from Commandants and general officers outside the 
College, for what he proposed needed a patron, and the Army‘s senior leadership needed to recognize 
the merit of such a course.
169
 In a fortuitous convergence, Lieutenant Colonel Wass de Czege‘s idea 
of a second-year course came at a time when the Army‘s senior leadership questioned the efficacy of 
CGSC. Wass de Czege‘s findings followed the harsh criticism levied on CGSC by the DCSOPS 
Director of Training, Major General Guy S. (Sandy) Meloy. Meloy, surveying CGSC at the request of 
the Army‘s Chief of Staff, reported a plethora of shortcomings. Meloy‘s report, dated 1 February 
1982, is worth quoting at length, for it catalogs the ills of a professional, academic institution that, 
despite internal attempts at reform, had gone adrift, intellectually and organizationally. 
Faculty quantity, quality and stability is surprisingly poor; the Deputy Commandant job 
is a revolving door; the College mission has a low floor (brigade) and a virtually 
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unending ceiling; the student population coupled with the current student evaluation 
system promotes teaching form more than substance; the diversity of material presented 
in ten months, much of it selected to support both the mission and implied OPMS 
requirements, allows little opportunity for much more than superficial treatment of any 
given subject (to include command, staff and tactics); and the basic purpose of the course 




Major General Meloy did not place the blame on CGSC for the situation, however. He found that the 
College attempted to cover too much content because the Army‘s leadership had not focused the 
school on an achievable mission, given the allocated ten months. ―The College mission should be 
limited to the achievable, and recast so its translation does not mean all things to all people and its 
interpretation open-ended to the eyes of whoever happens to be the incumbent holder.‖171 He noted 
too that the Army had not supplied the school with faculty of sufficient expertise to allow the school 
to meet expectations. In the tactics department, he rated five instructors ―exceptionally qualified,‖ 
twelve officers ―fully qualified but not best qualified,‖ another dozen officers ―marginally qualified,‖ 
and eleven faculty members ―totally unqualified‖ to teach.172 Most importantly, Meloy‘s report noted 
the dynamic between faculty, students, and knowledge—a faculty beset by turbulence, left to their 
own to select what to teach, possessing little or no expertise in the subjects, given no time to prepare, 
and allocated little time to delve into student reasoning during class—could hardly produce the 
thinking officer needed by the future Army.
173
 On this last point, Major General Meloy signaled a 
shift away from previous TRADOC guidance, which had emphasized Leavenworth‘s role as a 
training institution to the near exclusion of education. 
As the Army began to consider anew the question of officer education, Lieutenant Colonel 
William Stofft thought deeply about the challenges facing his profession, and more importantly, what 
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the officer education system should do about them. He wrote that the officer of the eighties faced ―a 
more volatile and complex environment where the application of military force is more demanding, 
exacting and perhaps more dangerous than at any time in recent history.‖174 He then asked, ―What is 
the major task of the professional military officer in peacetime?‖ His answers echoed many of 
Meloy‘s observations: ―To be prepared to fight and win.‖ As to what might be done, he criticized the 
career-mindedness of some of his fellow officers and instructors. ―Thus, the role of the college must 
be to produce a graduate better able to fulfill this role when he arrives [leaves] here. Not to prepare 
him for his next assignment, not to help him mark time until retirement, not to make him more 
promotable.‖ The purpose of education, Stofft wrote, was ―to prepare him intellectually – i.e. in habit 
of mind to meet any challenge that might come his way;‖ ―to prepare him to think beyond branch, 
battalion, or assignment—to think in terms of what General Meyer calls the ‗whole‘ army.‖175 
While the postwar Army professed to understand the importance of an educated officer corps, 
Stofft and Wass de Czege suggested that the outcome of officer education fell far short of the 
expectation. Wass de Czege‘s 1983 study, building on the Meloy Report, condemned the intellectual 
agility of the officer corps, particularly with regard to tactical expertise. Wass de Czege, a fellow at 
the Army War College, judged officers as unable to think clearly about the demands of modern 
warfare. ―Not being able to spend enough time in simulated combat situations to become comfortable 
with this increased complexity, too many of our officers seek simple formulas, recipes, and 
engineering solutions to make order of potential chaos.‖176 The longstanding aversion to the ―school 
solution‖ had inverted itself. Now officers demanded a procedural guide to solve dynamic problems, 
rather than apply professional judgment to the inherently difficult situation of combat. The need to 
create a new school arose from his realization that intellectual reform was not possible using the 
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College as the nucleus; CGSC‘s faculty would resist any change imposed upon them. The only 
suitable solution was to go outside the existing structure. 
The argument for an additional year of study rested in part on criticism of CGSC, which in 
turn centered on two points: ―CGSC is overloaded with topics and issues‖ and as a result ―had to 
reduce commitment to tactics and operations (from 800 to 200 hrs of school);‖ and second, ―CGSC, 
at best, can teach an officer to be competent in current doctrine: it can‘t hope to teach the principles 
and history on wh[ich] the doctrine is based.‖177 SAMS started because the officer education system 
that had evolved did not teach the unique knowledge required by the profession, and professionals 
recognized this situation. ―War [should be seen] as a science and an art,‖ recorded one interviewer. 
The Army needed a school that can ―teach how to think about war, rather than applying abstract 
generalizations [and] principles.‖178 Freed of the dysfunctional triad existing in CGSOC at the time, 
the Extended Curriculum, as the second-year course was first known, sought to deepen ―professional 
judgment‖ through in-depth study of tactics, history, and something called operational art.179 Partially 
a result of the Regular Course‘s failings, SAMS became the symbol for intellectual renaissance in the 
officer corps. 
The Advanced Military Studies Program (the second-year course‘s name evolved over 
several years) taught the history and theory underlying the doctrine, mixing in copious amounts of 
practical experience through exercises that allowed students to experience the dynamics of battles and 
engagements—the fundamental building blocks of tactical operations. Soon, the first graduates of 
AMSP began to exert an influence on the Regular Course. One such graduate was Lieutenant Colonel 
James H. (Jim) Willbanks, assigned to the department of tactics after graduation from SAMS. 
Willbanks took responsibility for developing a course, known as A391, The Operational Level of 
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 Crosbie E. Saint to LTG Stone, ―Concept for a Two-Year CGSC Course for Selected Students,‖ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1 April 1982. R. 
Berlin to Col. W.A. Stofft, memorandum, ―Faculty Council Meeting with MG Saint,‖ 10 Jan 1983, n.d. 
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War, based in part on the material from his SAMS coursework.
180
 It was a small step, but the 
leavening influence of SAMS began to exert itself on the courses taught in Bell Hall. Likewise, CAS3 
graduates began to arrive in the Regular Course in increasing numbers. Well-practiced in staff 
operations, the CAS3 graduate knew the fundamentals of the Army‘s decision making process.181 In a 
few years, both CAS3 and SAMS would have an even greater influence on what happened in the 
CGSOC classroom.  
Spray and Pray 
Student motivation, discussed earlier, suffered from the continued practice of re-teaching 
material that had been assigned as homework. Michael Pearlman‘s notes from an interview recorded 
Birrer‘s response to a question about classroom methods. Birrer said, the student ―didn‘t have to do 
work….[the] lecturer would tell you whatever is important.‖182 The benefits of smaller class sizes had 
been mentioned in numerous surveys and educational reports in the past.
183
 Signs that the 
philosophical change had taken hold appeared in College publications. The to-and-fro between 
student- and instructor-centered methods continued, even after Major General Cushman‘s initiatives 
began to infuse the College. The 1977-78 history stated: ―Students are expected to be participants in a 
learning experience in every class rather than be just an audience for the instructor.‖184 Yet little 
changed overall. 
In 1981, Lieutenant General Richardson took notice and directed the staff undertake a study 
to determine the optimal class size.
185
 One difficulty had always been the number of faculty needed to 
implement small group instruction—a limitation noted in Brigadier General Crosbie E. Saint‘s 
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memorandum to Brigadier General R.J. Sunnell, TRADOC‘s acting Deputy Chief of Staff – 
Training.
186
 The Commandant followed with a letter to Major General H.G. Crowell, Jr.: ―The 
Leavenworth experience suffers due to class size and faculty constraints, and I want to initiate a 
process to address this shortcoming by reducing the class size beginning with FY82.‖187 The 
transition envisioned by Lieutenant General Richardson faltered, since TRADOC did not support the 
initiative with the increased spaces and needed manpower. 
Tied to the small group methodology was a requested decrease in overall class size. 
Lieutenant General Richardson initiated action in July 1981, asking TRADOC to consider sending 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Core Course Hours Delivered in Each Classroom Configuration, AY80-81. 
Source: C.W. Hendrix to Department Directors, Instructor Student Ratio, FTLV, 15 August 1980, Folder Commandant‘s 
Monthly Update, Drawer 1980, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
 
As shown in figure 3 above, CSI and DTAC taught most of their courses in the 15:1 configuration, 
whereas the departments as a whole taught most of their instruction at the section level (60:1).
189
  
The Deputy Commandant continued to press the case for smaller class sizes, explaining to 
TRADOC in an August 1983 message the rationale behind a smaller overall Regular Course. By then, 
the College had over two years‘ experience with the small group approach in CAS3. ―Sound 
educational principles and our own experience demonstrate to us that the small group methodology is 
the most effective way to teach much of the CGSC curriculum.‖ 190 Another three years would pass 
before further movement occurred. 
A May 1984 request from TRADOC to CGSC asked for a recommended class composition. 
In June 1984, the College proposed retention of the 960 officer class based upon sixteen sections of 
                                                     
189
 This should not be interpreted to mean that the preponderance of classroom hours took place in 60:1 settings. 
190





















sixty students each. The proposal for U.S. Army officers is shown below (table 12). The remainder of 
the class would be composed of international students (100) and officers from other services. 
Table 12. Recommended Regular Course Composition, Active Army by Branch, 1984 
Combat Arms  Combat Support  Combat Service Support  Professional 




































Aviation 72  Chemical 4  Finance Corps 8    
   Total 384     Total 188     Total 112     Total 24 
Active Army Total 708 
Reserve Components 104 
Sister Service    48 
Foreign Military 100 
   Total   960 
 
Source: Howard S. Paris, Fact Sheet, CGSOC and Sister Service College Class Composition, FTLV, 11 June 1984, Folder 
General, HQ-003, CGSC 85, CAFLA. 
 
The actual attendance for 1985, shown in table 13 below, indicates the combat support branches had 
fewer than recommended, but the combat service support and specialized branches had twenty-four 











Table 13. Regular Course Composition, Active Army by Branch, 1985 
Combat Arms  Combat Support  Combat Service Support  Professional 




































Aviation 74  Chemical 8  Finance Corps 11    
   Total 408     Total 139     Total 135     Total 39 
Active Army Total 713 
Reserve Components 114 
Sister Service    52 
Foreign Military 100 
Civilian       1 
Total   980 
 
Source: James E. Tucker, Fact Sheet, Class of 1985, FTLV, 13 June 1984, Folder Mission and Resources, HQ-002, CGSC 
85, CAFLA. 
 
Brigadier General Frederick Franks arrived in the summer of 1985. The new Deputy 
Commandant, himself not a graduate of the Regular Course, echoed a familiar sentiment. In his view, 
curriculum was the interaction between students, instructors, and knowledge. The curriculum was 
―rigid.‖ Franks observed that the contact between the two human elements—teacher and student—
tended to be highly formal. Franks sought to break down the formality permeating the curriculum. 
Both CAS3 and SAMS used small group instruction, but the resident course relied heavily on lectures 
for delivery. Franks took notice, and he began to explore the possibility of implementing small group 
techniques in the Regular Course. ―Now the ‗body of knowledge‘ is sound,‖ said Brigadier Gen Fred 
Franks, the College curriculum can ―move to small group instruction.‖ The student would participate 
in a more effective learning experience. The ―Army needs ‗bold and adaptive thinkers: able to think 
and decide in a time of change.‘‖ For the College faculty, ―How fast‖ and ―how much‖ the new 
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technique should be used in the classroom was the question.
191
 From many on the faculty, the answers 
were slowly and as little as possible.  
Soon after his arrival, Brigadier General Franks revisited the simmering issue of small group 
methods.
192
 In September 1985, he instructed the Director of Academic Operations to study ―how we 
can improve the use of small group teaching methodology in CGSOC.‖ Franks told the director he 
wanted the study completed in time to embed the findings in the guidance for the 86-87 course. 
Franks closed the note by recognizing the immensity of the task. ―I know what I have asked you to do 
is difficult but I believe it imperative that the College move in the direction outlined above.‖193 
Brigadier General Franks, being practical, rejected some of the more radical options. For instance, the 
syndicate model in use at the British staff college was deemed impractical because ―it demanded too 
much change, too fast.‖194  
On December 19, 1985, Brigadier General Franks made the decision to proceed with partial 
implementation in the 1986-87 school year, using the Combat Studies Institute and the Department of 
Tactics as the test cases.
195
 Franks asked that the faculty move from an instructor-centered method to 
one that hopefully placed the student at the center and that made the instructors uncomfortable. 
Despite having communicated his intent openly, Brigadier General Franks still encountered 
resistance. His concept required a significant amount of work, and it certainly required modification 
to the faculty‘s approach. For the faculty, such an approach meant loss of authority, since they were 
no longer the classroom expert. The faculty of 1946, 1956, and 1974 had grappled with demands of 
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similar scale—prepare a new course while teaching the old. For the transition to succeed, he knew 
that the instructors must cooperate within the spirit of his vision. One difference in this situation was 
that the ―body of knowledge,‖ expressed in the 1982 doctrine, had some measure of stability.  
Franks began by convincing his department directors, starting with a director‘s meeting on 
February 14, 1986. Few of them supported the idea. At the session‘s opening, he explained why the 
long-established Leavenworth method needed to change: 
By looking at our doctrine and by understanding the environment of the future battlefield 
we should see that our officer corps must be compised [sic] of agile thinkers and 
problems solvers, therefore we must structure the educational sysyem [sic] to teach them 
how to think in a fluid, dynamic environment. The state of the Army and the College are 
intertwined. After WWII we still held on to prescribed curriculum and set piece way[s] of 
teaching. We have been evolving from the information dispensing method to a real 
educational environment ever since. Now is the right time in that evolutionary process to 
move into small group instruction….Considerigng [sic] that this is the right move and 
time the question we must address is, ―how do we do it?‖.196 
 
The conference revealed the deep apprehension among the directors. They brought up many 
impediments.
197
 What concerned them most is how to prepare to instructors for this environment. 
Colonel Frasche of the Combat Studies Institute countered his colleagues, remarking that ―SGI is 
nothing new. We are already doing that in Terms II and III. This will be the same process….‖ Colonel 
Sinnreich of SAMS pointed out one key difference between the concept and present classroom 
practices. ―Presently the student is the audience and the instructor is the performer. What we are 
seeking is the reverse.‖198 The group agreed that the key issue facing the faculty was preparing the 
instructors for leading small groups, and they agreed to meet in a few weeks to follow up on 
evaluation. 
On March 10, the directors gathered again with the Deputy Commandant to review the last 
meeting and to consider how to evaluate students in a small group setting. The department directors 
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listed many reasons for evaluating student learning.
 199
 As the discussion progressed, the difficulties 
inherent in assigning grades to thinking and judgment became apparent to participants. The ranking 
system still in existence allocated points and fractions of points across the entire curriculum to each of 
the core course subjects. Starting with 1000 points for the course, the Department of Academic 
Operations allocated quotas to each department‘s subjects (table 14). Students learned of their 
performance through monthly grade slips; for some, the most important number was their quintile.
200
 
Despite efforts by Major General Cushman and other leaders to evaluate thinking and decision skills, 
examinations still relied heavily on objective measures.  
Table 14. Core Course Point Distribution, AY 83-84. 
Course Number Course Title Scheduled Hours Point Value 
1 Staff Operations 113 167 
2 Management 54 79 
3 Tactics 160 236 
4 Logistics 55 81 
5 Strategic Studies 59 87 
6 Applied Military History 66 99 
7 Theater Operations and Plans 63 93 
8 Low Intensity Conflict 23 34 
9 Profession of Arms 84 124 
          Total  677 1000 
Source: Edward F. Stein to Assistant Deputy Commandant, Core Curriculum Course Suballocation of Hours, AY 83-84, 21 
June 1983, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 83, CAFLA. 
 
Small group instruction contributed more to the demise of the ranking system than perhaps 
any other development. The impossibility of maintaining the structured evaluation system, given that 
―traditional testing could be an insurmountable handicap to staff group instruction,‖ meant that some 
other means of evaluating learning had to be implemented.
201
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Next, how to implement the change became the focus of discussion. As Michael Pearlman 
wrote in his historical perspective on small group instruction, once the faculty absorbed that change 
was going to occur, they began to debate how to teach small groups. One group advocated the CAS3 
and SAMS model—one instructor per small group for the entire year. The second group, comprised 
of most Regular Course instructors, wanted a departmental model, which limited the depth expected 
of the individual instructor. In an undated, unsigned paper, Dr. Phil Brookes, Director of the Graduate 
Degree Program, outlined the arguments surrounding the various forms of small group instruction. 
Brookes discounted the syndicate system, saying the breadth of CGSC‘s resident course would not 
allow such practices, but he endorsed the alternative based upon departments. By organizing students 
into small groups and rotating departmental instructors—the experts—through the classrooms, the 
school could ensure quality instruction. Brookes‘ suggestion became the model that the College 
implemented the following academic year.
202
 The accommodation between faculty, students, and 
knowledge thus complete, the staff and faculty adjusted their lessons to reflect the new scheme. 
The new approach started out slowly in 1986. Difficulties quickly came to the Deputy 
Commandant‘s attention. According to the directors, peer pressure caused students to spend too much 
time preparing briefings; international officers found the new environment difficult, since they were 
expected to participate more; and some students complained. One Air Force officer was quoted, ―he 
came here to learn from experts, not from other students who know no more than me.‖203 By 
September, signs that the new approach was having a positive effect began to emerge. Student 
enthusiasm appeared to be high. They appreciated the close interaction with their fellow students and 
the instructor, even registering complaints about the less-common 1:60 classes. The directors noted 
other indicators of the positive change. The classes converted to small group instruction—corps and 
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 ―Reflections on Small Group Instruction in the CGSOC Curriculum,‖ n.d., ca. 1986, Folder SGI, HQ-011/002, CGSC 86, CAFLA. 
While the paper has no author listed, two key comments point to Brookes‘ authorship. The opening sentence reads, ―Since DGDP 
[Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs] has no common curriculum hours to arrange, I restrict myself in this paper….‖ Later, the author 
writes, ―For my purposes, as an educator….‖  
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 Michael Pearlman, handwritten notes, ―Comments from students, ACEs, teachers, etc.,‖ n.d. [ca. August 1986], Folder SGI, HQ-
011/001, CGSC 86, CAFLA. In February 1987, CGSC dispatched a message informing military attaches and combatant commands of the 
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division operations, Soviet operations, and military history—saw improved student responses. 
―Written complaints are virtually non-existant [sic].‖ Colonel Chase, who was a reluctant supporter, 
was forced to admit the program was a ―success up to this point; [it] exceeded my expectations.‖ 
―Today‘s students are telling CGSOC grads that the school is great…grads think they are crazy,‖ 
wrote one instructor in mid-September.
204
 Brigadier General Franks simply looked back with 
satisfaction. 
Toward a New Era 
The College‘s 1986-87 student handbook recognized the bond that Frederick Rudolph posited 
about American higher education curriculum: ―Education at the Command and General Staff College 
is a function of reciprocal relationships between three essential and interrelated components: the 
faculty, the student, and the body of knowledge.‖205 When these became imbalanced, or one or more 
elements were absent, the effectiveness of professional education at CGSC declined. The College‘s 
long-standing ability to resist change imposed from the outside diminished, as the considerable 
weight of a resource-conscious bureaucracy insinuated itself into Leavenworth‘s affairs. 
Starting in 1973, TRADOC intruded into the fabric of the College more deeply than had any 
previous headquarters. The corresponding growth of CAC, which resulted in the separation of the 
commandant from the College, placed the deputy commandant in the position of leading the 
organization. The frequent rotation of brigadier generals, many of whom went on to become the 
Army‘s most distinguished leaders, negated much of their potential influence.  
The complexity of large organizations complicated the task of implementing change when the 
need was recognized, and the web of the organization absorbed the efforts of leaders to modify the 
school. The faculty clearly resisted direction from senior officers as seen in Major General 
                                                                                                                                                                    
change to small group instruction and the necessity for allied officers to demonstrate English proficiency to succeed in the new classroom 
environment.  
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 Michael Pearlman, handwritten notes, 15 September 1986, Folder SGI, HQ-011/001, CGSC 86, CAFLA.  
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 CGSC, CGSC Memo 351-2, ―Supplement, Student Handbook, Command and General Staff School, 1986-87,‖ [1986], Folder CGSOC 
Small Group Instruction, Drawer 1986, Cabinet CGSC, CAFLA. 
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Cushman‘s experience as Commandant and Brigadier General Franks‘ time as Deputy Commandant. 
The College was not the obedient hierarchical organization normally associated with military units. 
The maturation of the elective system, the inclusion of reservists in the first term of the 
Regular Course, and the creation of two new schools modified the Regular Course. Non-resident 
studies, never a priority, languished as the faculty attempted to keep up with day-to-day changes in 
doctrine, which led to constant updates of resident course materials. On the other hand, the needs of 
reserve component officers, and the unlucky half of the officer corps, periodically attracted attention.  
The faculty continued to draw knowledge from outside the profession of arms, adding 
civilian faculty, creating CSI, and cementing relationships with regional higher education. The actions 
of the Commandant and other College leaders in the late seventies and early eighties suggest that the 
pendulum had swung too far away from the profession‘s core competencies, and a more moderate 
approach was needed. The creation of the Center for Army Tactics is but one artifact. Equally 
suggestive is the growing role of military history in officer education, dating back to Major General 
Cushman‘s addition of historical examples. The near extirpation of small wars, and their limited 
resurgence, shows that professionals were cognizant of the need for a broad definition of warfare, 
even as they struggled to re-establish the tenets of conventional war.  
All of this required good people. The Army short-changed its officer education system in this 
regard. Their leaders, students, and even profession looked upon instructors as inferior. A chronic 
shortage of qualified faculty made daily life difficult. Instructors served mainly as vessels to deliver 
pre-selected content for much of the period, except when given the freedom to create electives based 
upon their own interests. Instructors dealt with broad shifts in content and method. Not until an 
outside agent made the suggestion did the faculty gain a collective voice in the institution‘s 
governance. Even then, the hierarchy muted their observations, regardless of merit. Somehow, 
officers assigned to instructor duty found their way through the system existing within the College.  
Lastly, one must look at the experience of the students. Overscheduled students plodded 
through the stultifying curriculum. Each gathered what they could from the experience. A few failed. 
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Most, by the measures established, succeeded. Given the arena, they chose to emphasize the social 
aspects of the year at Leavenworth—―best year of your life‖—as the saying went. Most graduated 
and went on to further assignments, never desiring to return again. 
By 1986, one can discern an improvement in the prevailing attitudes within the College. 
Reforms begun under Major General Cushman had taken time to mature, but many components of his 
original vision had become accepted norms by 1986. Smaller, student-centered classes, more attention 
to tactical operations, and expanded consideration of military history were ideas first proposed by 
Major General Cushman. A decade of professional dialogue had created an operational concept that 
officers discussed and studied in the classroom. Faculty expertise had grown, largely due to General 
Richardson‘s continuous attention. The positive influence of two new schools and a core of 
professional historians infused the Regular Course with a new energy. To the faculty and the 





Teaching a Future Army 
I shall always urge that the tendency in the future should be to prolong courses of 
instruction at the colleges rather than to abridge them and to equip our young officers 
with that special technical professional knowledge which soldiers have a right to expect 
from those who give them orders, if necessary, to go to their deaths. Professional 
attainment, based on prolonged study, and collective study at colleges, rank by rank, and 
age by age—those are the title reeds of the commanders of the future armies, and the 
secret of future victories.
1
 
      Winston Churchill 
 
Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
marked a new direction in officer education.
2
 For at least ten years beforehand, small hints of what 
was to happen revealed themselves in conferences and other events. The Joint Staff’s creation of 
intercollegiate coordinating bodies and the expansion of Congressional interest in military education 
preceded the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
3
 Soon after its passage, Congress took a more 
direct interest in military education.
4
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 Quoted in House Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 101st Cong., 
1st sess., Committee Print 4, April 21, 1989, 12. 
2
 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, 99th Cong. (October 1, 1986). Sec. 
661established education requirements for joint specialty officers, and Sec. 663 added the requirement to cover “joint matters” in 
intermediate level education.  
3
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff formed the Intermediate Military Education Coordination Conference (IMECC) in 1975. Representation came 
from the Joint Staff and each of the five intermediate staff colleges. In November 1983, the President of the National Defense University 
wrote the CAC commander, Lieutenant General Carl E. Vuono to request CGSC send a representative to a professional military education 
policy conference. Lawrence had been asked by the JCS J-1 to assist in drafting JCS policy on officer education. Richard D. Lawrence to 
Carl E. Vuono, Washington, DC, November 17, 1983, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 84, CAFLA. The JCS directive, signed by the 
Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt (a former CGSC Commandant), stated “This document will have significant 
implications, not only the National Defense University, but also for the professional military educational institutions of each of the Services. 
Jack N. Merritt to President, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 16 November 1983, Folder General, HQ-003, CGSC 84, 
CAFLA. 
4
 House Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 
Committee Print 4, April 21, 1989, 12. U.S. General Accounting Office to The Honorable Ike Skelton, “NSIAD-93-197R, Army Reserve 
Officer Education,” Washington, DC, 18 May 1993. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Professional Military Education: An 
Asset for Peace and Progress,” Panel Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997). The panel 
recommended expanded coverage of joint topics at the service’s intermediate colleges. CSIS, 40. 
5
 The Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) of 1985 was the successor to the RETO analysis. Because it had limited affect 
on the College as of 1986, it is not explored in detail. Charles W. Bagnal and others, “Professional Development of Officers,” 6 vols. 
Washington, DC, 1985. Paul F. Gorman, The Secret of Future Victories (1992; repr., Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 1994). A 
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From this point forward, the armed services lost their autonomy in selecting the knowledge 
taught in the staff colleges. Joint instruction requirements and professional military education 
accreditation standards introduced mandatory coverage of learning areas, which added curricular 
requirements to the services’ staff schools. As a result, external directives would encroach upon 
CGSC again. The services still deal with the ramifications of this legislation. For that reason, it is 
fitting to end this story, since subsequent histories must consider an even greater scope. 
For a time after World War Two, CGSC filled its traditional niche as the Army’s senior 
tactical institution. No other American institution, military or civilian, taught the management, 
sustainment, and employment of the Army in the field. The Army’s senior leaders, however, 
questioned its effectiveness, starting shortly after World War Two and continuing up until 1986, 
when this story ends. 
Between 1946 and 1986, the Army expected CGSC to prepare an officer for at least the next 
ten years of service in peace and war, at echelons ranging from division (and even as low as battalion) 
staff and command to the Joint Staff and combined headquarters. The War Department gave the 
Command and General Staff School a similar task in 1946. After reconsideration and restructuring, 
the Army re-established the Army War College, allowing CGSC to return to the business of educating 
and training large unit tacticians. Slowly, and almost unnoticed by the larger Army, CGSC claimed an 
expansive swath of intellectual and professional knowledge and attempted to dispense it to those 
officers fortunate enough to be selected for attendance. The transition to a less-focused organization, 
which occurred around 1962, placed CGSC in competition with other military education and training 
institutions, or even American universities. The move fulfilled professional aspirations, but it eroded 
the College’s claim to be the Army’s senior tactical institution. During the prolonged conclusion of 
the Vietnam War, senior Army leaders, William E. DePuy, Donn Starry, and William Richardson 
                                                                                                                                                                    
bibliography on Professional Military Education published by the Naval Postgraduate School numbers over eighty pages as of 2007. Officer 
education remains a subject of intense interest in the period subsequent to this study. Greta E. Marlatt, ed., A Bibliography of Professional 




among them, began to take notice, and questioned, what had happened at Fort Leavenworth while the 
Army was away at war. 
The Command and General Staff College declined in professional stature after World War 
Two. The waning of the College left its reputation as a curious amalgamation of past and present. Still 
able to claim a lineage to the great captains of World War Two, Leavenworth’s leaders retained the 
air of confidence. Underneath the brick façade of Bell Hall, however, deep rifts appeared.  
What had occurred? For one matter, the Army’s personnel system had forgotten 
Leavenworth. In the post-war Army, officers no longer considered the staff college education at Fort 
Leavenworth to be a seminal experience. For students, selection to attend, rather than learning while 
in attendance, became the mark of professional achievement. Boards seldom looked at class ranking 
after the fifties, and the practice of ranking became completely impractical when the College shifted 
to small groups. The school’s faculty no longer winnowed the gifted from the less-capable, displaced 
by a personnel system that valued operational experience over education.  
Instructors fared less well. As pointed out by numerous commissions and the College’s 
leadership, the institution required talented faculty. Inexplicably, the Army put more effort into 
selecting the students than it did instructors. A broad cross section of Army officers taught the 
Army’s top fifty percent. The officer promotion system placed less value on teaching than it did other 
pursuits. Unlike other countries, or even the interwar Army, the Army did not seem to value the other 
graduating class—departing instructors. The officers who had taught for two to three years were not 
seen as valuable commodities, which was a significant departure from previous eras. One should note 
the role new faculty played in bringing knowledge into the school. The all-too-frequent observation of 
a faculty member lacking the professional qualifications to teach his subjects may indicate a principal 
reason why the College experience fell short of expectations. In the 1980s, the College’s leadership, 
notably Lieutenant General Richardson, worked hard to convince other senior leaders that investing 
in a quality faculty was necessary. 
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Major George S. Patton once said of the interwar Army, “[We are] seeking so hard for an 
approved solution that will avoid the odious task of thinking….”6 Commandants and faculty 
commented on the desire to teach officers how to think and how to make decisions, yet the faculty 
found it difficult to accommodate this ideal. The faculty used teaching methods in the College 
classroom known to be less effective than others in stimulating thought. In those days, officers were 
neither educated nor trained—but indoctrinated—through the Leavenworth method. Gradually, and 
grudgingly, the faculty adopted teaching practices more appropriate to teaching how to think. 
The institution did not always serve its profession well. Commandants, and later the deputy 
commandants, found themselves unable to implement a long-range plan due to shifting resources, 
new educational philosophies, or external changes. The constant rotation of decision makers crippled 
any opportunities for substantive modifications to the school. At times, the U.S. Army bore the 
blame. As seen in several examples here, an army without an operational concept has a difficult time 
educating itself. The periodic marriage and divorce of doctrine writing from teaching inserted a 
wedge between research and knowledge. In a period of great stability, this may be acceptable. In 
times of momentous change, it proved dysfunctional, since the College relied upon published doctrine 
for lessons. Students and faculty came to the College expecting to learn the latest, only to find that the 
documents used in the classroom were years out-of-date. On the other hand, packaging the latest fad 
as knowledge could prove devastating. The College’s adoption of the atomic battlefield as the norm, 
absent any experimentation and proof of concept, led to fictional, even fantastical scenarios. Leaders 
educated using such lessons led the Army in Vietnam. As the post-Vietnam experience demonstrated, 
recreating an educational base without an operational concept to guide military culture required 
decades to accomplish.  
Over time, too much of the curriculum became remedial, and not necessarily because of the 
presence of non-combat arms officers as has often been presumed. From its resumption after the war, 
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 Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers 188-5-1940, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 792. 
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CGSC had representatives from other branches and services. The collective curiosity of the officer 
corps had declined to the point where each entering class had to be reminded of basic factual 
information before engaging in graduate-level study. Officers too busy to study on their own appeared 
at Fort Leavenworth’s gates ready to receive the imprimatur of Leavenworth graduate. Ten months 
later, they left just as eagerly. In between, they attended classes—lots of classes.  
Deficient in basic knowledge of their profession upon arrival, but not challenged enough to 
recognize this for themselves, students sat through lecture after lecture, absorbing five learning points 
per fifty minute period. An examination discerned how much of the content the student had retained, 
but more importantly, how closely the individual student’s response approximated the “school 
solution.” Taught to search for perfection in complexity, graduates became symptoms of an institution 
that no longer challenged students to think nor taught the lessons of war effectively. 
What officers learned at CGSC shifted perceptibly during this period. The officer corps 
redefined professional expertise, moving away from “purely military” considerations towards a body 
of knowledge that was no longer unique. As a result, the curriculum, and therefore the institution, 
distributed its resources—the most critical being time devoted to learning—across too broad a front. 
True, officers in peacetime needed a broad range of management skills. To teach these and, 
simultaneously, to become proficient in large unit operations across multiple levels of war was far too 
much to ask of a ten-month training and education experience. Too late, military professionals 
realized that fighting wars—of any scale—required intensive study. Vietnam, the Mayaguez incident, 
Lebanon, Grenada, and Desert One all stood as evidence of the decline in professional acumen. 
Senior leaders’ efforts to “fix” the College in the 1980s reflected their realization that officers did not 
possess the needed competence in their most vital professional function.  
During the late fifties and early sixties, officers expanded their view of what was considered 
relevant professional knowledge. They came to believe that mid-career officers needed to know 
subjects such as management, political science, and international relations. The staff college 
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curriculum changed to accommodate this new perspective, adding “general education” and 
“peacetime subjects” to the course. This led to further changes, including the addition of electives and 
then the realignment of the course into “terms.” Not long afterwards, officers returned to traditional 
views (warfighting as the core knowledge of the profession) as part of a broad reform and adjusted 
the curriculum to reflect this view. Throughout this period, CGSC’s leaders attempted to balance the 
competing demands of peacetime and wartime subjects in a ten-month course, finding it difficult to 
accommodate the demands of both. The core of the profession of arms remained fire, maneuver, and 
sustainment, but the administrative Army needed support from the educational base of the Army, too. 
The College’s leaders recognized that their school could not do everything asked of it in the time 
available, so they compromised.  
Outside influences shaped the College curriculum more than those inside the College’s 
administration admit. Although change took time, many of the notable developments during the 
period arose from, or were vetted by, review boards and educational survey commissions. Electives, 
small group instruction, faculty councils, and the MMAS all relied upon the sanction of outsiders. 
The more direct role of TRADOC in College affairs is a notable inflection point; the formerly inward-
looking staff college began to be shaped by a distant bureaucracy. 
The significant influence of civilians is under-recognized in official histories. Ivan Birrer 
served as the vanguard of civilian contributions to the officer education system. He participated in the 
development of, or introduced, the most significant structural changes to the mid-career education 
scheme. The transitory tenure of commandants and assistant or deputy commandants, the frequent 
rotation of instructors, and the relatively brief enrollment of the officer-student placed Birrer in a 
unique position. Unequivocally, his continuity sustained the nascent MMAS program. Absent any 
formal authority for most of his thirty years, Birrer shaped the College curriculum by suggesting, 
illuminating, and questioning, which by the way, are attributes of good graduate educators.   
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A subsidiary question remains. To what degree was CGSC itself a graduate institution? The 
evidence is contradictory. Dr. Birrer certainly attempted to give it all of the trappings of one—
graduate degree accreditation, membership in a recognized higher education association, and 
relationships with universities. Yet in some respects, these were appliqués. What happened in the 
classroom counted most, and while the material taught was certainly advanced to some, or even new, 
it is difficult to argue that the overall experience approached graduate level work. Faculty and 
students recognized that much of the work was remedial, that the examination program did not test 
mastery, and that the course could have achieved more in other circumstances. The master’s degree 
program, on the other hand, encouraged officers to explore their profession and to create new 
knowledge. Professors associated with the MMAS degree imposed traditional graduate standards on 
their students. The choices available to the CGSC student of the 1980s preclude broad 
generalizations. Perhaps it is safest to conclude that each student drew from his educational 
experience what he wanted, based upon his experience with the faculty, his peers, and the lessons. 
Frederick Rudolph’s observation about the curriculum as a “social artifact” applied to CGSC, 
too. As shown, one cannot assess the educational experience by leafing through the CGSC catalog.
7
 
CGSC’s curriculum formed through the interaction of faculty, students, and knowledge. An 
exceptional program does not maintain international acclaim by resting on prior accomplishments. 
The upswing in the College’s importance in the 1980s came from renewed attention to the needs of 
the modern university—a professionally qualified faculty; motivated, capable students; knowledge, 
expanded by research; and often overlooked, classroom methods appropriate to achieving mastery. 
The research presented explained the evolution of the Command and General Staff College 
after World War Two, but the historical characteristics of the postwar CGSC may lend insight to 
current Army challenges. As shown here, the Army chose not to close CGSC during the Korean and 
Vietnam wars. This was a distinct departure from the pattern of World Wars One and Two. In fact, 
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student attendance at the Regular Course expanded during the Vietnam War. Understanding the 
reasons why may assist contemporary decision makers as they resolve personnel and education 
policies for the present and future officers. Additionally, the strategic outlook seems uncertain, 
leading to speculation about how to prepare professionals for an ambiguous future. Those who would 
consider reform of the officer education system would be wise to consider the evolution of CGSC 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Regular Course, Evaluated Exercises Plan, 1954-55 
 
 
No. Exam Title Emphasis Hours 
1 G1 Functions  2 
2 G2 Functions  2 
3 G3 Functions  2 
4 G4 Functions  2 
5 Infantry Division, Attack  Operations 4 
6 Infantry Division, Defense Operations 4 





8 Armored Division Operations 4 
9 




10 Infantry Division, Attack Administration 3 
11 Infantry Division, Defense Administration 2 











15 Corps Operations Operations 4 
16 Army and Corps Operations Operations 4 
17 Army Operations Administration 6 
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Associate Course, Evaluated Exercises Plan, 1954-55 
 
 
No. Exam Title Emphasis Hours 
1 G1 Functions  2 
2 G2 Functions  2 
3 G3 Functions  2 
4 G4 Functions  2 
5 Infantry Division, Attack  Operations 4 
6 Infantry Division, Defense Operations 4 
7 Infantry Division, Attack Administration 3 
8 Armored Division* Operations 3 
9 Communications Zone 
Operations** 
Administration 3 
 Total  22 
Source: Annex B Summary of the 1954-55 Evaluated Exercise Program (Draft), CGSC, Staff Study (Draft), CGSC 





Instructor Training Course Subjects, 1954-55 
 
Opening Exercises 
Mission and Organization of CGSC 
Administration of CGSC 
Principles of Learning 
Methods of Presentation 
The Oral Presentation 
Planning the Instructional Unit 
Preparing the Instructional Unit 
The Evaluation Program 
The Lesson Plan 
Question Composition 
The Map Exercise 
Oral Presentation Exercises 
The Conference 
The Lecture and Demonstration 
The Class Supervisor and Advisor-Advisee Program 
Operations Section Orientation and Tour of Schedules Unit 
Editing and Publishing Services 
Planning and Production of Instructional Aids 
Practical Teaching Devices 
Oral Presentation Laboratory 
The Exercise 
The Map Maneuver 
The Terrain Exercise 
Tour of AFPP and Instructional Aids Production Facilities 
Tour of Class halls and A&D 
Practice Teaching – 20 Minute Conference 
Library Services 
Orientation on Research and Evaluation Activities 
Special Instructional Activities 
Practice Teaching – 40 Minute Exercises 
The Academic Staff Seminar 
Closing Exercises 
 
Source: Regular Instructor Training Course No. 4 Schedule, Box 17, Command and General Staff, 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Correspondence 1953-1958, Records of the United States Continental 





1958 Educational Philosophy 
Major General Lionel C. McGarr 
 
1. Continue the USACGSC tradition of serious student application and hard work. 
2. Emphasize decision-making and problem-solving. 
3. Teach staff as a vital and essential component of command.  
4. Emphasize the command point of view. 
5. Use an educational approach whenever practicable. 
6. Appropriately emphasize the preparation of student officers for the future. 
7. Eliminate minutiae and unnecessary repetition. 
8. Encourage and develop student reasoning powers, inquisitiveness, creative thinking, and a critical 
approach. 
9. Exploit the individual and collective experience and maturity of the student body. 
10. Keep elementary introductory type instruction to the minimum practicable. 
11. Ensure that instruction is continuously more ―reason‖ and less ―solution‖ oriented. 
12. Place maximum appropriate responsibility for learning on the student. 
13. Create a classroom atmosphere and learning situation that inculcate and refine integrity, moral 
courage, intellectual honesty, and leadership. 
14. Develop in the student an analytical and constructively critical attitude toward doctrine. He must 
be objective and creative. 
15. Suitably emphasize future warfare and new concepts throughout all courses of study. 
16. Further both interservice and Allied understanding and cooperation without harming Army 
objectives. Ensure Combined Arms and Services approach whenever possible. 
17. Give full recognition in all aspects of the College mission – resident, nonresident instruction, 
current doctrine, and combat developments – to the importance of the Reserve Components of the 
Army as an essential and vital element of the Army team. Also be alert to the need for markedly 
increased quality and state of readiness of all reserve components organizations and activities as 
the result of time compression factors brought about by the Nuclear Age. 
18. Emphasize the concept of the use of instruction to test, develop and evaluate doctrine as 
appropriate. 
 
Source: CGSC, ―The Commandant’s /60 Curriculum Guidance and Decisions on /60 Curriculum‖ 
















Colonel 3 3 0 0 
Lieutenant Colonel 36 37 67 7 
Major 47 49 780 77 
Captain 11 11 162 16 
 
Age 
Age Range Allies US 
Allied 
Percentage US Percentage 
32 or less 13 235 13 23 
33 – 39 62 749 64 74 
40 or over 22 25 23 3 
 
Average Age 37 years, 2 months (34 years, 10 months)  
Minimum Age 28 years  (29 years, 5 months) 
Maximum Age 56 years  (46 years, 3 months) 
 
Years of Active Commissioned Service 
Years Allies US Allied Percentage US Percentage 
7-9 8 229 8 23 
10-16 56 767  58 77 
17-20 24 5 25  
Over 20 9 0 9 0 
 
Average   15 years (11 years, 2 months) 
Minimum  8 years  (8 years) 
Maximum  25 years (19 years) 
 
Command Experience 
Echelon Allied Officer Exp. 
Allied Officer 
Percentage US Officer Percentage 
Platoon 57 60  
Company 72 74 87 
Battalion 25 26 6 






Echelon Allied Officer Exp. 
Allied Officer 
Percentage US Officer Percentage 
Battalion 33 34  
Brigade 36 37 50 
Division 23 24 27 
Corps 7 7  
Army 31 32 15 
Higher 20 21 10 
 
Marital Status 
No. Married  94   
No. Single   3   
 
Accompanying Dependents 
Wives   66 
Children   139 
Other Adults  6 
 
Average number of dependents per accompanied student 3.2 




Source: Allied Student Profile 73/74 – 1 October 1973, Folder College History, Miscellaneous 





The John. F. Morrison Chair of Military History Incumbents, 1974-1986. 
 
1974-75 Harry L. Coles   The Ohio State University 
1975-76 Warren Hassler, Jr.  Pennsylvania State University 
1976-77 Archer Jones   North Dakota State University 
1977-78 K. Jack Bauer   Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
1978-79 Dudley T. Cornish  Pittsburg State University 
1979-80 Ira D. Gruber   Rice University 
1980-81 D. Clayton James  Mississippi State University 
1981-82 David Syrett   Queens College 
1982-83 Raymond A. Callahan  University of Delaware 
1983-84 Theodore A. Wilson  University of Kansas 
1984-85 Bruce W. Menning  Miami University 
1985-86 Donald W. Smythe, S.J.  John Carroll University 










DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 
Washington, DC 20310 
 
 
Reply to attention of DAMO-ZA      1 April 1982 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL THURMAN 
 




1. You and I are committed to insuring our Army’s ability to provide unparalleled training to those in our 
Officer Corps who are to lead our forces in the future. Although there are many fronts upon which to 
attack this concern, in my view none represent a more direct and potentially profitable course than a 
revitalization of the education our officers receive at both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College (C&GSC) and the Army War College (AWC). These two institutions are absolutely essential 
elements in our pursuit to broaden the base of knowledge and interests of our Officer Corps. It goes 
without saying that the Officer Corps looks to these colleges for the lead in providing doctrinal and 
strategic focus to the preparation and conduct of war. 
 
2. We already have underway or under study a number of initiatives to improve the curricula of these two 
key colleges. The authorized number of faculty members does not present a serious problem at either 
institution; nor does the quality of the Faculty at the AWC. But the Faculty at C&GSC must be 
substantially improved if we are to produce the future leaders the Army needs and that we both want. The 
crucial need to improve the quality of the Faculty at C&GSC is the subject of this memorandum. 
 
3. Traditionally—up to about the period of our involvement in Vietnam—faculty service at C&GSC was 
one of the most prestigious assignments in the Army. In my judgment, it was also one of the most 
valuable to the Army in that it produced double benefits: students were guided, taught and tested by the 
highest quality officers we could produce; these faculty members emerged from this experience with a 
greater depth and breadth of understanding of the military art that prepared them even more fully for key 
command and staff positions. As General Maxwell D. Taylor reminisced in a recent conversation, ―The 
instructors I had at Leavenworth emerged as the corps commanders in World War II.‖ 
 
4. More recently, we have learned that other armies with high professional values—especially the British 
and German Armies—place an extraordinary emphasis on selecting the most highly qualified officers for 
the ―Directing Staff‖ at their staff colleges. Then they insure that these officers are stretched and made to 
grow. It is not too much to say that they regard the ―graduating faculty‖ as being at least as important to 
the professionalism of their armies as the students these officers taught. 
 
5. Compared to this high standard—similar to the one we maintained for many decades—MG Meloy 
confirmed during his recent assessment of the C&GSC Faculty, at the CSA’s request, that quality was 
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low. One student summarized it succinctly: How can the Army, he asked, justify hand-picking former 
battalion commanders to teach twelve captains how to be battalion and brigade staff officers, yet assign 
relatively inexperienced majors and lieutenant colonels to teach fifty field grade officers how to be 
battalion and brigade commanders and staff officers at every level up to international NATO staffs? 
 
6. I would be pleased to assist you in whatever portrayal of costs and opportunities is necessary to permit 
the CSA to judge what measures are both affordable and necessary to raise the quality of the Faculty at 
C&GSC. Among the measures that might be undertaken are the following, which are not mutually 
exclusive: 
 
 --Make appointments to the Faculty by nomination. 
 
 --Establish successful completion of specified duties as a precondition for some percentage of the 
Faculty: principal division staff officer, battalion or brigade command, etc. 
 
 --Direct assignments to the Faculty, as compared to other assignments. 
 
7. The Army needs your able assistance in providing the requisite level of professional competence at 
C&GSC. I am convinced that an upgrade in quality and experience on the Faculty at C&GSC will 





       William R. Richardson 
       Lieutenant General, GS 
       Deputy Chief of Staff for 




Lieutenant General Stone 
 






Course Development Cycle, 1977 
 
 
Step 1. OCAD will identify the critical subjects/learning tasks for the course/subcourse. These are 
converted to TLO’s for the College and given to the academic departments responsible for the 
presentation of instruction in a given area. 
 
Step 2. The academic department reviews the TLO’s it has been given, develops guidance, and assigns 
TLO’s to instructional committees for course/subcourse development and implementation. 
 
Step 3. The instructional committee assigns an author/instructor (A/I) to develop LO’s and lesson plans 
(LP’s) based on the TLO’s. 
 
Step 4. The A/I conducts research into the subject material and the media available for use. Combined 
these two factors, he develops a concept for the course. Individual A/I’s may coordinate with OCAD 
regarding media concepts. 
 
Step 5. Using the TLO’s and any guidance received, the A/I translates his concept into draft LO’s and 
LP’s. This is a critical point in the development cycle. The A/I must insure that each LO contains tasks, 
conditions; [sic] and standards that support the TLO. The LP’s must contain well-structured learning steps 
and events that guide the student in a logical direction toward the accomplishment of each LO. Assistance 
in selection of media, instructional methods, classroom arrangement, and writing of LO’s may be 
provided by OCAD. 
 
Step 6. The A/I briefs the committee/department head who reviews the concepts to insure that LO’s, 
learning steps, and LP’s best support the achievement of the TLO. 
 
Step 7. Based on the results of the concept briefing, the A/I will write/rewrite course/subcourse material 
in final form and begin circulating draft coordination copies to other departments and to OCAD for 
comment. 
 
Step 8. At this point, the A/I should prepare a Course/Subcourse Data Card, CGSC Form 951 (example 
B-1). This information must be received in OCAD 6 months prior to course/subcourse start date. 
 
Step 9. On completion of coordination, the A/I reviews final drafts of the entire course/subcourse to 
insure that all LO’s of the course/subcourse support the TLO’s in the best possible manner. 
 
Step 10. The A/I will submit the final draft to the Editing and Publications Branch (E&P) for complete 
edit on the date specified for that course/subcourse in the Printing and Training Aids Schedule. 
 
Step 11. The drafts are forwarded to the Army Field Printing Plant (AFPP) for publication. There will 
also normally be a suspense date for arrival at the AFPP. The AFPP sends proofs of materials to the A/I 
for proofreading. When completion dates are very near, the A/I may be asked to review proofs at the 
AFPP. He will also be furnished a date when the material will be completed. 
 
Step 12. The A/I presents a briefing of the class to associates who will also be presenting the class or will 
have a direct interest in its content. Usually this will take place within a department. Some 




Step 13. Rehearsals are conducted by instructors as appropriate. Reviews may be conducted at 
committee/depart level. 
Step 14. The course/subcourse is implemented through scheduling by the DET. 
 
Step 15. Feedback is provided to OCAD and the academic departments from several sources. The 
students provide feedback by means of informal comments, student sheets, the Student Curriculum 
Committee, and the End-of-Course Survey. Faculty provides information on course content, 
methodology, and student receptivity. The Combined Arms Training Developments Activity 
(CATRADA) provides information regarding educational needs of the Army. All of this input is 
consolidated, evaluated, and considered for course/subcourse revision. 
 






Comparison of Evaluation Systems—Intermediate Level Staff Colleges, 1976 
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Source: DTD to Commandant, Fact Sheet, Evaluation Procedures, 17 November 1976, Folder DOD 







Inventory Exam Result 1978 and 1979 Classes 
 
 
Subject Area Raw Score Percentage 
 1978 1979 
History 41.4 Not tested 
Strategy Not tested 55.2 
Geography 37.8 48.9 
Management 62.5 61.7 
Threat 62.5 62.5 
Logistics 70.4 67.9 
Tactics 60.1 60.5 
Cumulative 59.8 60.3 
Source: Jack B. Farris, Jr., memorandum, Comparison of Inventory Exam Results (/8 vs /9), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 22 
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